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# *Stasis and Stability*

Exile, the Polis, and Political Thought, c.404–146 BC

Benjamin Gray



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c.404–146 BC

BENJAMIN GRAY

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UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,  
United Kingdom

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First Edition published in 2015

Impression: 1

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Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press  
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data  
Data available

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014952955

ISBN 978-0-19-872977-8

Printed and bound by  
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

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## *Preface*

Exile is an attractive subject for study not least because of its close connection, in the ancient world as in the modern, with difficult, defining political choices, and with political idealism and political outsiders. The phenomenon of exile in ancient Greece reflected and provoked intense debates about fundamental political ideas of virtue, justice, and community, closely entwined with ethical, cultural, and religious questions. For this reason, studying exile seemed to me a way of contributing to modern debates about the nature of the Greek polis and Greek citizenship, in practice and in theory, and about the relationship between Greek civic life and Greek political philosophy. It is with this aim in mind that I have sought to interpret the varied and rich evidence for later Classical and Hellenistic exile, taking account of poleis across the Greek world.

I hope that the resulting book reveals some of the potential for conceptual—or even philosophical—analysis of everyday Greek political rhetoric, especially the rhetoric of civic inscriptions, and its underlying assumptions. Conversely, I hope that this book contributes to confirming the value of studying the works of Greek political philosophers within the context of a very broad range of Greek political ideas, including those underpinning even non-theoretical, apparently routine inscriptions. In addition, I have sought in this book to demonstrate that prominent political ideas and assumptions exerted an important influence on the shape and course of Greek politics, especially in connection with *stasis* (the Greek term for ‘civil strife’). Indeed, as the title suggests, a central aim of the book is to shed further light on the connections between the notions of *stasis* and stability, for the Greeks and for us: opposites, synonyms, or something else? Finally, I hope the book offers some interesting historical background to contemporary debates about migration, refugees, citizenship, and revolution.

I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the institutions which provided the two fellowships which made possible my work on this project: a Fellowship by Examination at All Souls College, Oxford (2006–2013), and a Chancellor’s Fellowship in the School of History, Classics, and Archaeology at the University of Edinburgh (2012–present). The book originated in an Oxford D.Phil. thesis examined in 2011, which I have comprehensively revised and expanded. I have continued to benefit a great deal from discussing the polis with John Ma, who was a very supportive and inspiring doctoral supervisor. I was also most fortunate that my successive Academic Advisers at All Souls were Angelos Chaniotis and Simon Hornblower. They were both very generous in reading and commenting on work and offered very valuable advice, ideas, and

encouragement. I have also received much helpful support and guidance from my formal mentors in Edinburgh, Ulrike Roth and Andrew Erskine.

The original thesis was examined by Robert Parker and Malcolm Schofield, who made many useful and thought-provoking suggestions for revision. Prof. Schofield subsequently served as a very helpful adviser for the *Oxford Classical Monographs* series, commenting on drafts of the book and helping me to expand its more theoretical elements. Josiah Ober offered, as a reader for OUP, wide-ranging constructive comments on the whole work, to which I have attempted to respond, especially in Chapters 4 and 5. All those involved in the production of the book on behalf of OUP have also been very helpful at all stages.

I have also benefited from the help of many people, especially in Oxford and Edinburgh, who have discussed my ideas, commented on chapters, or provided advice. They include J. N. Adams, Bridget Anderson, Douglas Cairns, Mirko Canevaro, Boris Chrubasik, Charles Crowther, Aneurin Ellis-Evans, Matthew Gibney, Lisa Kallet, Nicola Lacey, Will Mack, John Matsui, Oswyn Murray, P. J. Rhodes, Christos Simelidis, Tsutomu Tanaka, and Rosalind Thomas. Eftychia Bathrellou read the whole manuscript when it was near completion and made many helpful suggestions for improvement. I would also like to mention the help and encouragement of my teachers, especially Peter Heinecke and Stan Wolfson. It is a great pleasure also to have the opportunity to acknowledge all the ideas and support provided to me by my family, especially Christa, Corinna, Julia, and Richard Gray, to whom I dedicate this book.



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## Conventions and Abbreviations

All ancient dates are BC, unless otherwise stated. Many famous Greek names (including all literary authors) are given in Anglicized or Latinized form; other Greek names are transliterated. Abbreviations of Classical journals follow *L'Année Philologique*; other abbreviations are as follows.

|                                            |                                                                                                                                        |
|--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| von Arnim SVF                              | H. von Arnim, <i>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta</i> (four volumes, Leipzig 1903–1924)                                                     |
| BE                                         | <i>Bulletin Epigraphique</i> , published annually in the <i>Revue des Etudes Grecques</i>                                              |
| Chaniotis <i>Verträge</i>                  | A. Chaniotis, <i>Die Verträge zwischen kretischen Städten in der hellenistischen Zeit</i> (Stuttgart 1996)                             |
| CID                                        | <i>Corpus des Inscriptions de Delphes</i>                                                                                              |
| DGE                                        | E. Schwyzer, <i>Dialectorum Graecarum Exempla Epigraphica Potiora</i> (Leipzig 1923)                                                   |
| DK                                         | H. Diels and W. Kranz, <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: griechisch und deutsch</i> (three volumes, sixth edition, Berlin 1951–1952) |
| FD                                         | <i>Fouilles de Delphes</i>                                                                                                             |
| FGrH                                       | F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> (seventeen volumes in three parts, Berlin 1923–1958)                       |
| Hatzopoulos <i>Macedonian Institutions</i> | M. B. Hatzopoulos, <i>Macedonian Institutions under the Kings</i> (two volumes, Athens 1996)                                           |
| <i>I.Adramytteion</i>                      | J. Stauber, <i>Die Bucht von Adramytteion</i> (two volumes, Bonn 1996)                                                                 |
| <i>I.Amyzon</i>                            | J. and L. Robert, <i>Fouilles d'Amyzon en Carie</i> (Paris 1983)                                                                       |
| IC                                         | M. Guarducci, <i>Inscriptiones Creticae</i> (four volumes, Rome 1935–1950)                                                             |
| <i>I.Eleusis</i>                           | K. Clinton, <i>Eleusis. The Inscriptions on Stone</i> (two volumes, Athens 2005–2008)                                                  |
| <i>I.Ephesos</i>                           | H. Wankel and R. Merkelbach et al., <i>Die Inschriften von Ephesos</i> (eight volumes, Bonn 1979–1984)                                 |
| <i>I.Erythrai</i>                          | H. Engelmann and R. Merkelbach, <i>Die Inschriften von Erythrai und Klazomenai</i> (two volumes, Bonn 1972–1973)                       |
| IG                                         | <i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>                                                                                                           |
| IGSK                                       | <i>Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien</i>                                                                                  |

|                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>I.Iasos</i>                      | W. Blümel, <i>Die Inschriften von Iasos</i> (two volumes, Bonn 1985)                                                                                                                                                                             |
| <i>I.Ilion</i>                      | P. Frisch, <i>Die Inschriften von Ilion</i> (Bonn 1975)                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| <i>I.Kyme</i>                       | H. Engelmann, <i>Die Inschriften von Kyme</i> (Bonn 1976)                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| <i>I.Labraunda</i>                  | J. Crampa, <i>Labraunda. Swedish Excavations and Researches. Volume III: Greek Inscriptions</i> (two parts, Lund and Stockholm, 1969–1972)                                                                                                       |
| <i>ILLRP</i> <sup>2</sup>           | A. Degrassi, <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae</i> (second edition, Florence 1965)                                                                                                                                                   |
| <i>I.Mylasa</i>                     | W. Blümel, <i>Die Inschriften von Mylasa</i> (two volumes, Bonn 1987–1988)                                                                                                                                                                       |
| <i>I.Oropos</i>                     | B. C. Petrakos, <i>Οἱ ἐπιγραφές τοῦ Ὀρωποῦ</i> (Athens 1997)                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <i>IOSPE</i>                        | V. Latyshev, <i>Inscriptiones Antiquae Orae Septentrionalis Pontis Euxini Graecae et Latinae</i> (three volumes, St Petersburg 1885–1901); vol. I, second edition, <i>Inscriptiones Tyriae, Olbiae, Chersonesi Tauricae</i> (St Petersburg 1916) |
| <i>IPArk</i>                        | G. Thür and H. Taeuber, <i>Prozessrechtliche Inschriften der griechischen Poleis: Arkadien</i> (Vienna 1994)                                                                                                                                     |
| <i>I.Priene</i>                     | F. Hiller von Gaertringen, <i>Inschriften von Priene</i> (Berlin 1906)                                                                                                                                                                           |
| <i>I.Rhamnous</i>                   | B. C. Petrakos, <i>Ὁ δῆμος τοῦ Ῥαμνοῦντος. Σύνοψη τῶν ἀνασκαφῶν καὶ τῶν ἐρευνῶν (1813–1998). II, Οἱ Ἐπιγραφές</i> (Athens 1999)                                                                                                                  |
| <i>I.Sestos</i>                     | J. Krauss, <i>Die Inschriften von Sestos und der thrakischen Chersones</i> (Bonn 1980)                                                                                                                                                           |
| <i>I.Sinope</i>                     | D. H. French, <i>The Inscriptions of Sinope. Part I</i> (Bonn 2004)                                                                                                                                                                              |
| <i>IvO</i>                          | W. Dittenberger and K. Purgold, <i>Die Inschriften von Olympia</i> (Berlin 1896)                                                                                                                                                                 |
| <i>I.Pergamon</i>                   | M. Fraenkel, <i>Die Inschriften von Pergamon</i> (two volumes, Berlin 1890–1895)                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Knoepfler, <i>Décrets érétriens</i> | D. Knoepfler, <i>Décrets érétriens de proxénie et de citoyenneté</i> (Lausanne 2001)                                                                                                                                                             |
| <i>LSCG</i>                         | F. Sokolowski, <i>Lois sacrées des cités grecques</i> (Paris 1969)                                                                                                                                                                               |
| <i>LSJ</i>                          | H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> , revised and augmented by H. Stuart Jones, with the assistance of R. McKenzie (ninth edition, Oxford 1996)                                                                           |

|                                   |                                                                                                                                                               |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Maier, <i>Mauerbauinschriften</i> | F. G. Maier, <i>Griechische Mauerbauinschriften</i> (Heidelberg 1959)                                                                                         |
| Meiggs-Lewis <i>GHI</i>           | R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.</i> (Oxford 1969); revised edition (Oxford 1988) |
| Michel <i>Recueil</i>             | C. Michel, <i>Recueil d'inscriptions grecques</i> (Brussels 1900)                                                                                             |
| Migeotte, <i>Emprunt</i>          | L. Migeotte, <i>L'emprunt public dans les cités grecques. Recueil des documents et analyse critique</i> (Quebec and Paris 1984)                               |
| <i>Milet</i>                      | <i>Milet. Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit dem Jahre 1899</i> (Berlin 1906–)                                                               |
| <i>Nomima</i>                     | H. Van Effenterre and F. Ruzé, <i>Nomima. Recueil d'inscriptions politiques et juridiques de l'archaïsme grec</i> (two volumes, Rome 1994–1995)               |
| <i>OCD</i>                        | S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth and E. Eidinow, <i>The Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> (fourth edition, Oxford 2012)                                              |
| <i>OGIS</i>                       | W. Dittenberger, <i>Orientalis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae</i> (two volumes, Leipzig 1903–1905)                                                             |
| Osborne, <i>Naturalization</i>    | M. J. Osborne, <i>Naturalization in Athens</i> (four volumes, Brussels 1981–1983)                                                                             |
| Peek <i>GV</i>                    | W. Peek, <i>Griechische Vers-Inschriften I</i> (Berlin 1955)                                                                                                  |
| <i>RE</i>                         | <i>Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>                                                                                          |
| Rhodes-Osborne, <i>GHI</i>        | P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404–323 B.C.</i> (Oxford 2003)                                                                 |
| <i>SGDI</i>                       | H. Collitz, <i>Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften</i> (four volumes, Göttingen 1884–1915)                                                          |
| <i>SEG</i>                        | <i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>                                                                                                                      |
| <i>SIG</i> <sup>3</sup>           | W. Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> (four volumes, third edition, Leipzig 1915–1924)                                                      |





# Introduction

## 1. EXILE AND IDEAS OF CIVIC VIRTUE: TWO SECOND-CENTURY BC EXAMPLES

The theme of exile often provoked Greek thinkers and citizens to reflect about the foundations of politics, citizenship, and civic virtue. A concise example is an inscription from Delphi, dating to c.120–115 BC. This inscription records a decree of the Delphic Amphictyony, the federal body in charge of the whole Delphic sanctuary, in honour of some citizens of Delphi who had been forced into exile after making allegations of corruption against sanctuary magistrates. The decree includes abstract reflections about the ethical qualities of the exiles:

... καὶ ἐπιβουλευθέντες καὶ ἐκπεσόντες ἐκ τῆ[ς πατ]ρίδος, οὐκ ἀπέστησαν τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ καλῶς ἔχοντος καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱεροῦ προστασίας, [κατ]α[φυγό]ντες δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν σύγκλητον τὴν Ῥωμαίων, καὶ οὐ προῖδόμενοι οὔτε κίνδυνον οὔτε κακοπα[θίαν οὔ]τε δαπάνην...

... and having been plotted against and forced into exile from their homeland, they did not defect from the just and fine and the supervision of the sanctuary, but, having fled for refuge to the Roman Senate, and not having had any concern about danger or hardship or expense...<sup>1</sup>

This decree offers an unusually direct and arresting insight into everyday Greek assumptions and ideas about citizenship, of the kind to which speakers could appeal in the public forum of a political assembly, like the one which endorsed this decree. This is because the authors of the decree, like many other Greek writers about exile, explicitly reflected about the questions of political legitimacy and morality raised by exiles' predicament. In particular, in the extract given here, they sought to identify the basic, abstract, ethical components of citizenship to which virtuous citizens could cling even when in exile, removed from the physical environment and normal social relations of their polis. These individuals, though exiled from their home polis, had not 'defected

<sup>1</sup> CID 4.118, ll. 6–9; the main verb of the 'but' clause is unknown, because the inscription breaks off after more participles.

from the just and fine and the supervision of the sanctuary', but spared no effort in going to the Roman Senate, presumably to campaign for what they perceived as the welfare of the sanctuary. The predicament of these exiles thus provoked a particularly explicit comment on the importance of commitment to justice, the common good, and common traditions at all costs: the inalienable kernel of good citizenship is to show very strong civic virtue, which has a crucial religious component. That virtue often demands, as in this case, considerable self-sacrifice.

This inscription can be compared and contrasted with another example of second-century BC rhetoric concerning exiles, this time from a literary work. In the mid-second century, the historian Polybius, himself a type of exile, a citizen of Peloponnesian Megalopolis who had been taken as a hostage to Rome, reflected in his *Histories* on the ethical qualities of a group of earlier exiles from Megalopolis. He criticized the earlier historian Phylarchus for failing to record the most praiseworthy aspects of the behaviour of the Megalopolitans when they were expelled en masse from their polis in 223 BC by Cleomenes III of Sparta. Assembled in exile in neighbouring Messene, the Megalopolitan refugees collectively refused an offer from Cleomenes of a return to their home polis in exchange for alliance with him, preferring to remain loyal to their longstanding allies, their fellow members of the Achaian League:

οἱ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν χώραν Κλεομένει προείντο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ὁλοσχερῶς ἔπταισαν τῇ πατρίδι διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς αἴρεσιν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον, δοθείσης ἀνεπίστως καὶ παραδόξως αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίας ἀβλαβῇ ταύτην ἀπολαβεῖν, προείλαντο στέρεσθαι χώρας, τάφων, ἱερῶν, πατρίδος, τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἀπάντων συλλήβδην τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαιοτάτων χάριν τοῦ μὴ προδοῦναι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους πίστιν. οὐ τί κάλλιον ἔργον ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γένοιτ' ἂν; ἐπὶ τί δ' ἂν μᾶλλον συγγραφεὺς ἐπιστήσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας; διὰ τίνος δ' ἔργου μᾶλλον ἂν παρορμήσαι πρὸς φυλακὴν πίστεως καὶ πρὸς ἀληθινῶν πραγμάτων καὶ βεβαίων κοινωνίαν;

They first gave their territory up to Cleomenes, and after this they completely lost their homeland as a result of their policy towards the Achaians. Finally, when, beyond their hopes and unexpectedly, they gained an opportunity to take their homeland back unharmed, they chose to be deprived of their territory, graves, sanctuaries, homeland, and property, in sum, of all the most necessary things among men, for the sake of not betraying their good faith towards their allies. What finer act than this has happened or could happen? To what should an author direct the attention of his audience more readily? Through what other action could an author better urge his audience towards the maintaining of good faith and the sharing of true and firm business?<sup>2</sup>

In its eulogistic rhetoric, this extract from Polybius closely resembles a Hellenistic honorary decree, like that of the Amphictyony. It is thus an important initial indication of a phenomenon explored throughout this book: the permeability

<sup>2</sup> Polybius 2.61.9–11.

of the boundary between the vocabulary, style, and concerns of public political rhetoric recorded in epigraphic form and the rhetoric of contemporary literary authors, especially historians, orators, and philosophers.

Moreover, Polybius uses precisely the same rhetorical *topos* as the authors of the decree from Delphi: he uses military and diplomatic language (*προδοῦναι*, *φυλακῇ*) in claiming that, though physically removed from their home city, the Megalopolitans preserved the most important abstract components of virtue. However, he stresses a different type of virtue: the Megalopolitan refugees set greatest store by ‘not betraying’ (*τὸ μὴ προδοῦναι*) their good faith towards allies. This was an example of the ‘guarding’ of good faith (*φυλακῇ πίστεως*), the quality involved in respecting agreements and contracts. Paradoxically, in Polybius’ view, the Megalopolitans could in this case be better citizens, of both Megalopolis and the Achaian League, by remaining in exile, rather than returning to their physical polis. Polybius even explicitly praises the fact that the Megalopolitans chose good faith towards their allies over recovering their territory, graves, *sanctuaries*, homeland, and property. There is thus a pronounced contrast with the Delphic example: whereas the authors of the Amphictyonic decree made self-sacrificing concern for the local sanctuary, exemplified in perilous diplomacy on its behalf, central to virtue, Polybius gave overriding importance to the sanctity of contracts and agreements. In his view, the requirements of contractual good faith could legitimately oblige citizens even to abandon their home sanctuaries to be sacked by their greatest enemies.

## 2. THE SUBJECT AND ARGUMENT OF THIS BOOK

Expulsion from their cities was a perennial risk for citizens of Greek poleis, from the Archaic period to Late Antiquity. This could occur in many different ways, of different frequencies in different periods. Citizens could be sentenced to formal exile by a court; forced to flee their city, like the Delphian exiles considered in the previous section, to avoid condemnation by a court or political persecution; driven out during civil war (the most violent type of *stasis* or ‘civil strife’); or expelled from their city by an external invader, like the Megalopolitan refugees praised by Polybius. In each case, exile<sup>3</sup> entailed loss of security and status, devastating for those affected. One indication of this is that philosophers of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods wrote consolatory tracts,

<sup>3</sup> ‘Exile’ will be understood to refer to the multiple processes caused by human action through which Greek citizens were forced to emigrate from, or prevented from returning to, their homeland or preferred residence, without the original expelling power equipping them with a new place of residence or enslaving them.

a genre otherwise principally concerned with poverty and bereavement, addressed to exiles.<sup>4</sup>

One purpose of this book is to provide a new history of Greek exile in the later Classical and Hellenistic periods, and its causes and consequences. However, the principal aim is to explore the phenomenon evident in the previous section: the way in which experience or discussion of exile provoked fundamental political reflection or exposed fundamental political assumptions.<sup>5</sup>

Accordingly, the book uses exile to probe the character, development, and influence in this period of Greek poleis' political cultures: the basic shared political ideas, assumptions, and ambiguities in circulation within individual poleis, within regional groups of poleis, and within the Greek world as a whole. It also examines aspects of the more developed political thought which ancient Greeks built upon the foundations provided by those political cultures, using the resources of those political cultures themselves. To make this project as effective and revealing as possible, the scope of the political activities and debates relevant to exile is very broadly interpreted. Attention is given to the whole range of processes of civic unrest and stabilization resulting in, or caused by, the exiling of citizens from their cities.

The book also interprets broadly the range of evidence relevant to reconstructing Greek political thinking. The book addresses not only literary and philosophical texts, of types commonly used for this purpose, but also epigraphic texts concerning exile. The latter are often ostensibly routine and administrative, but nonetheless, like the Delphic Amphictyonic decree discussed in the previous section, richly revealing of underlying abstract political ideas and assumptions. Moreover, with the aid of the epigraphic evidence, this book analyses political and legal institutions and their accompanying practices and terminology<sup>6</sup> as evidence for political assumptions and ideas, treating the design and running of such institutions as themselves forms of implicit 'political thinking'.

Taking into account political thinking, speaking, acting, and organizing at many different levels in these ways makes possible a much richer and more complex picture of the range of ancient Greek ideas about what a polis could and should be, and their interconnections.<sup>7</sup> The argument of this book is that applying this method reveals the particular importance in Greek civic political

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Giesecke (1891); more recently Garland (2014), 26–9. Teles *On Exile* is the only (partially) surviving example from the period covered by this book, but Plutarch's contribution to this genre drew on a rich fourth-century and Hellenistic tradition.

<sup>5</sup> Compare the approach of Forsdyke (2005) to the Archaic and Classical periods.

<sup>6</sup> For the Classical period, these are now very richly and informatively documented in Hansen and Nielsen (2004).

<sup>7</sup> For earlier attempts to integrate epigraphic and literary evidence as evidence for political ideas, see, for example, Bertrand (1999); Liddel (2007).

culture of contrasting, interlocking basic approaches to politics similar to those evident in the rhetoric about exile of the Delphic inscription and the Polybius extract: strong ideals of virtue, patriotism, and community coexisted with strict ideals of good faith, like-for-like exchange, and punctilious respect for rules and contracts. The influence and interaction of these two approaches, including the tensions between them, exerted a very significant influence on the course of Greek politics.

This introduction seeks to lay the foundations for making this argument effectively. The next section explains the reasoning behind the book's geographical and chronological scope. Section 4 defends in more detail the notion of political culture central to the book. It also sets out explicitly the method of studying political culture followed here. This section is necessarily written at a much more abstract and theoretical level than the rest of the book, since it deals with fundamental questions about the nature of political thinking and action within a political community. The account is, however, kept as concise and straightforward as possible. Section 5 then explains further why different phenomena involving exile offer particularly useful tools for interpreting Greek political culture. The next step, in Section 6, is to introduce leading scholarly interpretations of Greek civic political culture and this book's relationship to them, which involves defining some of the basic political ideals central to the argument.

### 3. GEOGRAPHICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL SCOPE

This book examines evidence from throughout the Greek world. The chronological period addressed is the 'long fourth century',<sup>8</sup> c.404–146, from the end of the Peloponnesian War to the Roman conquest of the Greek world. There was probably no great change in the role of exile in the Greek world in c.404. The other chronological limit does, however, mark a significant shift: Roman regulation gradually came to curtail the Greek exile phenomenon substantially, without bringing it to an end.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, while increased direct Roman involvement after c.146 caused many significant changes in poleis' political cultures, there was much more limited change in the character of poleis' political cultures around 404.

Despite these considerations, the period c.404–146 is suitable for separate study, because the nature, quality, and spread of the evidence enable more detailed and wide-ranging consideration of prominent basic political assumptions than is possible for earlier periods of Greek history. This is partly due to

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Ma (2000).

<sup>9</sup> Seibert (1979), 218–19.

the emergence of utopian political writing in prose.<sup>10</sup> It is also because a new, less circumscribed rationalism,<sup>11</sup> connected with the full embrace of literacy as a political technology,<sup>12</sup> led to many explicit, relatively unequivocal statements by non-philosopher citizens of basic political assumptions, in the preserved rhetoric of speeches and inscribed decrees.

## 4. THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CULTURE

### 4.1. The Nature of Political Culture

The notion of political culture is a useful tool for responding to a specific problem faced by the historian of Greek political thinking and events. Citizens of a Greek polis, like members of any other political community, both did and did not possess a shared political consciousness. On the one hand, Greek citizens were inescapably deeply influenced in their thinking, attitudes, and emotions by the particular political milieu or milieux to which they were exposed. On the other hand, those same citizens could also exercise significant political agency. They did so to different degrees, but often in ways which could not be predicted even with exhaustive knowledge of the different milieux which influenced them. The challenge is to find a theory of political thought and action which simultaneously gives adequate weight to both of these aspects of politics.<sup>13</sup>

Study of Plato's political thought is a case in point. It is necessary to find a way of interpreting and explaining Plato's revolutionary political thought as that of an Athenian citizen, keenly aware of wider Greek civic practices, expectations, and problems.<sup>14</sup> Plato's political ideas, or, at least, the political ideas with which he made sympathetic characters experiment, were clearly shaped by prevalent Classical Greek political assumptions.<sup>15</sup> In particular, they bear the imprint of Plato's upbringing, in and around the Athenian urban deme of Kollytos, and his exposure to Classical Athenian politics. The broader culture of Classical Athens also exerted an influence: for example, the centrality in Athenian civic life of the symposium and its cultural products, including vase painting and lyric poetry, can be seen as a provocation for the

<sup>10</sup> Gadamer (1983); Hornblower (2011), 192–5.

<sup>11</sup> Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1973), ch. 1.

<sup>12</sup> Murray (1990c), 11.

<sup>13</sup> For the general problem, compare Habermas (1990a), 102, 199–200; Hurley (1990), ch. 15, esp. 317–18; Frazer and Lacey (1993), 198–201, 203.

<sup>14</sup> See Monoson (2000); Schofield (2006), chs. 2–3. For a recent picture of Plato as a more autonomous cultural critic, less rooted in existing frameworks, see Allen (2010), chs. 2–4.

<sup>15</sup> Consider Bertrand (1999), on overlaps between the approaches to legislation of Plato and other civic Greeks.

comments on art and imitation in Book X of the *Republic*.<sup>16</sup> Apparently paradoxically, even the vigorous attacks on the Athenian democracy which feature in Plato's works were couched in terms very familiar from democratic culture. As Monoson has emphasized, Plato drew on Athenian democratic expectations and practices of free or frank speech, as well as on Athenian democratic interest in the connections between politics and theatre.<sup>17</sup>

Nevertheless, it is impossible to account for all the ideas and rhetoric pursued in Plato's works as results of him unwittingly reproducing, or explicitly engaging with, the ideas and debates of his time and place. On the contrary, Plato set out through the voices of his characters a radical, ground-breaking political philosophy, incorporating original and penetrating criticisms of democracy, which could certainly not be predicted simply by analysing the many strands of contemporary political thinking and their interconnections.<sup>18</sup>

To take another example, this time involving someone who was not a philosopher, the notion of political culture is also a useful response to the problems raised by the task of describing and explaining the political career of Polemaios, a prominent later second-century citizen of Colophon in Asia Minor, well-known from one of the most famous Hellenistic civic inscriptions. As that Colophonian honorary decree<sup>19</sup> makes clear, Polemaios had been comprehensively habituated in such a way that he had an instinctive commitment to the ideals of Colophonian and Greek culture. In addition to his experience of the political assemblies, festivals, and other celebrations of Colophon itself, he was educated in the intellectual centre of Rhodes. He also acted upon those ideals, conducting himself as a stereotypical Greek civic benefactor. Like Plato before him, he must have engaged with the basic political assumptions of the majority of fellow citizens, including those of his political opponents and of citizens from quite different socio-economic backgrounds. He could not otherwise have succeeded in gaining and retaining the support of the Colophonian citizen assembly for his policies and honours. On the other hand, even though he must have been firmly rooted in his particular political milieu and was nowhere near as independent-minded as Plato, Polemaios was able to rise to the challenge of innovating significantly in his political methods: he conducted a new type of diplomacy in his interactions with the Roman Senate, showing sufficient political flexibility to establish Colophonian relations with Rome on a favourable footing.

<sup>16</sup> Burnyeat (1999).

<sup>17</sup> See Monoson (2000). This aspect of Monoson's analysis can stand independently of her more controversial suggestions that Plato was to some degree himself a democratic sympathizer.

<sup>18</sup> On the need to account for simultaneous cultural embeddedness and free-thinking criticism in interpreting classic works of political thought: Skinner (2002), esp. ch. 4.

<sup>19</sup> Robert and Robert (1989), Polemaios text, pp. 11–17; SEG 39.1243.

A promising response to these practical problems is to suppose that any coherent political group has a shared political culture of a particular, complex kind, whether or not its members live together. That political culture consists of all those fundamental, non-partisan political ideas in circulation which are consensually accepted by members as valid foundations for political claims. This is the common stock of political notions maintained and used by all, which does not belong to any particular individual or section of the group. Not all or even most such ideas become transparent to many or any of the group's members: many remain at the level of unconscious assumptions about politics, taken for granted but unexpressed.<sup>20</sup>

The 'fundamental' ideas which make up any political culture include very varied conceptions, paradigms, and norms. They include conceptions of the essential nature of community and the individual; of political community and political membership; of the particular political group involved and its members; of valid sources of political legitimacy, secular and religious, especially law; and of the relationships between those things. For example, the political cultures of the Greek civic world included, to consider only conceptions of discrete concepts identifiable with a single word, varying conceptions of 'virtue' (*ἀρετή*), 'justice' (*δικαιοσύνη*), 'friendship' (*φιλία*), 'flourishing' (*εὐδαιμονία*), 'freedom' (*ἐλευθερία*), 'equality before the law' or 'the rule of law' (*ἰσονομία*), and 'piety' (*εὐσέβεια*), among many other things.

Closely related to such conceptions are fundamental paradigms<sup>21</sup> of political organization and behaviour: models of how a polis or citizen should be organized and behave. In the ancient Greek world, for example, a widespread, quite constant paradigm was that of the polis as a simultaneously political and religious community, whose political and religious aspects are inextricably intertwined.<sup>22</sup> From such paradigms derive fundamental political norms: implicit rules concerning citizens' political behaviour, in political contexts in general or in specific situations. The widespread Greek paradigm of the polis as a political and religious community commonly entailed, for example, norms requiring participation in civic festivals, as a central citizen duty.<sup>23</sup>

The fundamental ideas of a political culture are the collective products of ongoing dialogue among members of the group concerned, which builds on and develops the collective self-understanding of their predecessors as members.<sup>24</sup> Those collective products are dispersed throughout the minds of individual members, and throughout their communication with one another. In addition, they are in circulation in the group in that they are encoded in the

<sup>20</sup> Compare Taylor (1995), ch. 9; Freeden (1996), e.g. 21, 34–5, 101–4; Schmidt (2008), 308. This is, of course, only one among many possible ways of understanding political culture: see Welch (1993).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Burke (1986), 445–7.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Sourvinou-Inwood (1990).

<sup>23</sup> Note, for example, Goldhill (1987); Parker (2005).

<sup>24</sup> Compare Schmidt (2008), esp. 309–21.



full range of collective institutions, traditions, stories, symbols, and practices. Many of these are cultural and religious rather than narrowly political.<sup>25</sup> They are also embedded in the often material products of those parts of collective life. In Greek poleis, those products included, for example, inscriptions, coins, or monuments, but also, less obviously, the poetry and art associated with civic festivals.

Understood in this way, political culture can explain why Greek citizens, like other political agents, always remained mentally embedded in one political milieu or several, even when physically uprooted (compare Chapter 6 below). First, it is necessary for anyone to remain mentally embedded in at least one political culture in order to develop and sustain any political identity and understanding whatsoever. This is because the fundamental shared ideas which make up a political culture represent some of the indispensable basic points of orientation, which enable individuals to understand themselves and their world,<sup>26</sup> even if they have only a very partial or hazy grip on them.<sup>27</sup> Individuals need this general type of understanding as acutely as material goods and the power and knowledge required to obtain them.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, for such understanding to be satisfying, it cannot be a simple translation of material interests into ideas and values. The constituent ideas of a political culture can provide a useful framework for such understanding of the world because they are shared by many individuals and expressed in institutions, and have often been subject to selective social processes of critique<sup>29</sup> or tailoring to the broad needs of the group and its members. Consequently, they have the authoritative, comparatively stable character required to serve as reliable basic points of orientation. For both Plato and Polemaios, for example, the notion of a polis, widely conceived as a participatory, organized group of citizens, must have provided a crucial initial foothold in developing an understanding of their political environment and their place in it. It provided an irrevocable framework which shaped their subsequent political behaviour and thinking.

<sup>25</sup> Some would plausibly argue that all these media for preserving, disseminating, and adapting fundamental political ideas should themselves be regarded as part of political culture: for example, that the legend of Harmodios and Aristogeiton was itself part of Classical Athenian political culture.

<sup>26</sup> On the indispensable role of culture and environment in providing such points of orientation, see Habermas (1987), chs. V–VI, esp. 120–6 (describing Habermas' conception of the 'lifeworld' of a society); also Habermas (1972), 53; (1990a), 67–8, 102, 199. Note also Taylor (1989), esp. 35–40; compare Sandel (1982); Walzer (1983). For the general approach, see also Freedman (1996), e.g. 51.

<sup>27</sup> Compare Plato *Phaedrus* 249b3–c4: in order to serve as a human soul, as opposed to an animal's, a soul must have had at least some experience of the really existing, perfect Forms. Even rudimentary human thought or communication requires at least hazy acquaintance with, or memory of, sophisticated paradigms. The paradigms of a political culture are, however, very different from Platonic Forms: they are mutable social constructs.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Habermas (1972), esp. chs. 2–3.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Habermas (1987), 124–6.

Second, it is necessary to remain mentally embedded in at least one political culture in order to be able to participate at all in meaningful political communication with others, which must draw on shared basic points of reference. Shared basic concepts and ideas are required to make possible even political disagreement, let alone consensus.<sup>30</sup> To return to the specific example of Plato, both he and many staunch Athenian democrats were convinced of the need to identify solid ethical foundations for political life, and to protect them against opportunists and relativists. It was probably partly that shared conviction which made it possible for them to participate in vigorous exchanges about the nature of those foundations, and of the identity of the main relativistic threat to them: democracy, for Plato,<sup>31</sup> or Socratic philosophy, for his opponents. Arena has recently made a similar case about the nature of Roman politics in the late Roman Republic, arguing that the Roman elite and its critics were able to debate strenuously the nature of *libertas* because they collaborated in maintaining a shared framework of language and debate. That shared framework was based on a consensual notion of *libertas* as freedom from even the possibility of arbitrary domination by another, which could be applied in contrasting egalitarian and anti-egalitarian ways.<sup>32</sup>

On account of these two broad points, the traditional view that the elements of a group's political culture are comparatively stable, though mutable through long-term processes of reflection and dialogue, is probably preferable to a major modern alternative: the view that a group's political culture should be viewed as a radically mutable process or 'discourse', in which fluid shared concepts and rules are repeatedly constructed afresh.<sup>33</sup> The theory advocated here does, however, need to address some of the concerns motivating this alternative approach.

An immediate important objection to the picture offered here of strong mental embedding of individuals in political cultures might be that it

<sup>30</sup> Taylor (1985), 36–7. Taylor advocates the view that the shared political consciousness of a group consists of 'intersubjective meanings', in opposition (cf. Taylor (1985), 31–2) to the view of Almond and Verba, the political scientists who first attempted to make the notion of political culture useful for empirical political-scientific research, that a group's political culture is a composite of the subjective basic political attitudes of its members (cf. Almond and Verba (1963), 12–14, 16).

<sup>31</sup> See especially Plato *Gorgias*, e.g. 464b2–466a3.

<sup>32</sup> Arena (2012), 8, 11–13, 30–1, 44, 78–9, 200, 256–7, 265–6.

<sup>33</sup> For a historiographical example of this alternative approach, see the works on the French Revolution of Chartier, who emphasizes, in a reaction against his *Annales* predecessors, the importance for historical explanation of studying practices, media, and a particular notion of discourse, as opposed to 'mentalities' and representations; consider Chartier (1988), esp. 13–14, 36–7; 40; (1991), 6–7, 15–17, 42. The approach followed here is not, however, incompatible with less radical approaches to politics as discourse, which treat discourse as wide-ranging communication concerning ideas which are mutable but also durable: see, for example, Schmidt (2008), 309–13; compare the views analysed and partially endorsed in Welch (1993), chs. 6–7, esp. 111–17; 147–58.

presupposes that political communities are far more insular and simple than is usually the case. However, according to this theory, a group sharing a political culture need not be a stable or closed one. There may be frequent changes in membership, including through exile and migration (compare Chapter 6 below). New members can then bring new assumptions and approaches, reinforcing other external influences. Those newcomers may even, through long, difficult processes, shed their earlier political cultures, or combine some or all of them with this new one: individuals are certainly not trapped in one political culture.

Moreover, a political culture is often itself internally dynamic. Indeed, as well as being able to explain the strong embeddedness of Greek citizens in at least one particular political milieu, the conception of political culture followed here can also explain how Greek citizens such as Plato or Polemaios were nonetheless able to exercise substantial, unpredictable personal agency in their political thinking. The fundamental shared ideas of their political cultures provided starting points and building-blocks of kinds which are, in fact, necessary for independent political reflection and decision-making.<sup>34</sup>

The internal range of even a single political culture is usually sufficiently wide to enable the extent of individual agency which makes possible both substantial conflict between members of the group sharing that political culture and substantial change in political ideas, even in the absence of strong influence from outside.<sup>35</sup> This is precisely because a group's political culture comprises all fundamental political ideas in circulation within it which are consensually accepted as valid bases for political claims. The ideas under this broad umbrella are very unlikely to form a unified whole, even if membership of the group is relatively closed and constant. More probably, the group's political culture will be a dynamic composite of varied, or even contradictory, basic ways of thinking about politics. In many cases, it will also be the case that significant ideas are ambiguous and indeterminate.<sup>36</sup> It is possible to point, for example, to the very varied, ambiguous basic ways of thinking about the foundational act of voting which are widely shared, at least unconsciously, by democratic citizens, no matter what policies or parties they

<sup>34</sup> Compare Brock (2013), xii, on the mutable 'underlying ideological landscape' of Greek politics. Also recently on ancient Greece, compare Johnstone (2011), 6 (different socially constructed 'logics' and associated practices both enable and restrict individual agency) or van Nijf and Alston (2011a) (on the post-Classical polis). That latter volume borrows from the historian of early modern France, L. Hunt, a conception of political culture as 'the values, expectations, and implicit rules that expressed and shaped collective intentions and actions' (van Nijf and Alston (2011b), 11).

<sup>35</sup> For the difficulty of accounting for these social phenomena within a traditional 'mentalities' approach: Burke (1986), 443–4, 447.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Ober (2003a), 237–8. Freedman (1996), 55–60, goes so far as to classify political concepts as 'essentially contested concepts' (compare his 60–7: political concepts as 'cluster concepts', with an 'ineliminable core' but an indeterminate, contested 'circumference').

tend to vote for. Should good citizens vote for the common good or each for perceived self-interest? Should they treat voting as a political ritual of unity, or rather as an opportunity to display independence?

With all their variety and ambiguities, political cultures commonly not only enable, but also encourage, independent thought, often including reactions against widely accepted principles.<sup>37</sup> Contradictions and indeterminacies in basic shared assumptions can provoke a Socrates or a Plato to attempt to develop coherent, innovative philosophical syntheses of ideas about the good city and soul. For example, the city-soul analogy of Plato's *Republic* develops in a groundbreaking, provocative way the common Greek assumption that a polis is in some way analogous to an individual person or body.<sup>38</sup> In a less extreme version of this process, contradictions or indeterminacies within prevailing ideas about the nature of patriotism, and the status of the outside world, could lead a more conventional Greek, like Polemaios or Polybius, to reflect carefully about a particular choice of foreign policy, in a way which yielded an independent perspective (compare Chapter 5 below).

Substantial conflict is possible when different individuals and groups seize on ideas with incompatible practical implications, or advocate contrasting interpretations of a single indeterminate idea. Similarly, substantial change occurs when individuals or groups interpret or combine ideas in new ways, for example by conceiving a synthesis of contradictory ideas in a new idea.<sup>39</sup> The phenomenon of divergent or even clashing applications of shared basic conceptions of good citizenship is evident in contrasting Roman republican interpretations of a shared notion of *libertas*, or in the two examples with which this introduction began. Polybius and the authors of the decree of the Delphic Amphictyony were each equally influenced by the metaphor of the good citizen's loyalty to certain abstract principles, which he can preserve regardless of his physical location and circumstances. However, they applied that metaphor to exiles' relationships with quite different types of fundamental political obligation, themselves drawn from the very broad repertoire of types of political virtue available within Greek civic political culture.

In addition to underpinning other mental constructions, including political philosophies, the fundamental ideas of political cultures provide the necessary starting points and building blocks for the thought and communication required to construct interlocking sets of ideas which are more complex, explicit, and specific to particular political questions than the components of a political culture:<sup>40</sup> for example, different detailed ancient Greek ideas of democratic or aristocratic order, or modern conservative or liberal visions

<sup>37</sup> Compare Freedman (1996), 115–16.

<sup>38</sup> Compare Brock (2013), 74–6.

<sup>39</sup> 'Friction' between basic shared political assumptions as drivers of change and innovation: Lieberman (2002), 702–3; Schmidt (2008), 314–17, 320.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Welch (1993), 108.

of society. Such more developed sets of practical ideas can be described as ideologies.<sup>41</sup> As Freeden argues, individuals and groups develop ideological positions by interpreting, and giving more precise meaning to, the indeterminate, open-ended political concepts of their conceptual world. The resulting ideologies can themselves be open-ended and mutable, more like a developing, porous language than a fixed canon of principles.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, unlike necessarily rigorous political philosophies, ideologies can involve varying degrees of intellectual content and supporting argument.<sup>43</sup>

Unlike the fundamental ideas which make up a group's political culture, an ideology is almost always shaped by its adherents' social position and particular experiences. Moreover, an ideology often gives priority to the partisan interests of a particular group within the broader political community. There is, therefore, strong reason for bearing in mind the Marxist notion of ideology as an important basis of class power.<sup>44</sup> However, it is not a necessary feature of an ideology that it should be partisan and power-oriented in this way: there can be complex, explicit, and specific sets of political notions which are not of this kind.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, very few developed ideologies command wide-ranging consensus within any political group. This is the main reason for not including ideologies themselves among the constituents of political culture, something necessarily shared and non-partisan.

Modern attempts, similar to this one, to mark out within the conceptual worlds of political communities a sphere of political culture, containing ideas and assumptions which are non-partisan and consensually accepted as valid foundations for political claims, have been strongly criticized. A major objection has been that all political ideas and norms are in some way oriented towards the assertion or preservation of the power of a partisan group, or even ideological in the Marxist sense.<sup>46</sup> Many taken-for-granted assumptions and more developed ideas can be described in that way,<sup>47</sup> but even those assumptions and ideas are often interwoven with non-partisan presuppositions. Indeed, individuals commonly succeed in inducing peers to accept their partisan ideological claims or assumptions only because they successfully

<sup>41</sup> Alternatively, they could be characterized as 'programmatic beliefs', constructed upon a foundation of basic 'public philosophies' and issuing in more specific and pragmatic 'policy ideas': Schmidt (2008), 306–7.

<sup>42</sup> See Freeden (1996), esp. 14, 39–40, 75–91.

<sup>43</sup> Compare the concept of 'intellectual traditions', intermediate between ideologies and philosophies, which Arena (2012), 6–8, 78–9, advocates as an alternative to 'ideologies'.

<sup>44</sup> For discussion and criticism of the Marxist approach to ideology, see Rosen (1996).

<sup>45</sup> Compare Freeden (1996), 22–3: ideologies are always connected with political power, but not necessarily with exploitative political power.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Pateman (1980).

<sup>47</sup> Compare Bourdieu's emphasis on taken-for-granted assumptions (the constituents of *doxa*) which are themselves strongly implicated in struggles for 'symbolic domination'; see, for example, Bourdieu (1990), 67–8; (1991), e.g. 50–2.

manipulate non-partisan, consensual standards: their audience accepts their claims because they appear consistent with fundamental collective objectives.

Consider, for example, Foucault's argument that the laws and institutions of the modern state should be seen principally as products of a political elite's rapacious pursuit of power. Habermas criticizes this argument on the grounds that those in power rely on consensually accepted, communally beneficial norms to formulate and successfully advocate even their own partisan projects. For instance, the institutions and norms of bureaucratic, impersonal administration and surveillance which arguably sometimes form a basis for intrusive state control of national populations often, in fact, overlap substantially with the very institutions and norms consensually accepted as necessary for the effective and equitable functioning of a communally beneficial welfare state.<sup>48</sup> As the modern French historian Rosanvallon puts the general point, also reacting against some of Foucault's ideas, politics must be seen as a sphere, not simply of power and domination, but also of experimentation and exploration concerning shared values and problems.<sup>49</sup>

According to this approach, followed here, ideological manipulation and rhetorical power plays are always parasitical on the conceptual and linguistic products of the cooperative pursuit of collective self-understanding: for effective oppression, oppressors and oppressed must share a common ethical and political language. Accordingly, it is wrong to see (for example) Liddell and Scott's Greek lexicon as a catalogue only of partisan words and ideas, weapons in power politics and class struggle. Any dictionary also records ideas which have been painstakingly developed by the members of political and cultural groups over long periods, through very complex and lengthy processes of collective reflection and pursuit of mutual understanding. These are neutral, consensual, often open-ended points of orientation, and foundations for claims in social and political life. According to the approach followed in this book, it is of such ideas that a political culture is composed.

#### **4.2. The Relationship between Political Culture and Political Action**

Political culture contributes to causing political action by helping to shape individuals' intentions and motives. Fundamental political ideas are most obviously relevant to explaining cases in which agents deliberate carefully before acting, especially when they deliberate about the ethical and political status of their action. However, they are also relevant in the case of more unconsidered or even impulsive action: they shape the agent's instincts and

<sup>48</sup> Habermas (1990b), 286–91.

<sup>49</sup> Rosanvallon (2006), 74–5.

horizons, which are always in the background even of swift, situational decision-making.<sup>50</sup>

The influence of one or more political cultures, combined with individual agency, obviously cannot offer a full account of political action. Socio-economic structures (class, status) and institutions, and individuals' interests within them, exert their own constraints. The discussion in the previous section entails, however, that the influence of those factors is not entirely distinct from that of political culture. Rather, the ideas which constitute political cultures themselves underpin social organization and institutions: they enable agents to participate in the creation and perpetuation of social relationships, hierarchies, and institutions<sup>51</sup> and to recognize or conceive personal or sectional interests within them.<sup>52</sup> The approach followed in this book is not, therefore, unsympathetic to arguments that political explanation must take account of the influence of both institutions and ideas on individuals' political action.<sup>53</sup> It clashes only with the more reductionist assumption that all human agents have predictable egoistic motivations, whose interactions with a given set of institutions can be quite straightforwardly mapped.

To take a concrete example, Polemaios, standing before the Roman Senate, was guided in his political action and speech by a wide range of interconnected factors: his own idiosyncratic preferences, fears, and impulses on the day in question; his awareness of his class interest as a member of the landowning, credit-giving elite of Asia Minor, with a material interest in Roman support; but also the particular political attitudes and beliefs, such as patriotic pride in his own particular, small-scale polis, and its territory, traditions, and autonomy, which he had assimilated from the political cultures to which he had been exposed.

It is also assumed in this book that there is a symmetrical indirect causal process in the other direction between political action, including the creation and running of institutions, and political culture.<sup>54</sup> By acting politically, proposing or using institutions, or observing the political actions of others, individuals can come to understand better the political conceptions, paradigms, and norms influential on them, or recognize new connections or contradictions between them. For example, the particular act of voting may

<sup>50</sup> Compare Berman (2001), 241: 'the growing insistence that motivations, interests and preferences be analyzed and problematized rather than assumed or posited is one of the most important contributions that ideational scholarship has made.'

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Godelier (1982), 16–17, 20–1, 32–8, on the necessary 'ideal' element in social relations; Berman (2001), 237–41, on the complex questions which must be tackled in studying 'institutionalization' of ideas.

<sup>52</sup> Habermas (1987), 95–6; (1990a), 67–8, 199–200; cf. Welch (1993), 112–13.

<sup>53</sup> See, for example, Lieberman (2002) and Schmidt (2008), arguing for 'discursive institutionalism'.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Taylor (1985), 33–4.

lead citizens to recognize the ambiguous meaning of the vote, noted above. Similarly, the ways of thinking and behaving which individuals develop, or come to understand, through participation in institutions<sup>55</sup> provide a rich source of new ideas. If new ideas, inferences or associations resulting from action or the functioning of institutions are confirmed and disseminated through political communication,<sup>56</sup> they themselves become part of the political culture affected.

### 4.3. Studying Political Culture through Interpretation

If political culture is defined in the way outlined here, the problem arises of how any political culture can be studied with any rigour.<sup>57</sup> Since even survey interviews do not provide direct access, political culture can be effectively studied only through interpretation: political speech, organization, and action by members of a group should be interpreted as evidence for underlying shared conceptions, paradigms and norms, and tensions and ambiguities within or between them.<sup>58</sup> The aim is to find the best possible explanation, at the level of political culture and habituation, for the attested explicit rhetoric and action. This method is not far removed from that adopted by Socrates and his interlocutors in Plato's dialogues: the probing of common political and ethical statements, and associated practices, in order to discover the fundamental political and ethical paradigms or tensions presupposed or encouraged by them.

It is legitimate to interpret almost all political speech and action in this way: according to the argument developed in this introduction so far, some of the fundamental political ideas which determine agents' self-understanding and political horizons are necessarily at least implicit in much of their political action and speech, whether or not they have a firm or systematic grasp of them. A consequence of applying this approach is that underlying ideas are not fully articulated or represented in many of the pieces of evidence discussed. Indeed, very often, those pieces of evidence testify only to Greek citizens acting upon basic paradigms and norms simply by thinking, speaking, organizing, and behaving in accordance with their requirements, without closely inspecting their own assumptions and motivations. For example, by voting to use public funds to support theatrical contests and subsequently attending them, Greek citizens presupposed and implied that

<sup>55</sup> Compare Lieberman (2002), 700.

<sup>56</sup> For an interpretation of such processes, see Schmidt (2008), especially pp. 309–14.

<sup>57</sup> For methodological defences of the use of the concept of political culture in historiography: Welch (1993), 147–58; Formisano (2001), esp. 426.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Taylor (1985), 31–2. On the distinction between this 'interpretive' approach and 'behaviouralist' approaches to studying political culture: Welch (1993), 2–6.



cultural activities represented an important element of civic life, as well as actively making that the case. On the other hand, many members of the Athenian audience at any particular Great Dionysia, for example, would never have consciously reflected deeply about the relative importance of military, political, and cultural activities in civic life, even though their own attendance was partly inspired by underlying Athenian ideals emphasizing the intertwining of culture and politics.<sup>59</sup>

In the face of this difficulty, it is the careful interpretation of a very wide range of contrasting evidence which creates the best chance of uncovering underlying political cultures. It is necessary to study together pieces of evidence drawn from quite different contexts, and of quite different levels of theoretical sophistication. This involves trying to identify the shared presuppositions and ambiguities of these contrasting pieces of evidence, through comparison of more explicit and more implicit, and more theoretical and more practical, expressions of basic political ideas.<sup>60</sup>

It is partly this method of studying political culture which drives a central aim of this book: in the ancient Greek case, this approach demands an attempt to integrate better inscriptions and literary texts as evidence for Greek political assumptions and ideals. The value of integrating the epigraphic evidence is partly due to the fact that most inscribed decrees of Greek cities necessarily rested upon widely shared Greek ethical and political assumptions, because they had to be accepted by large and heterogeneous civic assemblies. Indeed, many inscribed civic decrees give a particularly direct insight into the processes by which diverse Greeks contributed to the painstaking, mammoth collective task of creating, sustaining, and adapting a civic political culture.

In addition, the comparison of epigraphic with literary texts makes widely shared assumptions and ambiguities stand out: overlaps between texts of contrasting kinds strongly suggest the influence of underlying political culture. Each type of evidence also gives insights into the other. Inscriptions often give a sense of the wider conceptual context within which intellectuals made their theoretical interventions, including some of its tensions and ambiguities.<sup>61</sup> In the other direction, some Greek philosophers' arguments and disagreements crystallize tensions within wider Greek ethical and political thinking. This throws into much sharper relief the distinctive aspects of particular pieces of inscribed rhetoric, or the submerged fault lines which cut through an apparently bland assemblage of civic virtues in an honorary decree. For this period, in particular, it is fortunate that Aristotle self-consciously set out to capture in sharper form widespread ethical and political assumptions. The result is that

<sup>59</sup> See, for example, Goldhill (1987), (2000), with earlier bibliography.

<sup>60</sup> Compare Rosanvallon (2006), esp. 64.

<sup>61</sup> Compare the approach to political thought championed by Pocock, e.g. (1972), and Skinner, e.g. (2002).

Aristotle's analyses of, for example, different approaches to friendship or political theorizing, and also his own equivocation between those approaches (see Chapter 1), make it much easier to discern patterns, ambiguities, and tensions in non-philosophical Greek rhetoric.

Interpretation of varied Greek political texts as evidence for underlying political cultures cannot yield indisputable answers: the resulting picture of political culture will inevitably be open to further debate. Nevertheless, great care can be taken to tie an interpretation very closely to the evidence. A specific danger with the method is that, whatever attested political speech or action is the object of interpretation, the interpreter can easily import the ideas of his own society.<sup>62</sup> In order to minimize this risk of anachronism, it is important that any reconstructed political conception, paradigm, or norm should be amenable to being described using language and concepts attested for the society concerned.

Nevertheless, it is legitimate and often even necessary to use alien terminology to classify and analyse reconstructed political ideas, especially those which remain mainly latent or unconscious in a given society. In the Greek case, as will be argued in Chapter 1 and subsequent chapters, common items of Greek political vocabulary often had very varied meanings. Moreover, the Greeks had not always already developed words to describe important political ideas: as Brock has recently emphasized, Greek thinkers and politicians could use political imagery and metaphor to 'illuminate thoughts which (were) not yet explicitly formulated'.<sup>63</sup> The result is that it could be misleading or limiting to use principally individual words to map Greek political culture. The character of Greek political culture can best be captured by identifying, with convenient modern or invented terminology, the basic political ideas evident in whole pieces of rhetoric, institutions, or actions, between which individual Greek terms could be ambiguous.<sup>64</sup>

Despite these complications, the application of this approach to explicit Greek political language is the most straightforward one, which gives the most direct insights into the fundamental assumptions which an individual either himself held or expected his audience to hold. It is much more difficult to accurately identify the basic political ideas which guided Greek citizens' decisions about institutions and actions on the sole evidence of results of those decisions: there are great difficulties in putting into practice the method advocated by Taylor, the identification of the 'view of the agent and his

<sup>62</sup> Welch (1993), 98, 105–6.

<sup>63</sup> Brock (2013), p. xi.

<sup>64</sup> Compare Cairns (2008), esp. 49–50, on the plurality of 'scripts' underlying most terms for emotions in ancient Greek (and other languages). Even strong advocates of the importance of studying closely the meanings of individual political words often also stress the need to take account of ways of thinking and underlying assumptions, for which societies sometimes take considerable time to find an appropriate vocabulary (see Skinner (2002), 159–60; compare Arena (2012), 31, 33).

relations to others' which is 'implicit in social practices'.<sup>65</sup> These difficulties arise from the fact that it was perfectly possible for a Greek citizen to behave in a way which can be analysed in certain terms while being guided by a quite different understanding of his action. For example, it has recently been forcefully argued that participation in Greek political meetings and religious festivals provided excellent means for individuals to develop useful and lucrative networks of acquaintances.<sup>66</sup> This does not, however, mean that relevant individuals were self-consciously economically rational. The argument could be true even if most Greeks took part in such gatherings exclusively because they were committed to ideals of civic participation and piety.

As a result of this problem, particular care is taken in this book to justify claims that certain decisions about political institutions and actions are sufficient evidence for the influence of particular ways of understanding politics. At least one of two conditions must be met. First, it is necessary to ask whether it would have made sense to citizens to make particular decisions unless they were guided by relevant political ideas. If this question must be answered negatively, that gives strong grounds for believing that those ideas were influential. Alternatively, it is possible to ask whether significant links can be shown between the types of political assumption reconstructed as underlying particular political decisions, on the one hand, and, on the other, the explicit political principles advocated in other contexts by the agents concerned, or by others exposed to the same political cultures. If such links can be identified, and if the relevant assumptions seem to provide the best explanation for the motivations and decision-making of the agents for whom explicit statements of principles are lacking, that also provides strong grounds for believing that those assumptions were influential.

## 5. EXILE AND EXILES AS A KEY TO UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL CULTURES OF GREEK POLEIS

As suggested at the start, later Classical and Hellenistic rhetoric, action, and institutions related to the context of exile provide crucial insights into the political cultures of the Greek civic world as a whole, and also of particular poleis. It is important to bear in mind these two levels of Greek civic political culture, and their interconnections. Certain basic conceptions, paradigms, and norms were widely dispersed around the Greek civic world: they made up a single, highly generic Greek civic political culture. Individual poleis' political

<sup>65</sup> Taylor (1985), 35.

<sup>66</sup> On this function of Athenian political meetings, see recently Ober (2008).

cultures drew on, and fed into, this wider civic political culture, not least through exile and migration themselves, but often gave widespread ideas more specific, local forms.

Exile is a particularly good tool for investigating these different levels of Greek political culture because it necessarily brought to the fore fundamental questions about politics: criteria of political exclusion and inclusion; the legitimacy of different forms of political organization and behaviour; and even the nature of political utopia and dystopia. These issues could be brought into focus when, as in the two examples with which this introduction began, Greeks reflected on particular exiles' ethical qualities.

However, there were also many other ways, examined in the successive chapters of this book, in which exile catalysed fundamental reflection about politics or exposed basic assumptions, ambiguities, and contradictions. Chapters 1–3 examine static products of political interaction: texts and institutions, of types widely attested for different poleis, in which ideas and practices relating to citizenship were crystallized. Chapters 1 and 2 address texts regulating and discussing the reintegration of exiles into poleis. Chapter 3 turns to the process inverse to reintegration, examining texts regulating or discussing the criteria for the lawful expulsion or disenfranchisement of citizens.

In these three chapters, the texts and the institutions those texts establish or advocate illuminate relevant political cultures. In producing relevant epigraphic texts, citizens were obliged to define through dialogue criteria for the exclusion and inclusion of citizens, capable of commanding wide-ranging consensus. In so doing, they necessarily made explicit shared fundamental assumptions and equivocations about the nature of the good polis and the good citizen, and their opposites, as well as applying and developing those assumptions in revealing ways. These chapters' subject matter also lends itself to productive juxtaposition of relevant inscriptions with discussions of the general problems by intellectuals and philosophers, for the sake of exposing common underlying political cultures.

While Chapters 1–3 examine static products of political interaction, Chapters 4–6 examine dynamic political interactions, treating them as further evidence for the shape of civic political cultures. Chapter 4 examines the rhetoric and behaviour of citizens in times of civic peace, showing the workings in practice of the paradigms identified in Chapters 1–3. A connection is made with the main theme of exile through analysis of the rhetoric of participants in Athenian legal cases in which the exile of one of the participants was a looming possibility. Chapter 5 analyses the political language and behaviour of factionaries in civil wars leading to expulsions of citizens. Turning to a different type of political interaction, Chapter 6 considers the political identities and organization of exiles, predominantly groups of fellow exiles from one place or several places. It examines exiles expelled through a wide range of processes,

including both members of factions expelled through *stasis* and whole civic populations expelled in interstate war.

The types of rhetoric and action selected for examination in these last three chapters are particularly revealing of citizens' fundamental political assumptions, and the different ways in which they applied them. Making a speech advocating or opposing calls for the expulsion of a citizen, of the kind considered in Chapter 4, forced an orator to appeal to basic criteria of inclusion or exclusion. Similarly, bouts of *stasis* leading to exile, examined in Chapter 5, were periods of existential crisis for many poleis, which forced citizens to fall back on, but also to examine, their basic assumptions about politics, especially their assumptions regarding political membership, entitlement, and virtue. As for Chapter 6, the political identities and organization of Greek exiles provide a unique laboratory of political habits, assumptions, and ideals. In developing *ab initio* their own political relationships and institutions in exile, exiled citizens, especially when gathered in groups, were forced to make the most basic choices about citizen identity and citizen organization, which they never faced directly within the established political systems of their home cities.

In addition to revealing underlying political assumptions, analysis of the political speech and action addressed in these three chapters also makes it possible to consider the ways in which the indeterminacies and contradictions of Greek civic political culture enabled and encouraged individual agency. These chapters argue that orators in the courts, rivals in *staseis* leading to exile, and groups of exiles adapting to different habitats in exile were able to exercise agency in appropriating, interpreting, or modifying established basic political norms in very varied ways.

The forms of political interaction considered in these chapters also illustrate the influence of exile on civic political cultures. The attested speech and behaviour of some exiles, considered in Chapter 6, indicates ways in which their experience of exile shaped their political consciousness. In some cases, such modifications of perspective were disseminated into wider Greek civic political culture, with significant consequences for the development of the polis.

## 6. RECENT DEBATES ABOUT THE POLITICAL CULTURES OF THE LATER CLASSICAL AND HELLENISTIC POLIS, AND THIS BOOK'S RESPONSE TO THEM

This section places the book in the context of existing scholarship concerning the political cultures of later Classical and Hellenistic poleis. The dominant tendency in scholarship concerning Greek political cultures and civic life in

these periods has been to emphasize the influence of one particular basic political paradigm: a paradigm of the good polis as a community of participatory, virtuous citizens, united in solidarity and political friendship through civic education, shared civic ideals, and collective civic practices and laws.

According to this paradigm, civic education in a wide variety of forms, including both legally regulated and more informal ones, is one of the most crucial means of maintaining citizens' characters and civic harmony. This paradigm requires that the good citizen should, as made forcefully explicit in the decree of the Delphic Amphictyony considered at the start, devote himself to the welfare of his polis and its institutions and culture.

This kind of basic understanding of the nature of a good polis and a good citizen has been widely recognized as underpinning much of Aristotle's political and ethical philosophy,<sup>67</sup> which was, as mentioned in Section 4.3, partly an attempt to capture common fourth-century assumptions. Many scholars have emphasized Aristotle's insistence that the end (*τέλος*) of a complete, true polis is realized when its citizens all choose,<sup>68</sup> within the framework of civic law, to satisfy standards of civic virtue (or 'living well') inculcated in them through civic education.<sup>69</sup> Indeed, Cooper has recently argued that Aristotle intended to suggest that an individual can understand and act on full human virtue only through political interaction with fellow citizens who also aspire to it.<sup>70</sup> In any legitimate constitution, including that of Aristotle's ideal polis, citizens exercise magistracies in ways conducive to the common good, rather than in ways which further their narrow personal or sectional interests.<sup>71</sup>

Although Aristotle's emphasis on civic virtue and community is often regarded as a reaction against prevailing Athenian democratic norms encouraging individual freedom,<sup>72</sup> many scholars have emphasized the prevalence of norms of solidarity and civic virtue in Athenian democratic political culture itself.<sup>73</sup> The Athenian ideal of democratic citizenship has been interpreted as requiring of the good citizen substantial, enthusiastic engagement in the

<sup>67</sup> Cf. Barnes (1990); Cooper (1999), chs. 6, 9–10; Rowe and Schofield (2000), chs. 15–18, e.g. 316–17; Kraut (2002); Irwin (2007), 208–32. The main evidence for this interpretation of Aristotle's political philosophy is derived from Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* Books I, VI; *Politics* Books II–III, VII–VIII.

<sup>68</sup> Nussbaum (1980), esp. 422–3.

<sup>69</sup> e.g. Kraut (1989), 90–104; (2002), esp. chs. 6–7; Depew (2009), esp. 401–8. Note especially Aristotle *Politics* 1278b21–3; 1280a25–1281a8; 1263b36–7; also *Nicomachean Ethics* 1099b29–32.

<sup>70</sup> Cooper (2010), 228–48; cf. Cooper (1999), ch. 15.

<sup>71</sup> See, for example, Aristotle *Politics* 1279a25–31.

<sup>72</sup> e.g. Schofield (2000), 317; compare Christ (2012), 50, 61–7, on the community-oriented ideas of other intellectuals at Athens.

<sup>73</sup> For the overlaps between utopian political philosophy and mainstream political debate in the fourth-century: Bertrand (1999); Loraux (2001); (2005); Holmes (2005), 12–15.

Athenian civic community, if necessary at the expense of narrow personal interests.<sup>74</sup> This expectation has been seen to guide a range of specific aspects of Athenian democratic civic life: for example, economic and financial relations between citizens, such as those involved in moneylending;<sup>75</sup> the shape of religious and dramatic festivals;<sup>76</sup> attitudes concerning public speaking;<sup>77</sup> approaches to dispute-resolution and the courts;<sup>78</sup> and widespread concern with individuals' character and education as guides to their suitability as citizens or political leaders.<sup>79</sup>

Other scholars have argued for the prominence of civic unity and solidarity as components of the Classical Greek civic ideal more generally.<sup>80</sup> For example, the common Greek metaphor of the polis as a body which is put under severe strain in *stasis* presupposes that a good polis should have an organic unity.<sup>81</sup> Studies of more theoretical Greek political language have emphasized many Classical Greeks' high evaluation of forms of 'positive' and 'republican' liberty: liberty as self-mastery; liberty as the state of being liberally educated and capable of social interaction through reason, not force; and liberty as the freedom to participate in civic government.<sup>82</sup> Others have shown similar patterns in Classical Greek evaluations of emotions. An important case is Classical Greeks' frequently high evaluation of 'shame' (*αἰδώς*). That emotion was commonly conceptualized as a form of concern for others' opinion which reinforced, rather than clashing with, respect for demanding, non-negotiable ethical standards, because it compelled self-restraint and civic commitment.<sup>83</sup>

These aspects of the Classical Greek civic ideal of unity and fraternity have been shown to have found very varied expression in widespread institutions and practices: rituals of civic commensality, which helped to represent a polis as like a household or family;<sup>84</sup> collective involvement in, and commemoration of, war;<sup>85</sup> the development of imagined relations of 'kinship' through common descent<sup>86</sup>

<sup>74</sup> For example, with varying emphases: Humphreys (1978), 239–40; Loraux (1981); Ober (1989), 68, 72, 81, 262–3; Loraux (2001); (2005), 39–40; Wolpert (2002), 78–9; Farenga (2006), 536–7; Herman (2006).

<sup>75</sup> Millett (1991).

<sup>76</sup> Seaford (1994), chs. 7 and 10; Parker (2005).

<sup>77</sup> See recently Saxonhouse (2006).

<sup>78</sup> Herman (2006).

<sup>79</sup> This last tendency may have become more pronounced in the mid-fourth century: Allen (2006); compare Azoulay (2006b).

<sup>80</sup> e.g. Veyne (1982), 884–8; Murray (1990c), esp. 21–3; Bertrand (1992), 76–7, 194; Ludwig (2002), 339–40. On special concern with solidarity in Spartan political culture (principally with reference to the Archaic period): Nafissi (2009), 130–1.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Brock (2000), (2013), 74–6; Kosak (2000), 45–51.

<sup>82</sup> e.g. Cartledge (2000), 16–20; cf. Laks (2007) on Plato's *Laws*.

<sup>83</sup> Cairns (1993), esp. 235–7, 354–60 (discussing in particular Plato *Protagoras* 322b6–323a4); Williams (1993).

<sup>84</sup> Schmitt-Pantel (1992).

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Raaflaub and Wallace (2007), 35 (on the hoplite phalanx in the Archaic period).

<sup>86</sup> e.g. Loraux (1981); Lape (2010).

or real relations of friendship or erotic love between citizens;<sup>87</sup> the development of collective traditions about local history and origins;<sup>88</sup> or the stirring and transformative use of political language and rhetoric.<sup>89</sup>

Studies of the political cultures of poleis after the conquests of Alexander the Great also tend to emphasize features which can be seen to be inspired by underlying commitment to principles of civic solidarity and unity. Many such studies, in which the poleis of Asia Minor tend to figure prominently, stress the expectations of civic virtue, public-spiritedness, and participation on the part of civic elites reflected in the phenomenon of civic euergetism, in the ascendant in the Hellenistic polis, and the associated prominence of honorific decrees and portraits.<sup>90</sup> Some also emphasize other aspects of the civic life of Hellenistic poleis which also reflected and reinforced underlying ideals of solidarity: the holding of civic festivals, including festivals celebrating civic unity or the city itself;<sup>91</sup> the expectation that family life and reproduction would serve the interests of the city, reflected in marriage practices;<sup>92</sup> the employment of public doctors;<sup>93</sup> the publicly administered, ethical and cultural education of young citizens, especially in the gymnasium, designed to socialize them into civic life and to make them identify with their city;<sup>94</sup> rigorous programmes of military training for young citizens and schemes of military duties for older citizens;<sup>95</sup> and the corporate solidarity and virtue-oriented rhetoric of Hellenistic poleis in communication with kings.<sup>96</sup>

In opposition to this dominant interpretation, which stresses Greek emphasis on civic solidarity, other scholars argue that later Classical and Hellenistic civic political cultures and political philosophy gave much greater importance to individualism and to competition between citizens.<sup>97</sup> The influence of Horden and Purcell (2000), with its emphasis on interconnections between poleis and personal mobility, has been a significant recent bolster to such views. For example, Vlassopoulos, inspired by Horden and Purcell, has argued that the diversity and variability of civic populations was reflected in

<sup>87</sup> Schofield (1999b), 35–46; Loraux (2001), ch. 8; Ludwig (2002).

<sup>88</sup> See, for example, Clarke (2008); or the papers collected in Foxhall, Gehrke, and Luraghi (2010).

<sup>89</sup> Bertrand (1992); (1999), 49–50, 396–400.

<sup>90</sup> e.g. Veyne (1976); Gauthier (1985); Fröhlich (2005), 239, 255–6; Ma (2013), esp. chs. 1–2. On the corresponding interest in ‘generosity’ in Hellenistic political philosophy: Laks and Schofield (1995).

<sup>91</sup> Thériault (1996); Chaniotis (1995); Chankowski (2005).

<sup>92</sup> van Bremen (1996); (2003). <sup>93</sup> Davies (1984), 307–8; Massar (2005).

<sup>94</sup> See, for example, Gauthier (1995); Gehrke (2004); Kennell (2013).

<sup>95</sup> Ma (2000); Chaniotis (2005), especially 20–6. <sup>96</sup> Ma (2002a).

<sup>97</sup> Cf. Long (R.T.) (2007). On the polarization of modern scholarly interpretations of Greek political culture emphasizing solidarity and individualism respectively: Loraux (1981), 4–7; Murray (1990c), 2–3.



prominent Greek conceptions of good social and political communities, which gave such communities more fluid boundaries and a greater level of internal diversity than characteristic of a closed, inward-looking, solidaristic polis.<sup>98</sup>

Scholars have long emphasized Greek expectations, institutions, and ways of thinking which can be seen to be inspired by one particular basic political paradigm with individualistic colouring: a paradigm of the good polis as an efficient, fair association of mainly self-interested, competitive citizens. Such an association is regulated by laws and procedures of a quite minimalist type, entirely different from those characteristic of the community-oriented paradigm: laws and procedures whose principal roles are to resolve disputes, maintain basic order, and identify overlaps between the contrasting interests of different citizens.

Such an association is also regulated by principles of tit-for-tat reciprocity. Those principles have a particular influence on the granting of civic rewards and incentives. Under tit-for-tat reciprocity, benefits and slights are returned in kind, in a context which allows the return to be seen as a direct response to the earlier good or bad turn or even as a repayment of a symbolic 'loan',<sup>99</sup> even if not very close to it in time.<sup>100</sup> As a result, when tit-for-tat reciprocity dominates, individuals give benefits to others in the expectation of a direct return at some stage.

It is very important to be clear that relations of tit-for-tat reciprocity are fundamentally different from other social relations which can also be described as reciprocal. Under an alternative, more 'generalized' regime of reciprocity, a citizen might aid another citizen or his polis for a less focused reason: because he hopes to be in a position to call on the general goodwill of the recipient, or of observers of his generosity, if he should find himself in need in some indefinite context at some indefinite future time.<sup>101</sup>

Indeed, a sociological observer might argue that the forms of civic benevolence treated here as intrinsic requirements of the other, more community-oriented paradigm are, in fact, usually moves in a more extended and nebulous reciprocal process guided by such hopes.<sup>102</sup> This point is worth exploring, because it bears on a crucial objection to my approach: the objection that the polis-as-association paradigm being introduced here is not really so different

<sup>98</sup> Vlassopoulos (2007a), esp. chs. 2–3.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1162b31–3.

<sup>100</sup> For the possibility of tit-for-tat reciprocity, in accordance with an agreement (*ὁμολογία*), with a 'friendly' delay, see Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1162b25–9.

<sup>101</sup> Compare Sahlins' distinction between 'balanced' and 'generalized' reciprocity, critically discussed in van Wees (1998), 22–3. The objection to this distinction raised by van Wees is that a precisely calculated exchange does not involve the performance of generosity intrinsic to reciprocity on his definition (see pp. 18–19), but this book adopts a much broader conception of reciprocity.

<sup>102</sup> Compare the interpretation of Athenian credit relations in Millett (1991); see also van Wees (1998), 19.

from the previous polis-as-community paradigm. Can we not easily reconcile the two paradigms as different applications of vague basic ideas of reciprocity and two-sidedness? The problem with such an objection is that there is limited evidence for Greek political orators and philosophers explicitly accepting the alternative, more nebulous form of reciprocity identified above, still involving strategic pursuit of self-interest, as a positive ethical approach. It is true that that alternative form might offer a valid sociological analysis of some Greek civic benevolence apparently inspired by commitment to community. Nonetheless, Greek political orators and philosophers do not seem to have understood community and solidarity principally in that way. In so far as any Greek political orators and philosophers did explicitly embrace forms of strategic reciprocity, they tended to concentrate on tit-for-tat relations involving clearly identifiable, proportionate obligations of gratitude (*χάρης*) between benefactors and beneficiaries.<sup>103</sup>

Probably the closest thing to explicit endorsement of a more nebulous form of strategic reciprocity in attested Greek political oratory and philosophy is the argument that it is worth contributing to the prosperity of one's polis, because one may need to rely on one's polis as a safety blanket at some indefinite future time of personal crisis.<sup>104</sup> However, that argument does not appeal directly to the instrumental material benefits accruing from good reputation and good social relations, only to those deriving from an impersonal collective store of resources, to whose size all citizens can contribute.

To say that alternative forms of strategic reciprocity, lacking clearly identifiable, precise relations of *χάρης*, are not strongly endorsed in Greek political oratory and philosophy is not to deny that many Greek advocates of more community-oriented values, including Aristotle himself in relevant parts of his work, did regard benefactions to the polis as personally beneficial for the benefactor. It is simply to insist that what most such Greeks regarded as most personally valuable was the intrinsic quality of the social relations and lifestyle involved in engaged civic service, appreciated only by individuals with roots in their civic communities and an elevated, community-oriented understanding of personal well-being. They set much greater store by that than by the contingent accompanying gains in material goods and useful esteem, potentially appreciated by anyone. According to this way of thinking, there is no question of the good benefactor being directly and principally motivated by the prospect of narrow personal gain, in wealth or honour, even if it should happen to accrue to him through his actions. Rather, the focus of the good benefactor's motivations is civic commitment and engagement with his fellow citizens, through which he knows that his self will be changed, and then

<sup>103</sup> For more on these points, see the discussion of Demosthenes *Against Leptines* in Chapter 3.4.

<sup>104</sup> Consider Pericles at Thucydides 2.60.2–3, discussed in Chapter 5.4.2.

benefited in its changed form. Indeed, he will become enmeshed with his community to a degree which makes it pointless to think strategically about future benefits for himself in isolation.

A similar case can be made about the overlap between Greek language about civic benefaction and a still more indefinite and nebulous form of 'generalized reciprocity': the 'golden-rule' form, under which an individual acts benevolently because he wishes to contribute to maintaining or creating a generalized expectation throughout his society that all should behave in a similarly benevolent way, without any expectation of a certain return, when circumstances make it necessary. There is little sign of Greek political orators and philosophers advocating the strategic pursuit of personal advantage through this type of 'generalized reciprocity'. By contrast, there is good evidence for Greeks recognizing the potential of this type of 'generalized reciprocity' to reinforce civic community. For example, Greek citizens commonly praised a particular benefactor, in a speech or honorary decree, for being an exemplary model for others. The stress in such cases lay on the considerations emphasized in my account of the polis-as-community paradigm in this section: self-restraint, education of others, and a substantial notion of the common good.<sup>105</sup> Indeed, in general, as this book will argue, there is little sign of a middle way in Greek concepts of civic generosity between two extremes, often combined within the political outlook of Greek citizens: on the one hand, stress on tit-for-tat requital, underpinned by a quite narrow conception of what enlightened pursuit of self-interest might involve; on the other, stress on self-sacrifice, civic commitment, and exemplarity, which may well bring long-term, broadly conceived happiness to the benefactors involved.

The overarching polis-as-association approach to civic virtue and ethics is evident in a strong form in the extract from Polybius considered at the start: Polybius there explicitly elevates good faith in respect for rules and contracts above direct concern for communal welfare, traditions, and institutions. As far as fourth-century philosophy is concerned, Yack has reacted against dominant interpretations of Aristotle's political philosophy as strongly concerned with political solidarity. In his view, the more pragmatic claims and proposals offered in some parts of the *Ethics* and *Politics* themselves constitute a normative theory of truly political interaction: Aristotle regarded regulated conflict and competition between citizens as a natural part of politics, at least in any polis inferior to the utopia sketched in *Politics* Books VII–VIII.<sup>106</sup> Ober has even defended the view that Aristotle at times treats a polis as a social contract, emphasizing that Aristotle argues that individuals and households

<sup>105</sup> See, for example, *I.Sestos* 1 (c.120 BC), ll. 70–2; *I.Iasos* 98 (first century BC), ll. 16–19.

<sup>106</sup> Yack (1985); (1993). Compare Saxonhouse (1992), 203–4, who attributes to Aristotle the quite extreme view that 'to have factions is to be a polis, so to speak'.

initially come together in a polis for their mutual advantage ('for the sake of bare life').<sup>107</sup>

Other scholars have made similar criticisms of the dominant interpretation of Classical Athenian political culture as strongly community-oriented, identifying important elements in Athenian attitudes and practices more suited to a fair association of competitive citizens.<sup>108</sup> Some have emphasized fundamental norms guaranteeing individual freedom and security, especially in the economic sphere: norms giving priority to individuals' property rights and personal liberty from slavery or imprisonment;<sup>109</sup> or norms granting special importance to everyday formal and informal voluntary agreements between citizens (and between citizens and outsiders).<sup>110</sup> Others have emphasized Athenian democratic basic norms encouraging individuals to pursue their self-interest within regulated bounds; making hard bargaining for individual advantage a paradigm of legal and political speech; or promoting the enforcement of principles of tit-for-tat reciprocity and personal desert.<sup>111</sup> For example, scholars have drawn attention to Athenian democratic norms making grants of citizenship dependent on concrete financial or political contributions<sup>112</sup> and to Athenian democratic norms of punishment and retribution making the attribution of personal just deserts the main function of civic legal institutions.<sup>113</sup> Related to such approaches is Ober's recent attempt to present the Classical democracy as a knowledge-aggregating 'machine', 'fuelled by a variety of incentives'.<sup>114</sup>

Such interpretations of Athenian democratic basic norms can be compared with scholarly attempts to characterize more widespread Classical Greek ideas of citizenship as grounded in a conception of the good polis as an efficient, fair association. For example, some scholars suggest that a dominant Classical Greek idea of a citizen-body was that of a body of shareholders,<sup>115</sup> analogous to shareholders in a company. This interpretation of Greek ideas of citizenship can in turn be put in the context of a broader scholarly tendency to identify reciprocity and reciprocal exchange as cornerstones of Greek ethics.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>107</sup> Ober (1996), ch. 11. See Aristotle *Politics* 1252b27–30; compare *Nicomachean Ethics* 1160a8–14.

<sup>108</sup> For a recent extended version of this case, see Christ (2012).

<sup>109</sup> e.g. Kahrstedt (1934), 133–57, with Scafuro (1994a), 3.

<sup>110</sup> e.g. Cohen (1973); (2000), chs. 5–6; (2003).

<sup>111</sup> Contrast the view of Seaford (1994), esp. 191–206, 303–7, 388–405, that Classical Athenian political culture was marked by a rejection of socially disruptive principles of material reciprocity (the Homeric inheritance) in favour of ideals of civic solidarity.

<sup>112</sup> Davies (1977/8), 114–15, 118–20.

<sup>113</sup> Allen (2000), esp. 241.

<sup>114</sup> Ober (2008), 121.

<sup>115</sup> J. K. Davies, *OCD*<sup>3</sup> s.v. 'citizenship'; compare Todd (1993), 182; Brun (2000), 134; Christ (2006), ch. 1 (on Athens).

<sup>116</sup> Cf. most papers in Gill, Postlethwaite, and Seaford (1998); Balot (2001), e.g. 5–6.

A minority strand in scholarship concerning the Hellenistic polis makes norms appropriate to an efficient, fair civic association a determining influence on Hellenistic civic life. Bargaining and reciprocal exchange of favours have been identified as the hallmark of relations between poleis and their benefactors<sup>117</sup> and between poleis and their sanctuaries in Hellenistic Asia Minor.<sup>118</sup> Moreover, scholars have analysed in similar terms Hellenistic federal states or *koina*, such as Polybius' Achaian League, which incorporated many poleis and usually reproduced familiar civic institutions on a larger scale. For example, Mackil has recently presented the political life of such federal states as distinguished by bargaining, give and take, and compromise between member states and the central federal authorities.<sup>119</sup> Such accounts of Hellenistic civic and federal life can be set alongside accounts of mid- and later Hellenistic Stoicism which identify the protection of property rights and other individual entitlements as a priority of Stoic political philosophy from the mid-Hellenistic period onwards.<sup>120</sup>

In addition to the paradigm of a good polis as an efficient, fair association, two other basic individualistic paradigms of citizenship have been presented as characteristic of the fourth-century Athenian democracy. First, D. J. Cohen (1995) argues that, in the fourth-century Athenian law courts, dominant underlying civic norms encouraged competitive self-assertion by citizens, as heads of households. In his view, the relevant norms did not discourage even extremely aggressive, almost anarchic pursuit of personal and family feuds through civic institutions. Second, there has been an increasing tendency, partly motivated in some cases by a desire to differentiate Greek civic political thinking from communitarian or even totalitarian approaches,<sup>121</sup> to assimilate the norms of fourth-century Athenian political culture to what can be called 'proto-Kantian' assumptions: the basic, uncoded assumptions which have been developed into systematic philosophies in both Kantian moral philosophy and ensuing neo-Kantian moral and political philosophy.

I am referring in particular to the basic ethical assumptions about the value of individuals as ends in themselves which are given formal shape in the 'Humanity' and 'Kingdom of Ends' versions of Kant's Categorical Imperative: the imperative 'so act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means'; and the requirement that 'a rational being must always regard himself as lawgiving in a kingdom of ends possible through freedom of the will, whether as a member or as sovereign', that is, as a member of a potential community of fellow legislators who treat one another as moral ends in

<sup>117</sup> e.g. Davies (1984), 307, 310–11.

<sup>118</sup> Dignas (2002).

<sup>119</sup> Mackil (2013), e.g. 346, 392–8.

<sup>120</sup> Long (1995); (1997).

<sup>121</sup> Note, in particular, anti-totalitarian interpretations of the Greek polis developed in the aftermath of the Second World War, such as Arendt (1958), e.g. 24–33, 205–7; Vernant (1962).

themselves and engage in rational deliberation about morality.<sup>122</sup> I am also referring to the related basic political assumptions developed into systematic form in subsequent, more explicitly political and pluralist<sup>123</sup> developments and adaptations of relevant aspects of Kant's thought in neo-Kantian philosophies, notably those of Rawls and Habermas.<sup>124</sup> According to such underlying assumptions, citizens should show unconditional equal respect, for its own sake, towards all individual fellow citizens and their aims in life. Showing such respect involves recognizing that all fellow citizens are capable of formulating their own valid ethical and political ideas. This usually makes necessary recognition of the simultaneous validity of a wide range of divergent, often conflicting points of view. Significantly, according to this set of basic political assumptions, this recognition should not take the form merely of passive, detached acceptance: citizens must put it into practice through participation in extensive pluralistic dialogue and deliberation, in which they each attempt to understand one another and to find common ground.

Few would claim that the ethical universalism of Kant and some of his successors finds many prominent precursors in Classical Athenian political culture, but several scholars have argued that the Athenians did strongly value relevant types of mutual respect in connection with a more limited range of human relationships, those among fellow citizens. One relevant recent example is Liddel (2007), a very thought-provoking previous attempt to weld together the evidence of literary sources and inscriptions, in order to offer a broad account of Greek political thinking. Liddel recognizes substantial differences between the good liberal society and the fourth-century Athenian democratic ideal. However, he also identifies substantial overlaps between the two, especially between the basic conceptions of liberty and obligation prominent in each. According to him, in fourth-century Athenian political culture, individual liberty was predominantly interpreted as the liberty to participate in a political community, partly prefiguring Rawls' good society, of mutually respectful, relatively equal citizens with reciprocal political obligations.<sup>125</sup>

<sup>122</sup> Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4.429 and 434, in the translation of M. Gregor (Korsgaard and Gregor (1998)).

<sup>123</sup> For the view that there are significant pluralistic elements in Kant's own philosophy, sometimes implicit, see Hill (2000).

<sup>124</sup> See especially Rawls (1972); Habermas (1996). Admittedly, both Rawls and Habermas diverge substantially from Kant, rejecting the transcendental foundations of his moral theory. However, similarities in basic approach are substantial: Kant's ideal of a self-legislating 'Kingdom of Ends' can be seen as providing the basic structure even of Habermas' Ideal Speech Situation, even though Habermas makes his ideal community of mutually respectful legislators more social or sociable, in accordance with Hegel's criticisms of Kant, and more political, in accordance with Marxist thought.

<sup>125</sup> For a similar interpretation of Athenian notions of the freedom of the citizen, this time expressed within a civic republican framework: Cartledge and Edge (2009).

In a partly similar vein, Ober consciously draws on Rawls' ideas<sup>126</sup> in arguing that fundamental Classical Athenian civic norms gave very considerable weight to respect for the dignity of individual citizens, including their right to free speech.<sup>127</sup> Ober makes subtle and effective distinctions between different types of 'dignitarian' approach. For example, he has recently endorsed the view that a 'fully moralized Kantian conception of human dignity as intrinsic worth without price' is 'distinctly modern'. This forms part of his argument that the ancient Athenians developed a more limited notion of 'civic dignity' as freedom from humiliation and infantilization, mutually recognized only by fellow citizens of the same polis.<sup>128</sup>

Ober's discussion leaves two possibilities open. On the one hand, Athenian democrats may have believed that respect for another man's dignity should be unconditional and for its own sake, provided that he cleared the hurdle of being a fellow citizen. On the other, they may have thought that such respect ought to be more deeply conditional on that other man's conformity with shared aims or identity. Nevertheless, Ober explicitly presents as central to any form of dignity 'having one's claims recognized and respected by others',<sup>129</sup> presumably irrespective of the content of those claims, a point which favours the former interpretation of how his argument applies to Athens. Understood in that way, even Ober's Athenian 'civic dignitarianism' can be characterized as proto-Kantian, to the extent that it too anticipates, in restricted form, Kantian concern with entirely unconditional respect for individuals as ends in themselves. This aspect of Ober's work chimes with aspects of Hansen's picture of Athenian democratic political culture: without explicitly drawing attention to Kantian or neo-Kantian ideas and assumptions, Hansen has identified basic norms of tolerance as prominent within fourth-century Athenian political culture.<sup>130</sup>

Such emphasis on Athenian tolerance is consistent with a wider recent tendency to view the Athenian democracy as an example of the modern ideal of deliberative democracy: a political system in which citizens participated in unconstrained dialogue, recognizing the plurality of important ethical considerations and the possibility that they might be incommensurable. Some have even compared the deliberative practices of the Athenian democracy with those intrinsic to Habermas' Ideal Speech Situation.<sup>131</sup> The broad recent tendency to identify proto-Kantian elements in Athenian political culture has been mirrored in some recent approaches to Aristotle: some historians

<sup>126</sup> Cf. Rawls (1972); (2000).

<sup>127</sup> Ober (1996), 101; (2003a), esp. 251–2. Compare Miller (2009).

<sup>128</sup> Ober (2012), quotation from p. 828.

<sup>129</sup> Ober (2012), 831; cf. 837, 842 on civic dignity in particular.

<sup>130</sup> See, for example, his comments in *BMCRev* 2006.01.32. For his more general liberal democratic conception of Athenian democracy: Hansen (1999), 73–85; (2006).

<sup>131</sup> For a critical discussion of such views, with bibliography: Schofield (2006), 55–8.

of philosophy have claimed that Aristotle attributed far more political and ethical importance than generally thought to unconditional respect for the dignity and rational preferences of individuals.<sup>132</sup>

As is clear from this discussion, many scholars have presented the political cultures of individual poleis in this period as internally homogeneous.<sup>133</sup> This is probably partly a result of a widespread belief in the rationality of Greek political cultures.<sup>134</sup> Nevertheless, there is a rival tendency in modern scholarship, which emphasizes the coexistence of different paradigms of good citizenship within individual poleis' political cultures. First, there has been a recent tendency in scholarship to claim that Classical Athenian and wider Greek political culture, and the political philosophy produced within them, harmoniously united in new syntheses competing ideals of citizenship: in particular, ideals resembling those underpinning modern liberal, communitarian, and sometimes also deliberative conceptions of democracy.<sup>135</sup> Second, other scholars have argued that coexisting paradigms of citizenship were in tension with each other within individual poleis' political cultures, making irreconcilable rival demands on citizens.<sup>136</sup> The result could be 'double-think'<sup>137</sup> or crisis, but also paradoxical flourishing.<sup>138</sup>

This book uses the evidence of exile to evaluate these different interpretations of Greek political cultures in this period, and to offer its own interpretation. The conclusions are gradually unfolded in the following chapters, with detailed summaries in the concluding sections of individual chapters, but they can be partly foreshadowed here.

The examination of the material relating to exile reveals much evidence for the underlying influence of some of the paradigms surveyed here, but little for others. There is strong evidence for the coexistence and influence of fairly radical forms of the two paradigms emphasized in this section,

<sup>132</sup> For example, Miller (1995) even sees Aristotle as an advocate of a theory of 'rights'. For an alternative way of seeing Aristotle as particularly keen to ensure respect for individuals' rational beliefs and preferences, see Irwin (2007), 226–7. Such approaches are criticized as anachronistic in Schofield (1999a), ch. 8; Gill (1996), e.g. 24–5, 338–40; (2006), 365–6.

<sup>133</sup> For an explicit claim to this effect: Herman (2006), 100. Compare Cartledge (2009), 18.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. Murray (1990c).

<sup>135</sup> On the Classical Athenian democracy: Ober (1999), 372; (2005), 88–9 (criticizing Loraux); Monoson (2000), 237 ('reciprocal exchange' and 'unity' both key to the democratic polis). On the Classical polis more generally: Gill (1996), 340–1 (arguing that norms encouraging cultivation of 'shared life' and norms encouraging maintenance of reciprocal relations were 'complementary' in Greek ethics); (1998) (identifying harmony between altruism and reciprocity); Farenga (2006), 36. On political thought: Balot (2006), 14–15, 54–62; (2009b); (2009c); Salkever (2009b).

<sup>136</sup> For example, Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1973); Veyne (1976), e.g. 163; Davies (1977/8), esp. 114–21; Ober (1989), e.g. 298–9; (1994), 103; Loraux (1993), 48; (2001), 245–64; Wilson (2000), e.g. 107–8; Davidson (2001), 47; Morgan (2003b), pp. x, xx; Moreno (2007); Ma (2008a), esp. 380–5. Compare arguments for the heterogeneity and internal contradictions of Greek culture in general: Veyne (1983), esp. 52–68; Dougherty and Kurke (2003).

<sup>137</sup> Moreno (2007), 268–9, 279.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Ober (1989); Ma (2008a), 380–5.



polis-as-community and polis-as-association, but relatively little evidence for the pronounced, mainstream influence of the other individualistic paradigms mentioned in this section. It is not surprising that there should be little evidence of explicit theorizing along Kantian or neo-Kantian lines in the ancient Greek evidence. It is, however, noteworthy that there is relatively little evidence in mainstream Greek political debate and interaction for the influence of underlying proto-Kantian assumptions favouring unconditional respect for individuals and pluralism, similar to those which were eventually to provide the raw material for Kant and his later followers to develop systematic philosophies.

With the help of the exile evidence, this book offers a new interpretation of the precise character of the two dominant quite radical underlying paradigms, named as 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan', after poleis in which they are particularly clearly attested, in Chapter 1. In that chapter and throughout, it reveals the importance of extreme features, indeterminacies, ambiguities, and tensions within Greek civic political cultures oriented around these two paradigms. As part of this exercise, the book considers the character of the coexistence of the two paradigms. It is suggested that the two paradigms can be understood as the two contrasting parts of a dialectical pair: each paradigm gained definition and strength from the contrast with the other; and they sustained each other in existence.

In addition, in Chapters 4–6, a new interpretation is offered of the complex workings in practice of the dominant underlying paradigms, across the Greek world as a whole and in individual poleis' political cultures. An argument emerges that the coexistence of the two paradigms could be conducive to civic stability, and even flourishing, when citizens engaged in the imaginative 'doublethink' necessary to ignore, tolerate, negotiate, or harness the contradictions and inconsistencies involved. This process did, however, have a devastating corollary: the dominant underlying paradigms, and their extremes, ambiguities and contradictions, often led, individually or in combination, to violent *stasis*, which often forced citizens into exile. This was especially true when external or internal pressures forced citizens to attempt to derive coherent, consistent principles, ideologies, and plans of action from the complex, swirling resources of their political cultures. The contrasting ways of imagining the good polis thus had crucial practical effects on both civic peace and civic unrest, both *stasis* and stability.



## Two Modes of Greek Civic Politics: the 'Nakonian' and the 'Dikaiopolitan'

### 1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter and the next address the first type of evidence related to exile which illuminates prominent basic assumptions about politics and civic virtue: texts concerning bipartisan civic reconciliation after *stasis*, involving reintegration of exiled citizens. As argued in the Introduction, both philosophical discussions of this process and inscribed civic documents regulating or recording it are particularly useful evidence for civic political cultures.

On the one hand, this is because bipartisan reconciliation and reintegration was a context in which political thinkers and active citizens necessarily, at least unwittingly, revealed by their choices and language in particularly clear form the basic political paradigms influential on them, central to their political cultures. As the theoretical model raised in the Introduction suggests, citizens drew at least partly on such paradigms, for orientation, guidance, and conceptual raw materials, in formulating political proposals and principles. They were even more reliant than usual on basic paradigms and norms in developing proposals concerning reconciliation and reintegration, because they had to identify means of restoring basic political order. It is thus often particularly fruitful to work backwards even from citizens' relatively straightforward and non-theoretical ideas and proposals concerning reconciliation to underlying paradigms and norms.

Bipartisan settlements after *stasis*, several of which are preserved in inscribed form, are particularly revealing in this respect. In order for such a settlement to come into existence, citizens of different political persuasions<sup>1</sup> had to come together to devise a consensually acceptable basic framework for future political life. Even if external advisers or arbitrators made the first

<sup>1</sup> Contrast more partisan post-*stasis* settlements, e.g. Aristotle *Politics* 1300a16–19 (on Classical Megara).

proposals, the recently discordant citizens of the relevant polis had to ratify and adopt them. Moreover, the range of citizens involved must often have been very broad: even though explicit emphasis on democracy is evident in such texts only in individual striking cases, identified as such in Chapter 2, almost all known bipartisan reconciliation texts derive, as will become evident, from cities with some form of democratic constitution, with a participatory assembly which played a role in the process of reconciliation itself. Because they were products of complex, bipartisan, democratic processes of this kind, such reconciliation settlements offer vivid guides to the shared implicit, underlying paradigms of good basic civic organization, central to their political cultures, which were influential on all the citizens involved, regardless of particular political outlook.

On the other hand, in attempting to devise criteria and methods of bipartisan reconciliation to restore political life after division and unrest, a rare practical opportunity to address the foundations of political order, thinkers and citizens often not only revealed their assumptions, but also themselves offered at least aspects of an explicit paradigmatic vision of how their polis should be. This could be a reproduction of a pre-existing paradigm, but it could also be a refinement or development of existing norms.

With regard to the epigraphic cases, it might be objected to this latter argument that relevant inscriptions rarely reflect their authors' positive, paradigmatic visions of civic order. Rather, they reflect only their authors' conceptions of the actual state of their polis' citizen-body, and of relations among its citizens, at a particular moment: citizens were often seeking principally to implement pragmatic devices designed to achieve immediate stability, tailored to their understanding of prevailing citizen relations.

Nevertheless, as will be seen, even ostensibly humdrum examples of this kind of inscribed document often possess positive, paradigmatic force. For example, relevant epigraphic texts often include the details of rituals and oaths of reconciliation, which symbolize or explicitly express ideals of citizen conduct. Moreover, because they were put on long-term public display, relevant inscriptions necessarily gave to citizens and outsiders a condensed, accessible description of normal, acceptable, or often even desirable civic organization: they were intended or *de facto* future guides to citizen behaviour.

This first chapter analyses in detail two examples of inscribed documents of bipartisan civic reconciliation, which set out particularly clear visions of the good polis: one from Nakone in western Sicily and one from Dikaia in Chalkidike. Each of these documents reflects in unusually pure, abstract form a significant underlying paradigm of the good polis: the Nakonian document reveals the influence of a quite radical version of the paradigm of the good polis as a community, sketched in the Introduction; and the Dikaio-politan document reflects the influence of a quite radical version of the paradigm of the good polis as an efficient, fair association, also sketched in

the Introduction. The two inscriptions do not explicitly attest all basic aspects of the two paradigms, let alone all of their practical implications. However, when combined with some comparative material from philosophical and literary texts, the two inscriptions make it possible to define in this chapter the precise character of the two basic radical paradigms. This method does require the chapter to range quite far beyond evidence relating directly to exile, but this is necessary to give greater definition and ancient grounding to the conceptual framework used to analyse exile evidence in subsequent chapters.

## 2. THE 'NAKONIAN' PARADIGM

At some point in the fourth or third century, some envoys from nearby Segesta brokered a reconciliation after an otherwise unknown *stasis*, involving bitter conflict between two factions, in a small Sicilian polis, Nakone. The envoys' proposals, ratified by the Nakonians, were subsequently recorded on a surviving bronze tablet. Unusually for a bipartisan post-*stasis* reconciliation, the document makes no explicit reference to exiles or their reintegration. However, many of the problems and attempted solutions involved were very similar to those attested in the other examples considered in this and the following chapter, in which reintegration of exiles was a prominent concern.

The full text of the Nakonian settlement, proposed by external arbitrators but endorsed by Nakonian assembly and council, is the following:<sup>2</sup>

- ἐπὶ Λευκίου τοῦ Καισίου καὶ Φιλωνίδα Φιλ[ . . . . . ],  
 Ἀδωνίου τετάρται ἵσταμένον. ἔδοξε  
 ταῖ ἀλῖαι καθὰ καὶ ταῖ βουλᾷ· ἐπειδὴ τᾶς  
 τύχας καλῶς προαγνημένας διώρθωται τὰ κο[ινὰ]  
 5 τῶν Νακωναίων, συμφέρει δὲ καὶ ἐς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ὁμον[ο-]  
 οῦντας πολιτεύεσθαι, πρέσβεις τε Ἐγεσταίων παργεναθ[έ]ν-  
 τες Ἀπέλλιχος Ἀλκίδα, Ἀττικὸς Πίστωνος, Διονύσιος Δεκ[ί-]  
 ου ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν συμφερόντων π<ᾱ>σι τοῖς πολίταις συνεβο[ύ-]  
 λευσαν, δεδόχθαι τοῦ Ἀδωνίου ταῖ τετάρται ἵσταμένον ἀλῖαν

<sup>2</sup> Ampolo (2001), Nakone text A; see also SEG 30.1119, with 51.1185. See earlier D. Asheri in Nenci (1982), 776–7 (text with apparatus), 782–3 (translation). The version printed here includes one change. The text on the tablet in l. 19 reads ἐς τὸν (see also ll. 25–7). This text has commonly been accepted on the hypothesis that the phrase should be understood as ἐς τὸν (κλᾶρον) αὐτῶντα οἱ συναχόντες; see D. Asheri in Nenci (1982), 776, 782–3. However, since that text leaves the clause without a main verb, the correction ἐστ<ω>ν is printed here (with the final nu preserved before the following vowel, as in l. 16; contrast the third person plural imperatives in ll. 14, 17, 24, 30, 32, and 35). The literal meaning of ἐστ<ω>ν αὐ[τ]ῶντα . . . ἀδελφοί would be 'they should be brothers of themselves'; for αὐτοῦτα used in Sicilian inscriptions in connection with family relations, see IG XIV 287, l. 2 and 288, II, l. 1; for αὐτῶντα, see IG XIV 316, l. 2.

- 10 τῶμ πολιτᾶν συναγαγεῖν καὶ ὅσοις ἂ διαφορά τῶμ πολιτᾶν  
γέγονε ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἀγωνιζομένοις ἀνακληθέντας ἐς  
τὰν ἀλίαν διάλυσιν ποιήσασθαι αὐτοὺς ποτ' αὐτοὺς προγρα-  
φέντας ἑκατέρων τριάκοντα. οἱ δὲ ὑπενάντιοι γεγονότες ἐν  
τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις ἑκάτεροι ἑκατέρων προγραψάντω. οἱ δὲ
- 15 ἄρχοντες τὰ ὀνόματα κλαρογραφήσαντες χωρὶς ἑκατέ-  
ρων ἐμβαλόντες ἐς ὑδρίας δυνὼ κλαρώντων ἓνα ἕξ ἑκα-  
τέρων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λοι[π]ῶν πολιτᾶν ποτικλαρώντων τρεῖς  
πὸτ τοὺς δύο ἕξω τὰν ἀγχιστεῖαν ἂν ὁ νόμος ἐκ τῶν δικασ-  
τηρίων μεθίστασθαι κέλεται καὶ ἔστ<ω>ν αὐτῶντα οἱ συν-
- 20 λαχόντες ἀδελφοὶ αἵρετοὶ ὁμονοοῦντες ἀλλήλοισ με-  
τὰ πάσας δικαιοτάτος καὶ φιλίας. ἐπεὶ δέ κα οἱ  
ἐξήκο<ν>τα πάντες κλᾶροι ἀερθέωντι καὶ οἱ ποτὶ  
τούτους συλλαχόντες, τοὺς λοιποὺς πολίτας  
πάντας κατὰ πέντε συγκλαρώντω, μὴ συγκλα-
- 25 ρώντες τὰς ἀγχιστείας καθὰ γέγραπται, καὶ ἔσ-  
τ<ω>ν αὐτῶντα ἀδελφοὶ καὶ οὗτοι καθὰ [κ]αὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσ-  
θεν αὐτοῖστα συνλελογχότες. οἱ δὲ ἱερομνάμονες τᾷ θυσ[ί]αι  
θυόντω αἰ<γ>α λευκάν, καὶ τὰ ποτὶ τὰν θυσίαν ὅσων χρεία ἐστί  
ὁ ταμίας παρεχέτω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ κατὰ πόδας ἀρχαὶ
- 30 πᾶσαι θυόντω καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ταῦται τᾷ ἀμέραι τοῖ[s]  
γενετόρεσσι καὶ τᾷ Ὀμρνο<ί>αι ἱερεῖον ἑκατέροις ὅκα δοκιμάζων-  
τι, καὶ οἱ πολῖται πάντες ἑορταζόντω παρ' ἀλλήλοισ  
κατὰ τὰς <ἀ>δελφοφετίας. τὸ δὲ ἄλίσμα τόδε κολαψάμε-  
νοι οἱ ἄρχοντ<ε>ς ἐς χάλκωμα ἐς τὸ πρόγαον τοῦ Διὸς [τοῦ] Ὀλυμπίου
- 35 ἀναθέντω.

In the magistracy of Leukios son of Kaisios and of Philonidas son of Phil- . . . , on the fourth day of Adonios. It seemed good to the assembly as well as to the council: since, fortune having developed in a fine way, the common affairs (l. 5) of the Nakonians have been put in order, and it is beneficial that they should conduct their life as citizens in harmony for the future, and the envoys who came here from Segesta, Apellikos, son of Adeidas, Attikos, son of Piston, and Dionysos, son of Dek- . . . , deliberated concerning the common good for all the citizens, let it be decided to convene an assembly (10) of the citizens on the fourth day of Adonios. For those among whom there was conflict, as they competed concerning common affairs, let them, having been summoned to the assembly, conduct a reconciliation with each other, a list of thirty members having been written in advance for each side. Let those who were previously adversaries draw up the respective lists, each of the other faction. The (15) magistrates should write the names of each group separately on lots, and put them in two urns, and draw one from each group, and from the rest of the citizens they should draw lots for three more members, excluding those relatives whom the law requires to be absent from trials in court; and those who have been (20) drawn together should be chosen brothers of one another, united in concord with each other with all justice and friendship. When the sixty lots have been drawn, and also the others drawn together with them, let them assign the rest of the citizens by lot to groups of five, not drawing (25) relatives together, as has been written, and those drawn together should be

brothers of one another like those previously drawn together. The *hieromnamones* should sacrifice a white goat for the sacrifice, and the steward should provide whatever is necessary for the sacrifice. And likewise all (30) the succeeding magistrates should sacrifice on this day each year to the ancestors and to Homonoia a sacrificial animal which they have had tested, one for each, and the citizens should all participate in a festival in groups, in accordance with the creations of brotherhoods. Let the archons inscribe this decree on a bronze plaque and set it up in the entry hall of the temple of Olympian Zeus.<sup>3</sup>

Strong ideals of community permeate this text. The fact is celebrated that 'common affairs' have been put in order. The text also expresses the aspiration that the Nakonians should go on living in concord (*ὁμόνοια*). The deified abstract value of Homonoia is even made the object of an annual sacrifice. However, the most distinctive strongly community-oriented feature of the settlement is the fact that 'fraternity' between citizens becomes more than a metaphor. New civic groups of five are to be formed, each consisting of one member from each of the two factions in the recent *stasis* and three neutral citizens.<sup>4</sup>

Significantly, no actual blood relations may be assigned to the same brotherhood: the 'fraternal' relations involved must be purely artificial and political. This is made explicit in the statement that members of these new groupings are to be 'chosen brothers' (*ἀδελφοὶ αἵρετοί*). The members of these brotherhoods are not only to be harmonious (*ὁμονοοῦντες ἀλλήλοις*), but also subsequently to participate together in an annual festival, accompanying the annual sacrifice to Homonoia (and the ancestors). As Loraux suggests, this *ἀδελφοθετία* is reminiscent of other Greek aspirations to create relations of quasi-kinship between citizens not related by blood. That wider Greek approach is most famously expressed, and most elaborately presented, in the Platonic Socrates' proposals for collective child-rearing among the governing elite of his ideal polis in *Republic* Book V.<sup>5</sup>

As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, this highly unusual document reveals in particularly pure form a distinctive underlying abstract paradigm of a good polis: a quite extreme version of the polis-as-community paradigm discussed in the Introduction. According to this radical underlying paradigm, the citizens of a good polis should show a very high level of solidarity with their fellow citizens: they should consider themselves bound to their fellow citizens in relations of fraternal 'friendship' (*φιλία*), which cut across divisions of self and family. This kind of bond has important, strong

<sup>3</sup> Compare Dössel's German translation (2003), 237–9.

<sup>4</sup> After all members of factions have been assigned, remaining neutral citizens are to be distributed to further 'brotherhoods' of five.

<sup>5</sup> Loraux (2001), 224; contrast Asheri (1982), 142, 144.

and distinctive emotional elements of trust and mutual concern.<sup>6</sup> It also has a strongly ethical character: it requires that citizens should show high levels of virtue in their relations with fellow citizens and with the community. In the Nakonian case, for example, citizen-brothers were expected to interact with one another 'with all justice', as well as 'friendship' (*μετὰ πάσας δικαιοτάτος καὶ φιλίας*).

The Nakonians made quite an unusual step in assimilating such civic relations quite so literally to brotherhood, but the underlying, more metaphorical notion of strong citizen fraternity was, it will be argued in this book, much more pervasive. There was a widespread Greek expectation of active virtue and devotion towards, rather than mere cohabitation with, fellow citizens beyond one's immediate circle of relations and intimates.

According to the paradigm underlying the Nakone settlement, this type of solidarity between particular citizens should underpin broader civic unity, of a distinctive type: citizens should be united in pursuit of demanding shared goals, dictated by demanding shared civic ideals. In the Nakonian case, this part of the underlying paradigm found expression in the sacrifice to the ancestors and to Homonoia and in the accompanying festival, celebrated by the new brotherhoods: Nakonian citizens were required to participate in unison in veneration both of the specific shared history and traditions represented by the ancestors and of the deified political abstraction of *ὁμόνοια*. That abstract ideal took different forms in different contexts, as will be clear later in this book. In this context, it clearly evoked the very high level of civic integration and shared virtue celebrated throughout the decree, something close to its literal, very demanding meaning of 'one-mindedness'.

This part of the underlying paradigm authorizes and requires citizens to take ambitious steps to habituate and educate one another in shared civic values. In addition, it authorizes and requires civic institutions to exercise very far-reaching influence on citizens' characters: civic institutions should habituate and educate citizens to be devoted citizens, committed to shared civic values. In the Nakonian case, the influence of this part of the paradigm was crystallized in the process of *ἀδελφοθετία* itself: the Nakonians attempted to reconfigure basic social relationships and habits through a complex and ambitious process of social engineering.

A significant feature of this paradigm, which will be very important later in this book, is its very generic character and indeterminacy about details. It prescribes a formally very well-defined type of civic unity: fraternal solidarity in collective enthusiasm for complex shared culture and demanding ideals of civic virtue. However, it does not offer precise guidance about the specific, concrete content of that shared culture and those shared ideals. This is

<sup>6</sup> See the discussion of the Nakone reconciliation in Chaniotis (2010), emphasizing the emotional dimension of the civic brotherhoods.



reflected in the Nakonian settlement in the lack of precise guidance about the practical scope and requirements of civic justice and virtue, or about the precise nature of the shared traditions and ideals around which the Nakonians are united in *δμόνοια*.

There is no straightforward name available for the underlying paradigm sketched in the previous paragraphs. ‘Communitarian’ or ‘strongly communitarian’ might appear an obvious choice. However, that would be potentially misleading. In modern political philosophy, the word ‘communitarian’ has a very close connection with moral relativism: a ‘communitarian’ believes that purportedly universal moral and political standards should not be allowed to inhibit specific communities from preserving and enacting distinctive cultural traditions.<sup>7</sup> The particular radically community-oriented paradigm sketched here does not privilege values and practices distinctive to particular communities: the goals and ideals around which citizens of any polis are expected to rally may equally be regarded as wholly or partly universal, objectively valid and abstract. Indeed, as will be explored in Chapter 6, there were tensions and disagreements in some Greek political contexts concerning the relative importance, as cornerstones of political unity, of particular and universal values. In cases where values regarded as universal, objectively valid, and abstract are given special importance, this paradigm shares important features with the modern notion of ‘civic humanism’, but with a greater stress on civic unity and a lesser stress on participation in formal civic institutions, as opposed to broader civic life, as the heart of citizenship.

There is no existing political theoretical term which captures the precise paradigm sketched here: in order to use abstract political vocabulary, it would be necessary to invent a label such as ‘solidaritarian’ or ‘strongly solidaritarian’ or devise a short-hand label such as ‘thick’ or ‘warm’. The alternative followed here is to name the paradigm sketched here the ‘Nakonian’ paradigm, in recognition of a place in which it once came to the surface in particularly simple, pure form, unmixed with rival paradigms and relatively free from local particularities. The choice of this name does not imply that all features of the ‘Nakonian’ paradigm are explicit in the Nakonian settlement. Rather, the label applies to the full paradigm identified in this section as underlying that settlement.

### 3. THE ‘DIKAIOPOLITAN’ PARADIGM

The other inscription on which I would like to focus is a recently published inscription from Dikaia, an Eretrian colony on the coast of Chalkidike, dating

<sup>7</sup> Compare the discussion in Kraut (2002), 353–6, of the difficulties in describing Aristotle’s political thought as ‘communitarian’.

to the reign of Perdikkas III of Macedon (365–359).<sup>8</sup> This reconciliation, which clearly did involve the restoration of exiles,<sup>9</sup> was brokered by a certain Lykios and fellow arbitrators, who may have been foreigners or Dikaiopolitans.<sup>10</sup> It contains markedly different rhetoric and procedures of reconciliation from those used at Nakone, testifying to the workings of a quite different underlying understanding of the basic nature of politics.

The text consists of five decrees of the Dikaiopolitan assembly, a report of events and the text of the oath sworn by all citizens:

- 1 [vacat Θεός:-] Τύχη Ἀ[γ]αθή. ἔδοξε τῇ ἐκ[κλησίῃ· γνώμη]ν  
[περ]ὶ τῶν συναλ[λα]γῶν παρῆν[εγκε]ν? Λύ[κιος καὶ] οἱ συν-  
αλλακταί. περὶ τ[ού]των πάντων ψηφί[ζ]ο[ντ]α Λύκιον καὶ  
ἐπιτελέοντα ἐν [τ]ῇ ἐκκλησίῃ κύριον εἶ[ν]αι. ἔδοξε τῇ
- 5 ἐκκλησίῃ· τοὺς [π]ολίτας πάντας ὁμόσ[α]ι τὸν ὄρκον τὸ[ν]  
συγγεγραμμένο[ν] ἐν τρισὶν ἱεροῖς τοῖς [ἀ]γιωτάτοις καὶ  
ἐν ἀγορῇ, Δία, Γῆν, [Ἡ]λιομ, Ποσειδῶ, κάπρ[ο]ν ἱερεύσαντας.  
ὀρκωσάτω δὲ Λύκιος καὶ οἱ συναλλακταί. τὸν δὲ ὄρκο-  
ν καὶ τὰ πιστώματα πάντα γράψαντας εἰς λίθον
- 10 θεῖναι εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀθηναίης. [θε]ῖναι δὲ καὶ  
εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν τὸν ὄρκον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ πισ-  
τώματα γράψαντας εἰς λίθον. ὁμόσαι δὲ πάν-  
τας ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις. ὅσοι δ' ἀποδ[η]μοῦσιν ἢ ἀσ-  
θενούσιν, τὸ μὲν ἀπόδημον ὁμόσαι καὶ ἀγνισθ-
- 15 ῆναι ἐπειδὰν ἔλθῃ τριῶν ἡμερῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀσθεν-  
οῦντα ἐπειδὰν ὑγιὴς γενηθῇ ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις  
ὁμόσαι. ὀρκωσάντων δὲ πρὸς ταῦτά. ὃς δ' ἂν μ[ὴ] ὁ-  
μόσῃ τὸν ὄρκον καθάπερ γέγραπται, τὰ χρήματα [α-]  
ὕτου ἱερὰ καὶ δημόσια ἔστω τοῦ Ἀ[π]όλλωνος το[ῦ]
- 20 Δαφνηφόρου ἄτιμός τε ἔστω καὶ τ[ῶ]ν δικαίων α[ὐ-]  
τῷ μηδενὸς μετέστω. μάρτυρα δ[ε] καὶ συνίστορ[α]  
τῶν ὀρκῶν καὶ τῶν πιστωμάτων π[ά]ντων Περδί[κ-]  
καμ ποιήσασθαι, δεηθῆναι δὲ αὐ[το]ῦ, ἂν τινὲς πο-  
τε τοὺς ὄρκους κ[αὶ] τὰ πιστώματα ἐ[γβ]άλλωσι, τού-
- 25 τοὺς δυνατὸν [ε]όντα θανάτῳ ζ[ημ]ιώσαι· ἣν τε  
φύγωσι, ἀγωγίμους εἶν' αὐτοὺς Δι[κα]ιολίταις ἐ-  
κ τῆς χώρας πάσης ἣς ἐπάρχει Π[ερ]δίκκας. ἔδοξε-  
ε τῇ ἐκκλησίῃ· δίκας ὅσαι φονικαὶ εἰσι πρὸ τ[ῆς] Γοργύθου ἀρχῆς,  
αὐτὰς ἐγδικάσασθαι πάσας ἐπὶ Γοργύθο[υ] ἄρχον[τος] μηνὸς Δα-

<sup>8</sup> SEG 57.576, based on Voutiras (2008), 787–9; the text printed here follows the latter for the distribution of dots indicating incompletely preserved letters. For the chronology of affairs in the North Aegean in this period: Heskell (1997). For a possible precise context for this settlement: Voutiras and Sismanides (2007), 263–4; see also Voutiras (2008), 783.

<sup>9</sup> The exiles are mentioned in ll. 36–7.

<sup>10</sup> See SEG 57.576, n. 1; Gray (2013d), 376–7.

- 30 φνηφοριῶνος πέμπτηι φθίνοντος· ὅς δ' ἄ[μ] μὴ ἐγδικάσῃται, [ἀ-]  
πόκλητα αὐτῷ ἔστω. ἄμ δέ τις δῶι δίκην φο[νι]κῇ<ν> ἢ  
δικάζηται[ι ὅ-]  
σα ἀπόκλητα ἢ ἐκκλησί[η] ἐψηφίσαιο, ὁ μὲ[ν] δ[ικ]α[α]ζόμενος  
φ[ευ-]  
γέτω τὴν γῆν τὴν Δικαιοπολιτῶν καὶ τὰ [χ]ρ[ή]ματα αὐτοῦ[ῷ ἔ-]  
στω δημόσια, ὁ δὲ διδο[ῦ]ς τὴν δίκην ἀτι[μο]ς [ἐ]στω καὶ τὰ  
35 χρήματα [α]ὐτοῦ ἱερὰ καὶ δημόσια ἔστω τοῦ Ἀ[π]όλλωνος τ[ο-]  
ῦ Δαφνηφόρου. εἰ δέ τι ἄλλο ἐγκαλοῦσι Δήμ[αρχο]ς ἢ οἱ μετὰ Δη-  
μάρχου φυγόντες τοῖς μετὰ Ξενοφῶντ[ος] ἢ Ξενοφῶν ἢ οἱ[ι]  
μετὰ Ξενοφῶντος τούτοις ἐγκαλοῦ[σ]ι, ὅσα πρὸ τῆς Γ-  
οργύθου ἀρχῆς ἐγκλήματα ἐγένοντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τ-  
40 οὔτοις ἀπόκλητα εἶναι πάντα καὶ περὶ τ[ο]ύτων μήτε δ-  
ικαζέσθω μηδεὶς μήτε ἄρχων δίκην διδόντω· ἄ[ν] δὲ δ-  
ικάζεται ἢ διδῶι, ὁ μὲν δικαζόμενος ἀτιμος [ἐ]σται κ-  
αὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω, τοῦ δὲ διδ[ό]ντος  
τὴν δίκην τὰ χρήματα ἱερὰ καὶ δημόσια ἔστω [τ]οῦ Ἀπ-  
45 ὀλλωνος τοῦ Δαφνηφόρου. ἔδοξε τῇ ἐκκλησίῃ· τοὺς Ἰέ-  
ρωνος παῖδας καὶ Ἑπικράτην καὶ Ἀργαῖον τὰς δίκας κ-  
αὶ τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰ πιστώματα δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι  
ἐν τῷ μνηί τῷ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἀνθεσστηριῶν καθάπ-  
{π}ερ συγ<γ>έγραπται ὁ ὅρκος. ἂν δὲ μὴ ποιήσωσι τὰ δεδογ-  
50 μένα, στερέσθωσαν τῶν ἐγκλημάτων πάντων  
ὅσα πρὸ τῆς Γοργύθου ἀρχῆς ἐγένετο καὶ τῷ ὅρκ-  
ῳ ἐνοχοὶ ἔστων. ἔδοξε τῇ ἐκκλησίῃ· τοὺς παῖδ-  
ας τοὺς Ἑρμίππου καὶ Ἐπιχάρους καὶ Δημωφέλε-  
ος, τούτων τοὺς μὲν ἐπιδημοῦντας ὀμνύειν κ-  
55 αὶ ἀγνίζειν καὶ ἀγνίζεσθαι καὶ τὰ πιστώματα δ[ι-]  
δόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι πάντα, τοὺς δ' ἀποδημοῦντα-  
ς, ὅταν ἔλθωσι, ὀμνύειν καὶ ἀγν[ί]ζειν καὶ ἀγ[νί-]  
ζεσθαι καὶ τὰ πιστώματα πάντα διδόν[α]ι κα[ὶ] δέ-  
χασθαι· ὅς δ' ἄμ παραβῇ τῷ γεγραμμένῳ[ν τι,]  
60 ἐνοχος ἔστω κατὰ τὸν ὅρκον ὃν ἔδοξε τῇ ἐκκλ[η-]  
σίῃ. οἱ δὲ ὅρκοι καὶ τὰ πιστώματα ἐγένον[το]  
καὶ τὰ ἀπόκλειτα τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις πᾶσι ἐκ-  
τὸς Δάφνωνος τοῦ Πολυζήλο καὶ Κηφισοδώρ[ο] τοῦ  
Ἀγαθοκλέος. τούτοις δέ, ἐπειδὴν τὰς δίκας δῶσ[ι] καὶ δέξ-  
65 ωνται κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἂν ἀποφύγωσι, μετεῖναι<ι> τῶν ὅρκ-  
ων κα[ὶ] τῷ μ πιστωμάτων πάντων, ὥμπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις πο-  
λίταις. ὅρκος· πολιτεύσομαι ἐπίπασι δικαί<ω>ς καὶ δημο-  
σίαι καὶ ἰδία καὶ τὴμ πολιτείαν οὐ μεταστήσω τὴμ πα-  
τρίαν, οὐδὲ ξένους εἰσδέξομαι ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τοῦ κοινοῦ  
70 τοῦ Δικαιοπολιτέων οὐτέ ἰδιώτεω οὐδὲ ἐνός· καὶ οὐ μν-  
ησικακήσω οὐδενὶ οὐτ[ε] λόγῳ οὐτε ἔργῳ· καὶ οὐ θανατώσω  
οὐδένα οὐδὲ φυγῇ ζημιώσω οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρήσομ[α-]  
ι ἔνεκα τῷμ παρηκόντων· καὶ ἂν τις μνησικακή, οὐκ αὐ[τ-]  
ῷ ἐπιτρέψω· καὶ ἀπὸ τῷμ βωμῶν καθελέω καὶ καθαιρεθ[ή-]

- 75 σομαι· καὶ πίστιν δώσω καὶ δέξομαι τὴν αὐτήν· καὶ ἀγνιώ  
καὶ ἀγνιούμαι καθότι ἂν τάξι[η]  
[τ]ὸ κοινόν· καὶ εἴ τινα ἐπίστωσα  
[ῆ] ἐπιστωσάμην, δώσω καὶ δ-  
[έ]ξομαι καθάπερ ἐπίστωσα καὶ
- 80 ἐπιστωσάμην· ἔν τε ταῖς δί-  
καις αἰς ἐδίκησεν ἡ πόλις ἐμ-  
μενέω· καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλον ὅρκ[ον]  
ᾧμοσα, λύω, τόνδε δὲ σπουδαιότα-  
τομ ποιήσομαι. ταῦτα ἔμπεδορ-
- 85 κήσω ναὶ μὰ Δία, Γῆν, Ἥλιομ, Πο-  
σειδεώ. εἰ μὲν εὐορκήσαιμι,  
πολλά μοι ἀγαθὰ γίνοιτο κα[ὶ]  
[αὐ]τῶι καὶ παισὶ καὶ χρήμασ[ι·]  
[ε]ἰ δὲ ἐπιορκήσαιμι, κακῶς [έ-]
- 90 μοὶ γίνοιτο καὶ αὐτῶι καὶ πα[ι-]  
σὶ καὶ χρήμασι. δέχομαι ἀπὸ τοῦ [υ]  
βωμοῦ παραθήκην παρὰ τοῦ Ἀπ[ό-]  
[λ]λωνος κατὰ τοὺς ὅρκους οὓς ᾧμ-  
οσα, εἰ μὲν ἐ[μ]μείναιμι ἐν τοῖς
- 95 ὅρκοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς πιστώμασι π-  
[ά]σι, πολλά μοι καγαθὰ γίνοιτο  
καὶ αὐτῶι καὶ παισὶ καὶ χρήμασι· εἰ δὲ  
[ἐπιο]ρκήσαιμι δεξιόμενος πα-  
[ραθ]ήκην παρὰ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος,
- 100 [έ]ξώλης εἶην καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ γέ-  
νος τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχον-  
τα πάντα· τιμωρήσειεν δὲ ὁ  
[θ]εὸς παρ' οὗ ἔλαβον τὴν παρ-  
αθήκην μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων
- 105 θεῶν πάντων.

[*vacat* God (?)] Good Fortune. *Resolved by the assembly*: Lykios and the conciliators made the following proposal concerning the reconciliation. Concerning all relevant matters, Lykios should have authority for putting them to the vote and bringing them into force in the assembly.

*Resolved by (l. 5) the assembly*: all the citizens should swear the oath which has been drawn up in the three most sacred sanctuaries and in the agora, by Zeus, Earth, Sun and Poseidon, having sacrificed a boar. Let Lykios and the conciliators administer the oath. Having written up the oath and all the pledges on stone, (10) they should place them in the sanctuary of Athene. They should also place in the agora the same oath and the pledges, having written them on stone. All should swear within three days. As for those who are abroad or ill: he who is abroad should swear and be purified (15) within three days of whenever he returns; he who is ill should swear within three days of whenever he recovers. Let them administer the oath to them on the same terms. Whoever does not swear the oath as it has been written, let his property be public and sacred to Apollo (20) Daphnephoros, let him be without civic rights and let him not

participate in legal affairs. Perdikkas should be made witness and guarantor of the oaths and all the pledges and it should be requested of him that, if anyone overturns the oaths and the pledges, he should, (25) if he is able, put them to death, and that, if they flee, the Dikaiopolitans should be allowed to arrest them anywhere in the territory of which Perdikkas is in control.

*Resolved by the assembly:* Proceedings concerning all the murder cases which arose before the magistracy of Gorgythos<sup>11</sup> should be conducted during Gorgythos' magistracy on the fifth day from the end (30) of the month of Daphnephorion. If anyone does not conduct legal proceedings, let the charges be excluded for him. If anyone admits a murder case or brings a suit which the assembly voted to exclude, the man who brings the suit should be exiled from the territory of the Dikaiopolitans and his property should be made public and the one who admits the case should lose his civic rights (35) and his property should be made public and sacred to Apollo Daphnephoros. If Demarchos or those who fled with Demarchos make any other charges against Xenophon's faction, or Xenophon or Xenophon's faction make charges against them, the charges which arose between them before Gorgythos' magistracy should be excluded and no one (40) should bring a suit and no magistrate should admit a case about them. If anyone brings a suit or admits a case, the one who brings the suit should lose his civic rights and his property should be made public and the property of the one who admits the case should be made public and sacred to Apollo (45) Daphnephoros.

*Resolved by the assembly:* the sons of Hieron and Epikrates and Argaios should bring and incur suits and give and receive the oaths and the pledges in the months of Lenaion and Anthesterion in accordance with the oath which has been written up. If they do not do what has (50) been decided, let them be deprived of all charges [sc. relating to events] before the magistracy of Gorgythos and let them be liable in accordance with the oath.

*Resolved by the assembly:* those of the children of Hermippos and Epichares and Demopheles who are in the city should swear and (55) give and receive purification and give and receive all pledges; those who are abroad, whenever they arrive, should swear and give and receive purification and give and receive all pledges. Anyone who transgresses anything which has been written (60) should be liable according to the oath which was agreed by the assembly.

The oaths and the pledges and the exclusions happened for all the other citizens except for Daphnon son of Polyzelos and Kephisodoros son of Agathokles. These men, whenever they bring and incur suits (65) according to the law, if they are acquitted, should participate in all the oaths and the pledges, the same as the other citizens.

*Oath:* I will be just in my behaviour as a citizen towards all in public and in private affairs. I will not change the ancestral constitution, nor will I admit foreigners to the detriment of the commonwealth (70) of the Dikaiopolitans or of any individual. I will not bear grudges towards anyone in word or deed. I will not put anyone to death or

<sup>11</sup> The formulation is a bit ambiguous (literally, 'all the murder cases which are before the magistracy of Gorgythos'). This is most probably a reference to all murder suits relating to events before Gorgythos' archonship, but it might have a narrower meaning: it might refer to cases which have already been brought, or at least formally announced, by that point.

punish anyone with exile or confiscate anyone's property for the sake of what is in the past. If anyone does bear a grudge, I will not allow him. I will take down (others) from the altars (75) and be taken down myself. I will give and receive the same good faith. I will give and receive purification as the commonwealth orders. If I bound anyone by a pledge or gave a pledge myself, I will give and receive as I exacted or gave (80) a pledge. I will remain faithful to the judgements which the polis made. If I swore some other oath, I revoke it, and I will make this one the most binding. I will uphold these sworn pledges (85) by Zeus, Earth, Sun and Poseidon. If I keep my oath, may many good things happen to myself, my children and my property. If I break my oath, may things (90) turn out badly for me and my children and my property. I am receiving a deposit from the altar of Apollo in accordance with the oaths which I swore. If I remain faithful to (95) the oaths and all the pledges, may many good things occur for me and my children and my property. If I break my oath after receiving a deposit from Apollo, (100) may I be utterly destroyed, myself and my line and all my property, and may the god from whom I took the deposit take revenge on me with all the (105) other gods.

*Ὁμόνοια*, so prominent at Nakone, is strikingly absent from the whole Dikaiopolitan text. Admittedly, the cult of Homonoia was far from well-established at this date, but the concept itself was in circulation from the end of the fifth century.<sup>12</sup> Its absence from the Dikaiopolitan settlement could well, therefore, have been a result of deliberate choice. In any case, rather than stressing 'Nakonian' concord and unity, this settlement gave priority to other political values.<sup>13</sup>

The distinctive style of reconciliation and vision of civic order characteristic of the settlement are crystallized in the oath of reconciliation, which was sworn by all citizens. The first clause is the promise: 'I will be just in my behaviour as a citizen towards all' (*πολιτεύσομαι ἐπίπασι δικάϊ<ω>*s, l. 67). This promise was probably placed first in the oath because it represents a punning promise to be, quite literally, a 'Dikaiopolitan'. It was thus a promise to uphold the polis' founding political principle: the original Eretrian founders, quite possibly exiled Eretrian Medisers of the early 470s, probably called their new polis the 'City of Justice' for ideological reasons, partly as a veiled criticism of the incumbent regime at home.<sup>14</sup> Significantly, abstract justice is conspicuous by its absence from other surviving inscribed post-*stasis* civic oaths, from Tegea, Itanos and Telos.<sup>15</sup> The Dikaiopolitan oath's championing of this aspect of Dikaia's political traditions probably even reflects a conscious preference on the part of the arbitrators and Dikaiopolitan assembly-goers for justice over civic friendship, community, or unqualified reconciliation.

<sup>12</sup> Thériault (1996), 180.

<sup>13</sup> Compare my earlier presentation of this interpretation of the document in Gray (2013d).

<sup>14</sup> D. Knoepfler in *BE* 2008, 263; cf. this book, Chapter 6.5.2.

<sup>15</sup> Tegea and Telos: see Chapter 2.2.2. Itanos: *IC* III iv 8 (probably third century; it is very likely that the inclusion in the oath of strong renunciations of revolutionary behaviour was a response to recent *stasis*).

The rest of the oath, from l. 68 onwards, makes clear the basic characteristics of the distinctive type of civic justice involved. Its main features are punctilious respect for procedures and studied obedience to the demands of a particularly uncompromising and precisely calibrated form of the tit-for-tat reciprocity distinguished from other forms of reciprocity in my Introduction. This particular type of reciprocity requires energetic pursuit, and staunch defence, of the ideal of particularly close equivalence between a good or bad turn and the response to it, though it still does not demand formal contracts or immediate requital. It may be called ‘strict reciprocity’ for convenience.

The concern for procedures is immediately apparent at the start of the oath: after promising to be just citizens, Dikaiopolitan citizens had to swear to abide by the ancestral constitution, a clause making respect for law and procedure, another category of ‘justice’, paramount. They were then obliged to make a sequence of negative pledges to respect fellow citizens and to respect procedures: they had to promise not to admit foreigners to the city to the harm of the community or of any individual; not to bear grudges; not to put anyone to death, exile anyone, or confiscate anyone’s property for the sake of things in the past; and not to collaborate with anyone who did bear grudges. They then had to promise: ‘I will take down (others) from the altars and be taken down myself’ (καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν βωμῶν καθελέω καὶ καθαιρεθ[ή]σομαι). The meaning was probably that they would not allow the asylum of the altars to be used to avoid punishment for contravening the terms of the settlement, or themselves make use of it in that way.<sup>16</sup> The text’s emphasis on respect for procedures and formal decisions is reinforced in the later promises, first, to give and receive in accordance with past pledges and, second, to abide by judgements which the polis made (ll. 77–82).

The link between the concern for the inviolability of procedures and the concern for strict reciprocity is the promise: ‘I will give and receive the same good faith’ (καὶ πίστιν δώσω καὶ δέξομαι τὴν αὐτήν, l. 75). This promise probably represented an undertaking to participate in a symbolic exchange of pledges at the end of the oath-taking.<sup>17</sup> It was thus probably no less than a promise to join in enacting a symbolic Dikaiopolitan civic contract: citizens

<sup>16</sup> Compare Chaniotis (2012), 134, n. 41. Alternatively, this could be a reference to a ritual of supplication or reconciliation involving the altars.

<sup>17</sup> Compare the references to ‘pledges’ (πιστώματα) in connection with ‘the oath’ (ῥρκος) in the second assembly decree (ll. 11–12, 22). The procedure was probably that each citizen would give his pledge of faith to all fellow citizens collectively and receive in return the deposit (παραθήκη) from Apollo mentioned later in the oath (ll. 91–4), which would symbolise the reciprocal good faith sworn by each of his fellow citizens, observed and guaranteed by Apollo. Significantly, the word παραθήκη could itself be used elsewhere to refer to things given in trust, as a guarantee of loyalty (see, for example, Herodotus 6.73; compare the more metaphorical use at 9.45). Compare its use to refer to financial deposits given to another for safekeeping, on agreed terms (SEG 19.595, ll. 3–4; compare Herodotus VI.86β1).

were to each give the same mutual pledge, of good faith and non-aggression, and thus to constitute their polis as a pact for mutual security.

This particular promise of contractual good faith is strongly in keeping with the surrounding pledges to show good faith in connection with the constitution, legal decisions, procedures, and particular pledges. However, it also makes clear the centrality of strict reciprocity to the Dikaiopolitan reconciliation: it is made explicit that each is to give and receive *the same* pledge. This insistence on strict equivalence encapsulates the essence of strict reciprocity, or of the principle of *do ut des* (or *quod dedisti*). Idealization of the same type of strict reciprocity is also evident in the surrounding pledges (ll. 74–7), by which citizens promise to undergo and perform the same things, using the same verbs in the active and then the passive or middle: ‘I will take down (others) from the altars and be taken down myself’; and ‘I will give and receive purification as the commonwealth orders’. The strictly reciprocal ethos of the mutual exchange of pledges, and the whole oath, is reinforced by the fact that they are subsequently given special protection, in a further appeal to standards of strict reciprocity: if the swearer perjures himself, Apollo should punish him in revenge, together with all the other gods (ll. 102–5).

Reciprocity and desert were also given great weight in the provisions of the Dikaiopolitan settlement concerning past events. It was common for Greek bipartisan post-*stasis* settlements of this type dating to the fourth century and Hellenistic period to stipulate a comprehensive amnesty concerning the events of the *stasis*: no prosecutions could be brought concerning the events of the *stasis*.<sup>18</sup> A comprehensive amnesty was apparently commonly regarded as the best way to preserve civic harmony.<sup>19</sup> Delving into questions of responsibility and desert could rekindle civic tensions. Indeed, the question of what constituted murder during a *stasis* or under a controversial regime was particularly susceptible to partisan interpretation, something vividly evident in the anti-tyranny law from Hellenistic Ilion, which brands all who vote for a subsequently enforced death penalty under a non-democratic regime ‘murderers’.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Compare Dreher (2013); Rubinstein (2013). This claim, also central to chapter 2, relies on the traditional understanding of the very common reconciliatory pledge ‘not to remember ills’ (μὴ μνησικακεῖν) as a wide-ranging pledge not to seek any retribution, inside or outside court, for past ills, or, at least, all past ills which occurred during the disputes being resolved. This traditional view has recently been attacked by Carawan, e.g. (2002), (2012) and (2013), who thinks that, at least before the Hellenistic period, such a pledge merely represented a sealing promise to respect specific reconciliatory agreements. Although Carawan offers an interesting alternative interpretation of the evidence, he does not offer compelling reason to abandon the traditional interpretation; compare Joyce (2008); Canevaro and Harris (2012), 110, n. 68.

<sup>19</sup> See Dreher (2013), 85; Gray (2013d), esp. 379–84.

<sup>20</sup> *I.Ilion* 25 (Ilion, c.280), ll. 97–9.



At Dikaia, there was to be a wide-ranging amnesty, but it was to be subject to major qualifications. In a way comparable to the Athenian post-*stasis* settlement of 403, certain identified *stasis* ringleaders were liable for extraordinary prosecution (ll. 61–7). Moreover, the amnesty was qualified in a second significant and probably more distinctive<sup>21</sup> way (see ll. 27–45): all suits relating to events before the start of the archonship of Gorgythos were unconditionally ‘excluded’ from prosecution, except murder suits. Since the archonship of Gorgythos was almost certainly the current archonship, this clause would have enabled citizens to conduct legal proceedings concerning murder charges relating to the events of the *stasis*.<sup>22</sup> That this was the case is further confirmed by the explicit statement (ll. 36–41) that, if the factions have any *other* grievance against one another (ἐἰ δέ τι ἄλλο ἐγκαλοῦσι), legal proceedings are barred. It was permitted to conduct proceedings for outstanding murder suits on a single day, the twenty-sixth day of Daphnephorion, after which they too would become ‘excluded’.

The aspiration evident here to a measure of retrospective justice concerning the events of the *stasis* represents powerful confirmation of the commitment to strict reciprocity of the arbitrators, and presumably also of the arbitrated. Indeed, it shows that they were sufficiently committed to principles of strict reciprocity to insist on strict retrospective justice, even at the risk of reopening intractable questions about recent civic history and political legitimacy, or even unleashing renewed civic discord. It is true that murder suits were permitted only on one day, which represented an attempt to limit the extent of possible judicial retribution. This restriction can itself, however, be seen as evidence that the Dikaiopolitans were aware of the boldness of allowing murder suits in the first place, and the risks which doing so posed.

Like the Nakonian settlement, the Dikaiopolitan settlement reveals in unusually pure, unmixed, and uninflected form underlying basic ways of understanding politics, clearly central to Dikaiopolitan political culture.<sup>23</sup> The ritual of exchanging pledges of faith, as a means of re-establishing civic order, gestures towards an approach to the foundations of political life quite common among Greek intellectuals: the ‘contractarian’ view that fundamental ethical and political norms and institutions are the product of a social contract, for mutual security and advantage, among past or present humans. This was a basic

<sup>21</sup> According to standard modern interpretations of the Athenian amnesty of 403, that amnesty also permitted some murder suits. However, the solidity of those modern interpretations is questioned in Gray (2013d), 385–7, 398–401; see also Chapter 2.2.1.

<sup>22</sup> As noted in this chapter’s n. 11, the formulation makes it possible that it was only murder cases which had already been formally started before Gorgythos’ archonship which could be brought, but a broader interpretation of the provision is probably preferable.

<sup>23</sup> If the arbitrators were Dikaiopolitans arbitrating between Dikaiopolitans, Dikaiopolitan political culture would undoubtedly have strongly shaped the settlement. If they were foreigners, they would have been partly influenced in their decision-making by other political cultures. However, in order to arbitrate between the former factions and to achieve a settlement which was to be ratified by the assembly of their host city, they would have had to take account also of local political culture.

approach to ethics and politics which was advanced by some Classical Sophists, by Epicurean philosophers,<sup>24</sup> and by Polybius.<sup>25</sup>

However, the Dikaiopolitan settlement reflects more clearly the influence of a related basic political paradigm, more concerned with the basic practical shape of a good polis than with the most fundamental origins of political order. This paradigm is a quite radical version of the second major type of civic paradigm discussed in the Introduction. According to this quite radical version of that type of paradigm, a polis should be a very efficient and strictly fair association of quite strongly self-interested and competitive individuals. Its principal role should be to strenuously protect the security and advance the distinct, separate interests of each of its citizens, especially where they happen to overlap. It should do so by providing a well-defined ethical and political framework of institutions, standards, rewards, incentives, and deterrents, within which citizens can peacefully and fairly engage in sometimes intense debate, bargaining and competing with one another, identifying common ground, and resolving differences.

Citizens should still show a commitment to strict justice and to their polis, especially its laws and procedures. Indeed, they should regularly engage in social and political life, both competing and conditionally cooperating with fellow citizens, albeit principally as an efficient and fair means of advancing self-interest.<sup>26</sup> It may be significant in relation to this argument that the Dikaiopolitans described their polis as a *κοινόν* ('commonwealth', ll. 69–70), a term often used in Greek socio-political language of voluntary associations, whether local clubs or federal agglomerations of states.

This more practical paradigm could be treated by Greeks, as in the Dikaiopolitan case, as the more practical correlate of contractarian principles. However, it could also be divorced from those principles. As will become clear in this book, citizens often treated their polis as an association of this type without reflecting about the deeper origins of political order, or while insisting that ethical and political standards and institutions are grounded in divine sanction or human nature. Conversely, not all contractarian thinkers regarded a strict, competitive association of this type as the necessary result of the initial social contract. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Anonymus Iamblichii offers an argument that a social contract will yield a very high level of mutual trust and sharing: something closer to Nakonian civic relationships.

Because it is necessary to distinguish this basic paradigm clearly from contractarian thinking, it is difficult to find an appropriate name among existing political theoretical vocabulary. In order to use an abstract term, it

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Laks and Schofield (1995), 3; Alberti (1995).

<sup>25</sup> Polybius 6.6.4–12; cf. Hahn (1995).

<sup>26</sup> Compare the model of 'the state as a partnership' which Asmis (2004) sees as the cornerstone of Cicero's *De Re Publica*.

would be necessary to invent a name, such as ‘associatarian’ or ‘strict associatarian’ or ‘egoist associatarian’. The strategy used in this book is to call this paradigm the ‘Dikaiopolitan’ paradigm, because it came to the surface of political rhetoric in an unusually pure form at Dikaia.

With the aid of the Dikaiopolitan settlement, it is possible to define more precisely some of the specific basic norms intrinsic to the ‘Dikaiopolitan’ paradigm. These include what may be called ‘regulatory’ norms: norms which encourage the devising of institutions, procedures, rules, and practical steps to regulate relations between citizens who remain in their ‘natural’ state, often sharply conflicting and mainly self-interested, or undergo only relatively limited changes to their habits. Such measures serve to mediate between, coordinate, and keep in check such citizens, in very efficient and scrupulously fair ways. Regulatory norms should be contrasted with ‘Nakonian’ norms authorizing measures designed radically to transform citizens’ characters and aspirations; to give citizens space to develop to the full habits of voluntary virtuous action;<sup>27</sup> or to rigorously constrain citizens’ freedom in accordance with some very substantial notion of a shared greater good.

The dichotomy has some overlap with the distinction between ‘proceduralist’ and ‘substantive’ approaches to law vigorously debated in modern scholarship about Greek law.<sup>28</sup> However, it certainly does not correspond to it. ‘Nakonian’ laws might be proceduralist in the sense of concentrating on procedure: they might simply create procedures and institutions which offer a forum for citizens to exercise voluntary civic virtue. More importantly, regulatory laws often offer substantive guidance about how to live and conduct civic life. They are often designed to shape citizens’ conduct, encouraging them to act hard-headedly and fairly in a wide range of areas, extending far beyond engagement with procedures themselves. Crucially, however, they are designed to do so principally through constraints, deterrents, and incentives, rather than by radically transforming character and motivation.

A clear example of the difference between regulatory and non-regulatory types of law comes in Aeschines’ discussion in his *Against Timarchus* of Athenian laws on pederasty. Aeschines claims that Athenian law forbids slaves from loving boys at all, but does allow free men to do so, encouraging them to exercise self-control and cultivate self-controlled relationships.<sup>29</sup> Aeschines assumes here that the prohibition in the case of slaves is necessary because slaves are incapable in principle of exercising the necessary self-control: a regulatory constraint is necessary to remove any opportunity for slaves to harm boys. In the

<sup>27</sup> Compare the Greek approaches to written law discussed in Bertrand (1999), putting Plato’s *Laws* in context: written law should not be a fixed constraint, a replacement for oral discussion of ethics and virtue, but an aid and incitement to reflection and debate.

<sup>28</sup> For discussion of this debate, and advocacy of a substantive interpretation of Athenian law, see, for example, Harris (2006), esp. sect. 4.

<sup>29</sup> Aeschines 1.138–9.

case of free men, by contrast, regulatory measures, aimed at guaranteeing the personal safety of boys at all costs, would be counter-productive: they would remove the possibility for free men, whose characters are suited to virtue, to develop to the full the habits of voluntary self-control and care for vulnerable fellow citizens indispensable for 'Nakonian' civic community.

Regulatory institutions and measures take many practical forms. They include those which serve to give special protection to the distinct interests of each individual citizen: note, for example, the inclusion in the Dikaiopolitan oath of an explicit pledge not to harm the person or confiscate the property of a fellow citizen, for the sake of past events.<sup>30</sup> Also regulatory are the many possible varieties of institution and procedure which serve primarily to keep conflict between citizens within peaceful bounds, especially by deterring violence or other anti-social behaviour and enabling peaceful bargaining. For their part, the Dikaiopolitans threatened secular and divine punishment for those who contravened the settlement. Conversely, they also emphasized, and gave special protection to, civic institutions which might in future permit citizens with differences to reach mutually acceptable, durable compromises. Citizens were explicitly required to swear to respect the outcome of proceedings in the civic courts. They were also required to swear to respect the ancestral constitution. In the light of the city's name, this 'ancestral constitution' presumably included punctiliously 'just' regulations, including some concerning political deliberation in the assembly.

Regulatory institutions and measures also include those giving particular weight to good faith between citizens in the observance and preservation of all these conflict-regulating and interest-balancing procedures, and also of resulting specific contracts. In the Dikaiopolitan case, relevant measures include the strong promises in the oath to respect prior and future specific pledges and contracts. Finally, regulatory institutions and measures can also take a range of more positive forms, designed to encourage civic prosperity and cooperation, not directly attested in the Dikaiopolitan settlement itself. In particular, they include institutions and measures designed to achieve coordination between citizens by appealing to, or productively channelling, individual citizens' pre-existing distinct interests and aspirations for self-preservation and self-aggrandizement.

The other principal specific norms intrinsic to the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm, shown above in this section to be clearly reflected in the Dikaiopolitan settlement itself, are norms of strict, literal-minded reciprocity. These encourage the distribution of goods and burdens among citizens according to harsh principles of tit-for-tat, under which entitlements and obligations are usually

<sup>30</sup> For a comparable 'regulatory' attitude, consider Demosthenes' claim in the *Against Leptines* that Athenian laws' most important aim is to prevent Athenians killing one another (Demosthenes 20.157).

determined through precise, materialistic calculation. These norms can apply both to relations between individual citizens and to relations between individual citizens and the citizen-body as a whole. In many cases beyond Dikaia, 'Dikaiopolitan' norms of strict reciprocity were applied to questions concerning the distribution of political power, honours, and opportunities: it was treated as axiomatic that tangible contributions to civic welfare should be requited with carefully calibrated tangible rewards. Indeed, Aristotle comments on the centrality of such strict reciprocity to fourth-century civic life in general.<sup>31</sup> This was an area in which the basic 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm possessed indeterminacies comparable to those of the 'Nakonian' paradigm: it did not offer anything like precise guidance concerning the question—what should count as a valuable contribution, and what a fitting reward?

Many pieces of evidence from outside Dikaia reflect the influence of only one or the other of the two principal components of the basic 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm, regulatory norms and norms of strict reciprocity. However, it was certainly not only at Dikaia that the close entwining of the two sets of norms was made explicit. For example, Aristotle at one point clearly brackets them together in his description of the principal components of a basic notion of a polis which he thinks inadequate, quite close to this book's 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm: in Aristotle's view, a polis is not a community living in a single place, for the sake of mutual protection from injustice and exchange (ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία τόπου, καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν). Those features must exist 'if there will be a polis', but they are not sufficient for qualification as a polis.<sup>32</sup>

A general objection might be that it is not clear why the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm should be regarded as radical or distinctive to anything like the same extent as the 'Nakonian' paradigm. It is, therefore, worth attempting to explain in detail, again with the aid of the Dikaiopolitan settlement, in what respects the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm encapsulated a quite radical way of thinking of a polis as an efficient, fair association. For one thing, as emphasized throughout the discussion above, the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm demanded very uncompromising enforcement of relevant rules and of principles of strict reciprocity, even, as at Dikaia itself, at the risk of endangering civic stability.

For another thing, the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm was quite radical in the nature and degree of the individualism on which it was based. Like any paradigm treating a polis as an association, the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm

<sup>31</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1132b21–1133a5. Clear evidence for the centrality of reciprocal χάρις in fourth-century Greek ethics is its crucial role in Xenophon's ethics, analysed in Azoulay (2004): Xenophon stresses the association of χάρις with exchange (e.g. Azoulay (2004), 28 or 41, discussing Xenophon *Memorabilia* 4.4.24: 'is it not lawful [or customary] (νόμιμον) everywhere to perform favours in return for those who perform favours (τοὺς εὖ ποιοῦντας ἀντεπεργετεῖν)?').

<sup>32</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1280b29–35.

treated the citizens of a polis as very much individuals. For its part, the rival 'Nakonian' paradigm was based on strongly anti-individualistic assumptions about human nature and potential. In particular, it was based on the assumption that the personal horizons of political subjects are usually decisively formed by their membership of particular social and political communities. From a 'Nakonian' perspective, this embeddedness must be reflected in political institutions and standards which encourage a very high level of solidarity, enabling wide-ranging attempts at collective self-definition. The prominence of this kind of view of human subjects in Greek thought has been emphasized by Gill, who stresses the importance in Greek thinking of an 'objective-participant' conception of self.<sup>33</sup>

According to the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm, by contrast, the typical citizen should not be conceived as an inextricable community member, but as a relatively independent individual, who might potentially remain much the same in identity and aims even if largely detached from his community in both thoughts and emotions.<sup>34</sup> Indeed, the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm relied for its coherence and relevance on the assumption that citizens are capable both of great independence of thought and emotion in developing their own ends and projects and of wide-ranging free choice in pursuing them, often in competition with fellow citizens. If citizens were not capable of substantial competition and conflict, there would be no need for characteristically 'Dikaiopolitan' institutions and standards, designed to mediate between citizens and enable them to reach compromises.

In the Dikaiopolitan example itself, the influence of this kind of individualistic assumption is evident in the approach taken towards the question of responsibility for the *stasis*. As Loraux has shown, in many cases, in a phenomenon explored further in Chapter 2, Greeks treated *stasis* as a collective madness or disease, for which individuals could not reasonably be held responsible.<sup>35</sup> This kind of reaction to *stasis* betrays the influence of the assumptions about self and agency underpinning the 'Nakonian' paradigm: citizens' characters and aspirations are inextricably entwined with one another, in such a way that it is much easier to talk about collective agency, virtuous or vicious, than about individual agency. At Dikaia, by contrast, there was much less hesitancy than normal about assigning responsibility for the *stasis* to the voluntary agency of individual citizens, rather than to collective irrationality or to malign external interference. Not only were some murder trials permitted relating to the *stasis*, but Dikaiopolitan citizens were required to swear to give

<sup>33</sup> Gill (1996), e.g. 6–12; (2006), ch. 6; cf. Farenga (2006), Introduction.

<sup>34</sup> He should not, however, be considered to resemble an extreme version of the modern Romantic self, possessing a highly subjective inner life, not accessible or comprehensible even in principle to anyone else. That conception of individuality, and associated puzzles such as the problem of other minds, are difficult to identify in ancient evidence (compare Vernant (1989)).

<sup>35</sup> See Loraux (2001), 22, 25; Loraux (2005), esp. 31–79.

and receive purification (ll. 75–7). Agreeing to such mutual purification represented an unusual admission by each individual citizen of his share of personal responsibility for the *stasis*.

While it shares this basic individualistic outlook with other possible ways of seeing a polis as an association, the ‘Dikaiopolitan’ paradigm was more radical than them in treating citizens as not only individuals, but particularly egoistic, competitive, and instrumentally rational individuals. The Dikaiopolitan paradigm was based on the assumption that citizens of a polis cannot be relied upon to act voluntarily as virtuous citizens and civic friends. Rather, they must be routinely constrained from egoistic wrongdoing through deterrents and encouraged to respect basic moral, legal, and political standards through incentives. These standards may themselves create habits of respect for procedures and rules, or even emotional attachment to them.

By contrast, the ‘Nakonian’ paradigm was based on the assumption that human beings are either naturally disposed to be highly public-spirited and cooperative, or susceptible to education and habituation aimed at making them so. Citizens who have actually achieved ‘Nakonian’ levels of civic solidarity, virtue, and unity would have little, if any, need for ‘Dikaiopolitan’ institutions, standards, deterrents, incentives, and even habits and emotions. Indeed, as Aristotle says, among true friends justice becomes superfluous (*φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης*).<sup>36</sup>

For their part, citizens who have not yet achieved, but seriously aspire to, ‘Nakonian’ unity would demand more ambitious measures, designed to habituate citizens to behave highly virtuously voluntarily. They might well even bridle at ‘Dikaiopolitan’ norms and institutions, as substantial constraints on the exercise of civic virtue or the forging of civic solidarity.<sup>37</sup> For example, the actual citizens of Nakone would probably have bridled at the publication of strict regulatory measures of the kind inscribed at Dikaia. The instincts of civic solidarity which they claimed to be rediscovering and recreating after their *stasis* would eventually make unnecessary strict, dispute-resolving procedures, let alone pointed insistence on their unconditional inviolability. At Dikaia, by contrast, there was not even any pretence of hope that reconciliation and durable order could be achieved by appeal to citizens’ higher instincts or latent solidarity with fellow citizens or by education: substantial constraints and grudging reciprocal guarantees, profitable for all parties, were the order of the day.

The intrinsic features and implications of the ‘Dikaiopolitan’ paradigm itself were as strongly egoistic as the assumptions on which it was based. First, as emphasized previously, ‘Dikaiopolitan’ institutions and laws left considerable scope for citizens to exercise personal freedom, in pursuit of their own private

<sup>36</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a26–7.

<sup>37</sup> Compare Plato *Laws* 743c5–e2: frequent litigation, especially when it arises from financial injustices and disputes, makes civic friendship impossible.

ends. This was because the constraining civic obligations involved were relatively minimal, compared with those entailed by the 'Nakonian' paradigm. On the one hand, citizens were technically obliged to demonstrate only a minimal level of civic commitment: abstention from undermining the basic order and security of their polis. On the other hand, citizens were required to give guarantees and services to fellow citizens and to the polis as a whole only to the extent that they had been, or expected to be, protected or benefited by their fellow citizens or by their polis.

Second, as well as minimizing burdens, the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm substantially encouraged the exercise of wide-ranging personal freedom by citizens: freedom in bargaining within the constraints of the civic association; and freedom in agitating more broadly for personal advantages, including civic benefits commensurate with contributions to the polis. Such bargaining, agitation, and competition might have important emotional dimensions, such as love of honour, desire for revenge, or simple competitiveness: 'Dikaiopolitan' behaviour was not necessarily drily dispassionate. At Dikaia, for example, citizens were permitted or even encouraged to stand up for their perceived entitlement to vengeance or retribution for murder through the courts, even in a fragile post-*stasis* environment. In her studies of Greek reconciliation after *stasis* in and after 403, Loraux argued that Greek citizens were only ever subconsciously<sup>38</sup> aware that division and conflict were inextricable elements of politics.<sup>39</sup> The Dikaiopolitan reconciliation shows clearly, in a phenomenon mirrored in other parts of this book, that fourth-century citizens could directly accept uncompromising conflict as a central part of politics.

Admittedly, Greeks only rarely spelled out the opportunities for egoistic pursuit of advantage opened up by 'Dikaiopolitan' stress on a shared regulatory framework of institutions and norms. However, this more commonly implicit basic approach to social life is crystallized in an analogy reportedly drawn by the third-century Stoic Chrysippus. According to Cicero, he compared life with a running-race, in which runners have a duty (*debet*) to strive to win and out-run competitors, to the greatest extent possible without physical foul play. In life, by analogy, it is not unjust (*iniquum*) to pursue one's own advantage, as long as one does not use illegitimate force to extract it from another, contrary to *ius*.<sup>40</sup>

Third, in addition to permitting or even encouraging positive self-seeking and demands for perceived deserts, the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm permitted or encouraged more defensive forms of self-interest on the part of citizens. Indeed, it encouraged citizens to adopt a posture, both rational and emotional, of distrustful self-sufficiency: they should attempt to insulate themselves against possible threats to their security, property, and honour from fellow citizens, rather than always attempting to reach out to them.

<sup>38</sup> Loraux (2001), 65.

<sup>39</sup> Loraux (2001), esp. 93–122.

<sup>40</sup> Cicero *De Officiis* 3.42.



In the Dikaiopolitan oath, the three adjacent pledges in which citizens promise to perform and undergo some activity read like grudging reciprocal pledges, exchanged between distrustful fellow citizens: each citizen promises to give guarantees, limit his own freedom of action, and make concessions, in return for precisely equivalent moves by his fellow citizens. It is true that even at Nakone both sides have to perform the same actions, each joining the new brotherhoods. Those moves are not, however, grudging, strategic concessions, but initial, open-hearted steps in the development of full-blooded, fraternal mutuality.

The negative pledges at Dikaia would surely have created or reinforced suspicions among Dikaiopolitans that their fellow citizens were the kinds of people who might engage in the forms of deceit, bad faith, and aggression which had to be explicitly renounced. A close parallel can be drawn with Feyel's recent analysis of the implications of the strict checks on magistrates' appointments and behaviour which were maintained in the Classical Athenian democracy, especially procedures of *dokimasia* (for vetting candidates for magistracies): if the Athenian democracy were viewed through that lens alone, the sources would give an impression of a 'société de soupçon', in which citizens were intent on reinforcing protections against possible abuses of power, even by their neighbours and associates.<sup>41</sup> In a similar way, the practice of making magistrates serve on boards with multiple members, bearing collective responsibility, was at least partly designed to encourage members to exercise 'surveillance' of one another.<sup>42</sup> The implication of relevant pledges and procedures, at Dikaia and Athens, was that wary distrust was an appropriate citizen attitude.

#### 4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PARADIGMS

##### 4.1. The Two Paradigms as Political Poles, Equally Divergent from a Proto-Kantian Middle

The 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigms were opposites. As emphasized in Section 3, they rested on diametrically opposed assumptions about human nature and the purpose and potential of politics. Moreover, they offered diametrically opposed pictures of the attitudes, habits, and behaviour necessary or desirable in a good citizen, both ethically grounded in their different

<sup>41</sup> Feyel (2009), 219; compare Johnstone (2011), 5, 49; P. Fröhlich in *BE* 2010, no. 105. For the widespread attestation of varied procedures of accountability in the Greek civic world, see Fröhlich (2004); (2013).

<sup>42</sup> Johnstone (2011), ch. 7, e.g. 147.

ways: the 'Nakonian' paradigm promoted selfless community-spiritedness; the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm allowed wary, scrupulous, but determined pursuit of self-interest within the just constraints of civic rules.

In some respects, the two paradigms were incommensurable; too different to be measured on a single scale. However, it is also helpful to think of them as, in some respects, two quite extreme positions on a continuous scale of possible political positions: a scale measuring the relative importance assigned to the community and the individual.<sup>43</sup> There is a large space on this scale between the 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigms. If the 'Nakonian' paradigm is towards the top of the scale, immediately below it there is considerable space for more moderate forms of community-oriented thinking about politics. Those more moderate forms can be distinguished from the 'Nakonian' paradigm itself because they have some shades of what was defined in the Introduction as a 'proto-Kantian' basic approach to politics: a basic approach, resembling that underlying much modern Kantian and neo-Kantian ethical and political philosophy, which gives priority to unconditional respect for individuals as ends in themselves. This approach treats individual citizens as possessors of distinctive needs and perspectives which are intrinsically worthy of political attention and consideration—achieved through widespread active involvement in pluralistic dialogue. Conversely, if the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm is towards the bottom of the scale, immediately above it there is considerable space for more moderate types of individualistic thinking about politics. Those too can be distinguishing from 'Dikaiopolitan' thinking itself on the grounds that they have some proto-Kantian shades.

Indeed, proto-Kantian thinking can be seen as the mid-point of the whole scale, which blends on each side into a penumbra of more moderate ways of thinking about politics, respectively more community-oriented and more individualistic. The reason why the proto-Kantian approach lies approximately half-way between the 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigms is that it promotes mutual concern and engagement, but not 'Nakonian' full-blooded fraternal unity, and welcomes or tolerates individual pursuit of personal ends and projects, but not 'Dikaiopolitan' single-minded, calculated pursuit of narrow self-interest.<sup>44</sup> The proto-Kantian approach requires citizens to show unconditional respect by taking a substantial interest, for its own sake, not

<sup>43</sup> The contrast between the paradigms has important similarities with the famous *gemeinschaft-gesellschaft* distinction of Tönnies (1935). However, a 'Nakonian' polis does not necessarily have any of the simplicity of a village-style *gemeinschaft*: it may have sophisticated institutions for promoting solidarity. Moreover, a 'Dikaiopolitan' polis is more oriented around principles of fairness and reciprocity than a modern urban-industrial, company-like *gesellschaft*.

<sup>44</sup> Relevant ways of thinking are often connected with 'contractualist' as opposed to 'contractarian' ideas: political community is not a straightforward contract for mutual security, advantage, and justice, but a more complex contract formed by autonomous individuals to protect the autonomy and dignity of each of them (cf. Darwall (2003)).

only in one another's welfare, but also in one another's values and outlook, an essential part of the pursuit of mutual understanding. At the same time, however, it does not lead citizens to expect or pursue strong convergence of opinion concerning principles or policies: it encourages citizens to develop personal objectives through reflection, sensitive to their surrounding environment, and to promote and defend them robustly.

A deeper reason why this proto-Kantian approach is intermediate between the 'Nakonian' and the 'Dikaiopolitan' approaches relates to the different conceptions of ethical and political value underlying the three approaches. The 'Nakonian' paradigm rests on the assumption that a true political community should be able to identify a single right answer to problems of value. This is partly because 'Nakonian' thinking is closely associated with the assumption that individuals' aims and opinions are strongly shaped by their social and political environment. At the other extreme, the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm rests on the assumption that the aims and values of the citizens of any polis will be so plural that political interaction can realistically take the form only of hard bargaining at a relatively superficial, materialistic level, within the constraints of established procedures and considerations of strict reciprocal justice. This is partly because the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm is closely associated with the assumption that individuals enjoy considerable agency and can freely develop their own opinions and aims, rather than being inextricably embedded in their communities. The intermediate proto-Kantian approach, for its part, relies on the intermediate assumption that citizens will be able to understand, and appreciate the force of, contrasting viewpoints through processes of dialogue and reflection. They will then be able collectively to achieve a consensus about the best course of action in given circumstances. This will involve mutual recognition of the simultaneous validity of different approaches, and the difficulties of reconciling them. The intermediate approach thus gives weight both to the social embeddedness and to the independent agency of individuals.

#### **4.2. Tensions between Civic Commitment and Strict Reciprocity**

It might be objected to this picture of the two paradigms as opposites that, even if they are different in nature and focus,<sup>45</sup> there are many fewer inherent tensions between them than suggested here. One possible objection would be that even radical norms of strict reciprocity are not strongly anti-'Nakonian', at least when applied to relations between individuals and the polis: it might

<sup>45</sup> See the discussion of the connections of the polis-as-association and polis-as-community paradigms with different forms of reciprocity in the Introduction, Section 6.

even be strongly consistent with ideals of strong community to reward substantial contributions to the common good with honours and privileges.<sup>46</sup>

My response to this objection is that the contradiction between the paradigms was very stark, even if many Greeks were often unconscious or insouciant of it. The principal reason is that the 'Nakonian' paradigm requires of citizens, not simply any civic contributions, but wholehearted solidarity, altruistic virtue, and unconditional devotion to the common good of the city, as a good in itself. This requirement entails that citizens should make regular, voluntary supererogative contributions to their fellow citizens and their polis, without any expectation of a return. Even though this aspect of the paradigm was not made fully explicit at Nakone itself, it did come to the surface in many other pieces of 'Nakonian' rhetoric.

Indeed, as Yunis has emphasized, orators of the Athenian democracy frequently appeal to an ideal of the selfless civic benefactor or orator: the one who puts his capacities, talents, and resources freely at the disposal of the polis, heedless of private concerns (his own or others'), debts owed, and potential rewards.<sup>47</sup> Such selfless devotion to one's polis involves contributing as much as one's means and abilities allow. For example, Demosthenes in his *Second Olynthiac* closely associates egalitarian civic organization with each citizen having the opportunity and duty to participate in politics and war, and to make an equal financial contribution according to his means (*ἀφ' ὅσων ἕκαστος ἔχει*).<sup>48</sup> Along similar, but non-democratic, lines, Xenophon associates King Agesilaos' status as a patriotic (*φιλόπολις*) Spartan king with his tendency to do anything possible to help his city, sparing no effort, danger, or expense.<sup>49</sup>

There is similar evidence from the Hellenistic period. The more 'Nakonian' parts of some Hellenistic honorary decrees, passed by poleis as tributes to benefactors, praise citizens for showing continuous commitment to the polis at the expense of personal material welfare. A citizen could be praised for making extensive use of his private wealth; putting devotion to his fatherland above all else, thinking personal losses of secondary importance;<sup>50</sup> or even regarding devotion to fellow members of his community, as opposed to wealth or honour, as his own most important personal attribute.<sup>51</sup> As examined further in the conclusion to this chapter, such honorary decrees also had important 'Dikaiopolitan' content and functions, but that complicates rather than diminishing the force of their 'Nakonian' rhetoric.

Strictly reciprocal, tangible rewards for civic contributions are thus out of kilter with the 'Nakonian' paradigm because tempting incentives and rewards are necessary only when 'Nakonian' ideals and institutions are ineffectual:

<sup>46</sup> Consider, for example, Luraghi (2010), 248–51, on Greek honorific practices.

<sup>47</sup> Yunis (1996).

<sup>48</sup> Demosthenes 2.30–1.

<sup>49</sup> Xenophon *Agesilaos* 7.1.

<sup>50</sup> *I.Sestos* 1 (dating to the 120s), ll. 4–7.

<sup>51</sup> *I.Priene* 107 (c.130 BC), ll. 18–21.

when wealthy or capable citizens are not predisposed to make voluntary, altruistic civic contributions. There is some surviving evidence for Greek rhetoric and institutions which indicate Greek recognition of relevant tensions between norms of strict reciprocity and 'Nakonian' norms. Scholars have identified in several Greek tragedies dramatic investigation of the tensions between an ethics of tit-for-tat reciprocity and retribution and a more public-spirited ethics of civic solidarity.<sup>52</sup> The Thucydidean Pericles also shows signs of awareness of tensions between the two codes. Thucydides makes his Pericles claim that the Athenians always try to make the first benefaction in a relationship, so that they are earning gratitude, not merely repaying a debt. In his next sentence, Thucydides' Pericles goes much further in disparaging strict reciprocity: the Athenians do not help others through a calculation of personal advantage, but through trust in their own liberality.<sup>53</sup>

There is evidence for similar ideas in actual democratic rhetoric. For example, the speaker of Lysias 21 implicitly disparages those who expect a 'gift' in return for their civic contributions.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, the speaker of Lysias 19 portrays his father as a man who donated to the polis 'without compulsion', contrasting his type with those who donate not only for its own sake, but also in order to obtain prestigious, lucrative offices. His father also paid ransoms and dowries for poorer fellow citizens, simply because he considered it good to help one's friends with money, even if no one else knows about it.<sup>55</sup> The speaker had a prudential interest in emphasizing his father's unstinting generosity: he wished to explain the small size of the estate left by his father by some other means than fraud. It is, however, notable that he expected his highly self-sacrificing notion of civic virtue, and disparagement of calculated pursuit of a tangible return for a good turn, to strike a chord with his audience.

In Hellenistic poleis, it was commonly expected that individuals should relinquish some of their strict entitlements and perceived deserts when civic friendship and harmony required it. Decrees praising foreign judges who have come to a polis to resolve financial disputes sometimes present as the best outcome an arbitrated settlement of differences, rather than strict enforcement of relevant laws and legal entitlements.<sup>56</sup> The endurance of this kind of approach in Hellenistic civic ethics may well have influenced some Stoic philosophers. Writing in the Stoic tradition, Seneca insists in his *De Beneficiis* that exchange of favours should not be a question of requital of like with like, but a matter of liberality. The giver of the first benefit should make no claims,

<sup>52</sup> See Seaford (1994); Goldhill (2004), 24–33.

<sup>53</sup> Thucydides 2.40.4–5. For the first sentiment, compare Xenophon *Agésilaios* 4.4.

<sup>54</sup> Lysias 21.11.

<sup>55</sup> Lysias 19.56–9; compare the arguments about the Ring of Gyges in Plato's *Republic*.

<sup>56</sup> Compare Chapter 4.2 below.

while the recipient should be eager to requite what he has received with something far superior.<sup>57</sup>

Greek advocates of 'Nakonian' ideals sometimes made explicit a fear that provision of strictly reciprocal rewards for civic service and contributions might encourage self-interest and harmful competition. In a fifth-century example, Thucydides presents his Diodotos arguing, in a speech before the Athenian assembly, that the Athenians should not give honours to good speakers or punish bad speakers: giving honours to good speakers merely encourages speakers to engage in self-serving flattery of the people.<sup>58</sup> In a fourth-century example, Isocrates argues, in his strongly 'Nakonian', traditionalist *Panathenaicus*, that things were far better in early Athens, when political office was regarded as a burden, not advantageous for personal prosperity, rather than an opportunity to gather prestige and other rewards. At that stage, those conscientious in their duties were only moderately praised,<sup>59</sup> while the slightest misconduct was severely punished, in a way going far beyond measured proportionality.<sup>60</sup> Fourth-century suspicion of the entanglement of political office with honour and privileges is also evident in Socrates' insistence in the *Republic* that those who should rule are those who are unwilling to do so: philosophers eager to return to theoretical contemplation,<sup>61</sup> individuals who have no interest in the intrinsic or coincidental honours and other personal benefits of ruling, because they are more interested in the 'other honours' inherent in their lives of virtuous contemplation.<sup>62</sup>

In a Hellenistic example, the citizens of Kalymna made explicit their fears that strict enforcement of law and reciprocal justice could destroy civic unity. In an honorary decree, subsequently inscribed at Iasos, they praised Iasian foreign judges for persuading the parties to intractable legal disputes to accept arbitration, 'so that the people might not be thrown into greater uproar, with the matters being judged by a vote' (ὅπως μὴ διὰ ψάφου τῶν πραγμάτων κρινομένων εἰς πλέω παραχὰν ὁ δᾶμος [καθισ]τάται).<sup>63</sup> This association of enforcement of strict entitlements with the risk of unrest or even *stasis* recalls the immediate sequel to Xenophon's praise of Agesilaos' unconditional civic virtue, mentioned above. Xenophon praises Agesilaos for showing that it may not be patriotic to press one's claims to perceived just deserts: Agesilaos set an example of obedience to the law, of a type suitable to encourage even those

<sup>57</sup> Seneca *De Beneficiis* 1.4.2–3; the third-century Stoic Chrysippus is adduced as a supporter of this approach at 1.4.4.

<sup>58</sup> Thucydides 3.42.5–6.

<sup>59</sup> This implies that they did not necessarily receive any material rewards.

<sup>60</sup> See Isocrates 12.145–6; compare also the argument attacked in Demosthenes 20.112–15, discussed in Chapter 3.3.4.

<sup>61</sup> e.g. Plato *Republic* 347b6–d8, 520e1–521b10.

<sup>62</sup> Plato *Republic* 521b7–10.

<sup>63</sup> *I.Iasos* 82, ll. 39–42.

who consider themselves to be getting less than their share (*μειονεκτεῖν*) to desist from revolutionary activity.<sup>64</sup>

Furthermore, Greek advocates of strict reciprocity had to take into account scepticism about its presuppositions and effects. For example, Aristotle defends the granting of pay for office in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: magistrates' pay is simply an appropriate honour and privilege (*τιμὴ καὶ γέρας*). However, he seems sensitive at this point to the accusation that for magistrates to claim rewards for their contribution is self-serving: he is anxious to point out that, because the just magistrate claims only what is his due *and not more*, he does indeed 'labour for another', securing another's good.<sup>65</sup> Similarly, in the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon makes his Cyrus argue in favour of the principle that the proceeds of his military campaigns should be distributed in proportion to soldiers' actual contributions. He explicitly defends this approach against the rival, more utopian or 'Nakonian' view, supposedly supported instinctively by his common soldiers, that all should have equal shares of the booty. According to Cyrus, equal shares favour the indolent and give the impression that vicious behaviour can win rewards, whereas proportionate shares create incentives to stick to virtue.<sup>66</sup> Xenophon even presents Cyrus succeeding in persuading at least one common soldier: a certain Pheraulas praises the fact that, under Cyrus' scheme, all can compete on equal terms (*ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου*) for rewards.<sup>67</sup> This Pheraulas himself shows sensitivity to the counter-claims of equality and solidarity: as Johnstone argues, his remark about competing on equal terms represents an attempt to appropriate the language of equality, by arguing for something close to modern 'equality of opportunity'.<sup>68</sup>

The incompatibility of strictly reciprocal incentives and rewards with a substantial notion of justice is a central theme of some modern philosophical critiques of popular attitudes. The view that the provision of widespread incentives and rewards for benefactors is inconsistent with rigorous standards of equality and justice is a Marxist position. Marx himself identified incentives and rewards for contribution as bourgeois means of cementing the legitimacy of egoistic self-seeking and inequality. In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, he argues that rewards for labour will have to be retained pragmatically as incentives in the early stages of a future socialist society, but will eventually wither away in the face of the principle 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs'.<sup>69</sup> More recently in the Marxist tradition, Cohen

<sup>64</sup> Xenophon *Agesilaos* 7.1–2. For Agesilaos' tendency to rise above considerations of strict entitlement, see 4.3–5, especially the suggestion that Agesilaos' behaviour illustrated the value of 'having less than one's share with nobility on one's side, rather than more than one's share with injustice on one's side' (*σὺν τῷ γενναίῳ μειονεκτεῖν ἢ σὺν τῷ ἀδίκῳ πλεόν ἔχειν*).

<sup>65</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1134b2–8.

<sup>66</sup> Xenophon *Cyropaedia* 2.2.18–28, with Johnstone (2011), 141–5.

<sup>67</sup> Xenophon *Cyropaedia* 2.3.8. <sup>68</sup> Johnstone (2011), 142–3.

<sup>69</sup> Marx and Engels (1956–1990), vol. 19, 18–22.

has given prominence to the argument that the provision of incentives to encourage the talented to contribute to society is in tension with the ideal that all should be committed to justice as a good in itself.<sup>70</sup>

Nevertheless, scepticism about the compatibility of rewards for contribution with true justice has also become common among non-Marxist political philosophers. For example, Rawls insists that it is inappropriate to aim to reward individuals for contributions to society, because the extent of individuals' contributions is heavily influenced by genetic and environmental influences outside their control.<sup>71</sup> Taking a more neutral position, but still very conscious of the tension, Taylor insists that there is a genuine, ineradicable conflict in prominent modern Western ethical assumptions between the idea that contributions should be rewarded and the idea that all should always act on the best aspects of their natures, putting their talents fully and unconditionally at the disposal of their communities.<sup>72</sup>

Theoretical points related to those underpinning these modern philosophical moves were, however, probably already recognized in ancient Greece. There is an interesting example of a relevant line of thought in Plato's *Laws*. In Book V of that work, Plato's Athenian speaker suggests that, in the ideal scenario, all new colonists of the new imaginary city of Magnesia would be equal in total property, not merely in landholdings. This is presumably due to a 'Nakonian' social rule which the Athenian speaker elsewhere presents as proverbial: 'equality produces friendliness' (ἰσότης φιλότητα ἀπεργάζεται).<sup>73</sup> In reality, colonists will arrive with different amounts of movable wealth. It will thus in practice be necessary for many reasons, including 'equality', to distribute political offices and financial obligations, not absolutely equally, but in proportion to 'worth': not only in proportion to individual and family virtue and to bodily attributes, but also to 'use of wealth and poverty' (κατὰ πλούτου χρήσιν καὶ πενίαν).<sup>74</sup>

One of the 'many reasons' is probably that the burdens of office and financial obligations should fall hardest on the privileged and affluent, to compensate for their unequal standing. This would cohere well with the more general 'Nakonian' aspects of the *Laws*: its ideal of a polis of virtuous, educated, well-habituated, cohesive citizens, who willingly and conscientiously dedicate themselves to the interests of their polis and the defence of its laws.<sup>75</sup> It would also be consistent with the spirit of the immediately following proposal to enforce a maximum level of wealth for individuals.

<sup>70</sup> See especially Cohen (2008), chs. 1 and 4.

<sup>71</sup> Rawls (1972), 103–4.

<sup>72</sup> Taylor (1994), 39–42.

<sup>73</sup> Plato *Laws* 757a5–6.

<sup>74</sup> Plato *Laws* 744a8–d1.

<sup>75</sup> Compare the arguments in the *Laws* that law's function is to instil full virtue in citizens (cf. Bobonich (2002), 120–3, citing in particular 705d3–706a4, 770c7–771a4) and that citizens should be bound together in a close form of friendship, involving shared activities and aspirations (Bobonich (2002), 426–32, citing in particular 816c5–d2; cf. 743c5–6).



However, another unspecified reason why proportionate distribution of offices and burdens is desirable is presumably that, since citizens are in practice unequal in wealth, the wealthier must be given an incentive to contribute strenuously to the polis: the prospect must be held out that they will receive a proportionately greater share of the advantages of high office if they make more substantial contributions to the polis, showing a commendable, virtuous 'use of wealth'. This would explain why Plato's Athenian speaker here refers to making contributions proportional to 'use of wealth'. If he had intended simply to advocate a policy of 'from each according to his ability', he would have advocated proportionality to wealth *simpliciter*.

It would also explain why he claims that this type of proportionate distribution, 'equal by an unequal measure', well-suited to preventing disputes, is a distribution of 'honours (*τιμαί*) and offices (*ἀρχαί*)'. Whereas recipients might conceivably use offices merely as means to benefit the whole polis, rather than for personal advantage, 'honours' are clearly principally beneficial for recipients themselves. They are thus principally rewards or incentives, rather than principally collective resources which must be distributed in the most communally beneficial way. Along similar lines, in Book VI, when the Athenian speaker explicitly advocates proportionate 'equality' over the absolute equality which can be achieved by using the lot to distribute offices, he describes the former as the granting of greater honours (*τιμαί*) to superior individuals.<sup>76</sup> Interestingly, this comment casts the widespread use of the lot in Greek democracies as itself partly a 'Nakonian' reaction against 'Dikaiopolitan' attempts to associate appointments to magistracies with desert and earned entitlement.

These different Platonic accounts of equality and inequality cast into relief, not only different possible Greek attitudes towards reciprocity, but also the roots they sometimes had in different approaches to the basic function of political theory, of great importance for this book. As Schofield argues, 'two projects', one utopian and one realist, permeate the *Laws*, though they are really made explicit only in the Book V passage discussed above. Plato's Athenian speaker often stresses the need for a very high degree of civic unity and virtue. Elsewhere in Book V, for example, the Athenian speaker argues that citizens of Magnesia should be made as happy as possible, and friends with one another as far as possible (*ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις φίλοι*).<sup>77</sup> In parts of the earlier books and in the practical legislative suggestions of Books VII–XII, by contrast, he puts a much greater stress on the use of constraints and disincentives: an approach more tailored to dealing with egoistic, unreformable characters.<sup>78</sup> It is possible to compare the way the *Republic's* Socrates makes separate social regulations for different citizens: more utopian ones for

<sup>76</sup> Plato *Laws* 756e9–758a2.

<sup>77</sup> Plato *Laws* 743c6.

<sup>78</sup> See Schofield (2010), esp. 24–5.

guardians, suited to communal living, and more realist ones for non-guardians, reliant on the biological family and private property.

Significantly for the argument of this book, the more realist arguments pursued in these works involved approaching 'Dikaiopolitan' assumptions, norms, and institutions in a spirit quite different from that attested at Dikaia itself: treating them as regrettable concessions to imperfect human nature, to be accepted with resignation, rather than as desirable in themselves. A parallel can be drawn with a mirroring argument about strict negative reciprocity made by Polybius two centuries later: superstition and fear of divine retribution might not be necessary to keep order in a citizen-body composed purely of wise men, but they are very useful for keeping order among the unreliable, lawless, passionate multitude.<sup>79</sup>

In sum, there are good reasons for thinking that the 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigms are in tension with each other conceptually with regard to the question of rewards for civic contributions, and that some ancient Greeks were aware of that tension, its implications, and even its deeper roots. The view that the two paradigms were significant rivals to each other within the political culture of the Greek civic world must, however, face another major objection: the objection that the two paradigms shared the same Greek political vocabulary.

#### 4.3. The Ambiguities of Greek Political Vocabulary: Slippage between the Paradigms

It is true that it is not possible to point to distinctive Greek political vocabulary unique to each paradigm, which can serve as a reliable diagnostic tool. This raises important methodological problems in identifying the influence of the paradigms: it is necessary to look beyond individual words, by seeking to analyse the general spirit and assumptions of a given piece of rhetoric or institution. The sharing of vocabulary does not, however, count as a strong argument against the view that the two paradigms were rivals to each other within Greek civic political culture. Indeed, it is possible to make a strong argument that many major Greek political words and slogans oscillated between 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' meanings. In the same way as the two paradigms each gave different natures and functions to the same central civic institutions, such as law,<sup>80</sup> they each gave different meanings to central items of civic vocabulary.

<sup>79</sup> Polybius 6.56.9–12.

<sup>80</sup> Compare the discussion of 'regulatory' and 'Nakonian' approaches to law in Section 3 above.

For example, it is very significant that the ideal of justice figures prominently in both the Nakonian and the Dikaiopolitan settlement.<sup>81</sup> In the Nakonian settlement, it is the quality which, together with 'friendship' (φιλία), is to mark the communal life of the new brotherhoods. At Dikaia, by contrast, justice, as the unifying value of the civic association, is closely associated with the rule of law and strict reciprocity. More widely in Greek political discourse, δικαιοσύνη could be a 'Dikaiopolitan' matter of ensuring that all achieved what they strictly deserved, or it could be a 'Nakonian' matter of ensuring social harmony.

It is possible to cite, for example, the widely differing notions of justice canvassed within individual literary and philosophical works: for example, Aeschylus' *Eumenides*<sup>82</sup> and Plato's *Republic*. In the latter work, Socrates develops a 'Nakonian' conception of civic justice as a matter of solidarity, harmonious order, and the appropriate distribution of civic roles among citizens of different aptitudes.<sup>83</sup> He argues for this 'Nakonian' vision partly in reaction against the more 'Dikaiopolitan' notions of justice offered by other, more pragmatic characters in Books I and II: justice as keeping promises and giving back what one owes; helping friends and harming enemies; or respecting a social contract for mutual security and advantage.<sup>84</sup>

It is interesting to compare the approach to δικαιοσύνη in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*. Aristotle sometimes associates justice, or common notions of justice, closely with the common good,<sup>85</sup> but he also shows great sensitivity to the strictly 'just' claims of individuals to deserved rewards, retaliatory judicial punishment of those who have wronged them, and fair exchanges.<sup>86</sup> His interest in strict, precise justice is very clear in his discussion of justice in exchange, in which he argues that a just exchange is one in which the goods exchanged are exactly equal in value, something which can be precisely determined by considering the amount of demand for them.<sup>87</sup> The conflict between Aristotle's two approaches to justice is not insoluble at the level of theory: he can be considered to hold that certain principles of reciprocity and personal justice should be observed because their universal, long-term observance promotes the common good.<sup>88</sup> However, Aristotle's arguments still leave great scope for competing specific claims which each at least seem just. For example, a citizen who has been seriously wronged by a

<sup>81</sup> At Nakone, the word used was δικαιοσύνη, not the more common δικαιοσύνη.

<sup>82</sup> Compare Goldhill (1986), ch. 2, esp. 36–7, and (2004), 24–33: δίκη has many different meanings in the *Oresteia*, ranging from tit-for-tat retribution to cosmic and social harmony.

<sup>83</sup> Note, for example, Plato *Republic* 431e10–432b1, 434c4–10.

<sup>84</sup> On this last option: Schofield (2006), 87, with n. 110.

<sup>85</sup> e.g. Aristotle *Politics* 1282b16–18; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1129b14–19, 1160a12–14. For the strongly 'Nakonian' implications of such rhetoric, compare Holmes (2005), 12–13.

<sup>86</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1131a1–1134a16.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Yack (1993), ch. 5.

<sup>88</sup> Compare Kraut (2002), 156.

particularly talented or virtuous fellow citizen might make a 'just' claim to judicial retaliation, which another citizen could oppose on the 'just' grounds that removing or subduing this particular citizen would substantially reduce the total welfare and virtue of the citizen-body.

In an ambiguity which closely parallels this ambiguity in *δικαιοσύνη*, the principle that power and advantages should be assigned in accordance with 'worth' or 'value' (*κατ' ἀξίαν*), something on which Aristotle says fourth-century Greeks of all political persuasions agreed,<sup>89</sup> is susceptible to very different interpretations. It can be interpreted as expressing the widespread 'Dikaioopolitan' intuition that individuals should be awarded personal benefits in recognition of their talents, effort, and resulting contributions to the city: civic virtue should be rewarded.

The same words can, however, also be interpreted in a strongly 'Nakonian' way. They can be taken to capture the view that political power and material goods should be distributed in proportion to individuals' excellence, because that is the best way of ensuring the order and flourishing of the polis as a corporate community, in pursuit of communal goals: excellent individuals will use available power and resources in the way best for all. As Aristotle puts it, the most important political privileges should be given to those who are best equipped to use them well, in the same way that the best flutes should be given to the best flute players.<sup>90</sup> This is presumably partly because such individuals can not only help other citizens to flourish in virtue, as far as their natures allow, but also thereby exercise to the full their own advanced virtuous capacities, which is itself an important part of the flourishing of the Aristotelian polis.<sup>91</sup>

To sum up this point, the principle that power and advantages should be distributed *κατ' ἀξίαν* can be interpreted as capturing either 'to each according to his ability' or 'from each according to his ability', or both. One of the reasons why these different senses could be easily elided in Greek thought was a more basic ambiguity in the meaning of the 'common good' or the 'common interests' (*τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον, τὰ κοινά*) to which benefactors contributed. According to the 'Nakonian' paradigm, the common good is something above and beyond the separate private interests of individual citizens: it is the flourishing of all the polis' corporate interests, including both collective property, honour, and culture and individual citizens' virtue, which may have to occur at the expense of the immediate, narrow interests of individual members. Under the 'Dikaioopolitan' paradigm, by contrast, the common good represents the overlap between individual citizens' separate legitimate private interests, which are entwined through complex relations of interdependence and reciprocity.

<sup>89</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1131a24–9.

<sup>90</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1282b14–1283a26.

<sup>91</sup> Compare Frede (2005), 179.

Participating in these two types of 'common good' involved distinctive types of civic friendship. Again, a common term (*φιλία*) oscillated between the two senses in Greek political discourse. Aristotle distinguishes the two senses with precision in his general analysis of the concept of *φιλία*. In Aristotle's philosophy of friendship,<sup>92</sup> there are three types of friendship, each distinguished by the factor which causes it.<sup>93</sup> The first type is friendship through pleasure (*δι' ἡδονήν*). The second, friendship through utility (*διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον*), resembles the type of relationship which exists between ideal 'Dikaiopolitan' citizens: the friends hold goodwill towards each other on account of the exchange of useful services. Aristotle probably thought that such a friend wishes his friend good fortune in general, not only good fortune which contributes directly to his own welfare,<sup>94</sup> but utility is the cement of the friendship. Indeed, friends for utility (or pleasure) cease to be friends when the friendship ceases to be a source of utility (or pleasure) for them.<sup>95</sup>

Aristotle's third type of friendship is 'virtue friendship', based on mutual appreciation of virtuous character (*δι' ἀρετήν*). It is only of this kind of friendship that it can be said that each friend wishes the other well truly for the other's own sake, giving full consideration to his true self. This type of friendship, which Aristotle regards as the only complete, durable form of friendship,<sup>96</sup> closely resembles in its intrinsically ethical and demanding character the *φιλία* which holds together ideal 'Nakonian' citizens, including the citizens of Nakone itself, united 'with all justice and friendship'.

Significantly, it is not easy to determine which type of friendship distinguishes relations between fellow citizens of a genuine polis in Aristotelian philosophy. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle presents 'civic friendship' as *ὁμόνοια*: consensus among citizens about the advantageous, *τὰ συμφέροντα*.<sup>97</sup> This picks up his earlier claim that a civic community is an association which is formed and endures for the sake of the beneficial (*τὸ συμφέρον*).<sup>98</sup> Those claims might seem to gesture to the view that civic friendship is a form of utility friendship. However, especially in the light of the ambiguities in the notion of the 'common good' noted above, those formulations could also describe virtue friendship: virtue friends may come together because of, and mutually recognize, a substantial sharing of elevated interests, especially a shared interest in joint cultivation of virtue.

Elsewhere, however, the Aristotelian text is more explicit in linking political and utility friendship, though there is debate about whether Aristotle was himself responsible. The most striking presentation of civic friendship as

<sup>92</sup> See especially Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII–IX.

<sup>93</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155b18–1157b5.

<sup>94</sup> See Cooper (1999), ch. 14.

<sup>95</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1156a16–24; 1156b7–19.

<sup>96</sup> See Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1156b7–19.

<sup>97</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1167a22–b16; Schofield (1998), 43.

<sup>98</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1160a8–30, esp. 11–12; Cooper (1999), 332–5.

utility friendship in the Aristotelian corpus is the explicit description of civic friendship as a prudential alliance for mutual advantage at *Eudemian Ethics* 1242b22–31.<sup>99</sup> According to that presentation, civic friendship simply dissolves when citizens cease to each derive private advantage from it.<sup>100</sup>

In other places, Aristotle appears explicitly to adopt a quite different view: there are hints that, in order for a community truly to qualify as a polis, its members must relate to one another in a form of ‘character friendship’.<sup>101</sup> Aristotle at one point comments that *ὁμόνοια* is possible only among decent men.<sup>102</sup> He also states that citizens of a true polis, unlike members of an alliance, take heed of one another’s characters, using language very similar to that which he elsewhere uses to describe the mutual admiration for character which binds virtue friends.<sup>103</sup> Moreover, that Aristotelian civic friendship makes robust practical demands, going far beyond mutual exchange of useful services and general goodwill, is evident from Aristotle’s argument that virtue will make fellow citizens of a good polis voluntarily share material possessions in practice, in accordance with the proverb that ‘friends’ things are common’ (*κοινὰ τὰ φίλων*).<sup>104</sup> A similar, demanding understanding of civic friendship also seems to underpin Aristotle’s comment, noted in Section 3, that the type of friendship at which (good) lawgivers aim has the effect that there is little need for strict ‘justice’.<sup>105</sup>

There are several possible ways of accounting for the way in which Aristotelian civic friendship appears sometimes closer to utility friendship and sometimes closer to virtue friendship. Cooper and Irwin argue in different ways that Aristotle never in fact suggests that civic friendship is anything other than a form of utility friendship: civic friends show a type of concern for fellow citizens’ good character which is either standard in any friendship<sup>106</sup> or distinctive to the political bond, because it involves the respect for others’ opinions necessary for genuinely political debate.<sup>107</sup>

Another possible approach would be to argue that the contrasting comments reflect Aristotelian attachment to the two-tier type of political theorizing encountered in Section 4.2 in Plato’s *Laws*: an approach which leaves space for both utopian and realist reflections. The *Politics* contains utopian reflections about education, virtue and the fulfilment of man’s better nature, most evident in Books III and VII–VIII. However, it also contains much realist, resigned reflection about the appropriate means of governing and organizing

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1163b32–5; Yack (1993), ch. 4.

<sup>100</sup> This *Eudemian Ethics* passage may have been consciously adapted to the tastes of a democratic audience unfamiliar with, or opposed to, ideas of virtue friendship and deeply attached to the principle of egalitarian advantage friendship. It may even have been written by someone other than Aristotle. See Schofield (1998).

<sup>101</sup> Schwarzenbach (1996–7), 105.

<sup>102</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1167b2–16.

<sup>103</sup> Compare Aristotle *Politics* 1280b1–6 with Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1156a12–14.

<sup>104</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1263a21–39.

<sup>105</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a22–8.

<sup>106</sup> Cooper (1999), 370–2.

<sup>107</sup> Irwin (2007), 226–7.

contemporary Greeks as they are, egoistic, obstinate, and distrustful, through carefully designed constitutions which can ensure a blend of freedom and constraint, incentives, and disincentives. That latter approach dominates the central books, IV–VI.<sup>108</sup> In the introduction to Book IV, Aristotle argues quite explicitly that the true political theorist must be able to offer theoretical proposals both for the best polis absolutely and for a polis founded on some particular political principle, but also more realist principles, some suited to particular, actual poleis as they already are and others to the average, standard polis, widely applicable in Greek states.<sup>109</sup>

Appealing to this background would be a possible way of explaining the ambiguities in the Aristotelian approach to civic friendship. However, the comments which appear to liken civic friendship to utility friendship are not represented as provisional or realist, but as fundamental reflections about the nature of the political bond. It is probably best, therefore, to identify a genuine ambiguity in Aristotelian thinking about the basic nature of civic *φιλία*: an uncertainty whether its foundation is utility or mutual concern for virtue.

#### 4.4. The Paradigms as a Dialectical Pair

To sum up the last two sub-sections, neither a shared valuing of contributions to the common good, nor a sharing of vocabulary, prevents conceiving the ‘Nakonian’ and ‘Dikaiopolitan’ paradigms as conceptual opposites. Indeed, several elements of the preceding discussion support the view, defended further in the course of this book, that the ‘Nakonian’ and ‘Dikaiopolitan’ paradigms were the antithetical parts of a dialectical pair. They each gained definition from the contrast with the other: Greeks grasped, defined, and expressed ‘Nakonian’ ideals by contrasting them with ‘Dikaiopolitan’ ideals, and vice versa. Citizens relied on clear notions of free, self-interested agents and merely prudential and fair laws and procedures in order to understand and express substantial notions of self-sacrifice, community, harmony, and utopian civic organization; and they simultaneously relied on clear, substantial notions of collective power, the common good, and civic virtue in order to define against them sharp-edged notions of personal freedom, personal desert, and political bargaining.<sup>110</sup> Partly as a result of this conceptual interdependence, the two paradigms helped to sustain each other in existence: forceful advocacy of ‘Nakonian’ policies provoked forceful advocacy of ‘Dikaiopolitan’ measures.

<sup>108</sup> See Kraut (2002), 181–7, discussing the views of Jaeger. Kraut himself emphasizes the unity of the *Politics*, but nonetheless recognizes Aristotle’s veering between ideal and distinctly non-ideal constitutions.

<sup>109</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1288b10–39.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. Derrida (1994), 40, identifying a similar dialectic as central to all democracies.

Aspects of these dialectical processes are evident in the settlements from Nakone and Dikaia themselves. The Nakonians' refusal to countenance any further political differences between citizens can be seen as a reaction against more pragmatic approaches to political community and unity: true justice is brotherly unity. Conversely, the exclusion of *δμόνοια* and similar terms and ideals from the rhetoric of the Dikaiopolitan settlement should be seen as a reaction against the normal, community-oriented Greek rhetoric of reconciliation, further explored in the next chapter.

Similarly, philosophical discussions analysed in this chapter reveal relevant dialectical processes. When Aristotle seeks to define his more 'Nakonian' notion of a complete, true polis as a necessarily ethical community, he does so by drawing a contrast with a straightforward association for mutual security, advantage, and justice. A true polis comes into existence for the sake of enabling and preserving bare life, but, unlike an alliance, exists for the sake of the good life (*γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν*). Moreover, in making this case, Aristotle represents true law as a means of educating citizens in virtue, using as a foil the Sophist Lycophron's contractual view of law as a 'contract' (*συνθήκη*) and 'guarantor of individuals' just claims on one another' (*ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων*), mutually beneficial for those who accept its requirements.<sup>111</sup>

The discussion above of tensions in Greek thought between strict reciprocity and 'Nakonian' ideals offers ample examples of other Greek thinkers and orators, following a strategy similar to Aristotle's, using merely 'Dikaiopolitan' regulations, norms, and habits as foils for a 'Nakonian' vision of civic community and supererogative civic virtue. In a related way, in his *On the Crown*, Demosthenes at one point even explicitly contrasts the Athenians' approach to decision-making about matters of crucial importance for their polis, where civic traditions are very important, with their approach to the mere adjudication of contractual disputes:<sup>112</sup> 'Nakonian' reflection about the common good and civic history must be free from contamination with bargaining and contracts. This dialectical understanding of different types of civic decision-making was arguably even institutionalized in the Athenian legal system, in the distinction between *γραφαί* and *δίκαι*, suits aimed principally at the common good and personal redress respectively.<sup>113</sup>

The political thought of Polybius is an interesting example of the opposite half of the dialectical process, also attested at Dikaia itself and in some of the defences of strict reciprocity considered in Section 4.2 above, such as that of Xenophon's *Cyrus*. Polybius can be seen to delineate more 'Dikaiopolitan' and

<sup>111</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1252b27–30; 1280a7–1281a10.

<sup>113</sup> See, for example, Todd (1993), 99–100.

<sup>112</sup> Demosthenes 18.210.



individualistic ideas, which he applies to both Rome and the Achaian League, through an explicit reaction against 'Nakonian' assumptions and arguments.<sup>114</sup> Polybius' near contemporary, the later second-century Stoic Hecato of Rhodes, reacted against traditional 'Nakonian' assumptions in a similar way. He made the radical claim, further discussed in chapter 5.6.2.2 below, that the common good of a polis is best served if its individual members determinedly pursue their material self-interest in the flourishing of their family estate, within the bounds of custom, law, and institutions: the coincidental benefits for all citizens are greater than those of direct striving for the common good.<sup>115</sup>

Hecato's intervention was probably a contribution to a broader debate within the mid- and later Hellenistic Stoa, a particularly explicit and sophisticated crystallization of the underlying 'Nakonian'–'Dikaiopolitan' dialectic. Cicero reports a famous disagreement between two earlier second-century Stoics, Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus, concerning the question whether a virtuous man is obliged to go beyond the letter of his formal obligations to his fellow men: for example, whether a trader is obliged to disclose to a customer that goods he is selling are faulty. According to Cicero, Diogenes claimed that the virtuous man is obliged only to observe the letter of the law and to abstain from active deceit: the trader is not obliged to reveal flaws in his products. This minimalist notion of virtue probably represented a reaction, comparable to Hecato's later reaction, against traditional Greek idealization of more substantial, 'Nakonian' forms of virtue. Indeed, according to Cicero, Antipater made a counter-reaction, responding to Diogenes with an ambitious vision of human solidarity, extending far beyond fulfilment of formal requirements.<sup>116</sup>

There are also some signs of a second dialectic, related to the one explored in the preceding paragraphs: a dialectic involving more optimistic and more pessimistic views about human nature and potential. As argued in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, both Plato and Aristotle clearly distinguish utopian and realist approaches to political theory. In the two philosophers' political works, the two approaches serve as justifications for each other, but also push each other apart: ever more optimistic visions of perfect virtue help to reinforce

<sup>114</sup> For the argument that Polybius consciously reacted against earlier community-centred visions of the good polis as a harmonious community, see Gray (2013b), esp. 339–40, 352–3 (on Polybius' implicit rejection of more harmonious models of the good mixed constitution); 338–41 (on Polybius' implicit criticism of Aristotle in his contractual portrayal of the second-century Achaian League as almost itself a polis).

<sup>115</sup> Cicero *De Officiis* 3.63. See also Schofield (1999a), 175–6, comparing Hecato's argument with Adam Smith's 'invisible hand'; also recently Arena (2012), 156–7.

<sup>116</sup> Cicero *De Officiis* 3.50–7, 91–2. Contrast the interpretation of Diogenes' position in Annas (1997), esp. 158–60, criticized in Schofield (1999a), ch. 9. For the background to Antipater's vision of cosmopolitan solidarity, see Schofield (1999b), chs. 3–4.

ever more pessimistic views about current reality. The closest thing to a third way between the two approaches in Plato and Aristotle is not some distinct alternative approach, but rather the kind of ingenious amalgam of realist and utopian impulses examined in Chapter 2.3.

## 5. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS

This chapter has identified and defined two significant, rival modes of Greek politics, the 'Nakonian' and the 'Dikaiopolitan', each underpinned by a basic paradigm of the good polis. It is argued in the remainder of this book that the exile evidence shows that these two paradigms dominated the political cultures of the Greek civic world in the fourth century and Hellenistic period.

A sceptic might claim that this conclusion is unremarkable: all political cultures contain some more community-oriented and some more individualistic elements. However, this book attempts to paint a more distinctive and subtle picture of Greek political cultures. The crucial point is that dominant political norms were situated towards the two extremes of the scale sketched in Section 4.1, and exerted their influence to the exclusion or detriment of norms on other points of the scale. They forced out more moderately community-oriented or individualistic norms, of the kinds common in other political cultures. Moreover, they diminished the scope for strong intermediate, proto-Kantian norms to become established and to exert a strong influence on mainstream, everyday political interaction, in the ways in which related norms arguably do in many modern liberal democracies, alongside many other, contrasting norms.<sup>117</sup> According to this interpretation, therefore, the Aristotelian unwillingness or inability to identify any third category to which civic friendship might belong, something less egoistic than utility friendship but less utopian than virtue friendship, was symptomatic of broader and deeper trends.

This is not to deny that some Greek intellectuals may have developed more pluralistic political ideas, closer to the proto-Kantian ideal, advocating them alongside more familiar 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' ideals. Debates about that question remain open, but some scholars have advanced strong arguments for seeing concern for individual material and moral dignity and open dialogue for their own sakes in some Classical literary genres.

For example, sensitivity to individual weakness and circumstances, and to diverging personal viewpoints and values, has been identified as characteristic

<sup>117</sup> Consider the role of the German *Grundgesetz*, with its quasi-Kantian provisions, in modern German politics.

of Attic tragedy.<sup>118</sup> Moreover, the form of Platonic dialogue has been thought to reflect an ideal of free, unconstrained rational dialogue. According to this interpretation, Platonic interlocutors respect one another, even when their views sharply diverge, and remain strongly aware of the difficulties in precisely defining the concepts they use.<sup>119</sup> These interpretations are also consistent with signs in some parts of Plato's work of almost proto-Kantian concern to treat the material and moral dignity of each individual as inviolable: for example, the Socrates of the *Republic* convinces Polemarchos to join in what is paradoxically called a 'battle' to show the world that it is not just to harm *anyone*, even enemies, because that would be inconsistent with true concern for the defence of virtue and justice.<sup>120</sup> In addition, modern philosophers have identified doctrines partly resembling or anticipating later Natural-Law theory and even liberal, rights-oriented egalitarianism in some later Hellenistic and Imperial Stoicism.<sup>121</sup>

Whatever the merits of arguments for seeing something like a proto-Kantian approach in the arguments of some Greek intellectuals, the evidence considered in this book suggests that any such tendencies did not much percolate into mainstream political discourse, or even into the forefront of Greek political philosophy. There is really only one trend analysed in this book of which some elements and reflections might be seen as results of relevant processes of percolation: the new turn in some Hellenistic contexts, discussed in Chapter 6, towards politicized humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism.

My central argument that the 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaioopolitan' paradigms provided the most important basic points of orientation for Greek citizens could also be expressed with the claim that the 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaioopolitan' paradigms dominated the logical or conceptual space of the concept 'polis' or 'good polis'. It was usually necessary to have some grasp, at least a minimal one, of one or both in order to have a working understanding of the notion of a polis, or of associated notions such as citizenship or civic virtue.

For the reasons emphasized in the general account of political culture in the Introduction, such a grasp was often more instinctive or habitual than intellectual,<sup>122</sup> and thus not entirely conscious. In particular, it often did not

<sup>118</sup> Williams (1993); cf. Nussbaum (1986). Williams would have strongly rejected any suggestion that this feature of Greek literature had anything 'Kantian' about it, but the sensitivity to individual dignity, needs, and perspectives does chime at least with the twentieth-century pluralistic forms of neo-Kantian ethical and political thinking considered in the Introduction.

<sup>119</sup> See Euben (1996); also the critical discussion in Schofield (2006), 56–8. Saxonhouse (1992), 105, sees the Socrates of the *Apology* as a champion of compassionate concern for the welfare and thinking of individual Athenians as particular, private individuals. For discussion of possible reflections of the ideals underpinning the dialogue form in the content of Plato's political philosophy, see Schofield (2006), 84–8.

<sup>120</sup> See Plato *Republic* 335b4–e11.

<sup>121</sup> Schofield (1999b), ch. 4; Long (A. A.) (2007).

<sup>122</sup> Compare Taylor (1995), ch. 9, on different ways of understanding rules, including habitual and even 'bodily' ones.

involve conscious awareness of the paradigms' role as paradigms. It was probably in fact quite rare for Greeks who were not intellectuals to reflect about the overarching basic paradigms which guided their political thinking and behaviour. Even within philosophical and intellectual circles, it was quite unusual for Greek thinkers to distil the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm, in particular, into systematic thinking.<sup>123</sup> Indeed, the two paradigms can be compared to mountains under the surface of the sea of Greek political life, which usually emerged, unlike at Nakone and Dikaia themselves, only partially and sporadically in institutional design and explicit political language.

The word 'paradigm' might itself be thought inappropriate in these cases. First, it could be taken to imply a greater level of theoretical sophistication than assumed here: 'way of thinking', 'approach', or 'set of intuitions' might be considered better. Such words and phrases could indeed be safely substituted for the word 'paradigm' in most cases in this book, but the word 'paradigm' is retained: it conveys strongly the point that the two basic approaches to politics were each based on a distinctive fundamental conception of the nature and function of political institutions and political interaction. Indeed, in this respect, the two paradigms might be compared to another pair of posited basic, underlying, antithetical Greek cultural paradigms: the 'Apollonian' and 'Dionysian' paradigms which a Nietzschean might perceive operating in this way beneath explicit Greek culture.

Second, the word 'paradigm' might be thought to give the misleading impression that the 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' ways of thinking could be comprehended or endorsed by Greek citizens only in an idealistic spirit. However, the word 'paradigm' is used here with a more neutral sense: a political cultural paradigm is simply a model of how a polis or citizen should behave. Individual citizens could endorse a particular paradigm through straightforward conformism, or even, especially in the case of the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm, in a spirit of pragmatic adaptation to prevailing circumstances.

An obvious objection to my central argument is that it is simplistic to identify only two predominant political paradigms. It would indeed be extremely simplistic to claim that the vast range of attested actual, developed Greek political ideas, rhetoric, and institutions can be straightforwardly and usefully classified as embodying two main paradigms. At that level, what can be identified are, rather, too broad sets of brackets, each enclosing heterogeneous applications of the basic underlying paradigms, in diverse forms of political thinking, language, and organization. It is only at the deeper level of political culture that it is possible to identify a limited number of paradigms, which are abstract and generic.

<sup>123</sup> The main exceptions are Classical Sophistic contractarianism and the ideas of Polybius and some contemporary Stoics about the value of conflict within the good polis.

Indeed, precisely because the two paradigms and their associated norms were abstract, generic, and quite indeterminate points of basic political orientation, they were necessarily open to very varied interpretations and practical applications, for reasons emphasized in the Introduction. As a result, in addition to arguing for the pervasiveness and coexistence of the two paradigms within the shared political culture of the Greek civic world in the period covered by this book, subsequent chapters investigate the rich variety of possible interpretations and applications of the paradigms. They attempt to show that Greek political life was based not only on basic shared intellectual foundations of great complexity, radicalism, and even grandeur, but also on multifarious ingenious and imaginative developments of them.

The two paradigms coexisted in varied, complex ways within specific political cultures: the individual political cultures of particular poleis and regions tended to contain distinctive, local versions of both paradigms side-by-side, coexisting in different degrees of harmony and tension. Moreover, individuals and groups often applied, opposed, and combined the generic and local versions of the paradigms and associated norms in idiosyncratic ways, in developing ideologies and political philosophies.

It was possible, as will be shown in Chapter 5, for a 'Nakonian' and a 'Dikaiopolitan' faction to compete with each other within a single polis. However, that was certainly not a very common pattern: more commonly, both paradigms played a role in shaping the political consciousness of all citizens. A crucial point to make clear is, therefore, that the 'tensions' between the paradigms within particular political cultures studied here were not usually a matter of opposing factions, but of contradictions within collective and individual self-understanding.

As will become clear in the course of this book, the 'Nakonian' and the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm and associated norms could each be applied in contrasting hierarchical and egalitarian, democratic, and oligarchic ways. This was, however, only one way in which their applications could differ. Something of the variety of possible interpretations and applications of the paradigms and their characteristic norms is evident in the ideas of some of the thinkers considered in this chapter. For example, while Plato and Aristotle were both strongly influenced by 'Nakonian' assumptions and ideals, they developed them in contrasting ways. Indeed, Aristotle explicitly criticizes Plato's Socrates for proposing a much greater degree of political unity and integration than is actually desirable in a polis, neglecting the necessary diversity of any civic community.<sup>124</sup> As several scholars have emphasized, Aristotle himself attempts to reconcile respect for citizen diversity with an aspiration for civic community and unity. In his philosophy, the realization of the true polis' end (τέλος) depends on all citizens choosing to act in

<sup>124</sup> See Aristotle *Politics* 1260b36–1264a11.

accordance with an appropriate application of complex standards of civic virtue to their specific aptitudes and situations.<sup>125</sup> The result is a complex 'harmony' (συμφωνία) of differing individuals.<sup>126</sup> As for 'Dikaiopolitan' norms, it was possible to approach them, as shown in this chapter, in contrasting realist and more positive ways.

Moreover, as will emerge in the course of this book, there were multiple possible different ways of mixing together the two paradigms or their implications within a single political culture, ideology, or philosophy. In some cases, Greeks neglected, tolerated, or harnessed the tensions between them. Indeed, it will be argued in this volume that Aristotelian equivocation about whether civic friendship is a type of utility friendship or virtue friendship, considered in Section 4.3, is a particularly sophisticated example of a type of equivocation very common among civic Greeks: doublethink, uncertainty, or studied ambiguity concerning the question whether the bonds holding together the citizens of a good, stable polis are 'Dikaiopolitan' or 'Nakonian'.

For example, the pervasive genre of the honorary decree for a home citizen also reflected precisely the ambiguity evident in Aristotelian thought. Such a decree tended to elide concern with the strict deserts of the honorand, and other benefactors, with promotion of virtue, solidarity, and the common good. It was thus partly a precise, 'Dikaiopolitan' requital of concrete, useful services with tangible privileges, centred on considerations of utility (τὸ χρήσιμον): it partly created and reinforced something like 'utility friendship' between fellow citizens. However, it was also partly a means of assigning intangible esteem to a good citizen, a product of collective recognition of virtue and goodwill, passed 'for the sake of goodwill and virtue' (ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ εὐνοίας): a basis for something like 'virtue friendship' between the honorand and fellow citizens, and an incitement to virtue for others.<sup>127</sup> This ambiguity was also reflected in uses of the word χάρις, central to honorific rhetoric: Wilson argues that that term moves the relationship between benefactor and beneficiaries 'between the hard world of a favour owed and the transcendent realm of divine grace'.<sup>128</sup> The word τιμή (honour) possessed a very similar ambiguity in honorific rhetoric, representing both a currency for repaying benefactions and an attitude of appreciative respect. One of the main forms of expression of the Greek polis, the honorary decree, thus encapsulated what was, according to this book, a central ambiguity and contradiction of Greek civic life.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Nussbaum (1980), 422–3, with n. 61; Cooper (1986), 96–9; Kraut (2002), 195–7.

<sup>126</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1263b31–7.

<sup>127</sup> On honorary decrees' self-declared educational function, see, for example, *I.Sestos* 1, ll. 89–92; compare Veyne (1976) 239; Liddel (2007), 165, 167.

<sup>128</sup> Wilson (2000), 135.

## Inclusion and Political Culture

### Projects of Civic Reconciliation and Reintegration beyond Nakone and Dikaia

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

As a first step in the argument that the ‘Nakonian’ and ‘Dikaiopolitan’ paradigms exercised a decisive influence on Greek ideas about civic reconciliation and reintegration of exiles beyond the Nakonian and Dikaiopolitan cases themselves, Section 2 of this chapter analyses bipartisan settlements of reconciliation from other poleis. It concentrates on inscribed settlements, but also considers the more varied evidence for the Athenian settlement of 403. As argued in the introduction to Chapter 1, the terms of such bipartisan settlements crystallize basic assumptions about politics dominant in the poleis concerned: they themselves offer positive, paradigmatic visions of civic order, intended as guides to peaceful, stable, civic life. They are thus very useful guides to the specific political cultures of the poleis concerned.

Most such settlements reveal the concurrent influence of the two paradigms. Indeed, their authors elaborated and applied the two paradigms, or particular norms associated with the two paradigms, in a rich variety of ways, sometimes revealing the dialectical relationship between them. Usually, however, one or the other paradigm or its associated norms exerted predominant influence: Section 2 considers first reconciliation settlements which are predominantly ‘Nakonian’, and then predominantly ‘Dikaiopolitan’ ones.

The question of reconciliation and reintegration of exiles<sup>1</sup> lends itself to comparison of actual civic ideals and procedures with intellectuals’ proposals. Section 3 of this chapter analyses the ideas about the supersession and prevention of *stasis* advocated by the Anonymus Iamblichi and Aristotle. It argues that their ideas reveal similar patterns to those exposed by the

<sup>1</sup> For detailed discussion of procedures for reintegrating exiles, see Lonis (1991); Rubinstein (2013).

epigraphic and other evidence for actual settlements, confirming the shape of the political cultures influential on those authors. Moreover, those philosophical works confirm that the two paradigms and the norms intrinsic to each could be developed and combined by individual thinkers in complex and varied ways, which often involved setting the two paradigms against each other.

## 2. BIPARTISAN SETTLEMENTS AFTER STASIS, WITH REINTEGRATION OF EXILES

### 2.1. Predominantly ‘Nakonian’ Reconciliations: Mytilene and Athens

It was not only at Nakone that the authors of a bipartisan civic reconciliation settlement strove to forge recently discordant citizens into a close-knit whole, united in ethical and cultural attitudes.<sup>2</sup> A second representative case-study of ‘Nakonian’ civic reconciliation, which partly resembles and partly contrasts with the Nakonian reconciliation itself, involves the two decrees of Mytilene on Lesbos contained in Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85. These texts concern one or, more probably, given their different contents and emphases, two reconciliations and reintegrations of exiles, probably dating to 334, 332 and c.324, or two of those.<sup>3</sup> The exiles concerned had presumably been expelled during long-running unrest in the second half of the fourth century, probably related to competition for influence in Lesbos between the Macedonians and the Persians. In passing these decrees, the Mytilenians were probably acting with some autonomy in interpreting and applying the instructions of a king, most likely Alexander the Great.<sup>4</sup>

The two decrees do not stipulate anything resembling the ἀδελφοθετία at Nakone, but they do contain other strongly ‘Nakonian’ features. The first document from Mytilene<sup>5</sup> regulates the return of property to restored exiles. It distinguishes between those exiled after a legal judgement and those exiled by some other means in a particular year, excluding the former group from its provisions. Before treating the question of the restored exiles’ entitlements, the

<sup>2</sup> Compare the practice attested for the Archaic period and fifth century of poleis engaging lyric poets to compose songs designed to weld the citizen-body into a faction-free whole: Hornblower (2009), 54–5 (with other bibliography).

<sup>3</sup> For c.334 (both texts) or c.334 (first) and c.332 (second): Worthington (1990); Rhodes and Osborne themselves. For c.324 (both texts): Brun (1988), 255–6; Dössel (2003), 159, 172, 177–8; and Dimitriev (2004), 357–60. Bencivenni (2003), 45–6, leaves the dating open, but does closely associate the two texts.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Bencivenni (2003), 46–51.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Heisserer and Hodot (1986).



decree stipulates a vow to be made by council and people, addressed to the Twelve Gods, Zeus Herais, Basileus and Homonoios, Homonoia, Dike ('Justice'), and 'Fulfilment of Good Things' (*Επιτέλεια τῶν Ἀγαθῶν*).<sup>6</sup>

This first document contains several strongly 'Nakonian' features, indicative of the influence of underlying 'Nakonian' norms. The inclusion of both Zeus Homonoios and Homonoia in the list of deities suggests that its drafters were strongly committed to the ideal of civic unanimity. Moreover, the opening aspiration of the decree confirms that they envisaged a 'Nakonian' type of unanimity, timeless and particularly close-knit, as the foundation for Mytilenian democracy. That opening aspiration is that citizens should live together in democracy 'for all time', behaving towards each other *ὡς εὐνοώτατα*.<sup>7</sup> citizens should not merely behave non-fraudulently and justly towards one another, but 'in a way involving as much goodwill as possible towards one another'. There is a clear overlap in sensibility with the aspiration of the Athenian speaker of Plato's *Laws*, mentioned in Chapter 1, that the citizens of Magnesia should be 'friends with one another as far as possible' (*ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις φίλοι*).<sup>8</sup>

In addition, there is a clear reflection of 'Nakonian' assumptions in the very presence in the Mytilenian decree of the stipulation of the collective vow to the various deities, which contains a conditional promise of a sacrifice and procession, if the reconciliation turns out well, to be regulated by the people.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the character and content of the proposed vow suggest that the authors of the settlement treated it as self-evident that the whole *δᾶμος* should undertake, and regulate, collective religious activities, closely entwined with political life, designed to achieve a single, consensual objective.

The second, longer document, which, unlike the first, clearly concerns a *stasis* between two well-defined factions, was apparently passed after an initial settlement had been judged by a king, probably Alexander.<sup>10</sup> It contains regulations concerning the restoration of property to returned exiles and the reconstitution of the democratic citizen-body. In this case, the influence of underlying 'Dikaiopolitan' norms is quite starkly evident, alongside that of underlying 'Nakonian' norms. Indeed, this second decree's strongly 'Nakonian' elements can be seen as a conscious or unconscious dialectical response to, or even reaction against, its own more 'Dikaiopolitan' elements.

For an initial period after the passing of this second decree, 'Dikaiopolitan' citizen interactions are to be crucial. A board of twenty arbitrators is to be established, consisting of ten members from 'those who have returned' and ten from 'those in the city'.<sup>11</sup> This board is to ensure that nothing in the reconciliation

<sup>6</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85A, ll. 5–12; cf. Bencivenni (2003), 48.

<sup>7</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85A, ll. 2–4.

<sup>8</sup> Plato *Laws* 743c6.

<sup>9</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85A, ll. 9–12.

<sup>10</sup> See Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85B, ll. 28–9.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Dössel (2003), 167–9.

arrangements is unfavourable to either side; to arbitrate property disputes<sup>12</sup> and, if necessary, judge them;<sup>13</sup> and to agree on proposals to bring before the people about the money for the settlement<sup>14</sup> and the formula for a civic oath.<sup>15</sup>

The board was presumably to reach decisions through a process of bargaining between the two representative groups of citizens, with their clearly conflicting interests. Indeed, since the two sides were equally represented, the most effective ways for either side to achieve its objectives would have been to offer concessions to the other and to identify overlapping interests. These types of bargaining are hinted at in the description of the responsibilities of the board. The proposals to be brought before the people concerning the money and the oath formula are to be 'whatever things the members of the board can agree upon with one another' (ὅσα κε ὁμο[λογέωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλο]ις): they are to be the contingent results ('whatever things...') of reciprocal ([πρὸς ἀλλήλο]ις) agreement; things which both sides undertake to tolerate. The resulting proposals will be 'the things which they agree with one another to be beneficial' ([τὰ] ὁμολογήμενα πρὸς ἀλλήλοισι συμφέρον[τα]): the points of agreed overlap in self-interest which they identify.<sup>16</sup>

The representatives of the two factions were thus not to pursue the 'Nakonian' course of aiming directly at a settlement consistent with shared substantial civic traditions and values, or tailored to the collective interests of a pre-existing 'Mytilenian' civic community, treated as already united in at least latent solidarity. Rather, they were to seek to reconstruct their fractured polis through the kind of bargaining and negotiation concerning basic questions of civic organization which would be undertaken by those brokering a civic contract *ab initio*, or by members of a fair, efficient association seeking to resolve differences. Importantly, the authors of the settlement did have a concrete choice here: they could, as at Nakone, have required or encouraged the two factions directly to give special, direct weight to 'the good of the polis', shared civic ideals and civic friendship.

There are some indications that the drafters of this settlement expected that citizens would continue to relate to one another in 'Dikaiopolitan' ways after reconciliation. In the first part of the preserved text, lengthy provisions are made for civic magistrates to enforce penalties on citizens who fail to abide by established terms of reconciliation concerning property rights.<sup>17</sup> The sheer

<sup>12</sup> Carawan (2013), 52–3, thinks that past injuries could also be judged at this point, but there is no direct textual indication of this.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Lonis (1991), esp. 95.

<sup>14</sup> Presumably, the money required to compensate the current owners of returned exiles' property, or the exiles themselves.

<sup>15</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85B, ll. 21–37.

<sup>16</sup> See Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85B, ll. 32–3, 35–6.

<sup>17</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85B, ll. 1–21. These provisions could have been intended to protect the decisions eventually reached by the arbitration committee subsequently established in the

length and severity of these provisions suggest that their authors were far from certain that competing citizens could be fully reconciled as anything like 'Nakonian' civic friends. Even after reconciliation, heavy legal sanctions would still be required to regulate and deter self-assertion in pursuit of old grievances, in contravention of agreed property rights.

Such expectations were fully consistent with the presuppositions about human nature and particular humans' characters shown in Chapter 1 commonly to underpin 'Dikaiopolitan' thinking. Indeed, this part of the settlement arguably helped to reinforce such presuppositions in Mytilenian political culture. The publicity and solemnity of these regulations would have enabled them to make their own contribution to shaping citizens' sense of self, agency, and interdependence. This is because, as argued in the Introduction, that sense was mutable, socially constructed, and very sensitive to collective deliberation and self-presentation. In addition, by presupposing a future lack of 'Nakonian' unity, the authors of these regulations implicitly gave an air of normality to more self-interested 'Dikaiopolitan' political motivations and behaviour in practice. Significantly, this was a self-reinforcing process. If citizens regarded themselves as isolated, competing, self-seeking, defensive, distrustful political agents, it became all the more necessary to devise 'Dikaiopolitan' institutions to appeal to, coordinate, and regulate individuals' self-interested motivations in fair and efficient ways.

The discussion so far might be thought sufficient only to warrant the view that the authors of these Mytilenian regulations made use of 'Dikaiopolitan' procedures and rhetoric in the realist spirit familiar from Plato and Aristotle, as unwelcome but necessary concessions to unpleasant human nature. However, the strong entrenchment of agreed property rights, for example, could easily have been interpreted as an anti-'Nakonian' move: it made them impregnable to future 'Nakonian' arguments for property redistribution, made in terms of the greater good or civic harmony, even if circumstances changed.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, there is a reason for thinking that at least some of the decree's drafters were consciously more positively inclined towards 'Dikaiopolitan' norms: the decree subsequently expresses an unambiguously positive aspiration to what could easily have been interpreted as a relatively limited level of civic unity.

decree. Alternatively, they could have been intended to protect other terms of reconciliation already established by some other process, such as decisions by civic magistrates (cf. Heisserer and Hodot (1986), 123–5; Dössel (2003), 167–8).

<sup>18</sup> For discussion of civic disputes which arose when the inviolability of property rights was challenged on 'Nakonian' grounds, see the discussion of examples from Phlius, Sparta, and Megalopolis in Chapter 5.2.4.

The following is the decree's description of the purpose of civic magistrates punctiliously protecting and enforcing the agreed terms of reconciliation:

ὥς κε . . . [ . . . ὁμόνοοι καὶ διαλε]λύμενοι πάντες πρὸς ἀλ-  
[λάλοις πολιτεύουιντο ἀνεπιβουλε]ύτως καὶ ἐμμένουσιν ἐν ταῖ ἀ-  
[ναγραφείσαι διαγράφαι καὶ ἐν τᾷ]ι διαλύσι τᾷ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ψα-  
[φίσματι.]<sup>19</sup>

. . . so that . . . [they might] all [act as citizens] towards o[ne another in concord and reco]nciled, [without plot]ting, and stick to the [order written up and to the reconci-]liation in this de[cree].

Admittedly, the drafters did probably here express the hope that the magistrates' vigilance would ensure that the citizens would live together in *ὁμόνοια*, reconciled with one another.<sup>20</sup> That kind of language would often indicate 'Nakonian' leanings. However, if the restorations are correct, the rest of the purpose clause indicates that, at this point in the document, its drafters envisaged a type of concord quite different from the 'Nakonian' ideal. It is possible that they explicitly stated that citizens should live together 'without plotting', which would be a very 'Dikaiopolitan' assertion, but that depends on a speculative restoration. It is more secure that the principal aspiration expressed at this point was that citizens should live alongside one another in fidelity to the settlement itself. The explicit expression of this aspiration, as a purpose of the reconciliation, could easily have been taken to imply that the authors of the settlement intended that the restored *δᾶμος* should be held together in 'concord' merely by mutual abstinence from deceit and by the force of formal, agreed regulations, not by the kind of civic friendship and unanimity which renders punctilious rule-following, strict respect for agreed property rights, and checks on misbehaviour superfluous or undesirable. The whole aspiration is quite different in kind from the parallel positive aspiration in the first decree from Mytilene that the Mytilenians should live together *ὥς εὐνοώτατα*.

Indeed, the probable favouring of a regulatory type of *ὁμόνοια* recalls the quite limited notion of *ὁμόνοια*, as consensus about laws rather than the sharing of judgements about art or pleasures, attributed to Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.<sup>21</sup> Christ thinks that this limited notion of *ὁμόνοια* was very prominent in Classical Athenian democratic ideology.<sup>22</sup> Xenophon himself probably made his Socrates interpret *ὁμόνοια* in this way partly in reaction

<sup>19</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85B, ll. 16–21 (abridged).

<sup>20</sup> Although restored here, this aspiration is almost fully preserved in l. 30.

<sup>21</sup> Xenophon *Memorabilia* 4.4.16. There is some similarity with the claim in Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1167a22–1167b4 that political *ὁμόνοια* need not involve agreement about all philosophical questions, but only about practical questions of common concern: for example, agreement between the people and 'the decent men' that the best men should rule.

<sup>22</sup> Christ (2012), 8, 50–6.

against more substantial notions of *δμόνοια*, such as the notion of *δμόνοια* as a very advanced state of social integration and harmony attributed to Socrates in Plato's *Republic*,<sup>23</sup> of the kind appealed to in the Nakone settlement and the first Mytilenian document.

Nevertheless, the probable 'Dikaiopolitan' implications of the purpose clause about *δμόνοια* are counterbalanced, and probably outweighed, by the 'Nakonian' force of the decree's later provisions regarding the sequel to the work of the arbitration committee: all citizens of Mytilene are to join in making a collective prayer for safety, for which the priests and priestesses are to open all the sanctuaries of the city.<sup>24</sup> Citizens were thus to enact through performative ritual a form of 'Nakonian' unity: strong unity involving shared attitudes, aspirations, and actions.

The explicit formulation of the object of the prayer confirms its 'Nakonian' character:

[εὔξασθαι] τὸν δᾶμον ἐν τᾷ εἰκοστῷ τῷ μῆνι  
[τῷ Μαιμάκτηρι (?) πάντεσσι] τοῖς θεοῖσι ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ καὶ εὐδαι-  
[μονίᾳ τῶν πολίταν πάντων] γενέσθαι τὰν διάλυσιν τοῖς κατελ-  
[θόντεσσι . . . . καὶ τοῖς] ἐν τᾷ πόλει ἐόντεσσι.<sup>25</sup>

... the people [should pray] on the twentieth of the month [Maimakter (?) to all] the gods that the reconciliation should be for the salvation and flou[rishing] of all the citizens], for those who ha[ve returned and for those] in the city.

The way in which the *δᾶμος* here publicly obliges all citizens to make this prayer represents a practical implementation of an essential aspect of 'Nakonian' thinking, encapsulated by Aristotle. The aspirations expressed in the prayer recall Aristotle's insistence that a complete, true polis does not exist merely for the sake of living, but for the sake of living well:<sup>26</sup> a comment which could easily be expressed as the claim that a polis exists for the sake of the 'well-being' or 'flourishing' (*εὐδαιμονία*) of its citizens, not merely their 'safety' (*σωτηρία*).<sup>27</sup> The settlement is to have come into being, like Aristotle's complete, true polis, 'for the sake of living': it will have been created through a process of bargaining concerning individual entitlements and their interconnections. However, this prayer makes clear that it is to exist, like Aristotle's complete, true polis, also 'for the sake of living well': all citizens are to pray that it will bring *εὐδαιμονία* for all. In this part of the decree, all citizens are required to do far more than preserve agreements and entitlements, respecting the bare *σωτηρία* of their fellow citizens. They are also required to wish, indeed

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Holmes (2005), 9.

<sup>24</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85B, ll. 39–49.

<sup>25</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85B, ll. 39–42.

<sup>26</sup> e.g. Aristotle *Politics* 1252b27–30; cf. 1280a31–4.

<sup>27</sup> Compare Ampolo (2001), Nakone text A, ll. 8–9. For a possible use of a similar expression in a Hellenistic text, cf. *IG* XII 5 1009, with *IG* XII Suppl. p. 96, ll. 1–4. Compare also *Milet* I 3, 139C, ll. 23–6. For the *σωτηρία* of all citizens by itself: *I.Priene* 11, ll. 6–7 (part restored).

actively pray, that the new civic regulations will enable the flourishing of all citizens, including their former enemies.

In sum, the authors of this settlement consciously or unconsciously compensated for the 'Dikaiopolitan' touches of their settlement by including ambitious 'Nakonian' rhetoric and procedures. The effect was a mixed vision of the nature of the Mytilenian polis, surely influential on future political debate. Mytilenian citizens could well have been left uncertain whether they should act and speak principally as members of a civic association, conscious of a need staunchly to defend their own honour, interests, and agreed entitlements, or principally as willing members of a solidaristic civic community, committed to the 'safety and flourishing' of their polis and of all fellow citizens, for their own sakes. At any rate, the two counterbalancing forms of political interaction which this document shows to have been legitimized by Mytilenian political culture were interest-oriented bargaining, on the one hand, and quasi-utopian ritual celebration of unity and goodwill. There is no sign of any intermediate form of political interaction, based on pluralistic dialogue and mutual recognition of different perspectives and needs.

As mentioned in the discussion of the Dikaiopolitan settlement in Chapter 1, Loraux has emphasized that radically 'Nakonian' attempts to re-establish or forge a united citizen-body were usually accompanied in post-*stasis* settlements by representation of the preceding period of *stasis* and exile as an uncharacteristic, unpredictable, short interlude in harmonious civic life: the result of external interference or a sudden onset of collective irrationality or, at most, of the calculated machinations of a small number of citizens. To admit otherwise would have represented an uncomfortably blatant acknowledgement that the polis in question was not a perfect 'Nakonian' community, but fell considerably short of the demands of that cherished paradigm.

Such presentations of the preceding *stasis* could be a means of transcending, or suppressing, genuine tensions within a citizen-body.<sup>28</sup> In an example of this, the Nakone settlement itself obscures the differences of interest and outlook underlying the recent *stasis*: it asserts that the two factions had been 'competing' concerning matters which were, in fact, common (ὕπερ τῶν κοινῶν ἀγωνιζόμενοι).<sup>29</sup> Similarly, the second Mytilenian text implies that the division of the citizen-body into conflicting groups was a temporary aberration, in which the *δᾶμος* temporarily ceased to exist: members of the two factions are described simply as 'returned exiles' and 'those (previously) in the city'.<sup>30</sup> Only in connection with the time after the hostilities is it considered legitimate to describe the citizen-body as a *δᾶμος*, a single, united entity with a corporate political identity, which hears the committee's proposals and

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Loraux (2001), esp. 215–28.

<sup>29</sup> Ampolo (2001), Nakone text A, l. 11.

<sup>30</sup> e.g. Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85B, ll. 21–2, 41–2. Cf. Heisserer and Hodot (1986), 123–5.

engages in the collective prayer.<sup>31</sup> It is also interesting to compare the honorific rhetoric of second-century Spartans who returned from exile. These exiles denied that they had ever really been anything other than ‘Nakonian’ civic friends of their fellow Spartans: they honoured Kallikrates for bringing to an end their exile, which they vaguely blamed on ‘tyrants’, praising him for restoring them to the ‘friendship which existed from the beginning’ (εἰς τὸν ἐξ ἀρχᾶς ἐ[οῦσαν] φιλ[ίαν]) with their fellow Spartans.<sup>32</sup>

On the legal plane, as also mentioned in Chapter 1, such attitudes commonly issued in attempts to restore the earlier *status quo*, especially through amnesties covering citizens’ behaviour during a *stasis*.<sup>33</sup> Such amnesties, a frequent hallmark of the bipartisan reconciliation settlements of the fourth century and Hellenistic period under consideration here,<sup>34</sup> were often very far-reaching in scope: they often prohibited any prosecutions for actions committed during a *stasis*.<sup>35</sup> Even the most famous post-*stasis* amnesty, the Athenian amnesty of 403, later reinforced with a specific rule against applying the laws to events before 403/2 and possibly adapted in 401/0,<sup>36</sup> may well have offered more extensive protections than often thought for all those protected by it, including all Athenian citizens other than the oligarchic ringleaders. A plausible reinterpretation of the relevant part of the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* suggests that the Athenian amnesty was far-reaching enough to prohibit even prosecutions for murder or wounding with one’s own hand, contrary to the dominant modern interpretation. Given the order and language of the presentation in chapter 39 of the *Athenaion Politeia*, the fragmentary line which appears to state that trials for murder and wounding ‘with one’s own hand’ will continue in accordance with ancestral practice is probably better taken as a restriction, for the future, on the autonomy of the new breakaway community of former oligarchs in Eleusis, the subject of the chapter until this point, rather than as a limitation on the amnesty, which is first introduced, as a new subject, only in the following sentence.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85B, ll. 33–4, 38–42.

<sup>32</sup> *IvO* 300 (179 BC), ll. 3–4. Concerning different exiles, compare Memnon *FGrH* 434, lone fragment, 7.3–4.

<sup>33</sup> Compare Rubinstein (2013), esp. 154.

<sup>34</sup> Compare Dreher (2013), esp. 83, 85, with catalogue of Classical cases (pp. 86–92); for the Hellenistic period, see Rubinstein (2013). For recent debates about the meaning of *μη* *μνησικακεῖν*, see Chapter 1, n. 18.

<sup>35</sup> On the commonly very extensive scope of such amnesties, much greater than at Dikaia, see Gray (2013d), esp. 379–84, citing much other bibliography.

<sup>36</sup> Carawan (2013), 68–9, 136–7.

<sup>37</sup> I have offered a preliminary fuller version of this argument, which I hope to develop, in Gray (2013d), 385–7, 398–401. I argue there that this reinterpretation of the *Athenaion Politeia* is consistent with other evidence, especially that of the orators: there are no conclusive indications in other sources that murder and wounding ‘with one’s own hand’ were not covered by the amnesty.

A far-reaching amnesty made clear that the common good and the communal harmony of a shaken but timelessly fraternal civic community had priority over private settling of scores.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, as Loraux also argues, citizens probably often took the view that, if a *stasis* was principally a result of foreign interference or collective madness, no particular citizens could legitimately be punished for their roles in it. Civic brothers and friends could not really be held culpable for violence against one another.<sup>39</sup>

Far-reaching amnesties may often have been the best route to stability in prevailing circumstances, but there was some choice involved: as the Dikaia settlement shows, the holding of regulated trials was another post-*stasis* option. In the Athenian case, the amnesty was partly a pragmatic response to the prevailing situation: the Spartans, very dominant at this point,<sup>40</sup> would not have tolerated large-scale retribution against oligarchs. However, for reasons of religion and propaganda, the Spartans would surely have found it hard to deny requests to hold trials at least of all suspected murderers, if Athenian democrats had pressed for them. The institution of a very wide-ranging amnesty would surely, therefore, have been partly a result of autonomous choice of a 'Nakonian' strategy.

This is consistent with the Athenians' wider approach to their post-*stasis* settlement. Allowing the formation of the breakaway community of former oligarchs in Eleusis, something similar to the institutionalized exile communities considered in Chapter 6, was a significant admission of civic divisions. However, this new settlement was short-lived, and did not strongly impinge on the Athenians' representations of their *δημος*. In general, the Athenians spoke and acted as if the settlement was simply a way of recapturing temporarily disrupted unity, by re-establishing and reinforcing frictionless, cordial civic relations between members of a close-knit, indivisible *δημος*.<sup>41</sup> This tendency is already evident in the strongly 'Nakonian' words attributed by Xenophon to the herald Kleokritos at the start of the reconciliation: Athenians on both sides share religious and military experiences.<sup>42</sup>

The view that the Athenian people were, and always had been, an indivisible, 'Nakonian' civic community was subsequently reflected in, and reinforced by, the development of popular legends regarding the collective heroism of the '*δημος-in-exile*'.<sup>43</sup> The impression created was that all democrats had fled the city, leaving a deserted city under the despotism of only thirty 'tyrants'. Orators subsequently also stressed the extent to which the new settlement recaptured this basic Athenian democratic unity. Consider, for

<sup>38</sup> Consider Andocides 1.81.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Loraux (2001), esp. chs. 6 and 9.

<sup>40</sup> Carawan (2013), 68–9.

<sup>41</sup> Compare Loraux (2001), esp. 245–64; note also Dössel (2003), 110–12, 141–2; Shear (2011), 295–301.

<sup>42</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.4.20–2.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Chapter 6.2.4.



example, Isocrates' retrospective synoptic view of the settlement: since the settlement, the Athenians have run their civic affairs 'finely and collectively' (*καλῶς καὶ κοινῶς*), as if no disaster had ever befallen them.<sup>44</sup> In his *Against Leptines*, Demosthenes briefly summarizes the reconciliation as the moment when the polis again became 'one'.<sup>45</sup>

Admittedly, the Athenian amnesty could also be presented in fourth-century Athens as a contract between parties with different interests. For example, the agreements could be conceptualized as *συνθήκαι*<sup>46</sup> or *διαλλαγαι*,<sup>47</sup> words which evoked formal contracts.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, some scholars have seen a 'Dikaiopolitan' style of political and legal interaction and decision-making as intrinsic to the settlement. Dössel argues that the balancing of the interests of the conflicting parties, including the numerically weaker defeated oligarchs, was a hallmark of the settlement.<sup>49</sup> A more radical view is Carawan's recent controversial reinterpretation of the whole settlement. He sees the settlement as a whole as a predominantly contractual one, involving mutual pledges of security and cooperation and guarantees that they would be upheld. Carawan even argues that the Athenian settlement was a type of social contract *ab initio*,<sup>50</sup> or a 'tradeoff of remedies and restrictions'.<sup>51</sup> Although these views must be built into any interpretation of the settlement, the more contractual conception of the nature of the settlement mainly remained implicit or secondary, probably often partly as a foil to the 'Nakonian' conception which dominates surviving sources.<sup>52</sup>

Other scholars advance another interpretation of the Athenian settlement of 403 as something other than a 'Nakonian' attempt to recapture and enforce fraternal civic unity. They argue that the settlement made possible a reflective style of politics as dialogue: the amnesty and its aftermath, especially the permitted scrutinies, trials, and public debates, enabled a period of mutual reflection about the violent conflict and expulsions, an effective means of reducing civic tensions.<sup>53</sup> As far as it occurred, this type of political interaction probably took the form mainly of the sensitive and imaginative vagueness, ambiguity, and ambivalence studied, in other contexts, in Chapter 4 below. There is little evidence of anything closer to modern ideals of conscientious

<sup>44</sup> Isocrates 18.46. <sup>45</sup> Demosthenes 20.11.

<sup>46</sup> See, for example, [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 39.1; Lysias 13.88; Isocrates 18.4.

<sup>47</sup> Note the language used about the Spartans responsible for brokering the reconciliation at Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.4.38; [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 38.4.

<sup>48</sup> For the latter term, compare Carawan (2006a), 59–60; (2013), 44.

<sup>49</sup> Dössel (2003), 98–9, 137, 140–5; compare Christ (2012), 58–61.

<sup>50</sup> Carawan (2002), 12; 23, with n. 85; Carawan (2013), e.g. 1–3, 96–7 (on Isocrates 18.24), 116 (on Lysias 12), 277.

<sup>51</sup> Carawan (2013), 19.

<sup>52</sup> Carawan (2013), 251–2, himself points out that the fourth-century Athenians quickly came to emphasize a patriotic, 'Nakonian' picture of their settlement.

<sup>53</sup> Consider Wolpert (2002), e.g. 117; Dössel (2003), 145–6.

coming-to-terms with political violence through deliberation in which all parties can take part, mutually acknowledging responsibility or even guilt and offering forgiveness.<sup>54</sup>

Significantly for this book's concerns, both the Mytilenians and Athenians remained vague, in devising and implementing their settlements, about the precise character of their cities' values and the precise boundaries of their civic communities. Indeed, probably in both cases, unity was to be based on mutual amnesty and forgetting. This collective forgetfulness was consistent with the indeterminacy of the underlying 'Nakonian' paradigm, emphasized in Chapter 1. It also formed part of broader tendencies of doublethink, sensitive ambivalence, and toleration of vagueness, presented in Chapter 4 below as central to Athenian and wider Greek political life: collective ignoring or imaginative sidestepping of normative tensions and disagreements, as opposed to positive embrace of precise political ideals.

## 2.2. Predominantly 'Dikaiopolitan' Reconciliations: Tegea and Telos

Whereas the reconciliation settlements considered in the previous sub-section were strongly shaped by underlying 'Nakonian' norms, it was not only at Dikaia that 'Dikaiopolitan' norms exerted a predominant influence on processes and rhetoric of bipartisan reconciliation. This can be illustrated through close analysis of two early Hellenistic reconciliation settlements, both involving reintegration of exiles: one from Tegea in the Peloponnese and one from the island of Telos in the eastern Aegean.

In the later fourth century, the Tegeates published a well-known document (Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 101), probably a relatively free interpretation and application of royal instructions,<sup>55</sup> regulating the reintegration of exiles. They did so probably in response to Alexander's Exiles' Decree of 324, but possibly in response to Polyperchon's Exiles' Decree of 319.<sup>56</sup> The text addresses in turn the restoration of the exiles' property; a question relating to civic festivals; the resolution of disputes about property; debts to 'the Goddess'; and the status of exiles' wives and daughters. It concludes with an oath of reconciliation.

<sup>54</sup> Compare Carawan (2013), 6, citing Konstan (2010).

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 101, ll. 1–4. Bencivenni (2003), 86–93, probably goes too far in taking these lines to show that the settlement represents a near faithful reproduction of Alexander's Exiles' Decree, with local references added: the settlement includes local features too distinctive to derive simply from a generic template, especially the regulations concerning 'the Goddess', presumably Athene Alea, and the future judicial role of Mantinea (F. Canali de Rossi, *BMCRev* 2006.01.35).

<sup>56</sup> Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 530. Worthington (1993) offers plausible, but not conclusive, arguments for 324; cf. Dimitriev (2004), 351–4.

The predominant influence of underlying 'Dikaiopolitan' norms on this document is best illustrated by contrasting it with the Mytilenian documents of the same period considered in the previous sub-section. Apart from anything else, that contrast shows that the Tegeates could have acted differently, faced with the problem of reintegrating exiles with claims to property. The contrasts are as follows. First, whereas the second Mytilenian document presents the two factions involved simply as 'the returned exiles' and 'those in the city', the Tegeate text makes a clear qualitative distinction between two groups: the 'exiles' or 'returnees'<sup>57</sup> and 'those who were previously living at home as citizens' (οἱ πρότερον οἴκοι πολιτεύοντες).<sup>58</sup> The drawing of this distinction presupposes that the polis of Tegea continued to exist, and its inhabitants to live as citizens, despite the divisions in the citizen-body and the subsequent absence of the exiles. This presupposition is later reinforced in the text of the oath, in a reference to those returnees whom it was 'resolved by the polis to receive back' (ἔδοξε τᾷ πόλι καταδέχεσθαι).<sup>59</sup>

This difference between the settlements could simply indicate different situations: whereas a coherent faction was reintegrated into Mytilene in the second Mytilenian document, it may have been disparate individual exiles who were reintegrated into Tegea.<sup>60</sup> Alternatively, the difference may simply show that the incumbent Tegeates were sufficiently dominant to assert that they had never ceased to be legitimate citizens. However, it probably also reflects a qualitatively different view of the nature of a polis at Tegea: a polis is not a structured community of citizens, which dissolves when it is divided; rather, it is a neutral, overarching political-legal institution conceptually distinct from the community of citizens.<sup>61</sup> On this view, individual citizens do not constitute their polis directly. Rather, they possess, and can lose, the right to participate in its procedures.

Second, a related interest in the neutrality of political and legal decision-making is evident in the nature of the tribunal the Tegeates appointed to resolve property disputes. Whereas the Mytilenians planned to constitute a board consisting of twenty Mytilenian citizens, the Tegeates called on a foreign court, making the polis of Mantinea responsible for judging cases which arose

<sup>57</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 101, ll. 4, 20, 49, 58, 61.

<sup>58</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 101, l. 21.

<sup>59</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 101, ll. 58–9.

<sup>60</sup> However, the Tegeate *stasis* of 370, when around 800 oligarchs were exiled (Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.5.10), or Tegeate involvement in the revolt of Agis against Alexander (Quintus Curtius 6.1.20) could each have created coherent factions of Tegeate exiles anxious for repatriation (Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 530, favour the latter possibility).

<sup>61</sup> Compare *SEG* 51.1075 (Chios, late fourth century; compare Malouchou (2000–2003), 275–6), ll. 4–7: the Chian 'polis' features apparently as an existing entity which interacts with restored exiles, rather than one which is in the process of being reconstituted through their return and reintegration.

after the court had ceased functioning.<sup>62</sup> By calling on external, supposedly impartial judges,<sup>63</sup> the Tegeates recognized that the Tegeate citizen-body consisted of conflicting individuals and groups, lacking all-encompassing shared horizons: the guidance of neutral outsiders was required in order to reach an even-handed settlement.<sup>64</sup> This was one key to ensuring the careful balancing of the interests and burdens of returnees and incumbent citizens reflected in the detailed provisions about returnees' property.<sup>65</sup>

The third contrast relates to the treatment of religion. In the first Mytilenian document, anthropomorphic gods and deified abstractions are to be promised sacrifices and a procession if they help to bring about the success of the settlement; in the second, all the citizens are to make a collective prayer to 'all the gods'.<sup>66</sup> In the Tegeate settlement, one religious element partly recalls the 'Nakonian' orientation of the Mytilenian documents: incumbent citizens are to swear their oath of reconciliation by shared civic gods, Zeus, Athene, Apollo, and Poseidon.<sup>67</sup> Significantly, however, the gods are here cast as upholders of the oath, rather than as direct promoters of the common good.

One more unequivocally contrasting religious element in the Tegeate text, of a notably regulatory, 'Dikaiopolitan' type, is the reference to arrangements concerning debts to 'the Goddess', presumably Athene Alea:<sup>68</sup> the patron goddess of Tegea features as a source of loans which must be repaid, not as a source of divine beneficence. Another such element is the reference to arrangements to be made, by a decision of the polis, concerning 'festivals' (*παναγορίαι*) during the exiles' absence.<sup>69</sup> As Harding suggests, the matter to be decided may well have been whether the exiles should perform liturgies, or make other contributions to festivals, which they had missed.<sup>70</sup> If so, these lines reveal a particular sensitivity to the reciprocal principle that those who benefit from citizenship should contribute to the expenses of civic life, even retrospectively.

The fourth contrast concerns the oath to be sworn at Tegea. It is not known what oath formula the Mytilenian arbitrators chose for the civic oath to cement the reconciliation at Mytilene recorded in the second Mytilenian

<sup>62</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 101, ll. 24–35. On the contrast: Worthington (1990), 200–1; (1993), 60–1.

<sup>63</sup> The document laid down principles governing the partial return of exiles' property; the foreign court was to decide disputed cases. Cf. Lonis (1991), 99–103.

<sup>64</sup> Compare the discussion of events and probable attitudes at Phlius in the period 384–1 in Chapter 5.2.4.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Carawan (2013), 54–5.

<sup>66</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85A, ll. 5–12; 85B, ll. 39–49. On the Mytilenians' heavy reliance on divine protection: Dössel (2003), 170.

<sup>67</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 101, l. 57.

<sup>68</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 101, ll. 37–48, with comment on p. 532.

<sup>69</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 101, ll. 21–4.

<sup>70</sup> Harding (1985), 152 (n. 10); contrast Worthington (1990), 199.

document. However, the reference to the ‘salvation and flourishing of all the citizens’ in the civic prayer gives a probable indication of its eventual content. The Tegeate oath<sup>71</sup> strikes one comparably ‘Nakonian’ note: the swearer must first commit himself to ‘bear goodwill’ (εὐνοήσω) to the returned exiles. This is then reinforced by the promise, mentioned above, not to bear grudges: the incumbent Tegeates had to make a ‘Nakonian’ pledge to renounce enmity and political rivalry for the sake of warmth and goodwill.

However, the swearer must then explicitly promise to show a far more limited, even grudging degree of concern for his fellow citizens returned from exile: he must promise neither to ‘hinder their safety’ (οὐδὲ διακωλύσω τὰν τῶν κατηνθηκότων σωτηρίαν) nor to ‘deliberate’ or ‘give counsel’ against anybody ([ο]ὐδὲ βωλεύσω πὸς οὐδένα). The fulfilment of the latter pledges might be thought to be necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for the fulfilment of the former, more ‘Nakonian’ pledges of goodwill and forgiveness. In fact, however, those preceding pledges of solidarity should have made superfluous more limited, dispassionate, contractual pledges of just, non-deceitful behaviour. Pledges of that latter type would be out of place, for example, in wedding vows or the initiatory oaths of a friendly sympotic group. They are much better suited to the membership oaths of an association for mutual security, advantage, and justice, whose members will preserve distinctive interests and pursue them vigorously.<sup>72</sup>

While these more ‘Dikaiopolitan’ elements of the oath do thus themselves lend legitimacy to ‘Dikaiopolitan’ citizen attitudes and interaction, they do so more equivocally than the other parts of the Tegeate settlement. Their close juxtaposition with the more ‘Nakonian’ elements of the oath gives them a tone of realist resignation. Indeed, considered alongside each other, the contrasting components of the oath betray contrasting assumptions, respectively optimistic and realist, warm-hearted and cold-blooded, about the nature and potential of civic politics and of the Tegeate citizen-body.

Such equivocation between alternative types of formulation, a key sign of the dialectical relationship in Greek civic political culture between more utopian and more realist assumptions about human nature and politics, was certainly not unparalleled in the rhetoric of Greek civic oaths. For a similar

<sup>71</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 101, ll. 57–66.

<sup>72</sup> Interestingly, the kind of distrustful, rule-focused civic commitment implied by the promise not to ‘hinder the security’ of the restored exiles, at Tegea, finds a fourth-century Peloponnesian parallel in the oaths exchanged in a civic agreement between distinct parties clearly lacking much warm-hearted fellow feeling, the fourth-century union (συνουκία) between the Arcadian cities of Orchomenos and Euaimon. The respective inhabitants of the two previously separate communities mutually renounced deceit and pledged security, with the Orchomenians explicitly promising not to expel citizens of Euaimon (*IPArk* 15, ll. 53–90, ll. 80–3 on expulsion; Sommerstein and Bayliss (2013), 31–2, remark on the note of at least initial tension between the newly united communities).

combination of contrasting pledges, it is possible to compare the oath to be sworn by a group of emigrants from Cretan Hierapytna in a second-century *ἰσοπολιτεία* agreement<sup>73</sup> with the citizens of their home city, which reveals similar equivocation about the degree of integration and trustworthiness possible or desirable among fellow citizens. Promises to 'bear goodwill' (*εὐνοσιῶ*) and to show strong solidarity, by sharing friends and enemies and offering wholehearted military support, are combined with more contractual promises not to engage in pledge-breaking, deceit, injustice, or plotting.<sup>74</sup> It might be thought that the stipulation of any oath to bind together individuals or groups, however 'Nakonian' its explicit content, rests on a cold-blooded presupposition of the ongoing possibility of discord between them.<sup>75</sup> There is certainly some truth in this. Nevertheless, oaths such as those from Tegea and Hierapytna, in which the parties explicitly promise not to engage in deceitful behaviour, give particular prominence to the underlying tensions or potential tensions to which they are themselves an imagined solution.<sup>76</sup>

The realist admission implicit in the inclusion of the more limited, contractual pledges that the Tegeate polis was not, and would not become, a solidaristic whole, but that regulated conflict between Tegeate citizens would continue, is reinforced by the fact that, unusually, not all citizens were obliged to swear an oath of reconciliation, but only a circumscribed group: the incumbent citizens. The character of the drafters' conception of the true nature of the reconstituted Tegeate citizen-body, divided and conflictual, must have been one reason why they thought it necessary or desirable to make use of the regulatory and other 'Dikaiopolitan' devices and rhetoric evident elsewhere in the settlement. Moreover, their very presupposition of intense distrust and competition between Tegeate citizens would itself have encouraged citizens to view one another as potential threats, rather than as reliable civic friends, collaborators on the path to collective security and success.

For its part, the early Hellenistic Telian reconciliation which shows significant 'Dikaiopolitan' features was devised by Coan arbitrators, after the Telian *δᾶμος* asked the Coans to send men to arrange a reconciliation with dissident citizens.<sup>77</sup> The conflict between the Telian *δᾶμος* and these citizens appears to have arisen because the dissidents refused to accept two or three types of penalty: penalties arising from 'sacred (legal) cases', 'public cases', and possibly also 'cases of the road'.<sup>78</sup> As a result, the Telian *δᾶμος* had apparently laid claim to all of the dissidents' property, presumably after it had imposed

<sup>73</sup> An agreement between two poleis under which citizens of each could register as citizens of the other.

<sup>74</sup> Chaniotis *Verträge*, no. 74, ll. 15–22.

<sup>75</sup> Compare Loraux (2001), ch. 5, esp. 143.

<sup>76</sup> Compare Chaniotis (2005), 105.

<sup>77</sup> *IG XII 4 1* 132, ll. 1–12.

<sup>78</sup> *IG XII 4 1* 132, ll. 41–78. Fines arising from a case 'of the road' (*IG XII 4 1* 132, l. 63) may have been paid to a fund for the upkeep of the road, or they may have been exacted as a penalty for offences relating to the road.

formal exile or the dissidents had ‘voluntarily’ fled into exile.<sup>79</sup> This reconstruction of the underlying situation is supported by independent evidence that politically motivated litigation and fines were a common starting point for *stasis*.<sup>80</sup> The inscription recording the reconciliation consists of an honorary decree for the *δᾶμος* of Cos and the arbitrators,<sup>81</sup> followed by the terms of the settlement agreed by the arbitrators, in their own words and then as adopted by the Telians, with slight modifications.<sup>82</sup> The settlement includes the text of the civic oath, to be sworn by all citizens over eighteen, which will accompany the settlement.<sup>83</sup> Finally, the document records a decree of the Telian *δᾶμος* confirming the settlement.<sup>84</sup>

Like the Tegeate and Dikaioopolitan settlements, the Telian document represents and envisages its citizen-body as a contractual association of conflicting citizens for mutual security, advantage, and justice, as opposed to a utopian, solidaristic civic community. Consistently with this, the text gives greater prominence to strict justice than to consensus or civic friendship. ‘*Ομόνοια*’ itself does feature, in the opening honorary decree and in the arbitrators’ settlement.<sup>85</sup> The word could even have had ‘Nakonian’ overtones for the Telians. However, the Telian oath is dominated by negative pledges of faith and renunciations of violence and deceit, resembling those in the Dikaioopolitan oath or those which dominate another Hellenistic oath to uphold civic order, preserved from Cretan Itanos.<sup>86</sup> The text of the Telian oath, which includes a striking explicit commitment to uphold Telian democracy, is as follows:

ἐμμενέω ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι τῷ  
καθεστακό-  
τι καὶ διαφυλαξέω τὰν δημοκρατίαν καὶ οὐ μνασικακήσῃ περὶ  
τῶν  
130 [ἐν ταῖ κ]ρίσ[ει] γενομένων οὐδὲ πράξῃ παρὰ τὰν διάλυσιν τάνδε  
οὐδὲν  
[οὐδὲ] ὄπλα ἐναντία θησεῦμαι τῷ δάμῳ οὐδὲ τὰν ἄκραν  
καταλαμψεῦντι  
συμβουλευσέω οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ ἐπιβουλεύοντι οὐδὲ καταλύοντι τὸν δᾶ-  
μον εἰδὼς ἐπιτραφέω· αἱ δὲ κα αἴσθωμαί τινα νεωτερίζοντα ἢ συλ-  
λόγους συνάγοντα ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δάμου, δηλωσέω τοῖς ἄρχου-  
135 σιν· εὐορκεῦντι μέμ μοι ἤμεν πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ, ἐφιορκεῦντι δὲ τὰ  
ἐναν-  
τία·

<sup>79</sup> Confiscated property: *IG* XII 4 1 132, ll. 79–87, 108–12.

<sup>80</sup> Gehrke (1985), 208–10; see especially Thucydides 3.70.3–6.

<sup>81</sup> Side A, fragment a.

<sup>82</sup> Side A, fragment b, and side B; for the slight difference, see Gray (2013d), 395, n. 85.

<sup>83</sup> *IG* XII 4 1 132, ll. 128–36.

<sup>84</sup> *IG* XII 4 1 132, ll. 138–41.

<sup>85</sup> *IG* XII 4 1 132, ll. 4–5, 38–9, 125–6.

<sup>86</sup> *IC* III iv 8, ll. 9–38 (Itanos, probably third century). That oath is dominated by negative pledges to abstain from disruptive or revolutionary behaviour, including interference with property and credit rights, but it also includes more positive regulatory pledges to act as a citizen on ‘equal and alike terms’ and to respect the laws and the constitution (ll. 28–38).

I will remain faithful to the established constitution and I will protect the democracy. I will not bear grudges [about the things] which were [subject to] the judg[ement], nor will I do anything contrary to this reconciliation, nor will I bear arms against the people, nor will I conspire with anyone who seizes the citadel, nor will I knowingly allow anyone else to plot against or dissolve the democracy. If I perceive anyone fomenting revolution or calling meetings aiming at the dissolution of the people, I will report it to the magistrates. May many good things happen to me if I keep my oath and the opposite if I perjure myself.

Swearing such an oath, and hearing others forced to swear it, would hardly have encouraged Telian citizens to regard one another as trustworthy civic friends, who could help one another to express the social, 'political-animal' aspects of their natures.

Notably, citizens were *not* required to swear to preserve *ὁμόνοια*,<sup>87</sup> to show goodwill to fellow citizens,<sup>88</sup> or to promote the common good. That the Coan arbitrators could have proposed a quite different, more 'Nakonian' oath is particularly clear from the fact that the Telian oath contrasts in this last respect with a later, equally staunchly democratic civic oath also, at least partly, devised by Coans: the more detailed 'oath upholding democracy'<sup>89</sup> to be sworn by all citizens of the expanded Coan polis after the establishment or re-establishment of a form of close union (called *ὁμοπολιτεία*) between the poleis of Cos and Kalymna in c.208.

That oath shows significant similarities with this one, but it also incorporates additional, more 'Nakonian' clauses, including ones binding the swearer to enhance the territory of the polis as far as he is able and to act as a 'just' (*δίκαιος*) jury member and an 'equal' (*ἴσος*) citizen, voting without favour *according to what seems to him favourable for the δᾶμος*.<sup>90</sup> These clauses placed substantial constraints on citizens' democratic political activity, in a way consistent with a broader Hellenistic Coan interest in civic unity, cutting across other affiliations.<sup>91</sup> In order to receive voting rights in the courts and assembly, citizens had to promise on oath to make the interests of the whole *δᾶμος* paramount in those contexts, if necessary at the expense of their

<sup>87</sup> Contrast *IOSPE I<sup>2</sup> 401* (Chersonesos Taurica, third century), l. 5; cf. Dössel (2003), 179–96, and chapter 3.3.4 and 5.5.3.1 below. Such homonoetic oaths were probably not uncommon: Xenophon's Socrates claims that Greeks in all the cities are commonly required to swear to preserve *ὁμόνοια* (Xenophon *Memorabilia* 4.4.16).

<sup>88</sup> Contrast the opening of the Tegeate oath of c.324, discussed earlier.

<sup>89</sup> Krob (1997), 445–7, also compares these oaths.

<sup>90</sup> *IG XII 4 I 152*, ll. 14–31, esp. 26–9; for translation, see Austin (2006), no. 153. Compare the similar combination of strong 'Nakonian' pledges at *IOSPE I<sup>2</sup> 401*, ll. 22–30.

<sup>91</sup> For the great interest of the Hellenistic Coans in close-knit unity (*ὁμόνοια*), and its connection with democracy, possibly a result of a particular anxiety to maintain democratic concord among the different communities merged into the Coan polis from the fourth century onwards, see Hamon (2009), 368, n. 46, and 370, n. 52; *BE* 2010, no. 122. Note *SEG* 51.1054, ll. 7–10; 55.931; 55.937–937ter.



personal or sectional interests. The Telian oath, by contrast, allowed considerable scope for Telians to pursue personal or sectional interests, within the constraints of the legal and political institutions of their polis.

The contrast with 'Nakonian' reconciliation settlements is even greater than in the case of the Tegeate settlement, due to one striking 'Dikaiopolitan' feature which the Telian settlement shares with the Dikaiopolitan settlement. The Coan arbitrators did not seek to erase all memory of the recent conflicts between citizens. Rather than instituting a comprehensive or near-comprehensive amnesty, they decided to take the unusual step of putting into practice their more 'Dikaiopolitan' notion of good civic relations by attempting to achieve a measure of retrospective justice with regard to the recent civic disturbances. They required those who had previously incurred the various penalties to pay fines or perform prescribed forms of 'community service' (contribution to a sacrifice or repair of an altar), or both, as an informal substitute for their overturned penalties.<sup>92</sup>

It was highly unusual for boards and courts concerned with bipartisan civic reconciliation to concern themselves with retrospective justice in this way: in most other known cases, except the Dikaiopolitan one, the relevant boards and courts were confined to resolving questions of property and future civic organization.<sup>93</sup> As at Dikaia, therefore, provision was made at Telos for some retrospective justice, despite the risk of rekindling discord. Moreover, as at Dikaia, the provisions for a measure of retrospective justice presupposed that the Telian citizen-body was not a homogeneous whole: Telian citizens had a significant measure of individual agency, for whose exercise it was legitimate to hold them personally responsible. This is not to deny that there were also significant differences from the situation at Dikaia: the retrospective justice at Telos was to be of an improvised, non-judicial kind. This only serves to confirm the diversity of the possible applications of 'Dikaiopolitan' norms of justice to post-*stasis* situations.

In sum, therefore, the Tegeate and Telian bipartisan reconciliations, like the Dikaia reconciliation itself, show significant 'Dikaiopolitan' features. This is strong evidence for the workings of an underlying 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm within the shared political culture of the Greek civic world. It could, however, be objected that the three cases of pragmatically 'Dikaiopolitan' reconciliation discussed in this book cannot by themselves demonstrate the existence and mainstream influence of a fully-fledged, positive 'Dikaiopolitan' basic

<sup>92</sup> IG XII 4 1 132, ll. 41–63, 66–85; for discussion of the details and their ideological significance, see Gray (2013d), 393–5.

<sup>93</sup> Compare the roles of the board of twenty at Mytilene and the foreign court at Tegea, considered earlier in this chapter; note also events at Sikyon after 251 (Plutarch *Aratus* 14.2). See also Lonis (1991); Dössel (2003), 174–5. In a more partisan reconciliation, a board could easily take on much wider responsibilities: consider the wide remit of the board formed at Phlius in 379 (cf. Chapter 5.2.1).

paradigm within Greek civic political cultures, a rival and alternative to the 'Nakonian' paradigm. This objection would be based on the view that the emphasis in each case on procedures, reciprocity, and agreement was merely a means to the 'Nakonian' end of civic community and concord (*δμόνοια*).

The best response to this objection is that it does not take account of the nature and extent of the types of civic community and concord required by the 'Nakonian' paradigm. As clear from the examples discussed so far, a 'Nakonian' polis must be a unity of civic friends or even 'brothers', who participate fully in collective rituals and celebrations and forget slights or injuries to their own interests for the sake of civic harmony.

That level of integration and harmony, as opposed to mere consensus and stability, cannot be achieved simply by balancing and managing self-interest and upholding procedures and strict reciprocity. It requires relatively extreme social engineering, such as the 'brother-making' at Nakone, or, at the very least, strong enforcement of exacting standards of civic virtue. Indeed, 'Dikaiopolitan' rhetoric and institutions can easily legitimate behaviour and demands strongly disruptive of thoroughgoing civic unity and 'one-mindedness' about virtue of the kinds required by 'Nakonian' ideals. These include 'Dikaiopolitan' attempts by citizens to immunize themselves against the demands of social life; to claim rewards for service; or to pursue retribution against enemies or the strict enforcement of law, procedures, and prior agreements, whatever the current circumstances.

### 3. PHILOSOPHICAL RESPONSES TO *STASIS* AND EXILE: ARISTOTLE'S APPROACH AS CASE-STUDY

It is possible to set alongside the epigraphic evidence for Greek attitudes to the resolution of *stasis* parallel ideas of Greek philosophers. These too reveal the dominant influence of 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' basic ways of thinking about civic order, but also some new applications, elaborations, and combinations of them. The text of the Anonymus Iamblichi offers evidence of a late fifth or early fourth-century approach to *stasis* prevention which reveals the simultaneous influence of both paradigms. As far as the foundations of political community are concerned, the author is a full-blooded contractarian: political and legal institutions are the natural product of a contract for mutual security and advantage, from which all participants benefit.<sup>94</sup> Universal respect for law and justice holds poleis and men together, preventing the outbreak of *stasis*, in a way which is to the advantage of all.<sup>95</sup> In the law-

<sup>94</sup> Anonymus Iamblichi 6.1 DK.

<sup>95</sup> Anonymus Iamblichi 3.6; 7.10, 15 DK.

governed, just polis, those who do well will be able to have confidence in their property and standing, while those who fare worse will benefit from the safety blanket of belonging to a supportive polis.<sup>96</sup>

As far as practical obligations are concerned, however, the author does not limit himself to prescribing 'Dikaiopolitan' respect for procedures and reciprocity. He does put some emphasis on the space left in his good polis for the kind of personal liberty, self-seeking, enjoyment, and assertion of power which a 'Dikaiopolitan' citizen would embrace. Indeed, he not only draws attention to the security of the property and status of successful citizens, but also suggests that his proposed system, based on law and justice, will both allow individuals to exercise genuine power within the city and also free them from perpetual political business, allowing them to concentrate on other, more pleasant activities.<sup>97</sup>

However, he also thinks that his social contract will yield a very substantial public realm, of the kind intrinsic to a 'Nakonian' polis. Good legal order (*εὐνομία*) will breed a very substantial kind of trust (*πίστις*), one which is so substantial that goods become common (*κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ χρήματα γίγνεται*). Individuals will not heap up private wealth, but pool their wealth for the common benefit.<sup>98</sup> This is a strongly 'Nakonian' approach to equality, redistribution, and stability, quite close to the one advocated in the fourth century by Archytas of Tarentum.<sup>99</sup> According to the Anonymus Iamblichii, in a good polis of this type the weak will receive support, not only because of mutual trust, but also because of the mixing (*ἐπιμειξία*) of citizens.<sup>100</sup> The ideal is the thoroughgoing blending of citizens into a single whole, not the pacification of competing interests. The 'Nakonian' thrust of this part of the discussion is consistent with the earlier sketching of a very far-reaching, unstinting type of virtue: all men should exercise rigorous self-control, which means that they should be impervious to money and 'unsparing' (*ἀφειδής*) of their souls in pursuit of the just and virtue.<sup>101</sup>

This discussion can be set alongside a slightly later and more extensive philosophical discussion of *stasis* and its prevention, contained in Book V of Aristotle's *Politics*, which has been intensively studied by philosophers and historians of ideas.<sup>102</sup> A common modern scholarly view is that Aristotle placed great stress on the encouragement of virtue, community, and unity as a means of maintaining or restoring the stability of a polis. In opposition to this common interpretation, Yack has argued, as discussed in my Introduction, that Aristotle's

<sup>96</sup> Anonymus Iamblichii 7.2 DK.

<sup>97</sup> Anonymus Iamblichii 6; 7.4 DK.

<sup>98</sup> Anonymus Iamblichii 7.1, 8 DK.

<sup>99</sup> Archytas of Tarentum fr. 3 DK: when 'calculation' (*λογισμός*) ensures *δμόνοια* and equality, both haves and have-nots trust in obtaining the equality which comes through voluntary redistribution from the latter to the former.

<sup>100</sup> Anonymus Iamblichii 7.2 DK.

<sup>101</sup> Anonymus Iamblichii 4.1 DK.

<sup>102</sup> Yack (1993), esp. 231–9; Kalimtzis (2000); Weed (2007).

political thought, including his approach to *stasis*, gives far greater scope to regulated conflict between citizens.<sup>103</sup>

Both of these views gain support from the text of Book V of the *Politics*. Book V belongs to the realist central books, in which Aristotle claims to be offering pragmatic political proposals tailored to prevailing circumstances, as opposed to utopian suggestions. It might, therefore, be expected that Aristotle would here consistently propose mainly 'Dikaiopolitan' laws and institutions as the keys to political stability, while signalling his real preference for more lofty political ideals and proposals. In fact, however, even in Book V, there are signs of a very substantial ideal of civic community, bordering on the 'Nakonian'.

At some points, Aristotle strongly advocates the view that civic order is best achieved through the habituation of all citizens' souls through education in substantial political and ethical values. Aristotle claims that, in a 'well-mixed' constitution, care is taken that no citizens transgress the laws, even through minor infringements.<sup>104</sup> Underlying this proposal is the view that the role of politics and law is to shape character in ambitious, even utopian ways, making people just in such a way that they voluntarily do their duty and abstain from *all* wrongdoing, not simply to regulate relations between existing characters, preventing individual acts of injustice.<sup>105</sup> In the same vein, Aristotle subsequently claims that political stability requires that magistrates inspect and reform the *private* lives of citizens whose private conduct does not conform with the ethos of the prevailing constitution, whether democratic or oligarchic.<sup>106</sup> This too relies on the 'Nakonian' assumption that civic stability relies on extensive social engineering: it requires the moulding of citizens' characters in accordance with a clear, shared template, sufficiently demanding and comprehensive to offer guidance about the correct conduct even of a citizen's private and family life.

These radically 'Nakonian' suggestions are, however, somewhat isolated in Book V: the dominant tone is more realist.<sup>107</sup> Nonetheless, even some of Aristotle's realist proposals reflect the influence of 'Nakonian' assumptions: Aristotle attempts to show how a simulacrum of civic unity and virtue can be achieved even among flawed citizens, who are not amenable to utopian education.<sup>108</sup>

First, Aristotle stresses the importance of a particular type of civic virtue, which partly evokes 'Nakonian' ideals but also reflects a more realist assessment of practical possibilities: a type of civic virtue which encourages

<sup>103</sup> Yack (1985); (1993).

<sup>104</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1307b30–9. Compare examples discussed in Chapter 3.3.3.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Aristotle *Politics* 1280b2–5, in the context of 1280a31–b6.

<sup>106</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1308b20–4. <sup>107</sup> Cf. Saxonhouse (1992), 227–31.

<sup>108</sup> Compare the way in which Plato's *Laws* offers a more realistic utopia than Plato's *Republic*.

voluntary vigilance on behalf of the civic community, but whose core is the more 'Dikaiopolitan' attribute of studied respect for the constitution, rather than fraternal feeling and generosity. For example, he argues that holders of major magistracies in a polis must possess, not only the ability to perform their role, but also an attitude of 'friendship' (*φιλία*) towards the prevailing constitution. They must also possess virtue and the type of justice associated with the prevailing constitution. Simple ability is most important for military commanders, but other office-holders must be virtuous in these ways in order to avoid *akrasia* ('loss of self-control'): if they are not virtuous, they may not be able to maintain their resolve to give priority to protecting the constitution and the city.<sup>109</sup>

Second, Aristotle also stresses the importance of a type of civic education which instils this type of civic virtue and associated attitudes. At one point, he makes a general comment about the importance, and current neglect, of education in the values of a *πολιτεία* as a means of achieving stability: it is necessary to habituate citizens into living in accordance with their city's constitution, presumably as a better option than waiting to punish or cajole them when they transgress.<sup>110</sup> There is again a trace of 'Nakonian' assumptions: in particular, of a concern to render direct constraints and incentives superfluous through education. However, there is also a strong sign of 'Dikaiopolitan' elevation of the inviolability of the constitution and procedures above other considerations. Indeed, the implication of this part of Aristotle's argument is that citizens should be educated in such a way that they voluntarily respect and follow established procedures, presumably even (or especially) in the course of political disagreements and conflicts.

Third, Aristotle makes the even more pragmatic, but still faintly 'Nakonian', suggestion that citizens should be mingled together, and made equal, in order to avoid conflict: the constitution should be 'well-mixed'; and the middle class should be as large as possible, with no particular section of the polis allowed to become particularly prosperous.<sup>111</sup> Although it is not emphasized in the discussion in Book V, Aristotle probably thought that this was a means of building a specific type of friendship between citizens,<sup>112</sup> a realistic imitation of the perfect civic friendship of the 'Nakonian' polis. Indeed, a connection is drawn by Aristotle in the equally realist Book IV between mixing of citizens and promotion of homogeneity and friendliness: in a polis whose citizens are polarized into the very successful and the very unsuccessful, there is envy and discord, with the result that the polis is very far removed from the friendliness

<sup>109</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1309a33–b14.

<sup>110</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1310a12–36; Kalimtzis (2000), 185–7.

<sup>111</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1307b30–1, 1308b24–31, 1309b14–19; Weed (2007), 134–45.

<sup>112</sup> Compare Kalimtzis (2000), 179–80, who sees friendship as important for Aristotle's account of *stasis* and its avoidance.

of a 'partnership' (κοινωνία). What is desirable is that a polis should be made up of equal and alike men, something for which 'middling' citizens are well-suited.<sup>113</sup>

The fact that Aristotle thus attempted an unusual type of fusion, seeking to offer realist proposals for forms of civic organization which have a partial 'Dikaipolitan' colouring but also promise to create mundane approximations to 'Nakonian' virtue and unity, did not prevent him from also offering in Book V quite uncompromising and unsentimental 'Dikaipolitan' proposals for *stasis* avoidance. Indeed, Aristotle appears there to hold that the only alternative<sup>114</sup> to the forging of a homogeneous, well-educated civic community is to maintain a relatively crude civic contract or association, in which the emphasis is on the regulation and satisfaction of citizens' pre-existing wants and emotions.<sup>115</sup>

For example, Aristotle advocates use of particular, pragmatic checks and balances to curtail individual self-assertion: all constitutions should adopt the currently 'democratic' practice of keeping terms of office quite short, to avoid corruption.<sup>116</sup> He also suggests that 'those concerned with the constitution' should use fear to ensure that citizens do not become complacent about civic security.<sup>117</sup> In this latter case, appealing to pre-existing, raw emotions is offered as a pragmatic way of avoiding possible shortfalls in principled civic courage and vigilance.

Aristotle also argues that those who have little political power in a constitution should be compensated, through a relatively crude bargain, with material rewards and incentives:<sup>118</sup> for example, a prominent social role, in the form of superior seats in the theatre.<sup>119</sup> Moreover, at one point, Aristotle suggests that part of the function of a bolstered middle class is to act as 'arbitrator' (δαιτητής) between rich and poor.<sup>120</sup> This suggests that the middle class is to be a protector of a pragmatic, variable 'mixed' civic contract, tailored to prevailing political circumstances.<sup>121</sup>

These comments can be compared with some of Aristotle's proposals in Book IV for the maintenance of stability in a mixed constitution or *πολιτεία*. Although he at first suggests that the friendliness which comes with equality and homogeneity will hold such a polis together, he subsequently emphasizes the need for incentives and disincentives which will appeal directly to the

<sup>113</sup> See Aristotle *Politics* 1295b1–27.

<sup>114</sup> Cf. Weed (2007), ch. 4 (esp. 166).

<sup>115</sup> For other highly prudential realist proposals about the avoidance of civic unrest by a fourth-century observer, see Aeneas Tacticus 10–11.

<sup>116</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1308a13–24.

<sup>117</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1308a24–30.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Weed (2007), 145–65. On the importance of incentives in Greek political thought more generally: Ober (2008), e.g. 118–21; (2009).

<sup>119</sup> e.g. Aristotle *Politics* 1309a14–32, cf. 1308a3–13.

<sup>120</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1297a5–6, in the context of 1296b34–1297a8; Weed (2007), 144.

<sup>121</sup> Compare Yack (1993), 231–5.

differing material interests of non-alike citizens. He proposes that mixed assemblies should be maintained by incentivizing poorer citizens to attend the assembly through assembly pay and sternly encouraging wealthier citizens to attend through fines for non-attendance.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, he argues that the poor will tolerate missing out on honours if their dignity and property remain secure, and will be more likely to join military campaigns if food is provided.<sup>123</sup> This Book IV discussion of the good mixed constitution thus leaves it unclear whether differences of interest and perspective among citizens will be eradicated or minimized through civic friendship, or whether they will remain normal, tolerated forces in civic life, subject to official regulation, channelling, or pacification.

To return to Book V, Aristotle also insists there that justice in distribution, whose nature varies across constitutions, is necessary to avoid *stasis* and exile:<sup>124</sup> citizens must receive that to which they are entitled, according to their constitution's definition of equality,<sup>125</sup> if they are not to become disaffected. This line of argument represents a much less crude appeal to principles of strict reciprocity. Indeed, as suggested in Chapter 1, Aristotle's notion of justice in distribution is indeterminate between a strongly 'Nakonian' and a 'Dikaiopolitan' interpretation. This is, however, a place in which 'Dikaiopolitan' concern with strict reciprocity does seem prominent. It is most plausible to interpret Aristotle as saying that citizens become disaffected because they perceive that they are not receiving their just deserts, proportionate rewards for their civic contributions. It is harder to imagine that he intended to argue that citizens become disaffected principally because they think that the structure and harmony of their polis has been compromised by an unjust general distribution of goods and burdens.

In sum, Aristotle's proposals for the avoidance or supersession of *stasis* reflect the competition within contemporary Greek civic political cultures between the familiar two radically polarized basic conceptions of the polis and citizenship. Aristotle's fusion of realist, 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' approaches in his proposals for constitutional education and social mixing represent something much closer to a middle way between the 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' paradigms than is evident in the evidence considered elsewhere in this book. However, there is no trace in Aristotle's arguments of an intermediate approach, of the kind defined as 'proto-Kantian' in the Introduction and Chapter 1: one centred on pluralistic deliberation among citizens

<sup>122</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1297a14–b1.

<sup>123</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1297b6–12.

<sup>124</sup> Compare Aristotle *Politics* 1309a33–9: major magistrates must be just, according to their constitution's definition of justice.

<sup>125</sup> For different definitions in different constitutions, see Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1131a25–9.

who are unconditionally respectful of one another as ends in themselves and demonstrate mutual recognition of competing needs, values, and perspectives. Rather, a just ethical order is to be achieved through far-reaching civic education in shared values, through more realist forms of social engineering and social mixing, or through the enforcement of strict constraints and principles of desert.

This approach to *stasis* is strongly consistent with the underlying conception of the role of the political thinker and legislator attributed to Aristotle, and also to Plato's Athenian speaker of the *Laws*, in Chapter 1. The main options available are to treat the citizens of a polis as potentially highly altruistic (or, at least, group-oriented), probably highly egoistic, or somehow both at once.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

This chapter has begun to reveal the pervasive influence of the 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaipolitan' paradigms and their local variants, at least on cities with some form of democratic organization. It has also begun to confirm the striking indeterminacy in content of the formally well-defined 'Nakonian' paradigm and its local incarnations: the conceptions of civic religion, history, and virtue embedded in local versions of the formally rigid 'Nakonian' paradigm were rarely well-defined or unambiguous. Moreover, this chapter has revealed a striking absence of evidence in the practical politics of reconciliation, or mainstream philosophical reflection about it, for significant proto-Kantian political ideals. This chapter has thus begun to bear out the argument that, in the Greek civic world in the period covered by this book, it was most straightforward for citizens to appeal in their mainstream political arguments to one of two extremes: to 'low' considerations of mutual interest, procedural consistency, and strict reciprocity; or to rather 'high' considerations of civic flourishing, solidarity, collective identity, shared values, and demanding civic virtue.

The influence of one or the other radical paradigm could be dominant in a single post-*stasis* settlement, as at fourth-century Dikaia or fourth- or third-century Nakone. Alternatively, the two paradigms could exert simultaneous influence on a given post-*stasis* settlement, as at later fourth-century Mytilene or Tegea: 'Nakonian' ideals partially eclipsed 'Dikaipolitan' ones at Mytilene, while the reverse was true at Tegea. This evidence thus suggests that, at the underlying level of political culture and taken-for-granted, often unconscious, basic political assumptions, one or the other paradigm could be dominant, or the two paradigms could coexist with each other, at varying levels of strength, within a single, complex civic political culture.



Indeed, coexistence was probably the dominant pattern: as argued in Chapter 1, the two paradigms sustained each other within civic political cultures through dialectical processes. This chapter has offered further evidence for the workings of those processes in practice. For example, as argued in Section 2.1, in the second Mytilenian text, it is envisaged in the closing provisions that solidarity in ritual and sentiment within a unified *δημος* will supersede and compensate for, as a kind of foil, mere interest-oriented bargaining between representatives of two factions. A similar dialectical move may well be attested in a document which shares some concerns with those examined in this chapter, the third-century, anti-tyranny law from Ilion.

That is a text which identifies civic order and solidarity with democratic organization much more explicitly than the second Mytilenian text. Indeed, it is a much more partisan document, one of the most striking signs of continued heated tensions between democrats and anti-democrats in the Hellenistic world. It includes various provisions for the prosecution of individuals who become involved in different ways with a non-democratic regime, who may be prosecuted at all times *μέχρι τέλος δίκης γένηται δημοκρατουμένων Ἰλίων*.<sup>126</sup> It is not straightforward to interpret that condition. One view is that it simply means that such people may be prosecuted at any time, ‘until a trial concludes while the Ilions are governed democratically’; repeat trials will be forbidden and acquittals under a non-democratic regime will not count.<sup>127</sup> That prosaic interpretation is possible, but *τέλος δίκης* can also be taken in an abstract, more idealistic sense: ‘until the *end*<sup>128</sup> of justice<sup>129</sup> is achieved, with the citizens of Ilion living in democracy’.

This could simply be a grandiose way of identifying the prosecution of these anti-democratic traitors, under a restored democratic regime, as the fulfilment of justice. Democratic rule would then be closely associated with justice’s demands. Alternatively, however, this provision with this meaning could well have had more practical legal force, in a way perhaps more in keeping with this document: when democracy is restored, there will be a set period for post-*stasis* trials, as at Dikaia, after which further prosecutions will be outlawed, for the sake of stability and unity.<sup>130</sup> In that case, this law would lend definition, and an air of permanence, to future democratic order and solidarity by contrasting it with

<sup>126</sup> *I.Ilion* 25, ll. 76–81, 90–1, 95–7, 99–101.

<sup>127</sup> See Teegarden (2014), 180–1, 189, citing earlier bibliography.

<sup>128</sup> Or ‘fulfilment’ or ‘aim’. <sup>129</sup> Or of ‘resort to law’.

<sup>130</sup> Compare the similar interpretation of Maffi (2005), 147–8, who thinks what was envisaged was a time limit for trials after democratic restoration. Maffi offers strong arguments against the rival view that the provision is intended principally to render acquittals under non-democratic regimes invalid. First, it is unlikely that the legislators would genuinely have anticipated trials for relevant anti-democratic offences under any constitution but democracy. Sham trials for such offences under a non-democratic regime, intended to create artificial future immunity, would have given an impression of corruption and insecurity. Second, the fact that the restriction is applied to the democratic figure of *ὁ βουλόμενος* suggests that it imposes a

the prospect of a fixed, relatively short, exceptional period of 'justice' and reciprocity after a possible *stasis*. During that first period, there will not be true or full, harmonious democracy; it is only with the *τέλος δίκης* that true democracy will begin.

This chapter has also offered further evidence for the second, related dialectic within Greek civic political cultures also identified in Chapter 1: that between more utopian and more realist assumptions about human nature and the potential of politics. The functioning of this second dialectic was evident, not only in the detailed discussion of Aristotle's ideas about how to avoid *stasis*, but also in the equivocation between optimistic and pessimistic oath-clauses at fourth-century Tegea.

Sometimes the intermingling of different approaches in a single decree must have been a reflection of multiple authorship. However, the two paradigms could also coexist with each other, as shown in Section 3 for the Anonymus Iamblich and Aristotle, within the political consciousness of a single individual. Even those two rigorous intellectuals sometimes obfuscated the contradictory assumptions and implications of the two ways of thinking. However, Aristotle, at least, attempted a distinctive type of fusion of them in his ideas about *stasis*: he offered realist means of achieving strong civic consensus, including ambitious education in 'Dikaiopolitan' habits of respect for constitutional procedure.

This type of fusion of the two ways of thinking can be regarded as the inverse of another interesting type of fusion of the two evident in the thought of a philosopher. According to the argument concerning civic obligation which Plato attributes to Socrates in the *Crito*, an Athenian citizen enters a binding contract with the laws of Athens by remaining in Athens as an adult: in return for the protection and guidance which they have offered him throughout his life, he must always respect them.<sup>131</sup> By here making the civic contract a contract between the individual citizen and personified laws, rather than a contract among citizens, Plato's Socrates complies with some formal aspects of the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm, without diluting his exacting standards of civic virtue.<sup>132</sup> In contrast to Aristotle, therefore, he gives 'Nakonian' thinking some 'Dikaiopolitan' clothes.

Although fusions of these kinds were possible, in many cases, citizens probably remained unaware of the extreme character of each of the two underlying paradigms, and of any tension between them. This need not, however, be taken

narrower limit on relevant prosecutions within the broader limit that democracy should be in place.

<sup>131</sup> Plato *Crito* 51c6–52d6.

<sup>132</sup> Cf. Bertrand (1999), 310–11. Compare Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 94, together with 95–101: Lycurgus implies that there is a binding contract between the individual citizen and his *πατρίς*, which cares for him from birth.

as evidence for political naivety or confusion. As will be explored in Chapter 4, there were many possible imaginative and subtle ways of combining the paradigms, consciously or unconsciously, in dynamic thought, rhetoric, and behaviour. Moreover, openness to both underlying paradigms would have been a very reasonable response to the fact that they could provide a basis for long-term stability, individually or together. Indeed, the two underlying paradigms would probably not have been so dominant in reconciliation documents across such a wide geographical range unless they were each known to be a relatively reliable means of ensuring civic unity. The very survival of the relevant documents of reconciliation supports this view: the inscriptions themselves would probably have been among the victims of renewed discord.

This and the first chapter have concentrated on the last stage in the life cycle of the exile: the reintegration of the exile into his home polis. The next chapter turns to the beginning of the cycle: it addresses Greek discourse about legitimate grounds for lawful expulsion of citizens. From that point on, the chapters of the book follow the life cycle of the exile in order, examining varied processes of expulsion and then varied exilic lifestyles. Each stage in the cycle offers new insights into basic Greek political assumptions and norms, adding complexity to the picture developed in these first two chapters on the basis of Greek discourses of reintegration. The next two chapters demonstrate that the 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigms each legitimated, or even demanded, lawful procedures of citizen expulsion. Even though the two paradigms could also underpin projects of reintegration, reasoned exclusion was intrinsic to the essence of each.



## Exclusion and Political Culture

### Greek Arguments for Exile

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses Greek arguments and regulations concerning lawful exclusion and expulsion of citizens. It first surveys the different categories of lawful expulsion and exclusion of citizens from their poleis.<sup>1</sup> It then discusses ancient justifications for the stipulation and enforcement of citizen expulsion and exclusion, both in civic laws and decrees and in philosophers' and orators' more theoretical discussions. As argued in the Introduction, these justifications, like rhetoric about reconciliation and reintegration, offer particularly important insights into citizens' assumptions and ideas about citizenship: citizens' attempts to define when a citizen could be legitimately expelled or excluded required them to address directly fundamental questions about the nature of political membership and community.

Even relevant epigraphic documents, at least ostensibly non-theoretical, often offer, like those analysed in Chapters 1 and 2, positive paradigms of the good polis. Stipulation of criteria for expulsion or exclusion from the citizen-body required citizens to commit themselves to a public view, for publication for posterity on stone, about the basic nature of their polis and the qualifications for membership. Indeed, the use of the relatively extreme penalties of expulsion and exclusion usually automatically gave paradigmatic weight to the types of civic law, institution, and relationship which they were used to protect. Citizens always had to take account of prevailing circumstances and exercise pragmatic judgement in determining what legal regulations were appropriate. Nevertheless, in most of the cases discussed in this

<sup>1</sup> This chapter does not address a related phenomenon: the tendency, probably common in Athens and other cities, for citizens to flee 'voluntarily' into exile to avoid condemnation by a court or social disapproval.

chapter, citizens had a choice between different pragmatic measures, consonant with different basic assumptions about the nature of the good polis.

The fundamental assumptions and paradigms revealed by such analysis give crucial insights into the underlying political cultures which shaped, and were shaped by, relevant citizens' political consciousness and actions: the conceptual building blocks which relevant citizens used, bolstered, and sometimes refined. The basic pattern which emerges is very close to that evident in Chapters 1 and 2: underlying 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigms exerted the predominant influence on Greek thinking about the boundaries of the polis. Indeed, Greek debates and practices concerning lawful expulsion considerably enrich the picture of the very varied ways in which Greek citizens interpreted, applied, and intermingled 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' ideas and practices.

## 2. CATEGORIES OF LAWFUL CITIZEN EXPULSION AND EXCLUSION: OSTRACISM, EXILE, OUTLAWRY, AND DISENFRANCHISEMENT

Lawful expulsion of a citizen of a Greek polis did not necessarily take the form of a punishment. Athenian ostracism, and related practices in some other poleis,<sup>2</sup> enabled citizens to vote to expel for a defined period any citizen, even one not considered guilty of any crime.<sup>3</sup> However, lawful expulsion was more commonly imposed as a punishment. Three legal penalties are relevant.

Formal exile (*φύγι*) involved expulsion of the punished man from the territory of his home polis. It was usually explicitly extended to his descendants and accompanied by public confiscation of his property. The penalty of exile could be applied, at least de facto,<sup>4</sup> by the fourth-century Athenian courts and assembly.<sup>5</sup> It could be imposed on Athenian citizens by the Palladion or the Areopagos<sup>6</sup> as the penalty for unintentional homicide of a citizen and possibly, in some cases, intentional homicide of a citizen;<sup>7</sup> homicide by plotting (*βούλευσις*); homicide of a foreigner, metic or slave; or premeditated

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Forsdyke (2005), 285–8.

<sup>3</sup> For the legal and pragmatic details of Athenian ostracism: Forsdyke (2005), 146–9.

<sup>4</sup> Todd (1993), 139: exile may merely have been 'implicit within a commuted death sentence'.

<sup>5</sup> Grasmück (1978), 17–18.

<sup>6</sup> For their respective roles, see [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 57.3; Kahrstedt (1934), 103–4; Todd (1993), 273–4.

<sup>7</sup> Demosthenes 21.43 may suggest that permanent exile, with confiscation of property, was an alternative to the death penalty for intentional homicide of a citizen. That passage may, however, show only that those who fled Athens to avoid a death penalty for intentional homicide of a citizen automatically incurred permanent exile. See MacDowell (1963), 113–15.

(ἐκ προνοίας) wounding of an Athenian citizen.<sup>8</sup> It was probably also an option for the assembly, alongside the death penalty, as a punishment for treason or temple robbery.<sup>9</sup> Exile was probably also at least a possible penalty at Athens for other types of impiety.<sup>10</sup>

Poleis other than Athens stipulated exile as the penalty for specific severe crimes bearing on public welfare. Examples from the Classical and Hellenistic periods are collected in Table 3.1. In an unusual case, in early Classical Elis, exile was probably the penalty for cursing an individual Eleian.<sup>11</sup> The underlying was, however, probably similar to that in the cases in Table 3.1: cursing individual citizens was a potentially severe threat to civic order.

In some cities, more indeterminate offences, ‘crimes against the polis’, were punishable by exile. Citizens convicted of conspiracy ‘against Mausollos and the polis of the Iasians’ were exiled by a Iasian decree of the mid-fourth century.<sup>12</sup> Such amorphous offences were probably commonly the basis in poleis for the judicial exile of members of a faction opposed to the dominant faction in relation to foreign policy.<sup>13</sup>

Closely related to *φυγή* was outlawry, which could be expressed in a variety of ways in Greek.<sup>14</sup> The difference between outlawry and exile was that an outlaw could be killed with impunity, even outside his home polis’ boundaries, whereas an exile had the protection of the law of his home polis if he stayed outside its territory: an exile’s relatives or associates were entitled to bring a prosecution in the home city against his killer, if he was murdered outside its territory.<sup>15</sup> Like exile, outlawry tended to be stipulated as the (often automatic) penalty for severe crimes affecting civic welfare. Table 3.2 collects stipulations of outlawry, by poleis throughout the Greek world in

<sup>8</sup> Todd (1993), 274; (2007), 347. Concerning murders of foreigners, metics and slaves: Busolt and Swoboda (1920–6), I, 298; Whitehead (1977), 93–4.

<sup>9</sup> MacDowell (1978), 177, discussing Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.7.22.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Lysias 7.3, 7.32, with Carey (1989), 88; Todd (2000), 78. In a partial parallel, the Athenians, or the Athenian amphictyons on Delos, in 375/4 imposed permanent exile (*ἀειφυγία*) (it is unclear from what extent of territory) on citizens of a distinct polis, fourth-century Delos (cf. Hansen and Nielsen (2004), 739), as a punishment for committing impiety (*ἀσεβεία*) at the Athenian-controlled Delian sanctuary of Apollo (Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 28, B(a), ll. 24–30; cf. Seibert (1979), 116).

<sup>11</sup> Mion (2007), no. 20 (c.475–450), ll. 1–2: anyone who ‘curses’ or ‘dedicates to the god’ (*καταραύσειε*) an individual secretary, Patrias, will be exiled as if he had done so to an Eleian (*Γάρρεν ὅρ Φαλείο*).

<sup>12</sup> *I.Iasos* 1 (c.367/6–355/4), ll. 2–6 (exile for all time, also imposed on descendants).

<sup>13</sup> For this phenomenon, consider (for example) Hatzopoulos *Macedonian Institutions* II, no. 40; Demosthenes 9.56. Teles *On Exile*, pp. 25–6 Hense, implies considerable autonomy for third-century civic magistrates in imposing exile.

<sup>14</sup> The word *ἀτιμία* sometimes expressed outlawry (cf. this chapter’s n. 40), but periphrastic descriptions were often required.

<sup>15</sup> On Athens: Busolt and Swoboda (1920–6), I, 235; MacDowell (1978), 255.

**Table 3.1.** Offences punishable by exile in poleis other than Athens in the Classical and Hellenistic periods.

| Offence punishable by exile                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Polis and date of the relevant inscription                                                                                                      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Seizing a newly enfranchised citizen's property, without the permission of the people.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Chaladros/Chaladra, in Elis, <sup>16</sup> c.500–475. <sup>17</sup>                                                                             |
| A certain form or forms of corrupt or subversive behaviour, threatening to the polis.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Teos, c.470: the penalty was a form of public cursing which probably entailed exile from the territories of both Teos and Abdera. <sup>18</sup> |
| Subjecting to a scrutiny (ἐϋθυνα), as a magistrate, a particular council or the holders of certain offices; or judging or bringing a legal suit regarding certain written regulations, in relation to a payment or assembly decision (probably regulations authorizing emergency expenditure of public or sacred money). | Argos or Halieis, 480–470. <sup>19</sup>                                                                                                        |
| 'Destroying' or 'throwing into confusion' (συγχέω), or proposing a vote to overturn, an agreement (called a νόμος) concerning property rights.                                                                                                                                                                           | Halicarnassus, 475–450. <sup>20</sup>                                                                                                           |
| Unspecified offences, probably involving anti-Macedonian agitation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Amphipolis, c.357. <sup>21</sup>                                                                                                                |
| Exiling, or confiscating the property of, particular citizens <sup>22</sup> whose citizenship was specially protected by law.                                                                                                                                                                                            | Elis, fourth century, possibly c.350 or c.335: exile 'as for blood-guilt'. <sup>23</sup>                                                        |

<sup>16</sup> See Hansen and Nielsen (2004), no. 249: this polis was either part of the Eleian state or a perioikic polis.

<sup>17</sup> Minon (2007), no. 12 (new edition of *DGE* 415), ll. 4–7. The inclusion of this example is due to the fact that the practical meaning of *Ἰέρο(ρ)εν* or *Ἰάρρεν* ('to be pursued') was probably 'to flee into exile' (compare Minon (2007), 144), rather than simply 'to be prosecuted'.

<sup>18</sup> *Nomima* I, no. 105, fr. b, ll. 5–12 ([ἀ]πόλλυσθαι ἐκ Τέω κ[α]ὶ Ἀβδήρ[ω]ν [κ]αὶ γῆς [Τῆ]ῃ[s] καὶ α[ὐ]τὸν καὶ γένος[s] τὸ κείνο).

<sup>19</sup> *Nomima* I, no. 107 (accompanied by confiscation of property).

<sup>20</sup> *Nomima* I, no. 19, ll. 32–41: the offender should go into permanent exile, with his property becoming sacred to Apollo; if his property does not sell for at least ten staters, he himself should be sold. From the Archaic period, compare *Nomima* I, no. 100 (Argos, 575–550), ll. 1–3: according to a plausible restoration, exile with confiscation of property was the penalty for ignoring or 'throwing into confusion' the written regulations contained in the decree.

<sup>21</sup> Hatzopoulos *Macedonian Institutions* II, no. 40 (permanent exile, with children; it is made explicit in ll. 7–10 that those concerned may be killed with impunity 'like enemies' if caught anywhere, presumably on Amphipolitan territory, though it is possible that the impunity is meant to apply also to killings outside Amphipolitan territory, which would elevate the penalty to outlawry; for this possibility, compare the cases in Table 3.2).

<sup>22</sup> Minon (2007), 200, thinks that those given special protection against being exiled, the *γενεαί*, were children of existing exiles.

<sup>23</sup> Minon (2007), no. 30 (new edition of Michel *Recueil* no. 1334), ll. 3–6, as interpreted by Szanto (1898), 200–1; Danielsson (1898–1899), 136; Seibert (1979), 150; Minon (2007), 199–202. Szanto (1898), 200–1, admits that *φενγέτω αἵματος* could mean 'let him be exiled on pain of death', but thinks 'let him be exiled as for blood-guilt' more likely (compare Minon (2007), 199: let him be 'banni pour meurtre'). Reinach (1903), 188–9, thinks *φενγέτω αἵματος* here means 'let him be prosecuted', not 'let him be exiled', 'as for blood-guilt', something which could well still have led to exile. Against this view, see Minon (2007), 201, with n. 137. Another problem is whether *φενγέτω ποτ' τῷ Διὶ τῷλυμπίῳ* means 'let him be exiled from the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus' (Szanto (1898), 199; Danielsson (1898–1899), 136–7; and Seibert (1979), 150) or 'let him be exiled in the name of [or "before"] Olympian Zeus' (Reinach (1903), 188–9; Minon (2007), 199, compare 91). In either case, the implication was probably exile from Eleian territory.



|                                                                                                                       |                                                                                   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Ruling as a tyrant.                                                                                                   | Eresos: an anti-tyranny law enforced in the later Classical period. <sup>24</sup> |
| Escaping condemnation to death for having voted (as a juror) to impose a death penalty under a non-democratic regime. | Ilion, c.280. <sup>25</sup>                                                       |
| Taking up citizenship in another city, possibly because it was a hostile one.                                         | Knossos and Gortyn, probably first third of the second century. <sup>26</sup>     |

<sup>24</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 83, γ back, ll. 23–8 (mid-fourth-century tyrants and their families exiled).

<sup>25</sup> *I.Ilion* 25, ll. 97–104: exile and ἀτιμία, also imposed on descendants; since ἀτιμία represents (reversible) disenfranchisement later in this text (ll. 140–4), it probably does not represent outlawry here. The interpretation of the nature of the provision offered in Table 3.3 relies on something close to Dittenberger's restoration of the relevant lines in *OGIS* 218: [ἐ]άν τις ἐπὶ τυράννου ἢ ὀλιγαρχίας ἀποκτ[εῖν]ηι τιὰ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὦν, πάντας τοὺς τῇμ ψήφ[ον προσθεμ]ένους ἀνδροφόνους εἶναι, κα[ὶ] ἐξ[ε]ῖναι ἐπεξελεθ[ε]ῖν αἰεὶ, μέχρι τέλος δίκης [γένηται δημοκρατουμ]ένων. *Ἰλιέων*: καὶ ἐάν τῇν δίκ[ην ἀποφεύγ]η τις, ψήφον πρ[ο]σθέμενος ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀτ[μ]ον εἶναι καὶ φεύγειν αὐτόν καὶ ἐκγόνους οἱ ἂν [ἐξ αὐτοῦ γ]ένωνται. On that restoration, the last clause concerns a case in which 'someone is acquitted in a trial' or 'avoids/flees a trial' (for the latter, compare Vandorpe (2007), text, pp. 123, 125, ll. 9–15). If considered too long, the first part of the relevant restoration could be shortened to ἐάν τῇν δίκ[ην φεύγ]η τις ('if someone flees a trial').

The interpretation offered in the table is probably the strongest. Nevertheless, other restorations and interpretations cannot be excluded. In *I.Ilion*, Frisch restores the controversial clause as follows: καὶ ἐάν τῇν δίκ[ην μὴ νικήσ]η, ψήφον πρ[ο]σθέμενος ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀτ[μ]ον εἶναι καὶ φεύγειν αὐτόν καὶ ἐκγόνους οἱ ἂν [ἐξ αὐτοῦ γ]ένωνται. Frisch argues in his commentary (p. 77) that, restored in this way, this provision must refer to a previously unmentioned hypothetical prosecutor who fails, after a democratic restoration, to win a conviction in a capital trial against a citizen who voted for a death penalty enforced under a non-democratic regime. The question of who is to face exile and disenfranchisement would then depend on who is the subject of ἀτ[μ]ον εἶναι: whether the unsuccessful prosecutor remains the subject or the subject changes to the man who escapes condemnation to death. The former view would yield a quite different result from Dittenberger's interpretation, making the threat of ἀτιμία a deterrent against half-hearted prosecutions under the clause branding non-democratic jurors 'murderers'. The latter view, on the other hand, would yield something very close to Dittenberger's interpretation. Frisch's restoration with one of the possible accompanying interpretations would be possible, but is somewhat weakened by the fact that there is not even a τις to identify the potential unsuccessful prosecutor. This interpretation also has the problem that it requires that the phrase τῇμ ψήφον προσθέμενος was used twice in close proximity to refer to voters in two quite different potential trials (under a non-democratic regime and a restored democracy respectively), without any explicit marking of the transition.

In the light of these points, Frisch's restoration, or something close to it, could also be interpreted as having another meaning: exile and ἀτιμία could have been the penalty for citizens who vote for the death penalty under a non-democratic regime, but on the losing side in a trial. In that case, it would be necessary to assume a transition from a plural (πάντας τοὺς τῇμ ψήφ[ον προσθεμ]ένους) to a singular subject (ὁ τῇμ ψήφον προσθέμενος). This difficulty would be resolved under a further interpretation: it could have been only the magistrate who votes in favour of an unsuccessful capital prosecution which he has instigated under a non-democratic regime who was subject to exile and ἀτιμία. That interpretation would preserve roughly the same singular subject for both of the main clauses quoted above: a potential magistrate under a non-democratic regime.

<sup>26</sup> *ICI* viii 9, ll. 22–32; *IV* 176, ll. 29–38: in each case, citizens of the relevant Cretan city who have taken up citizenship in Miletus, rather than simply residing as metics there, are to lose their right to return to their home city and their property there, and to be treated like men who have fought in a campaign against their home city (which might imply the death penalty or outlawry, as well as the exile implied in the denial of the right to return). W. Mack drew this example to my attention.

**Table 3.2.** Offences punishable by outlawry in the Classical and Hellenistic periods.

| Offence punishable by outlawry                                                                                                                                                                                           | Polis and date of the relevant inscription                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Unspecified crimes, probably involving killings in the course of political sedition.                                                                                                                                     | Miletus, early Classical period. <sup>27</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Establishing, or attempting to establish, a tyranny.                                                                                                                                                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Athens: outlawry was the long-standing penalty for attempting to establish or helping to establish a tyranny or overthrowing the democracy,<sup>28</sup> reaffirmed in 338/7.<sup>29</sup></li> <li>• Eretria, c.340 (anti-tyranny law).<sup>30</sup></li> </ul> |
| Failure to swear an oath of reconciliation after <i>stasis</i> .                                                                                                                                                         | Dikaia, c.365–359. <sup>31</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Killing a particular naturalized citizen.                                                                                                                                                                                | Athens, c.334. <sup>32</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| For magistrates and councillors: being away from the city in the event of an anti-democratic coup attempt.                                                                                                               | Eretria, c.340 (anti-tyranny law). <sup>33</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Attempting to overturn the established constitution by proposing a measure or putting it to the vote, as a magistrate or private citizen.                                                                                | Eretria, c.340. <sup>34</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Formally opposing, as a magistrate or private citizen, specific arrangements or oaths regarding a particularly important or controversial matter.                                                                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Issa, fourth or third century, possibly late fourth century.<sup>35</sup></li> <li>• Eretria, c.322–309/8.<sup>36</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                               |
| Seizing the citadel ( <i>ἄκρα</i> ) or another mountain, expelling anyone from the city, engaging in <i>stasis</i> , or carrying out battle weapons, then evading the resulting automatic death sentence through flight. | Sagalassos, early Hellenistic period. <sup>37</sup> The penalty was quasi-outlawry: the individual concerned was to be considered an ‘enemy of the polis’; any citizen could lawfully kill him anywhere and bring back the spoils.                                                                        |

<sup>27</sup> *Milet* I 6 187 (probably dating to the years after 450: see P. Herrmann in *Milet* VII, p. 197), ll. 2–7 (partly restored; imposition of outlawry on dissidents and their descendants).

<sup>28</sup> [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 16.10; Rhodes (1981), 220–2; Dössel (2003), 61. Cf. Paoli (1930), 312, with n. 1; Ruschenbusch (1968), 11; MacDowell (1978), 175–6.

<sup>29</sup> Rhodes–Osborne, *GHI* 79, ll. 7–11. Outlawry is also upheld as the penalty for overthrowing the democracy, or serving as a magistrate when the democracy is overthrown, in the version of Demophantos’ law, purportedly of 410, which features in the text of Andocides (Andocides 1.96).

<sup>30</sup> *SEG* 51.1105A, ll. 3–5 (heavily restored; the penalty is also to be imposed on the tyrant’s descendants).

<sup>31</sup> *SEG* 57.576, ll. 17–21: those who do not swear will have their property confiscated, be subject to *ἀτιμία*, and not have recourse to legal remedies.

<sup>32</sup> Osborne, *Naturalization* D22, ll. 31–3 (*πολέμιος ἔστω*).

<sup>33</sup> *SEG* 51.1105B, ll. 3–6 (partly restored; penalty probably also imposed on descendants); Knoepfler (2001), 217–19, 223.

<sup>34</sup> *SEG* 51.1105B, ll. 6–13 (partly restored; imposed together with confiscation of property and denial of burial on Eretrian soil); Knoepfler (2001), 225–8.

<sup>35</sup> Maier, *Mauerbauinschriften*, no. 57, ll. 11–13 (quite heavily restored). On the date, see *SEG* 55.639.

<sup>36</sup> *IG* XII 9 191, ll. 29–33 (partly restored; *ἀτιμία* and confiscation of property; whatever harm he or his family suffers, no penalty will be imposed on those inflicting it); note also the restorations in ll. 56–8.

<sup>37</sup> Vanderpe (2007), text, pp. 123, 125, dating to c.333–200 and most probably to the early third century), ll. 1–20, esp. 9–15. For this text, see also *SEG* 57.1409 (face A) + 50.1304 (face B).

Failure to give up a stronghold at the end of a Teos, third century.<sup>38</sup>  
term of duty.

Failure to pay within the prescribed time a fine Kyme, third century.<sup>39</sup>  
imposed for some offence relating to a  
magistracy concerned with upholding justice.

the Classical and Hellenistic periods, which are attested or plausibly restored in inscriptions.

The third relevant legal penalty is ἀτιμία *qua* disenfranchisement (loss of civic rights).<sup>40</sup> In Classical Athens, ἄτιμοι retained the citizen's advantages over metics in some respects, but were inferior even to metics in others.<sup>41</sup> Disenfranchisement was sometimes accompanied by confiscation of property.<sup>42</sup> Rainer (1986) argues that the stipulation of disenfranchisement became purely formal in the Hellenistic period, a mere *sanctio legis*. However, Rainer's general doubts about the relevance of disenfranchisement in the cosmopolitan and monarchical Hellenistic world<sup>43</sup> are offset by recent emphasis on Hellenistic poleis' continued vitality and importance.<sup>44</sup> deprivation of civic rights must have remained a major practical and symbolic punishment.

Disenfranchisement is included in this chapter partly because it could lead, not only to 'internal exile',<sup>45</sup> but even to actual exile: in addition to the loss of political and religious rights, the loss of the right to resort to legal procedures to defend one's interests<sup>46</sup> probably often made voluntary exile preferable to a humiliating existence in the home city.<sup>47</sup> Another reason for including disenfranchisement is that it was a form of full exclusion from the civic community,<sup>48</sup> analogous to exile.

<sup>38</sup> SEG 26.1306, ll. 21–6: exile (from the territory of both Teos and Abdera); cursing; loss of property; anyone who kills the exile will not be polluted.

<sup>39</sup> I.Kyme 11, ll. 8–12 (partly restored).

<sup>40</sup> It is probable that the original meaning of ἀτιμία, in Athens and elsewhere, was outlawry: Busolt and Swoboda (1920–6), I, 230–1; Paoli (1930), 307, with n. 2; Grasmück (1978), 17, n. 16; MacDowell (1978), 73–5; Vleminck (1981), 253–7; Poddighe (2001a), 37–8. However, Youni (2001), 129, thinks that it was only ever the adjective ἄτιμος, not the noun ἀτιμία, which was used in connection with outlawry. Even in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, those subject to outlawry could be described as ἄτιμοι (note the terms in which outlawry is stipulated in the laws of fourth-century Dikaia, Issa, and Eretria and third-century Kyme mentioned in Table 3.2). Although the legal impunity of the killer of the ἄτιμος was spelled out in such cases, this probably shows only that the meaning of ἄτιμος itself was not unambiguous, not that outlawry was an additional penalty: it would have been otiose to threaten to inflict ἀτιμία *qua* disenfranchisement on individuals who also faced outlawry (cf. Youni (2001), 129).

<sup>41</sup> Ruschenbusch (1968), 17–19; Hansen (1976), 55; Todd (1993), 142–3.

<sup>42</sup> Relevant cases are noted individually in the footnotes to Table 3.3.

<sup>43</sup> Rainer (1986), 172. <sup>44</sup> e.g. Gauthier (1985); Ma (2002a); Bencivenni (2003), 1–4.

<sup>45</sup> Allen (2000), 230. <sup>46</sup> Hansen (1976), 56; cf. Lysias 9.21.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Isocrates 16.47; Lysias 9.17, 21; Hansen (1976), 59; Todd (1993), 142; Poddighe (1993), 276, with n. 14.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Poddighe (2001a), 37.

In fourth-century Athenian law, disenfranchisement was the penalty for a wide range of offences bearing on public welfare, less severe than those punishable by exile and outlawry.<sup>49</sup> Outside Athens, disenfranchisement was stipulated, or is plausibly restored as having been stipulated, as a penalty for a range of offences of a similar type in the Classical, Hellenistic, and early Imperial periods. These are laid out in Table 3.3.

### 3. IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT GREEK ARGUMENTS FOR LAWFUL CITIZEN EXPULSION AND EXCLUSION

#### 3.1. Introduction

Forsdyke's recent important treatment of practices of, and attitudes to, citizen expulsion in the Classical Athenian democracy shows that the Athenians had some significant reservations about exile as a feature of political life. Forsdyke demonstrates well that the Athenians stigmatized violent, unregulated exiling of political opponents without proper procedures, associating such behaviour with tyrants.<sup>50</sup>

Forsdyke thinks that, in order to avoid political exiling of this kind, the Athenians encouraged citizens to tolerate their political opponents and pursue rivalries within the bounds of established institutions. When disagreements became difficult to contain, ostracism provided a moderate safety valve: a limited form of exile firmly under democratic control, 'infrequent and largely symbolic'.<sup>51</sup> Forsdyke accepts that judicial exile remained unchallenged as a penalty in the democracy, but argues that it was generally enforced scrupulously, fairly, and moderately.<sup>52</sup>

Athenian stigmatization of 'tyrannical' exilings does reveal the influence of norms of moderation on Athenian discourse about exile. However, Forsdyke probably puts too much stress on the mildness of Athenian democratic political culture. Even though the Athenians clearly did insist on the importance of the rule of law and institutions, it is far more difficult to identify positive evidence of ideals or practices of tolerance. There is little attested stress on acceptance of, and coexistence with, opponents, let alone on the need

<sup>49</sup> Paoli (1930), 334–6; Kahrstedt (1934), 106–11; Ruschenbusch (1968), 22–3; Hansen (1976), 72–4; Youni (2001). See Todd (1993), 142–3, for discussion of the possibility that a penalty of 'partial ἀτιμία' could also be imposed.

<sup>50</sup> Forsdyke (2005), 244–67.

<sup>51</sup> Forsdyke (2005), chs. 3–6, esp. 133–42 (on a supposed 'end to the politics of exile' in Cleisthenic Athens), 144–5, 151–3; quote from 144.

<sup>52</sup> Forsdyke (2005), 178–81.

**Table 3.3.** Offences punishable by disenfranchisement in poleis other than Athens in the Classical, Hellenistic, and early Imperial periods.

| Offence punishable by disenfranchisement                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Polis/civic sub-division and date to which the evidence relates                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Non-payment of a fine.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Delphian phratriy of the Labyadai, c.400–350.<sup>53</sup></li> <li>• Miletus, 205/4.<sup>54</sup></li> <li>• Samos, c.250 (?).<sup>55</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Failure, as a magistrate or councillor, to ensure that obligatory public payments are made to civic benefactors.                                                                                                                                                                                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ilion, c.280.<sup>56</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Violation of an entrenchment clause in a particular law or decree. Relevant offences included contravening or overturning provisions of the law or decree; making, or speaking in favour of, a proposal contrary to its provisions; or admitting such a proposal to the assembly, as a magistrate. <sup>57</sup> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hypoknemidian Lokris, c.460–450.<sup>58</sup></li> <li>• Erythrai, fifth or early fourth century.<sup>59</sup></li> <li>• Thasos, late fifth or early fourth century.<sup>60</sup></li> <li>• Nesos, 319–317.<sup>61</sup></li> <li>• Aegiale, second century.<sup>62</sup></li> <li>• Thasos, early Imperial period.<sup>63</sup></li> </ul> |
| Interfering with boundary stones of land in which the polis had an interest.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Chios, fifth century. <sup>64</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |

(continued)

<sup>53</sup> *CID* 1.9, B, ll. 40–5 (ἀτιμία, i.e. loss of entitlements, within the phratriy of the Labyadai until a fine is paid).

<sup>54</sup> Migeotte *Emprunt*, no. 97, ll. 21–9 (ἀτιμία until a fine is paid).

<sup>55</sup> *IG* XII 6 1 172, face A, ll. 79–80 (ἀτιμία until a fine is paid).

<sup>56</sup> *I.Ilion* 25, ll. 140–4 (partly restored; ἀτιμία, until relevant payments are made, for any magistrates and councillors who, having been in office when magistrates neglected to proclaim a crown at the Great Dionysia for, or pay compensation to, those who have played an important role in overthrowing a tyrant, are accused in a legal suit of failing to ensure that adequate compensation is offered; see Frisch's interpretation in his commentary in *I.Ilion*, p. 79).

<sup>57</sup> For comparison, Rubinstein (2007), 280, collects the instances of fourth-century and Hellenistic entrenchment clauses which make cursing a penalty. Cursing was probably a purely sacred penalty, with no automatic civil consequences: Ziebarth (1895); Rhodes with Lewis (1997), 524; Rubinstein (2007).

<sup>58</sup> *Nomima* I, no. 43 (a law of the Hypoknemidian Lokrians concerning their colony at Naupaktos, also valid for the West Lokrians of Khaleion, from where this inscribed version derives), ll. 38–41 (ἀτιμία with confiscation of property for those who make reforms to the arrangements set out which are not approved by assemblies of the Hypoknemidian Lokrians and the Naupaktians).

<sup>59</sup> *Nomima* I, no. 84, ll. 9–13 (ἀτιμία combined with cursing and a 100-stater fine); cf. *Nomima* I, no. 81 (Dreos, c.650), ll. 3–4.

<sup>60</sup> *IG* XII 8 264, with the restorations in *IG* XII suppl. p. 152, ll. 15–16 (ἀτιμία with confiscation of property).

<sup>61</sup> *I.Adramytteion* 34, B, ll. 39–58 (partly restored; ἀτιμία for the offender and his descendants, combined with cursing and liability to the law against dissolution of the δῆμος; taken together, these three elements may have amounted to a sentence of death, outlawry, or exile).

<sup>62</sup> *IG* XII 7 515, ll. 125–9 (ἀτιμία with confiscation of property).

<sup>63</sup> *IG* XII Suppl. 364, ll. 11–20 (partly restored; ἀτιμία for the offender and probably also his family, accompanied by a large fine).

<sup>64</sup> Matthaiou (2011), text pp. 15–16 (new edition of *DGE* 688; Koerner (1993), no. 62), A, ll. 9–16 (ἀτιμία combined with a 100-stater fine).

Table 3.3. Continued

| Offence punishable by disenfranchisement                                                                                                                                                                | Polis/civic sub-division and date to which the evidence relates                                                                                                                                                    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Failure to judge a particular type of suit, as a magistrate, within a specified period.                                                                                                                 | Hypoknemidian Lokris, c.460–450. <sup>65</sup>                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Unlawful iteration of a particular office.                                                                                                                                                              | Erythrai, fifth or early fourth century. <sup>66</sup>                                                                                                                                                             |
| Promulgating officially overturned regulations.                                                                                                                                                         | Thasos, late fifth or early fourth century. <sup>67</sup>                                                                                                                                                          |
| Bringing, admitting for trial, or judging a legal suit in contravention of particular civic decisions or agreements.                                                                                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arkesine, c.400–350.<sup>68</sup></li> <li>• Dikaia, c.365–359.<sup>69</sup></li> <li>• Mylasa, c.240.<sup>70</sup></li> <li>• Delphi, c.390–360.<sup>71</sup></li> </ul> |
| According to plausible restorations of the text: failure to repay a debt within a specified time, after failing to reach an agreement with creditors when some kind of formal accusation has been made. |                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| For members of the Athenian Areopagos: going up to the Areopagos, joining in a sitting of the council of the Areopagos, or deliberating about anything, in the event of an anti-democratic coup.        | Athens, 338/7. <sup>72</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| A possible case: disenfranchisement from a civic sub-division for non-payment of money (possibly rents), with interest.                                                                                 | A sub-division of the Athenian cleruchy on Samos, 330/29. <sup>73</sup>                                                                                                                                            |
| Adultery.                                                                                                                                                                                               | Lepreon, Classical period. <sup>74</sup>                                                                                                                                                                           |

<sup>65</sup> *Nomima* I, no. 43, ll. 41–5 (*ἀτιμία* with confiscation of property).

<sup>66</sup> *Nomima* I, no. 84, ll. 9–13 (*ἀτιμία* combined with cursing and a 100-stater fine, as the penalty for illegal iteration of the office of *γραμματεὺς*).

<sup>67</sup> *IG* XII 8 264, with the restorations in *IG* XII suppl. p. 152, ll. 5–6 (simple *ἀτιμία*).

<sup>68</sup> *IG* XII 7 3, ll. 38–46 (*ἀτιμία* is combined with a 3000-drachma fine for any *ἐσαγωγεὺς* who brings to trial a legal suit contrary to the terms of a wide-ranging arbitration settlement, or does anything else contrary to the settlement).

<sup>69</sup> *SEG* 57.576, ll. 41–3 (*ἀτιμία* and confiscation of property for bringing a legal suit subject to an amnesty); any magistrate who heard such a suit was also to suffer confiscation of his property (ll. 43–5), but there is no reference to *ἀτιμία* in that case.

<sup>70</sup> *I.Labraunda* 8, A (decree of Mylasa), ll. 2–8 (partly restored; *ἀτιμία*, accompanied by cursing, a fine, and confiscation of property, for bringing or judging a *εὔθυνα* contrary to what has been decreed).

<sup>71</sup> Homolle (1926), text, pp. 14–18 (edition of *FD* III 1.294; certain parts are reproduced in Jacquemin, Mulliez, and Rougemont (2012), no. 28; partial English translation in Arnaoutoglou (1998), no. 43), col. VII, ll. 6–14 (heavily restored; *ἀτιμία* until the debt is paid, confiscation of property, and payment of another sum, possibly the surety). For interpretation: Homolle (1926), 74–86; Asheri (1969), 23–5, 105–8 (text and Italian translation).

<sup>72</sup> Rhodes–Osborne, *GHI* 79, ll. 11–22 (*ἀτιμία*, also imposed on descendants, and confiscation of property). It is, however, possible that *ἀτιμία* was used here to refer to outlawry, rather than mere disenfranchisement: see Teegarden (2014), 88, n. 10.

<sup>73</sup> *SEG* 45.1161 (decree of a phyle of the Athenian cleruchy on Samos), ll. 7–9, restored by J. Cargill; the relevant restoration is not printed in *IG* XII 6 1 255.

<sup>74</sup> Heraclides Lembus *On Constitutions* 42 (both the man and the woman involved in the adultery apparently faced *ἀτιμία*; in the case of the man, for life). Contrast Polito (2001), 133, n. 1, who thinks *ἀτιμοῦσι* is used here to mean merely ‘they dishonour’, not ‘they disenfranchise’, because women as well as men are its potential objects. Comparative evidence which supports the view that some form of actual disenfranchisement was involved: adulterous women at Athens were excluded from public shrines ([Demosthenes] 59.85–7).

|                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                            |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Engaging in manual labour, being litigious, or engaging in small-scale retail.                                                              | Cyrene, c.320 (in Ptolemy I's new constitution for Cyrene). <sup>75</sup>                  |
| A possible case: failure to swear an obligatory oath.                                                                                       | Eretria, late fourth century. <sup>76</sup>                                                |
| Failure, as a magistrate, to exact and transfer to the polis fines from those who fail to pay interest on loans from specific public funds. | Delphi, 160/59. <sup>77</sup>                                                              |
| Having fled or fleeing the polis or its territory in a time of crisis.                                                                      | Pergamon, 133 or shortly afterwards (in the context of Aristonikos' revolt). <sup>78</sup> |

for mutual respect and understanding among citizens who remain of fundamentally different views. Moreover, norms of moderation do not appear to have led to more fundamental doubts about the legitimacy of harsh penalties of expulsion and exclusion, which might be deployed to remove opponents of the democratic system.

Indeed, a strong case can be made that, in fourth-century Athens and across the later Classical and Hellenistic civic world, citizen expulsion was commonly deployed and regarded as a legitimate, even necessary, function of civic government.<sup>79</sup> It is true that Greek citizens could justify the use of exile in an entirely individualistic, even anarchic way. In Plato's *Gorgias*, for example, Socrates and Polus discuss and criticize the view that the power to use exile and other extreme measures arbitrarily against opponents represents a valuable source of personal power for individual citizens.<sup>80</sup> However, this should not conceal the fact that exile was also commonly presented, as argued in the following sub-sections, as a means of preserving a polis as a structured political organism.

<sup>75</sup> SEG 18.726, ll. 46–8 (on date: Bencivenni (2003), 130–3). Fraser (1958), 120, 124, emphasizes the uncertainty of the readings in this part, and associated interpretations; compare Johnstone (2011), 106. However, Heraclides Lembus *On Constitutions* 18 confirms one element: ἀτιμία for πολυδικοί. Moreover, Heraclides' accompanying claim that κακοπράγμονες suffer ἀτιμία at Cyrene could well be an elliptical reference to the stipulation of ἀτιμία for individuals engaged in the other activities listed in SEG 18.726, ll. 46–8.

<sup>76</sup> IG XII 9 191, l. 43 (the clause is entirely restored; simple ἀτιμία).

<sup>77</sup> Ameling, Bringmann, Schmidt-Dounas, and von Steuben (1995), no. 94 (new edition of SIG<sup>3</sup> 672, relating to Attalus II's educational foundation at Delphi), ll. 76–89. The stipulation of ἀτιμία in ll. 85–9 could be interpreted as a penalty applicable only to magistrates who collected relevant fines, but did not pay them to the polis. There is, however, no explicit restriction to magistrates who embezzle fines in the open formulation used (εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀποδοίῃσαν οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ ἐν τῷ γεγραμμένῳ χρόνῳ τὸ ἀργύριον); those who did not collect the fines at all were probably also liable. For a parallel for punishment of magistrates who fail to collect fines, see Matthaiou (2011), text pp. 15–16, A, ll. 16–19. But note also that ἀτιμία (until a fine is paid) could be the penalty elsewhere for embezzlement as a magistrate: IG XII 6 1 172 (Samos, c.250?), face A, ll. 79–80 (see higher in this table).

<sup>78</sup> I.Pergamon I 249, ll. 26–30 (ἀτιμία for 'residents' (κατοικοῦντες), with confiscation of property).

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Aristotle *Politics* 1298a3–7: control of the penalty of exile as one of the basic functions of the deliberative part of a polis.

<sup>80</sup> See Plato *Gorgias* 466b4–469b9.

### 3.2. Exile, Ostracism, and Outlawry as Instruments of Social Regulation

In some cases, lawful expulsion of citizens was deployed or justified in non-ethical terms: as a pragmatic instrument of social regulation, useful in preventing unrest.<sup>81</sup> For example, expulsion could be used and justified as a means of removing individuals who blamelessly posed a threat to civic peace. These included individuals guilty of unintentional homicide, whose continued presence in their home polis could provoke blood feud. Exile offered a way to avoid this outcome. In Athens, for example, those exiled for unintentional homicide could return when pardoned by the victim's family.<sup>82</sup>

Moreover, citizens could sometimes be perceived as blameless threats to civic order, and thus legitimate candidates for expulsion, because of their superior talents or resources. Aristotle claims that the argument that poleis should ostracize exceptional individuals, in order to maintain a form of well-balanced civic order analogous to artistic beauty or musical harmony, has something politically just about it (ἔχει τι δίκαιον πολιτικὸν ὁ λόγος). Admittedly, Aristotle himself adds that lawgivers should organize poleis such that this remedy is unnecessary.<sup>83</sup> However, the underlying approach was prominent in some actual civic practices. For example, Ober sees Athenian ostracism as a morally neutral device of social regulation: votes on ostracism were a means of aggregating individuals' calculations of 'expected public gains and losses'.<sup>84</sup>

The apparent ease with which Greek citizens and philosophers sometimes accepted as legitimate the expulsion of the blameless and the non-vicious was probably partly due to remaining traces of the thinking underlying scapegoat rituals,<sup>85</sup> which were themselves probably already anachronistic and marginal by the Classical period.<sup>86</sup> Scapegoat rituals could, in a process not unlike ostracism in Aristotle's account, involve the exiling of individuals too powerful or honoured for the city to bear: the ritualized exclusion of individuals who had immediately before been ritually honoured with great privileges.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Parker (1983), 193; Dössel (2003), 30–8 (on early fifth-century Teian public curses).

<sup>82</sup> Herman (2006), 295.

<sup>83</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1284a3–b34, esp. 1284b15–20; cf. Kraut (1989), 90–7. Compare Diodorus 19.1.1–4: ostracism of great men is a means of self-preservation for democracies.

<sup>84</sup> Ober (2008), 160–1.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Bremmer (1983); Parker (1983), ch. 9. Nevertheless, a Classical Greek speaker could also present the exile of an individual whom he denounced as culpably impious as tantamount to the expulsion of a scapegoat (φαρμακός): [Lysias] 6.53; Parker (1983), 259. This is consistent with the fact that candidates chosen as ritual scapegoats by Greek communities were not necessarily considered blameless (see the examples in Parker (1983), ch. 9).

<sup>86</sup> Parker (1983), 258.

<sup>87</sup> See Azoulay (2009), 326, n. 110, on the Athenian Thargelia. For criticism of the view that ostracism was itself an adapted scapegoat ritual: Parker (1983), 269–71; Forsdyke (2005), 156–8.



The penalty of outlawry was also deployed by poleis as a pragmatic instrument of social regulation in an entirely different way: to complement civic institutions. In the democracies of Classical Athens and third-century Ilion, automatic outlawry was the penalty for establishing a tyranny: any citizen could lawfully kill a tyrant. This provision encouraged decisive individual initiative at moments when civic institutions collapsed.<sup>88</sup>

Finally, a further type of advocacy of social regulation by means of expulsion, perhaps conceived more metaphorically, emerged in mid-Hellenistic philosophy. Sextus Empiricus reports that the second-century Peripatetic Critolaus, together with some of 'those from the Academy', argued that poleis do not 'expel' (ἐκβάλλειν) true 'crafts' (τέχναι), because they are 'useful for life' (βιωφελείς), but do treat rhetoric as hostile and have even 'expelled' (ἐκβεβλήκασι) it.<sup>89</sup> These Hellenistic philosophers probably used this example, like Sextus himself, to argue for the shortcomings of rhetoric, contrasting it with philosophy.<sup>90</sup> They would at least implicitly thereby have endorsed the 'expulsion' of useless or harmless crafts, perhaps involving the literal expulsion of their practitioners.<sup>91</sup>

### 3.3. 'Nakonian' Arguments for Exile

As an alternative to emphasizing social regulation, ancient participants and observers could attempt to justify lawful expulsion and exclusion in explicitly ethical terms: as means of protecting or promoting their conception of good civic organization. In many relevant cases, citizens presented them as means of defending the virtue and tight-knit, fraternal unity of the citizen-body.<sup>92</sup> Such justifications presupposed, and themselves developed and reinforced, underlying 'Nakonian' assumptions.

There are very many cases of citizens justifying relevant penalties as means of protecting standards of civic virtue conceived as unitary and usually quite demanding.<sup>93</sup> Plato, for example, makes the Athenian speaker of his *Laws*

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Youni (2001). For a full argument that Greek anti-tyranny laws were rational, incentivizing bulwarks of democracy, which encouraged individuals to take dangerous action in the expectation of wider support, solving a 'revolutionary coordination problem', see now Teegarden (2014).

<sup>89</sup> Sextus Empiricus *Against the Mathematicians* 2.20–4.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Hahm (2007), 56.

<sup>91</sup> Compare the de facto expulsion of philosophers, rather than rhetoricians, from Athens in 307/6, resulting from Sophokles' decree requiring democratic authorization of all philosophical schools: Athenaeus Book XIII, 610ef; Diogenes Laertius 5.38; Momigliano (1977), 43; Habicht (1997), 73–4; Haake (2007), 29, 42–3.

<sup>92</sup> Compare Grasmück (1978), 35.

<sup>93</sup> On disenfranchisement as a means of upholding strict standards of civic virtue: Poddighe (2001a), 37–9. Compare also the common ancient belief that a polluted individual's exile was a means of maintaining a civic community's purity: a polluted individual was one who had transgressed civilized ethical standards (Parker (1983), 31, 114, 325–6).

claim that individuals posing a severe threat to the ethical ‘purity’ (καθαρότης) of a polis should be purged from it: lawgivers should execute or exile incurable reprobates and export to new colonies other burdensome citizens.<sup>94</sup> Plato probably thought that exile would not only prevent the individuals concerned from transgressing civic ethical standards, but also pre-empt contamination of other citizens’ characters. Indeed, his Athenian speaker stipulates that citizens of the imaginary new polis of Magnesia who even share food, drink, or any other contact with an individual exiled for life for insolence towards parents may not enter a temple, the agora, or the polis itself before being purified.<sup>95</sup>

Such ideas also gained great influence among non-philosophers in this period, even in Classical Athens, a context in which the relativism and anti-absolutism about values often associated with Athenian democracy in modern accounts<sup>96</sup> might have been expected to inhibit them. Isocrates expressed this approach in abstract terms: it is necessary to banish any reasoning within an individual mind tending towards the bad, in the same way as it is necessary to ‘exile’ (φυγαδέειν) an insurrectionary (στασιαστής) man from a well-governed (εὐνομουμένη) polis.<sup>97</sup> The good citizen should thus show ‘Nakonian’ restraint and modesty. As the chorus put it in Sophocles’ *Antigone*, the man who respects the laws of earth and of the gods is ‘high in the polis’ (ὕψιπολις); the one with whom the ‘not fine’ associates, because of his daring, is ἄπολις (‘lacking a polis’).<sup>98</sup>

As will be argued in Chapter 4.4., more democratically inclined fourth-century Attic orators than Isocrates applied this ‘Nakonian’ approach in actual forensic cases in which one party was facing possible formal or de facto exile. They presented opponents as deviants from acceptable standards of civic virtue and devotion, assuming consensus among the jury about the nature of those standards. Indeed, orators could simply represent opponents baldly as ‘vicious’ or ‘unjust’, or as transgressive individualists contemptuous of civic constraints.<sup>99</sup> This phenomenon suggests that fourth-century Attic popular consciousness was suffused, not only by demanding ‘Nakonian’ formal notions of what virtue and vice are like, but also by the ‘Nakonian’ assumption that relevant ideals should play a leading role in civic discourse.

<sup>94</sup> Plato *Laws* 735a7–736c4; Parker (1983), 263–4. For a similar view of punishment in general: Kolde (2005), text of the Epidaurian *Carmen Isylli* (pp. 8–15), ll. 3–6.

<sup>95</sup> Plato *Laws* 881d3–e4. <sup>96</sup> e.g. Ober (1996), 101.

<sup>97</sup> Isocrates fr. 31 Brémond-Mathieu. Similar arguments persisted in post-Classical philosophy. See Thesleff (1965), 114–15, forged texts, probably of the first century BC or AD, attributed to the Classical Pythagoreans Archippus and ‘Lysidas’ (probably Lysis): all ἀμετρία should be expelled from an entity (e.g. disease from a body and *stasis* from a polis).

<sup>98</sup> Sophocles *Antigone*, ll. 368–71.

<sup>99</sup> See, for example, Lysias 14.1–2, 9–10, 23, 31, 43–4; Demosthenes 58.27. Compare [Andocides] 4, esp. 16–19.

Occasionally, an orator could make explicit in quite abstract, almost theoretical terms, comparable to the rhetoric of laws and philosophers which is the main focus of this chapter, quite how demanding relevant 'Nakonian' standards of civic virtue should be. In his invective against Aeschines in *On the Crown* of 330, his defence of his ally Ctesiphon, the culmination of a long-running dispute which soon led to Aeschines' semi-voluntary flight from Athens, Demosthenes represents Aeschines as signally lacking in civic virtue: for example, as self-interested and slanderous, rather than statesmanlike and heedless of private concerns, in his contributions to civic debates and trials.<sup>100</sup> According to Demosthenes, the good citizen, unlike Aeschines, shares emotions of pleasure and pain with the rest of the citizens ('the many'),<sup>101</sup> a degree of emotional identification which even recalls that of the well-habituated citizens of Plato's *Republic*.

In general, Demosthenes' denigration of Aeschines in *On the Crown* offers some of the best evidence that a mainstream democrat's conception of the civic virtue in need of protection could be not far distant from the highly demanding and strongly intellectualist, knowledge-centred understanding of civic virtue attributed by Plato to Socrates. Indeed, at one point, picking up the language of Aeschines' own peroration in his prosecution speech, Demosthenes claims that Aeschines is unqualified to appeal to abstract ἀρετή (virtue), σύνεσις (understanding), and παιδεία (education), because he lacks education and the ability to make a discriminating judgement (διάγνωσις) about what is fine (καλός).<sup>102</sup>

Allen sees the presence of such rhetoric, somewhat reminiscent of Plato's ethical outlook, at this point in Demosthenes' speech, and more widely in Aeschines' speeches, as evidence for the direct influence of Platonic ideas on Athenian political discourse.<sup>103</sup> The correspondences are, however, not really sufficiently distinctive to demonstrate influence. It is more plausible to see both Plato and the orators tapping into complex notions of demanding civic virtue and education deeply embedded in the 'Nakonian' parts of Athenian and wider Greek political culture. As argued more fully in Chapter 4, strong virtue rhetoric was commonplace in earlier, less soaring Athenian oratory, including Lysias' speeches. The longer and more discursive speeches of the period after 338 exhibit more sophisticated vocabulary, as Allen demonstrates, but the basic outlook remains thoroughly traditional.

Some laws and decrees from poleis other than Athens stipulating penalties of expulsion and exclusion attest a similar aspiration to defend demanding, 'Nakonian' standards of civic virtue. The standards of virtue in question were sometimes presented as entirely generic. This is evident, for example, in a mid-Hellenistic decree from Phthiotic Thebes:

<sup>100</sup> e.g. Demosthenes 18.95, 111, 140, 207, 232.

<sup>101</sup> Demosthenes 18.292.

<sup>102</sup> Demosthenes 18.127–8.

<sup>103</sup> See Allen (2010), Part II, esp. 101–2.

- [.....]
- 1   οἱ β[ο]ύλω[ντ]αι· Θηβαίους δὲ μὴ ἐξε[ῖναι]  
      μηδὲ δι' ἐνό[ς τ]ρόπου μήτε κοινῇ<ι> μήτε  
      ἄρχοντα μηδένα μηδὲ ἰδίαι μηδέ[να] {ΑΠΕ}  
      ἀπε[λα]ύνειν Εὐρυδάμαντα ἀπὸ τῆς πο-
- 5   λιτείας ἂν [μ]ή τι πονηρὸν πράγμα πράσο-  
      ντα εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἢ εἰς τὰ πράγματα τὰ τῆ-  
      ς πόλεως ἐξελέγχωσι οἱ βουλόμενοι  
      ἀπελαύνειν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας· ἂν δὲ  
      μὴ ἐξελέ[γχ]ωσι οἱ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι ἐξε-
- 10   λέγχειν, ἀποτεισάντω τῇ Δήμητρι τῇ Π[α-]  
      ναχαΐαι τάλαντον ἀργυρίου καὶ τοῦ[το]  
      [ἰε]ρὸν ἔστω τῆς Δήμητρος Εὐρυδάμ[αντι]  
      [ὥστ' ἀσφά]λειαν εἶναι [.]ΑΣΩΝ ΑΧΡ[...]  
      [.]ΑΤΕΙΩΝ  
      [.....Εὐρυδ]άμαντα [.....]
- 15   [.....]αν δὲ βού[λονται].....]  
      ς παρὰ Ε[ὐρυδ]ά[μαντι].....]  
      ὑπὲρ εὐνοίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης τῆς πρὸς τὴν  
      πόλιν καὶ τὰ πράγματα τὰ τῆς πόλεως· ὁμνύ-  
      τω Εὐρυδάμας τὸν ὄρκον ὃν ἂν ἡ πόλις προγρ-
- 20   άψῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀνωμότῳ διαπιστεύωσι· ταῦτα  
      ἀναγραφάτω Εὐρυδάμας εἰςτήλας λιθί-  
      νας καὶ ἀνθέτω εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Δήμητρος  
      καὶ ὅπου ἂν ἀλλαχοῦ ἡ πόλις κελεύῃ.<sup>104</sup>

... they may wish. It is not allowed for Thebans to expel Eurydamas from the citizen-body by any means, neither acting collectively, nor acting as a magistrate, nor (l. 5) acting as a private individual, unless those who want to expel him from the citizen-body convict him of doing some vicious thing to the polis or to the affairs of the polis. If those who attempt to convict him do not succeed, (10) let them pay a fine to Demeter Panachaia of a talent of silver and let it be sacred to Demeter, [so that] there may be [secur]ity for Eurydamas... Eurydamas... (15)... [they] want... from E[ury]d[amas]... [on] account of his goodwill and justice towards the polis and the affairs of the polis. Let Eurydamas swear whatever oath the polis (20) should write in advance, if they do not thoroughly trust him unsworn. Let Eurydamas write these things on stone *stelai* and let him place them in the temple of Demeter, and wherever else the polis orders.

This text permits lawful expulsion of the naturalized citizen Eurydamas only if 'those who wish to expel him' prove that he has done some 'vicious' or

<sup>104</sup> SEG 53.565 (emended text of Lazaridis (1971), 42; cf. BE (1973), no. 238a). This text probably dates before 217 (Philip V's ἀνδραποδισμός of Phthiotic Thebes: Polybius 5.100.8). However, it could date to the period after the exiled Phthiotic Thebans' restoration in c.197 (Walsh (1993), 45), when the city probably needed to naturalize additional citizens.

‘harmful’ (πονηρόν) thing to the polis or its affairs.<sup>105</sup> This provision presupposes the existence of collective Phthiotic Theban substantial ethical standards (of πονηρία) and interests (τὰ πράγματα τὰ τῆς πόλεως). Any infringement of shared ideals or interests will put Eurydamas’ civic membership in jeopardy.<sup>106</sup>

The ‘Nakonian’ thrust of this provision is reinforced by some of the accompanying rhetoric. The praise for Eurydamas in lines 17–18, which probably represents the grounds for the conferral of citizenship, implies that goodwill and justice are qualifications for civic recognition or even citizenship at Phthiotic Thebes. These lines can even be read as an inverted echo of the earlier lines about expulsion. Whereas Eurydamas is praised, or even granted citizenship, on account of his ‘goodwill and justice towards the polis and its affairs’ (εὖνοια καὶ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ πράγματα τὰ τῆς πόλεως), he can be expelled from citizenship if he can be shown to be doing anything harmful (πονηρόν τι πρᾶγμα) towards the same combination (εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἢ εἰς τὰ πράγματα τὰ τῆς πόλεως).<sup>107</sup>

Taken together, the mutually echoing clauses reinforce the impression that the Phthiotic Theban polis has ‘Nakonian’ shared interests and values. Moreover, because they leave considerable discretion to the Phthiotic Theban people, these clauses express and reinforce the view that Phthiotic Thebans are ‘Nakonian’ citizens whose highly ethical characters make them accurate, reliable judges of undefined notions of goodwill, justice, and vicious or harmful behaviour. The mutually echoing clauses also reveal the usually suppressed implications of ‘Nakonian’ honorific language for the honorand himself: he is expected to comply with demanding civic ethical standards; and he can be punished by the polis with equal but opposite force to that of an honorary decree if he falls even slightly short.

The provision concerning expulsion also reveals the influence of another set of prominent Greek civic norms, closely related to ‘Nakonian’ norms, which will be very significant in Chapters 5 and 6: norms legitimating, or even demanding, far-reaching individual initiative by citizens in using, adapting, and inventing political institutions. The influence of what can be called norms of ‘civic voluntarism’ is evident in the way the Phthiotic Theban text permits

<sup>105</sup> SEG 53.565, ll. 5–8. For a possible parallel, compare SEG 34.758 (c.250–225), ll. 31–41, as restored and interpreted by Vinogradov: Anthesterios of Olbia took some action to quell *stasis*, possibly including the expulsion of those responsible for it, behaviour which revealed his qualities as a hater of vice (μισοσπότη[ρος]).

<sup>106</sup> Also from Hellenistic Thessaly, compare Philip V of Macedon’s letter to the citizens of Larissa, advising them to enfranchise new citizens, in which he tells them to delay a decision until his return in the case of potential candidates who have committed something ‘incurable’ ([ἀ]νῆκεστον) to his monarchy or to the city, or are unsuitable for some other reason (IG IX 2 517, ll. 35–8).

<sup>107</sup> Compare the argument of the Epidaurian *Carmen Isylli* (Kolde (2005), text pp. 8–15, ll. 3–6): the well-brought-up who slip into vice should be punished, to ensure the safety of the δᾶμος.

'those who wish to expel' (οἱ βουλόμενοι ἀπελαύνειν) the new citizen to do so if they can convict him of wrongdoing.<sup>108</sup> This represents an application to the institution of exile of the widespread Greek democratizing emphasis, very well-attested for democratic Athens, on the right and duty of ὁ βουλόμενος to intervene in political and legal contexts.<sup>109</sup>

More specific conceptions of civic virtue than that expressed at Phthiotic Thebes could also be protected outside Athens through the threat of disenfranchisement. For example, in Ptolemy I's new constitution for Cyrene promulgated in c.320, ἀτιμία was to be imposed, as recorded in Table 3.3, on citizens of Cyrene who engaged in characteristically demotic practices: manual labour, persistent litigation and small-scale retail.<sup>110</sup> This measure represents a striking, unconcealed deviation from democratizing rhetoric, of a kind not much encountered so far in this book outside Greek philosophical reflection. Indeed, it embodied a controversial, aristocratic approach to citizenship similar to Aristotle's: individuals who engage in such activities lack the leisure required for reflection and rational political activity.<sup>111</sup>

Moreover, the threat of disenfranchisement could be used to protect supposedly consensual specific attributions of virtue. In their later fourth-century honorific decree for their expatriate citizen Thersippos, who had become a 'friend' (φίλος) of Alexander the Great and some of his successors, the Nesians praised Thersippos in lavish, monopolistic<sup>112</sup> ethical terms: he had been responsible for great benefits to the polis, been a 'good man' with respect to the Nesian grain supply, given money which contributed to the city's salvation, and shown 'goodwill' (εὖνοια) towards the whole δᾶμος. They then granted him substantial civic honours on account of his virtue (ἀνδραγαθία) and εὖνοια.<sup>113</sup> The decree was protected through an entrenchment clause threatening ἀτιμία, a fine, and liability to the law against the dissolution of the δᾶμος for any magistrate who made or admitted a proposal against it or any orator who spoke against it (see again Table 3.3).<sup>114</sup> Deviation from monopolistic ethical evaluations, supposedly made by the civic community as a whole, was thus made tantamount to dissolving the democratic civic community.<sup>115</sup>

<sup>108</sup> SEG 53.565, ll. 1–13.

<sup>109</sup> On Athens: Hansen (1999), 71–2; Todd (1993), 114.

<sup>110</sup> For perceived personal vice as grounds for disenfranchisement, compare the report that adultery incurred disenfranchisement in Lepreon's constitution (cf. Table 3.3).

<sup>111</sup> Poddighe (2001a), 47–9; cf. Cary (1928), 235; Bencivenni (2003), 134, n. 59.

<sup>112</sup> In this book, 'monopolistic' is used to refer to presentations of ideas and proposals, which imply that what is advocated is uniquely justified: no opposition is ethically or politically legitimate.

<sup>113</sup> I.Adramytteion 34, A, ll. 8–9, 17–20, 29–35, 37–8.

<sup>114</sup> I.Adramytteion 34, B, ll. 23–58.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Poddighe (2001b). Rainer (1986), 168, 171, suggests that this decree was so trivial that the use of an entrenchment clause threatening ἀτιμία supports his general argument that such clauses had now become meaningless. However, he himself points out that the decree had wider political significance: any citizen who opposed the honours for Thersippos might jeopardize

Some Greeks justified lawful citizen expulsion and exclusion as means of promoting or reinforcing, rather than simply defending, standards of civic virtue. In the *Laws*, Plato's Athenian speaker prescribes temporary exile as the penalty for homicide through anger: two years for an unpremeditated and three years for a premeditated case. By going into exile, the murderer through anger will be 'punishing his own anger' (κολάζων τὸν αὐτοῦ θυμόν).<sup>116</sup> The underlying reasoning was probably that this temporary exile would have the transformative effect of checking the offender's propensity for anger, perhaps because the harsh conditions of exile would demand more prudent and restrained habits for mere survival.<sup>117</sup> This recalls the reformatory notion of exile and other punishments discussed in the *Gorgias*. There Socrates suggests that, after committing wrongdoing, the prudent man should use rhetorical skills to denounce, rather than deceitfully exonerate, himself, ensuring a penalty of corporal punishment, incarceration, a fine, exile, or death. Only exposure, and resulting punishment, can lead him away from the life of injustice, the greatest evil for a man.<sup>118</sup>

A dominant scholarly view is that this philosophical conception of punishment as rehabilitative was a complete inversion of dominant contemporary Athenian attitudes.<sup>119</sup> However, at least one Athenian speaker tried to appeal to a democratic audience by implying that exile can have a significant educational effect on an offender. Andocides comments in his *On the Mysteries* of c.399 that, if they kill or exile him again, the Athenians will lose a citizen who has experienced the life of both citizen and metic, one who knows how to be self-controlled and to deliberate well and who has experienced 'hardship after making an error' (τὸ ἀμαρτὸντα πράξει κακῶς).<sup>120</sup> As MacDowell comments, this is Andocides' only admission of personal guilt in this speech.<sup>121</sup> It is best explained as an attempt by Andocides to present himself as an ideal citizen,

Nesos' good relations with Polyperchon's Macedonians (Rainer (1986), 168). Moreover, action to overturn the decree could have unleashed *stasis* (Rubinstein (2007), 272, n. 7).

<sup>116</sup> Plato *Laws* 867c4–d3.

<sup>117</sup> Saunders (1991), 227. The Athenian speaker stipulates that judges should be sent to the frontier to decide whether such exiles should be permitted to return to the polis after their period of exile: in the mean time (ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ), these judges will have considered the exiles' actions 'still more closely' (ἔτι σαφέστερον) (Plato *Laws* 867e2–868a1). Saunders (1991), 227 (cf. Saunders (1972), note 86; contrast Reverdin (1945), 186–7), admits the attractions of interpreting the judges' consideration of the 'actions of the exiles' as an official assessment of the success or failure of rehabilitation. However, he points out that the specification that the judges are to have examined these actions ἔτι σαφέστερον in the period of the exile strongly suggests that the actions concerned are those involved in the original homicide, already the subject of a trial.

<sup>118</sup> Plato *Gorgias* 480b7–d7.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. Saunders (1991), 121–2; compare Allen (2000), 35; (2010), 92–3; also Bertrand (1999), 152. For criticism of their general approach, see Herman (2006).

<sup>120</sup> Andocides 1.144–5.

<sup>121</sup> MacDowell (1962), 163.

whose citizen education has included experience, not only of settled civic life, but also of the formative hardships of punitive exile.

In a similar way, a punishment of exclusion could be presented by an Athenian speaker as an educational influence on citizens other than the offender himself: Lysias claims that the disenfranchisement of the younger Alcibiades will make clear to other citizens standards of appropriate behaviour.<sup>122</sup> This example calls into question Allen's suggestion that it was 'Platonizing' politicians of the 340s and 330s who first took a serious practical interest in using punishment to educate citizens.<sup>123</sup> More likely, those orators were offering more elaborate applications of familiar ideals. Most relevant appeals to education relied on fundamental 'Nakonian' presuppositions: it is legitimate, or even necessary, to shape citizens' characters through civic institutions and sanctions, in accordance with shared, substantial, and demanding standards of civic virtue.<sup>124</sup>

Justification of lawful citizen expulsion and exclusion as means of defending and promoting standards of civic virtue is not the only well-attested 'Nakonian' approach. Greeks could also attempt to justify them as means of defending from any challenge citizens' shared religious standards, civic institutions, and genuinely collective interests. This is illustrated by a claim in a Demosthenic speech, relevant to present concerns because it has the same abstract tone, in its invoking of abstract standards of political legitimacy, as the laws and philosophical discussions which are this chapter's main focus.

In his own voice, Demosthenes represents his political adversary Meidias as worthy of disenfranchisement because his assault on Demosthenes while chorus-sponsor (*χορηγός*) was an offence against the whole civic community and against the gods.<sup>125</sup> If Meidias had struck Demosthenes while Demosthenes was purely a private citizen, Meidias would have needed to face only a private suit. However, by attacking Demosthenes while he was exercising a public office, Meidias has committed an offence of concern to the polis.<sup>126</sup> This type of argument presupposes that the purpose of punishment, including punitive exclusion, is not simply to apportion just deserts and to compensate

<sup>122</sup> e.g. Lysias 14.11–15; 15.9. Compare the near contemporary [Andocides] 4.40, advocating the ostracism of the elder Alcibiades. Modern scholars have demonstrated well that exile could have an educational effect, reinforcing collective civic ethical standards: e.g. Allen (2000), especially 224–37.

<sup>123</sup> See Allen (2010), 92–3, discussing in particular Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 10.

<sup>124</sup> For philosophical versions of this broader argument, see, for example, Aristotle *Politics* 1263b36–7 (and Books VII and VIII, *passim*), as well as Plato *Republic* Books VI–VII; for evidence of popular commitment to it, consider the hortatory clauses of many honorary decrees (e.g. *I.Sestos* 1, ll. 70–2, 89–92).

<sup>125</sup> Demosthenes 21.31–5, 51. Whether or not Demosthenes actually delivered it, the speech remains evidence for the arguments for disenfranchisement which Demosthenes thought an Athenian jury would accept.

<sup>126</sup> For the approach, compare Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1132b21–30.



victims of personal wrongs, or even to protect citizens' overlapping individual interests:<sup>127</sup> punishment must protect the integrity of a substantial public realm, including its symbolic representations.

As far as 'Nakonian' defence of civic institutions is concerned, democratic regimes could deploy penalties of expulsion to imply that the established democratic constitution was uniquely justified, a timeless, objective state of affairs which could not be legitimately questioned: participation in any other form of political regime was an ethical offence, incompatible with citizenship. At Ilion in c.280, for example, as mentioned in Chapter 1, those who voted for a subsequently enforced death penalty on a jury under a potential non-democratic regime were to be considered, not merely political criminals, but murderers. As stated in Table 3.1, exile was probably the penalty for those who escaped condemnation by a court.<sup>128</sup> A democratic regime could also use a relevant penalty to make clear that citizens were expected, not merely to acquiesce in democracy, but also to show active solidarity with the *δῆμος*. This was the implication of the stipulation of outlawry by the fourth-century Eretrians, also included in Table 3.2, for magistrates and councillors who were absent from the city and so necessarily failed to attend to their democratic duties, and thereby help to uphold democracy, in the event of a coup. Such magistrates and councillors would be open to suspicions both of deliberate absenteeism and of collaboration with hostile external powers or exiles.<sup>129</sup> Any relevant magistrate or councillor was to be treated the same as someone who dissolved democracy.<sup>130</sup>

Penalties of expulsion and exclusion could also be deployed to protect specific 'Nakonian' features of civic organization: for example, if the restorations of the relevant inscription are reliable, to protect an egalitarian property distribution in a new colony.<sup>131</sup> There was also a tendency to use penalties of expulsion and exclusion to protect the integrity of the resources on which civic life was based. For instance, the citizens of third-century Mylasa threatened *ἀτιμία*, in an entrenchment clause, against any citizen who brought or judged judicial proceedings in contravention of particular civic decisions, probably

<sup>127</sup> Contrast the discussion of Chapter 7 of this speech in Section 3.4 of this chapter.

<sup>128</sup> *I.Ilion* 25, ll 97–104. Other aspects of civic life under such a regime are to be similarly devoid of legitimacy: see ll. 53–71 and 81–6, on financial dealings involving such a regime's magistrates.

<sup>129</sup> Knoepfler (2001), 218; Teegarden (2014), 75.

<sup>130</sup> *SEG* 51.1105B, l. 6, with Knoepfler (2001), 223. Compare *SEG* 54.1229, ll. 16–18, 23, with Hamon (2008), 76–7, 94. For disenfranchisement as the penalty for failure to show solidarity with one's polis and fellow citizens in a crisis, compare *I.Pergamon* I 249, ll. 26–30 (cf. Table 3.3). On the role of anti-tyranny laws in general as a means of encouraging widespread mobilization and solidarity, especially in times of crisis, see Teegarden (2014), e.g. 84 (on the Eretrian law itself).

<sup>131</sup> Maier, *Mauerbauinschriften*, no. 57 (foundation of Kerkyra Melaina by citizens of Issa), ll. 11–13 (compare Table 3.2).

the civic confirmation of the grant of some land outside the city centre, for the benefit of Zeus Osogo and his cult, by the Seleucid official and dynast Olympichos.<sup>132</sup> In so doing, they deployed the threat of disenfranchisement probably to protect from any formal challenge a new material prop for collective polis religion.

It was not in itself distinctively 'Nakonian' to be concerned with the integrity of resources of collective concern: a committed 'Dikaiopolitan' would also be anxious to prevent individuals claiming more than their fair share of them. However, in at least one case, a probable use of the penalty of disenfranchisement to protect civic property or revenues was explicitly presented in strongly 'Nakonian' terms, as a means of deterring and punishing ethical transgressions against a straightforwardly unitary civic community.

In a complex legal document from fifth-century Chios, published on the 'Dophitis' or 'Lophitis stele',<sup>133</sup> ἀτιμία was stipulated (cf. Table 3.3) as the penalty for removing, moving, or making invisible boundary stones of the area called Dophitis/Lophitis. Although the exact nature of this territory is difficult to determine, it is very probable that Dophitis/Lophitis consisted of land in which the citizens of Chios had a significant collective interest: straightforward publicly owned land<sup>134</sup> or privately owned land in which the polis had a special interest, for reasons of taxation, military defence, or public order. Interfering with its boundaries was explicitly represented in 'Nakonian' terms as 'to the injustice of the polis' (ἐπ' ἀδικίῃ τῆς πόλεως).<sup>135</sup>

The Chians thus stipulated full exclusion from the citizen-body for the ostensibly fairly minor offence of interfering with individual boundary stones in a way detrimental to the polis: even an apparently minor encroachment on common resources, or resources of significant common concern, merited exclusion, combined with a very substantial<sup>136</sup> fine.<sup>137</sup> The stipulation of

<sup>132</sup> *I.Labraunda* 8, A, 2–8; cf. Table 3.3.

<sup>133</sup> On the name of the territory concerned, contrast Matthaiou (2011), 24–7 (favouring Dophitis), and Faraguna (2005) (favouring Lophitis).

<sup>134</sup> Faraguna (2005), 97–8.

<sup>135</sup> Matthaiou (2011), text pp. 15–16, A, ll. 9–16. For this type of public evaluation of a deplorable action as committed ἐπ' ἀδικίᾳ, cf. *IG XII* 6 1 172 (Samos, c.250?), l. 74; *IG XII* 8 150 (Samothece, 288/7–281/0), ll. 9–10.

<sup>136</sup> See Matthaiou (2011), 26.

<sup>137</sup> A possible objection to this view is that this provision was in fact designed principally to protect *private* property rights. This interpretation relies on the view that the sales of controversial land recorded on faces B, C and D concerned property within the boundaries of Dophitis/Lophitis. If this was the case, the argument goes, the reference to interference with boundary stones 'to the injustice of the polis' could be an allusion to the provision on face C, ll. 2–5, that the polis will take over legal responsibility if those land sales are challenged in the courts (Haussoullier (1879, 240; Koerner (1993), 232). This view is possible, but it is weakened by the fact that face A explicitly forbids only interference with Dophitis'/Lophitis' perimeter boundary stones, not boundary stones within Lophitis dividing individual plots. This last point bolsters the view that the Chians were anxious to defend a single piece of territory in which the polis had special interests.

disenfranchisement in this case was a practical implementation of a 'Nakonian' line of thinking already encountered in Chapter 2 in Aristotle's proposals for the avoidance of *stasis*,<sup>138</sup> and more fully captured by Lycurgus in his *Against Leocrates*.

According to Lycurgus, a citizen neglects his civic duty entirely by neglecting any part of it. Leocrates has shown that he is an inadequate citizen, liable to the death penalty, by fleeing the city when it came under attack, putting his personal safety before communal salvation. In general, *all* anti-civic or anti-social acts, however apparently minor or isolated, must be severely punished, because such acts would, if generalized, destroy the community.<sup>139</sup> In the *Laws*, Plato's Athenian citizen even applies this line of thought to the defence of public property, in a similar way to the Chians: any citizen who steals public property should be punished with death, however small the theft, because a citizen who steals a small amount of public property does so with the same desire (*ἔρως*) as one who steals much more. Extermination is the only viable option in the case of a citizen who shows such anti-civic passions even though, unlike a foreigner or a slave, he has benefited from a civic upbringing.<sup>140</sup>

The previous example from Hellenistic Mylasa also fits this model: disenfranchisement was probably there to be the penalty for any citizen who dared even to challenge in the courts the dedication of relevant land to Zeus Osogo, even without physically interfering with it. Admittedly, at both Mylasa and Chios, the immediate objective was doubtless simply to give special protection to particular pieces of land. However, the fact that those responsible regarded disenfranchisement as a legitimate means to this end, and successfully advocated it to fellow citizens, strongly suggests that the 'Nakonian' line of thinking explored above was at work beneath the surface. Full exclusion from citizenship becomes a legitimate, rational penalty for ostensibly isolated infringements of collective interests only if preponderant weight is assigned to the inviolability of the substantially conceived common good, and to the moulding and control of citizens' characters in such a way that they voluntarily respect it without demur. 'Dikaiopolitan' norms would have licensed only less severe, probably reversible<sup>141</sup> penalties, proportionate to the level of actual, material harm to citizens' overlapping interests.

In conclusion, a wide range of Greek citizens, of many different political stripes, heterogeneously reflected the influence of, and constructed and re-inforced, the underlying 'Nakonian' paradigm in their attempts to justify lawful citizen expulsion and exclusion. Significantly, the underlying, widely shared 'Nakonian' paradigm reflected in this evidence was marked by the

<sup>138</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1307b30–9.

<sup>139</sup> Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 64–7; compare Plato *Crito* 50a8–b5; Isocrates 12.146.

<sup>140</sup> Plato *Laws* 941c5–942a4.

<sup>141</sup> See Section 3.4, on reversible disenfranchisement for public debt.

indeterminacy also identified in Chapters 1 and 2: it demanded a formally very well-defined, tight-knit type of civic unity, but left indeterminate the precise nature of the ideals which would provide its focus.

In some cases considered here, such as the examples from Cyrene, Ilion, or Chios, citizens did attempt to give more specific meanings to generic 'Nakonian' ideals. In others, however, they preserved their indeterminacy. This is evident in the appeal of some texts, such as the Phthiotic Theban decree, to very open-ended standards of civic approbation and condemnation.

In other cases of indeterminacy, shared ethical and cultural standards were defined predominantly by negative means. For example, the stipulation or implementation of exile and outlawry for tyrants<sup>142</sup> conjured nebulous standards of good citizenship and legitimate government from an implied contrast with the figure of the tyrant. This was probably often a convenient, or even necessary, way of circumventing problems and ambiguities in notions of civic virtue and loyalty. For example, the status of the tyrant as antithesis of the good citizen was usually far less problematic than the status of the tyrannicide as stereotypical good citizen. Indeed, those responsible for the assassination of subversive political leaders could be previous close associates in their subversion<sup>143</sup> or even blood-relations,<sup>144</sup> which could lead to acute disagreements about their political, religious, and ethical standing.<sup>145</sup>

More generally in Greek civic life, precision about positive constitutional preferences in supposedly unifying rhetoric could easily have alienated significant numbers of citizens. This may explain, for example, the absence of dogmatic insistence on democracy as a rigid ideal in most of the inscriptions considered in this and the previous two chapters, which tend only to gesture towards democracy in their foregrounding of the sovereign role of an undefined *δημος* or, more blandly, 'polis'.<sup>146</sup> Indeed, it was probably often the open-endedness of civic ideals, both constitutional ideals and others, which made it easier in practice for all citizens to rally, in an imitation of formal 'Nakonian' unity, in support of them: citizens could each interpret those supposedly shared ideals in accordance with their own outlook.

### 3.4. 'Dikaiopolitan' Arguments for Exile

Very significantly, some texts considered in Section 3.3 confirm a pattern which began to emerge in Chapter 2: citizens used 'Nakonian' rhetoric cheek by jowl with more 'Dikaiopolitan' claims. Relevant examples demonstrate well

<sup>142</sup> See Tables 3.1 and 3.2.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. Aeneas Tacticus 10.17.

<sup>144</sup> Cf. Plutarch *Timoleon* 4.5–8.

<sup>145</sup> Plutarch *Timoleon* 5.1–2.

<sup>146</sup> For the latter, consider the texts from Tegea, Phthiotic Thebes, and Chios (the Dophitis/Lophitis stele) discussed in this chapter and Chapter 2.

the coexistence, or even entanglement, of the two radical paradigms within the political cultures of single poleis. This is clear, for example, from the fifth-century Chian Dophitis/Lophitis stele.

As argued in Section 3.3, the representation of interference with the boundaries of the region named Dophitis/Lophitis as ‘injustice to the polis’<sup>147</sup> in the regulations on face A implies that the Chian polis is a unitary community with its own interests: it can itself suffer injustice, which must be severely punished with disenfranchisement, even if ostensibly minor. However, the accompanying regulations concerning the sale of controversial plots of land, probably estates confiscated from citizens,<sup>148</sup> either within<sup>149</sup> or beyond<sup>150</sup> Dophitis/Lophitis, imply that the Chian polis is a different type of organization. The polis is to sell the estates to new owners,<sup>151</sup> drawn from among its own members, through a straightforward market transaction. Moreover, the polis acknowledges the land’s controversial character by providing a formal guarantee that it will assume liability in the event of legal suits against the buyers.<sup>152</sup> In the latter provision, the Chian polis emerges, not as a community with substantial, indivisible common interests, but as a ‘Dikaiopolitan’ prudential association giving special protection to individual members’ specific entitlements (namely, certain property rights) where that is of contingent mutual interest.

The latter provision also reveals a ‘Dikaiopolitan’ readiness to use material incentives to promote common security and interests. By promising to take all liability in the event of disputes, the Chians collectively agreed to provide a very substantial incentive to potential buyers. They tellingly did not rely on

<sup>147</sup> Matthaïou (2011), text pp. 15–16, A, ll. 12–13.

<sup>148</sup> The *πρήχμα* to be carried out (*πρήξεσθαι*) mentioned in Matthaïou (2011), text pp. 15–16, B, ll. 17–21, is most plausibly interpreted as an ‘exaction’ (i.e. confiscation) by the Fifteen: Faraguna (2005), 97–8; contrast Haussoullier (1879), 239; Koerner (1993), 231, 234–5. An important consideration in favour of this view is the use of the imperative *πρηξάντων*, clearly to refer to exactions, in face A, ll. 15 and 18. The word *πρήχμα* itself almost certainly also refers to exaction in face C, ll. 4–5. Alternatively, it might be possible to interpret *πρήχμα* as ‘public sale’ (Matthaïou (2011), 18–19, 29–31), but even that would very probably have followed confiscations of the land to be sold.

<sup>149</sup> Haussoullier (1879), 238–40; Koerner (1993), 236; Matthaïou (2011), 28–9.

<sup>150</sup> Faraguna (2005), 97–8. Faraguna suggests that faces A and B–D may have very little connection with each other, beyond a common concern with land. However, there is a scenario on which they could still be closely connected, even if the plots sold were outside Lophitis. Certain citizens could have incurred the *ἀτιμία* and fine stipulated for moving the boundary stones of Dophitis/Lophitis, but refused to pay the fine. Their exile and the full confiscation of their property could have been the result, probably in connection with a fifth-century Chian *stasis* (compare Chapter 2.2.2. above, on Hellenistic Telos, for refusal to pay fines as a cause of *stasis* and exile; for the likelihood that some form of *stasis* was involved in the Chian confiscations, see Matthaïou (2011), 29–31), maybe a *stasis* in which democrats were victorious (possibly in 406: Gehrke (1985), 45, n. 20). It would then be their estates, located in different parts of Chios, whose confiscation and sale were regulated and recorded in B–D.

<sup>151</sup> The contents of face B, which clearly regulate public actions by magistrates, make it hard to accept the view of Koerner (1993), 236, that the sales recorded were forced private sales.

<sup>152</sup> Matthaïou (2011), text pp. 15–16, C, ll. 2–5.

citizens' voluntary, virtuous aspirations to defend and further collective interests, or to avoid any 'injustice to the polis'. If anyone sought to challenge the new distribution of private property rights and material incentives on the grounds of what was 'just' or beneficial for the polis, he would face the polis itself as his legal adversary.

The coexistence of 'Nakonian' concern with inalienable common goods and 'Dikaiopolitan' concern with incentives and strict entitlements is more widely attested for Classical Chios. Texts protecting sacred land and property and a civic sub-division's sacred building from *any* private or personal use<sup>153</sup> survive alongside texts recording the perquisites of priests and priestesses, *de facto* personal rewards for service and incentives for future priests and priestesses.<sup>154</sup>

There is a similar intermingling of 'Dikaiopolitan' with 'Nakonian' elements in the Hellenistic Phthiotic Theban text concerning the citizenship of a certain Eurydamas, printed and discussed previously in Section 3.3.<sup>155</sup> In that case, however, the more 'Dikaiopolitan' rhetoric has something closer to the re-signed, realist tone familiar from Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, there are signs of equivocation on the part of the authors of the decree about whether to rely on 'Nakonian' ethical language of virtue and vice or to resort to 'Dikaiopolitan' checks and balances.

This is most vividly reflected in the tentative, uncertain closing provision: Eurydamas is to swear a civic oath *if* the citizens do not entirely trust him unsworn (ἂν μὴ ἀνωμότῳ διαπιστεύωσι). This provision betrays uncertainty about whether Eurydamas and his fellow citizens will spontaneously achieve the kind of deep mutual trust which makes formal 'Dikaiopolitan' constraints redundant, or whether the new arrangement between them will need the formal protection of an oath, itself a type of civic contract in microcosm. This example gives an unusually direct insight into the dialectical processes at work within civic political cultures. Exceptionally, the practical, surface marks of underlying tensions between utopian and realist assumptions, and between 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' approaches to political institutions, are here preserved in the fixed form of a decree clause in a suspended, unresolved state. In their equivocation between the two incompatible practical alternatives, the authors unwittingly revealed the simultaneous force of competing political instincts.

The same equivocation is arguably evident in the opening provision about expulsion itself. On the surface, as argued in Section 3.3, that provision is strongly 'Nakonian', stipulating that Eurydamas may be expelled if he commits any harmful action against the polis. Its wording does not, however, reveal thoroughgoing confidence in the unity and flawless probity of the Phthiotic Theban citizen-body. Indeed, it is striking that the provision is

<sup>153</sup> LSCG 116; Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 87, ll. 24–36 (regulations of the Klytidai, a civic sub-division).

<sup>154</sup> LSCG 119; 120.

<sup>155</sup> SEG 53.565.

expressed in a series of forceful prohibitions: no citizen may expel Eurydamas, by any means or in any capacity, except in the specified circumstances. This provision is reinforced with a formal deterrent: those who make unsuccessful bids to show that Eurydamas is liable to expulsion should pay a fine of one talent to Demeter Panachaia. Both the language and the use of a deterrent rely on the characteristically 'Dikaiopolitan' presupposition that distrust and competition, as opposed to the *εὐνοία* for which Eurydamas is praised, will be common between Eurydamas and his new fellow citizens. Strongly stated and defended institutional checks, which would be otiose in a 'Nakonian' polis, are expected to deter malicious prosecutions, not individual citizens' good dispositions.

The opening provision as a whole even appears positively to tolerate regulated antagonism among citizens. It explicitly makes the restriction on expulsion apply to any potential citizens who wish to expel Eurydamas from citizenship (*οἱ βουλόμενοι ἀπελαύνειν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας*). This formulation not only presupposes that individuals may want (*βούλεσθαι*) to expel Eurydamas from citizenship, even if they cannot prove he is harming the polis,<sup>156</sup> but also abstains from stigmatizing such desires: it merely establishes an institutional check on actual expulsion.

Interpreted in this way, the opening's wording calls to mind general regulations of the type attested in an inscription from early Hellenistic Sagalassos analysed below in this sub-section: regulations designed to protect from internal threats individuals' (or an individual's) security and basic entitlements as a member of a civic association for mutual security, advantage, and justice. Indeed, the forceful Phthiotic Theban prohibitions read like products of hard bargaining.

If these opening words were considered in isolation, what might be expected to follow in the subsequent concessive clause would be, not a 'Nakonian' reference to 'vicious' or 'harmful' behaviour towards the polis, but a reference to contravention of the terms of the civic association: Eurydamas may not be expelled 'unless he himself attempts to expel another citizen illegitimately from citizenship' or 'unless he breaks the law'. Other opening formulations would cohere better with the 'Nakonian' elements of the decree: 'any willing citizen may expel Eurydamas' or simply 'let him be *ἄτιμος*', if he commits any 'vicious' or 'harmful' act against the polis. It is this latter kind of formulation which features in the more unambiguously 'Nakonian' clauses stipulating expulsion and exclusion considered in Section 3.3, such as those in the Dophitis/Lophitis decree and the Mylasan decree protecting Zeus Osogo's land.

<sup>156</sup> Compare Philip V's near contemporary advice to the citizens of Larissa to take precautions to prevent malicious attempts, motivated by *φιλοτιμία*, to argue that individuals are unworthy of citizenship: IG IX 2 517, ll. 38–9.

The 'Dikaiopolitan' conception of the normal functioning of Phthiotic Theban civic life which is relatively muted in this decree was given far less equivocal expression in one of only two other surviving decrees of Phthiotic Thebes. This is a Hellenistic honorary decree for a citizen of Pherai, which straightforwardly requites usefulness to the community and individuals with personal privileges and uses no more abstract or adventurous ethical language.<sup>157</sup>

Published honorific decrees of the Phthiotic Theban polis would, therefore, have left citizens uncertain or ambivalent about their polis' true nature. Citizens would have been unsure whether they should always behave as members of a corporate polis, governed by substantial, abstract ethical qualifications for citizenship, consensually understood and accepted by all; or whether they should adopt a more realist approach, treating one another, mainly distrustfully, as members of a fair association, regulated by bargaining, explicit agreements, and checks and balances.

The kinds of 'Dikaiopolitan' consideration which feature alongside 'Nakonian' attempts to legitimate lawful expulsion in the Chian and Phthiotic Theban texts were themselves used in other contexts to justify lawful expulsion of citizens. According to most such justifications, an individual is a legitimate candidate for expulsion or disenfranchisement because he is an illegitimate, unfair, or dangerous burden on fellow citizens.

Through a quite theoretical remark incorporated within the otherwise radically 'Nakonian' argumentation of his *Against Meidias*, Demosthenes reveals particularly clearly the influence of a 'Dikaiopolitan' notion of a polis as a fair association. He comments that, in making a decision about Meidias' disenfranchisement, the jurors have to decide whether Meidias should be allowed in future to commit arrogant self-assertion (*ὑβρις*) against any random member of the jury (*τὸν τυχόνθ' ὑμῶν*) with impunity.<sup>158</sup> This claim might be thought consistent with the speech's general 'Nakonian' tone: Meidias could threaten 'Nakonian' civic order by mistreating any fellow citizen, since each citizen has a specific place within that order. However, the pointed reference to 'any chance one of *you*' is an explicit appeal to the self-interest of each assembled juror. It invites each juror to give significant weight to his private self-interest in public decision-making, something inconsistent with strictly 'Nakonian' standards of civic virtue. Indeed, this appeal is much more consistent with the idea that Demosthenes and the jurors are fellow members of a fair civic association, involving mutual pledges of respect for security and well-being, which can and should be defended through the disenfranchisement of defaulters, which is in the interests of all law-abiding citizens ('*you*').

This interpretation of Demosthenes' argument might be thought too elaborate a response to a single appeal to jurors' self-interest. However, it is

<sup>157</sup> IG IX 2 132.

<sup>158</sup> Demosthenes 21.7.



precisely this type of ‘Dikaiopolitan’ thinking to which Demosthenes appeals in the following much more abstract, generalizing comments. Demosthenes there claims to have shown by his appeal to considerations of mutual security that his prosecution is not a private matter, but one of common concern: any juror sceptical of this should recognize that ‘it is in the public interest that nobody should be allowed to do such a thing’ (δημοσίᾳ συμφέρει μηδενὶ μηδὲν ἐξεῖναι τοιοῦτο ποιεῖν).<sup>159</sup> Demosthenes here appeals to a much narrower, ‘Dikaiopolitan’ conception of the ‘public interest’, as the point of overlap between individual citizens’ self-interest, than that evident in the ‘Nakonian’ rhetoric and institutions considered in Section 3.3, including the later rhetoric about common interests in this very speech. He thus treats the court as a civic institution whose function is to enable citizens to identify and collectively safeguard their overlapping separate interests.<sup>160</sup>

Significantly for this book’s argument, my approach here diverges widely from those of scholars who identify proto-Kantian dignitarian assumptions at work in Athenian and Greek political culture. For example, Ober argues that this passage of the *Against Meidias* reveals Athenian democrats’ commitment to the dignity of all citizens, rather than the much more conditional type of mutual concern identified here.<sup>161</sup> Many Athenians undoubtedly treated protections for individual safety and welfare, including laws on ὕβρις, as justified for reasons more altruistic than those Demosthenes gives. I think it remains to be proven, however, that any Athenians strongly favoured a truly dignitarian ideal of unconditional concern for each fellow citizen’s dignity, for its own sake, rather than purely as a means of maintaining and strengthening a strong, exclusive, patriotic community.

Most commonly, underlying ‘Dikaiopolitan’ norms’ influence emerges in attempts by citizens to justify penalties of expulsion and exclusion as means of upholding the two main types of ‘Dikaiopolitan’ civic obligation identified in Chapter 1. First, citizens could defend those penalties as means of upholding regulatory institutions and rules and associated obligations: in particular, obligations to preserve civic peace, by respecting individual fellow citizens’ security and property, and by preserving strict good faith in relation to established laws, procedures, and specific contracts designed to regulate conflict<sup>162</sup> or coordinate separate interests. Second, citizens could defend those penalties as means of enforcing obligations to observe principles of strict reciprocity, and associated institutions and regulations: obligations to make precise, material contributions to individual fellow citizens and to the polis as

<sup>159</sup> Demosthenes 21.8; compare 221–5.

<sup>160</sup> Christ (2012), 110, identifies the idea of a ‘nexus of mutual support’ at this point.

<sup>161</sup> Ober (1996), esp. 101. Admittedly, in recent work, Ober himself identifies mutual self-interest as central to a regime of civic dignity (Ober (2012), 838).

<sup>162</sup> For exile as a means of cementing ‘governmental checks and balances’, see Fröhlich (2013), 233–5.

a whole closely proportionate with benefits received or anticipated from them. In some cases, such as the first two considered below, such institutions, regulations, and obligations were explicitly represented as grounded in a civic contract. In other cases, however, those who advocated them probably considered them to be rooted in other sources of authority, such as divine sanction.

An isolated, subdued abstract justification of citizen exclusion in terms of the upholding of regulatory institutions and obligations features in the first speech *Against Aristogeiton* in the Demosthenic corpus, of uncertain authorship. This speech was at least ostensibly written for a suit denouncing Aristogeiton as a public debtor, liable to ἀτιμία. The speech includes theoretical comments about the nature of law, intended to bolster the case for Aristogeiton's disenfranchisement.<sup>163</sup> These include quite 'Nakonian' characterizations of law. Law is presented as a force universally applicable to all citizens, which 'wishes for' the just, the fine, and the beneficial and is also a means of educating citizens in good behaviour. The speaker claims that 'all laws' are established with two aims. The first is highly utopian: nobody should do *anything* which is not just. The second is less ambitious, but still strongly 'Nakonian': punishment of transgressors should make other citizens 'better'.

Also 'Nakonian' in their basic character are the claims in the middle of this section that law is an invention and gift of gods and a judgement of wise men: it is something objective which has to be discovered by those with special powers of perception. However, perhaps conscious of the possible anti-democratic implications of this approach, the speaker immediately afterwards characterizes law in a quite different way: as the 'common contract of the polis' (πόλεως δὲ συνθήκη κοινή), in accordance with which all in the polis should live.<sup>164</sup>

This description of law as something 'common' might be thought entirely consistent with the accompanying 'Nakonian' rhetoric. However, the use of the word συνθήκη to describe law takes on an anti-'Nakonian' tone when put in the context of contemporary theoretical debates. The conception of law as a συνθήκη κοινή of the polis recalls the Sophistic conception of law, criticized by Aristotle, as a 'contract' (συνθήκη) and 'guarantor of individuals' just claims on one another' (ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων).<sup>165</sup> For Aristotle, therefore, the mere use of the word συνθήκη to describe law was sufficient to strike an anti-'Nakonian' note. The author of the Demosthenic speech thus at least unwittingly picked up the manner of speaking of contemporary polemical supporters of 'Dikaiopolitan' principles.

<sup>163</sup> [Demosthenes] 25.15–17.

<sup>164</sup> [Demosthenes] 25.16. Compare Hyperides 3, col. 15: Athenogenes is said, even though a metec, to have transgressed the κοινὰ[s] τῆς πόλεως συνθήκας.

<sup>165</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1280b6–12.

He may even have been well-informed about relevant contemporary debates. He opens his discussion of law by contrasting nature and law, claiming that nature, unlike law, is ungoverned and particular to the individual. Those who are bad by nature tend to behave badly. However, the speaker's subsequent claims about law and its educational powers, considered previously, evoke a quite different view of human nature, as governable and reformable. The reference to law as a *συνθήκη κοινή* of the polis could well, therefore, represent the author's attempt to take account of the implications of his initial more pessimistic view of human nature: it is necessary for individuals to form binding contractual agreements with one another, in the form of laws, to compensate for the fact that others' natures are unpredictable and potentially vicious.<sup>166</sup> According to this interpretation, the apparently throwaway reference to law as contract could have implied to contemporaries, aware of current debates, that one of various possible theoretical justifications for Aristogeiton's disenfranchisement was the protection of the integrity of conflict-regulating law, which was the product of an enduring, fair civic contract for mutual security, justice, and advantage.<sup>167</sup>

Outside Athens, the fundamental civic regulations from early Hellenistic Sagalassos in Pisidia mentioned in Table 3.2 reveal an attempt to implement, and protect through the penalty of outlawry, civic rules, institutions, and obligations of the types required by the regulatory element of the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm. The full text, which suggests a less democratic order than most of the civic inscriptions considered so far,<sup>168</sup> is as follows:<sup>169</sup>

- 1 Ἀκραν μὴ καταλαμβάνεσ-  
θαι μὴθὲν μὴδὲ ἄλλο ὅρος μὴ-  
δὲν μὴδὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐγβάλλειν μὴδέ-  
να μὴδὲ στασιάζειν μὴδένα μὴδὲ ὅπλα ἐκ-
- 5 φέρειν μάχιμα μὴδένα. ὅς δ' ἂν ἀλώι τούτω[ν]  
τι ποιῶν ἰδούσης τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν δικασ-  
τῶν ὅσοι ἂν βουλευσῶνται τεθνάτωσαν·  
[ἀ]ποκτεινάτωσαν δ' αὐτοὺς ἢ πόλις καὶ οἱ δικαστα-  
[ί· ὅ]σους ἂν δὲ μὴ δύνωνται ἀποκτείνειν ἀλλὰ ἐχφύγω-

<sup>166</sup> For a similar blending of utopian with realist approaches to human nature and law, compare a section of Isocrates' *Antidosis* (15.253–5): humans' distinctive power of speech enables them to legislate about justice and morality, something without which 'we would not have been able to live with one another' (*οὐκ ἂν οἶοί τ' ἡμεν οἰκεῖν μετ' ἀλλήλων*).

<sup>167</sup> Even if this speech was a Sophistic exercise, it nonetheless reflects ideas in circulation about legitimate grounds for disenfranchisement. On the coexistence of community-oriented and individualistic arguments in many Athenian legal speeches: Christ (1998), 161–6.

<sup>168</sup> Note the absence of references to decisions by an assembly and the concluding list of men, perhaps elite figures holding magistracies, responsible for the settlement.

<sup>169</sup> Vantorpe (2007), text, pp. 123, 125; see also SEG 57.1409 (face A) + 50.1304 (face B).

- 10 {γω}σί που φυγαδεύσαντες ἔστωσαν πολέμιοι τῇ[ι]  
 πόλει καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἕως ἂν ἀποθάνωσιν καὶ αὐτοὶ  
 καὶ οἱ ἔγγονοι αὐτῶν· καὶ ὃς ἂν τῶν πολιτῶν περιτυν-  
 χάνῃ που ἀποκτείνάτω καὶ ἔστ' αὐτῷ κομίζεῖν σκύλα·  
 καταγαγεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς μηδεὶς κύριος ἔστω μηδὲ
- 15 ἐχθύσασθαι περὶ τούτων μηδένα μηδέποτε· ἔαν  
 δέ τις ἐπίθῃται ἐχθύεσθαι ταύροις τριετέσι λευκοῖς  
 τριακοσίοις καὶ κριοῖς λευκοῖς τριετέ[σι] τριακοσίοις καὶ  
 τράγοις λευκοῖς τριετέ[τε]σι τριακοσίοις καὶ ἀνθρωπ[ί-]  
 [νοις ? ὑπέ]ρ ἀσυλία[ς τῆς πό]λεως, οἱ θεοὶ εἴησαν αὐτοῖς ἀλλ-
- 20 [ότριοι (?)] .....  
 .....  
 .....]

Gap of unknown length.

- 21 Ἐὰν δὲ δια[κρ]ατήσωσιν οἱ καταλ[αβόμε]νοι τῇ-  
 ν ἄκραν κἀγβαλῶσιν τινὰς ἐκ τῆς πόλε[ω]ς, ζη-  
 τείτω ἢ τε πόλις κἀναγέτω καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἀνάστατα  
 πάντα ποιο[ῶ]ντες ἕως ἂν ἀγάγωσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ὅσα ἂν [ἔχω-]
- 25 σιν τῶν ἐγβληθέντων οἱ ἐγβαλόντες καὶ ὅσα ἂν ἀπ[ὸ] [ῆι ?]·  
 ἀναβάντων δὲ αὐτῶν τινέτωσαν ἅπαντα ἐκ τ[ῶν]  
 ἰδίων καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ὑποχοὶ ἔστωσαν καὶ ἀποκτείν[ε]τω-  
 σαν αὐτῶν τρεῖς τοὺς ἄρξαντας, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τέως δ[ύ]-  
 δεκα τινέτωσαν ἅνα μνᾶς δέκα ἀργυρίου καὶ ἔστω ἱε[ρόν]
- 30 ἅπαν [ . . . . . ]· *vacat*  
 Περὶ κλοπῆς · ὃς ἂν κλέβῃ τι οὐ πρότερον ἢσαν μναὶ τρε[ῖς]  
 νῦν δ' ἔστω θάνατος ἢ ζημία ἐλεγχθέντι · *vacat*  
 αἱ δὲ ὁμολογίαι καὶ αἱ συνθήκαι ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ  
 ἀρχόντων [there follows a list of Pisidian names]

No one may seize the citadel or any other mountain, or expel anyone from the polis, or foment *stasis*, or raise (l. 5) battle weapons. Let anyone who is caught doing any of these things, when the polis has observed it, and those of the judges who participate in deliberation [during a *stasis*], die. Let the polis and the judges put them to death. Any whom they are unable to put to death, (10) but who flee, having come to live as exiles<sup>170</sup> somewhere, let them be enemies of the polis and the gods until they die, both themselves and their descendants. Whoever of the citizens comes upon such a man somewhere, let him kill him; and it is permitted for him to carry off the spoils. No one has power to restore such exiles or ever (15) to expiate them with sacrifices. If anyone attempts to expiate them with three-hundred three-year-old white bulls and three-hundred three-year-old white rams and three-hundred three-year-old white goats and

<sup>170</sup> Or possibly 'having exiled [others]' (compare ll. 3-4), which fits the context less well, but would be more consistent with the aorist participle and involve the more common (transitive) meaning of the verb.

human things (?)<sup>171</sup> . . . for the sake of the inviolability of the polis, let the gods be estranged (?) (20) from them.

[Gap of unknown length.]

(21) If those who have seized the citadel assert long-term control and expel individuals from the polis, let the polis seek them out and bring them back; and let the gods [be] making everything in turmoil, until they bring back them,<sup>172</sup> any possessions of the (25) expellees which the expellers have, and any which are missing (?).<sup>173</sup> When they have come back, let them pay reparations for everything from their own resources, and let them be at the mercy of the gods, and let them put to death the three of them who were in command; and let the others, up to the number of twelve, each pay ten minae of silver and let it be sacred (30) in its entirety . . . Concerning theft: if anyone commits a theft, for which the penalty would previously have been three minae, let death now be the penalty, for a man who has been convicted. The agreements and covenants were made when the magistrates were the following: [there follows a list of Pisidian names].

These Sagalassian regulations begin (ll. 1–20) with general regulations forbidding revolutionary behaviour by citizens, including the acts of expelling citizens or raising battle weapons. The next part of the text (ll. 21–30) stipulates measures to be taken against rebels in a specific situation: one in which a group in control of the citadel (*ἄκρα*) maintains control of it and expels citizens. These latter regulations could concern an already existing rebellious faction in control of the citadel. However, it is more plausible that these regulations were, like the preceding ones, hypothetical, even if prompted by recent bad experience: they were designed to deter regular civic garrisons, up to fifteen-strong, from maintaining control of the citadel after the end of their term of duty.<sup>174</sup> These civic precautions against *stasis* could have been imposed on, or suggested to, the Sagalassians by an external power: a Hellenistic monarch or royal official. However, in the absence of indications of external interference, it is plausible to imagine these Pisidian residents of Sagalassos voluntarily and self-consciously adopting distinctive civic institutions and rhetoric.

Crucially for present concerns, the text explicitly presents the regulations as ‘agreements and covenants’ (*ὁμολογίαι καὶ συνθήκαι*) made under particular

<sup>171</sup> Alternatively, restoring *ἀνθρώπων* [οἱ], ‘and a human’ (A. Chaniotis in SEG 57.1409).

<sup>172</sup> It is unclear whether these references to seeking and bringing back certain individuals concern those who seized the citadel, presumably now imagined to be in exile themselves, or the exiles they expelled while in charge of the citadel. If the latter interpretation is preferred, it would probably be better to punctuate after *αὐτοὺς* and take the two *ὅσα* clauses as accusatives of respect preceding the following requirement for the rebels to pay reparations (compare the translation of those clauses in Vandorpe (2007), 125). However, the *δέ* in *ἀναβάντων δέ αὐτῶν* does seem to mark that out as the beginning of a new sentence.

<sup>173</sup> Alternatively, restoring *ἀπ[αχθῆναι]* or *ἀπ[ήχθη]*, as A. Chaniotis suggests, ‘any which were taken away’.

<sup>174</sup> Vandorpe (2007), 129–31, comparing SEG 26.1306 (itself discussed below). Regular predictable numbers of garrison commanders and members would explain the numerical precision in ll. 27–30.

magistrates (ἐπὶ ἀρχόντων), whose Pisidian names are given in a subsequent long list (ll. 33–9). These were thus agreements transacted by all Sagalassian citizens or, at least, by all the named magistrates, acting as their representatives. The content of the regulations is very consistent with them being contractual ‘agreements and covenants’, negotiated among competing, distrustful citizens or representative magistrates for the sake of mutual security, advantage, and justice.

This is the best explanation for the tone and nature of the strict general prohibitions of revolutionary activity by any citizen. For example, by accepting the ban on raising battle weapons, citizens agreed to interact with one another in a peaceful manner, but implicitly endorsed continued unarmed competition or even conflict. Also amenable to such an explanation is the explicit ban on expulsion, presumably of any fellow citizen, which is later reiterated in the prohibition against members of a hypothetical garrison who have seized the citadel expelling citizens.<sup>175</sup> Significantly, as stated in Table 3.2, it was death and quasi-outlawry which were stipulated as the sanctions protecting this part of this Sagalassian civic contract.

The use of the threat of expulsion in this document was quite different from that in the strongly ‘Nakonian’ cases considered earlier in Section 3.3. The participants in the Sagalassian agreement did not stipulate expulsion or exclusion as the penalty for a citizen who showed *any* deviation from public-spirited, strongly conformist conduct, even an isolated one, in the way attested at Phthiotic Thebes, Nesos, Mylasa, or Chios. Rather, they stipulated outlawry only for a citizen who actively challenged the very basis of civic peace and civic interaction. They thus left considerable scope for citizens to pursue self-interested or contentious courses of action, before they became liable to expulsion or exclusion: provided that they stuck to these conflict-regulating rules, of contingent mutual advantage, they could remain in citizenship.

In addition, the participants in the agreement used the threat of death or outlawry, itself reinforced by the exclusion of expiation even by an incredibly extensive and generous sacrifice, to give special weight to individuals’ entitlement to security in their citizenship. They thus irrefragably fortified that entitlement even against possible ‘Nakonian’ arguments that the expulsion or exclusion of some citizens, or wider revolutionary behaviour, was necessary for the well-being or security of the whole community. It is possible to contrast, for example, the rhetoric of a third-century oath of loyalty and *δύμνοια* from Chersonesos Taurica, on the north coast of the Black Sea, in

<sup>175</sup> Compare the use of the threat of exile to deter harmful treatment of specified citizens in some Eleian texts: Minon (2007), no. 20, ll. 1–2; no. 30 (cf. Table 3.1). Compare an Athenian example (cf. Table 3.2), Osborne *Naturalization*, D22 (dating to 334), ll. 31–5: anyone who kills Peisitheides of Delos, naturalized as an Athenian, will be considered to be like an enemy (*πολέμιος*), together with any polis which receives him. For an Archaic regulatory text containing sanctions against violence against fellow citizens: *Nomima* I, no. 100 (Argos, 575–550).

which the swearer promised not to engage in conspiracy to the detriment of the community or any individual. In that case, the protection for the individual citizen even from being a victim of conspiracy was explicitly qualified: he must not have been shown to be an enemy of the polis.<sup>176</sup>

On the one hand, therefore, the authors of the Sagalassian document deployed rhetoric, rules, and procedures which betrayed the influence of underlying 'Dikaiopolitan' norms. On the other, the public epigraphic display of the regulations gave them particular paradigmatic force in themselves. In offering a paradigmatic picture of their polis, the participants in the agreement did not present it as a solidaristic civic community, so virtuous and united that it needed the threat of outlawry only to protect itself from possible vicious anti-democratic behaviour by unusual and corrupt deviants. They thus turned away from the option pursued in the anti-tyranny laws from Eretria or Ilion<sup>177</sup> and in the third-century oath from Chersonesos Taurica mentioned above, which repeatedly commits the loyal, swearing citizen to resist the designs of disloyal citizens.<sup>178</sup> Rather, the Sagalassians presented their polis as a civic contract, whose members universally accepted the stipulation of outlawry as a sanction necessary to protect themselves *from one another*.

The implication was that distrust and competition, held in check by inviolable law protecting individual entitlements, represented the normal, acceptable state of affairs. Indeed, even in endorsing these agreements themselves, the citizens involved had to adopt a 'Dikaiopolitan' frame of mind, paradigmatic for future generations: they had to treat their fellow citizens as potential threats to their own security, rather than embracing them as civic friends with whom they could readily share the kinds of trust required for full-blooded cooperation and mutuality.<sup>179</sup>

This frame of mind could lead to extremely egoistic attitudes. Plato's portrayal of Callicles in his *Gorgias* is strong evidence for ancient recognition of this point. Plato's Callicles is adamant that, in reality ('by nature'), the worst possible fate, far worse than committing injustice oneself, is to suffer injustice at the hands of another. In this he resembles the Sagalassians, determined to deter and pre-empt personal injustice and exploitation. Callicles infers from the acute disadvantages of suffering exploitation that, according to nature, the most prudent course is to do everything in one's power to avoid being vulnerable to unjust treatment, including extreme self-assertion, even if it

<sup>176</sup> *IosPE* I<sup>2</sup> 401, esp. ll. 36–40. There may well have been a *stasis* in progress: Dössel (2003), 187–90; compare Chapter 5.5.3.1 below.

<sup>177</sup> Compare Tables 3.1 and 3.3.

<sup>178</sup> *IosPE* I<sup>2</sup> 401, esp. ll. 5–20.

<sup>179</sup> A 'Nakonian' critic of these regulations might offer an argument comparable to the early Marx's interpretation of liberal 'rights of man', in *On the Jewish Question*: rights to personal freedom and private property 'lead each man to see in other men not the *realisation* but the *limitation* of his own freedom' (Marx and Engels (1956–1990), vol. 1, 365; translation from Livingstone, Benton, and Colletti (1975), 230).

requires active rapacity.<sup>180</sup> Socrates' very virtue exposes him to possible persecution, and even execution or confiscation of property, at the hands of the Athenian people.<sup>181</sup> Identifying similar dynamics to those Plato illustrates through the example of Callicles, Thucydides suggests that, in the widespread *staseis* of the Peloponnesian War, citizens, insecure about the future, treated it as more important to avoid personal suffering than to trust their fellow citizens.<sup>182</sup>

A close comparison can be made between the Sagalassian regulations and the Dikaipolitan reconciliation itself. As argued in Chapter 1, that reconciliation was presented as the re-establishment of a civic contract among distrustful, independent citizens. The feature relevant here is that, as mentioned in Table 3.3, disenfranchisement was made the penalty for private citizens who brought prosecutions against fellow citizens forbidden by the settlement. As at Sagalassos, the threat of exclusion was here deployed to mark the fairly broad limits of appropriate civic conduct: those who respected the civic contract could remain in citizenship.

Similar great weight was probably given to private citizens' respect for agreements and fellow private citizens' entitlements, specifically their financial entitlements, in the 'law of Kadys' from fourth-century Delphi. That law itself appears to contravene the principle of the inviolability of private contracts: it sets a quite modest maximum interest rate on loans, apparently to apply from a certain date even to credit contracts already agreed before the passage of the law.<sup>183</sup> This was quite probably an application of 'Nakonian' ideals of solidarity and help to the weak, coupled with democratic ideals about popular sovereignty even over solemn private contracts. For the future, however, probably partly in order to compensate for its own 'Nakonian' potency and to reassure creditors suspicious of demagoguery,<sup>184</sup> the law envisaged strict 'Dikaipolitan' fidelity to contracts. There was to be no scope for reversal of the law, itself a type of contract among those of different interests, whose breadth of support in the assembly was recorded numerically in the decree.<sup>185</sup> Moreover, as stated in Table 3.3, if Homolle's restorations are correct, disenfranchisement was stipulated in the law as the penalty for cases in which citizens failed to repay a contested debt, in particular legal circumstances; the inscription probably stated that those concerned were to be subject to public prosecution as if they were perpetrators of *stasis*.<sup>186</sup> Through such a provision,

<sup>180</sup> See, in particular, Plato *Gorgias* 483a7–d6.

<sup>181</sup> Consider Plato *Gorgias* 511a4–7; 521c3–6.

<sup>182</sup> Thucydides 3.83.2.

<sup>183</sup> See Homolle (1926), 86–9; note especially col. I of his text, pp. 14–18. On the level of the interest rate, see Reinach (1927), 171–3; Asheri (1969), 25; Jacquemin, Mulliez, and Rougemont (2012), 56.

<sup>184</sup> Compare Asheri (1969), 24–5.

<sup>185</sup> Homolle (1926), text, pp. 14–18, col. I, ll. 1–3.

<sup>186</sup> Homolle (1926), text, pp. 14–18, col. VII, ll. 2–14. Cf. Homolle (1926), 84–5.



fideliy to relevant financial contracts would have been made tantamount to preservation of the citizen-body.<sup>187</sup>

In an example similar to the probable Delphian case, the threat of disenfranchisement was deployed at fourth-century Arkesine on Amorgos to oblige civic magistrates to respect and enforce financial agreements between private citizens. As stated in Table 3.3, ἀτιμία was established there as the penalty for a magistrate of a particular type (an ἐσαγωγεύς, an ‘introducer of suits’) who brought to trial suits whose prosecution was forbidden by a more wide-ranging arbitrated settlement (brokered by arbitrators, διαλλακταί). These were probably cases relating to financial disputes which had already been resolved or terminated through the wider arbitration. In this case, the penalty of disenfranchisement was established to deter, and, if necessary, punish, neglect by magistrates of the terms of a supposedly consensual civic reconciliation agreement. This agreement was itself, to some extent, a renewal of a civic contract among citizens of Arkesine, mutually beneficial for those involved.

In these cases from Arkesine and probably also Delphi, the terms of formal financial agreements were given very strong protection, even against possible ‘Nakonian’ claims that the fulfilment of the agreements was a hindrance to collective projects or civic solidarity. In the Delphian case, it appears even to have been equated with subversion of the citizen-body for relevant debtors to dispute their financial obligations, even presumably on ‘Nakonian’ grounds, such as personal need or considerations of solidarity or virtue, of the kind which probably motivated the ‘law of Kadys’ itself. The criteria for exclusion at both Arkesine and Delphi would have encouraged citizens to act like the parties to the type of Aristotelian civic friendship, based on mutual utility, described in the *Eudemian Ethics*: civic friendship which ‘looks to the agreement and the thing’ (βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα),<sup>188</sup> rather than to questions of intention, character, or solidarity.

It is revealing to contrast unconditional privileging of particular agreed private property rights at Arkesine and probably also Delphi with the merely conditional use of exile to protect particular property rights in an early fifth-century text from Chaladros/Chaladra in Elis, mentioned in Table 3.1. In that text, it was stipulated that a newly enfranchised citizen, Deukalion, could keep his land situated in Pisa; anyone who seized it would suffer exile. However, the stipulation of exile was qualified with an acknowledgement of the primacy of the people as a collectivity: exile was to be the penalty ‘unless the people decide [sc. that the land should be seized]’ (αἱ μὲ δάμοι δοκέοι).<sup>189</sup> This example

<sup>187</sup> Compare Homolle (1926), 84: the man who refuses to settle a debt in relevant circumstances ‘entre en quelque sort en état de rébellion’.

<sup>188</sup> Aristotle *Eudemian Ethics* 1243a31–2.

<sup>189</sup> See Minon (2007), no. 12, l. 7, with her translation.

reveals a certain equivocation between ‘Dikaiopolitan’ strict respect for property rights and ‘Nakonian’ concern for the substantial common good, underpinned by collective decision-making. Although an attempt was made to guarantee property rights strongly, it was left open for the polis to quash private entitlements for the sake of the perceived greater good.<sup>190</sup>

In addition to being used to compel magistrates to enforce financial agreements, as at Arkesine, penalties of exclusion and expulsion could also be stipulated to deter or punish other breaches by magistrates of kinds of good faith given special importance by ‘Dikaiopolitan’ norms: good faith in the observance and enforcement of rules and procedures designed to protect individual entitlements and regulate competition between citizens. When the Hellenistic Teians integrated into their polis the settlement of Kyrbissos and its inhabitants in the third century, they published a document regulating the future administration of Kyrbissos.<sup>191</sup> The document opens with pledges to be exchanged by the two communities and regulations concerning the appointment of garrison-commanders for Kyrbissos:

- 2 [.....]ΙΗΙ συμφερόντως, ὁμ[όσ]αι [τ]οὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει [πο-]  
[λίτας μὴ κα]τασκάψειν Κυρβισσὸν μηδ' ἐτέρω[ι] ἐπιτρέψειν κα[τὰ]  
5 [δύναμιν μὴ]δ' ἐγκαταλίψειν μηθένα τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν ἐγ Κυρβισσῶ[ι]  
[κατοικούν]των· ὁμόσαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐγ Κυρβισσῶι κατοικούντας [μὴ]  
[ἐγκαταλείψ]ειν τὸν φρούραρχον τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἀποστελλόμενον  
[καὶ διαφ]υλάξειν τὸ χωρίον τῇ πόλει· ἐὰν δέ τις μὴ ὁμόσῃ, [.....]  
[..... κα]τ' (?) αὐτοῦ τὸν δήμον ὡς ἀδικούντος· ἀποδείκνυσθαι δὲ καὶ φ[ρού-]  
[ραρχο]ν εἰς Κυρβισσὸν μὴ νεώτερον τριήκοντα ἐτέων κατὰ τετρά[μην]-  
10 [νον ὧι] ἔστι τίμημα γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἐλεύθερον τεσσέρων ταλάν-  
[των· κατὰ]ρχειν δὲ τὸμ βουλόμενον τῶμ πολιτῶν ὁμνύντα ἐν τῇ ἐκκλη-  
[σίαι· ὁ] δὲ ὄρκος ἔστω· κατάρξω φρούραρχον εἰς Κυρβισσὸν ὅστις μο[ι]  
[ἂν δόξῃ] ἄριστα καὶ δικαιοτάτα ἐπιμελέσε[σ]θαι τῆς φυλακῆς τοῦ χωρί-  
[ου] καὶ διαφυλάξειν τὸ χωρίον τῇ πόλει ναὶ μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλ[ω].....]  
15 [..] καὶ μοι εὐορκ[οῦν]τι [μ]ὲν εὖ [εἴη], ἐπιορκοῦντι δὲ κακῶς· τὸν δὲ αὐτ[ὸν]  
φρούραρχον μὴ ἀποδείκνυσθαι ἐφ' ἔτη πέντε· ὅπως δ' ἂν εἰδῶμεν τοὺς φρου-  
ραρχήσαντας καὶ [.....], ἀναγράψαι τοὺς  
τιμούχους εἰς [λ]εύκω[μα ...]τ[...].] ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον· φρ[ου-]  
ροὺς δ' ἔχειν τὸ[μ] φρο[ύραρχον μ]ὴ ἐλάττους ἢ εἴκοσι τῶμ πολιτῶν καὶ  
20 κύνας τρεῖς· τοὺς δὲ κύνας [π]ριαμένην παραδοῦναι τῶι φρουράρχω[ι]  
τῇμ πόλιν· τρέψειν [δὲ] τοὺς κύνας τὸμ [φ]ρούραρχον· ὃς δ' ἂν παραλαβὼν  
τὸ χωρίον μὴ παραδῶ[ι] τ[ῶι] φρουράρχω[ι] τῶ[ι] ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀποσ[τελ]-  
λομένωι αἰε καθ' ἐκάστην τετράμη[νον], φ[ε]ύγειν τε αὐτὸν ἄραιον  
ἐκ Τέω καὶ ἐξ Ἀβδήρων καὶ ἐκ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῆς Τηϊῶν καὶ τῆς Ἀβδηρ[ι]-  
25 τῶν καὶ τὰ ὄντα αὐτοῦ δη[μό]σια εἶ[ναι], καὶ ὃς ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ αὐτὸν μ[ὴ]  
μιαρὸς ἔστω· ἐὰν δὲ μαχόμενος [ἀποθάνῃ, ὑπάρχ]ε[ι]ν αὐτοῦ δημόσια τὰ ὄντα·

<sup>190</sup> Compare Minon (2007), 91.

<sup>191</sup> SEG 26.1306, based on Robert and Robert (1976).

(l. 2) [ . . . . . ]beneficially, the citizens in the city should swear not to raze Kyrbissos to the ground, or to allow anyone else to do so as far as it is [in their power, o]r to abandon any of the citizens settled in (l. 5) Kyrbissos. And those settled in Kyrbissos should swear not to abandon the garrison-commander sent by the people and to preserve the stronghold for the polis. If anyone does not swear, [let] the people [take action against him] as against someone committing injustice. And a garrison commander should be appointed for Kyrbissos for every four-month period, a man not younger than thirty years (10) whose registered property level in non-mortgaged land and housing is [sc. at least] four talents. Any citizen who wishes may make the nomination, swearing an oath in the assembly. Let the oath be: I will nominate as garrison-commander for Kyrbissos whoever seems to be the one who will most virtuously and most justly take care of the guarding of the stronghold and preserve the stronghold for the city, by Apoll[o . . . . .] and let things go well for me if I keep my oath, and badly if I break it. The same man may not be appointed garrison-commander again within five years. So that we know the men who have served as garrison-commander [and . . . ], the *timouchoi* should list them on a white board . . . to the council house. The garrison-commander should have not fewer than twenty garrison soldiers from among the citizens and (20) three dogs. The polis should buy the dogs and give them to the garrison-commander. The garrison-commander should supply the dogs' maintenance. Anyone who, after taking command of the stronghold, does not hand it over to the new garrison-commander always sent out by the polis for each four-month period, let him be exiled, as a cursed man, from Teos and Abdera and from the territory of the Teians and the (25) Abderites, and let his property be made public, and let whoever kills him not be polluted. If he dies fighting, let his property become public.

There is one strikingly 'Nakonian', or even utopian, note in the regulations concerning garrison-commanders (ll. 11–15): the citizen responsible for nominating a garrison-commander promises to choose the person whom he thinks will take care of the guarding of Kyrbissos and preserve it for the polis 'most virtuously and most justly' (*ἄριστα καὶ δικαιοῦτατα*). In accordance with 'Nakonian' ideals, outstanding virtue is the qualification for leadership. Moreover, this provision relies on the 'Nakonian' assumption that Teian citizens will have the exceptionally trustworthy characteristics which make 'Nakonian' organization viable. It presupposes that the nominating citizen can be trusted to make a good and fair judgement of character. It also presupposes that there will be very virtuous candidates available for selection, like the garrison-commanders praised in Hellenistic Priene for their energetic, selfless leadership.<sup>192</sup>

However, the spirit of this provision contrasts with the following regulations concerning garrison-commanders' service, which are grudging and pragmatic, in a way which suggests the influence of 'Dikaiopolitan' assumptions. The term

<sup>192</sup> See *I.Priene* 19–23.

of service is limited to only four months.<sup>193</sup> Moreover, no individual may serve twice within any five-year period.

It might be objected that this restriction on office length was not grudging at all, but represented an attempt to avoid individuals being burdened with arduous garrison command over a long period. However, this alternative interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the fact that these restrictions on office tenure were underwritten with the threat of outlawry: outlawry was the penalty for any garrison-commander who failed to hand over command at Kyrbissos to his successor at the end of his four-month term (cf. Table 3.2).<sup>194</sup> This stipulation of outlawry makes it very clear that, as the Roberts argued, the strict regulations of office length were designed as a strict constraint, to curb individual self-seeking and pre-empt attempts by individuals to accumulate and abuse power by establishing a personal stronghold in the garrison.<sup>195</sup> This impression is reinforced by further guarantees against fraud. The names of those who have served as garrison-commander are to be written up for public display, apparently at the council house (ll. 16–18). Moreover, any garrison-commander must have at least four talents of landed property, probably, as the Roberts argue, so that the polis can take this property ‘hostage’ while the garrison-commander is away on duty.<sup>196</sup>

These provisions, in contrast to the earlier ones, presupposed ineradicable self-seeking by individual citizens and distrust among citizens.<sup>197</sup> In the light of the decree’s earlier comments about virtue and justice, one plausible view is that these provisions show that this decree’s authors accepted ‘Dikaiopolitan’ principles with the realist resignation also attested in Plato and Aristotle, while continuing to dream of ‘Nakonian’ unity.

Nevertheless, it is probable that at least some authors of the Teos-Kyrbissos settlement intended to give some positive weight to ‘Dikaiopolitan’ norms. The wider character of the settlement between the two communities supports this view. In the oaths to be exchanged between the Teians and the inhabitants of Kyrbissos, each group pledges good faith and non-betrayal, but no mention is made of any greater level of solidarity.<sup>198</sup> These oaths both presuppose ongoing distrust and competition between the two communities and implicitly render it

<sup>193</sup> For this as a short period, see Robert and Robert (1976), 197–9, adducing some parallels (e.g. *I.Priene* 19, ll. 5–8).

<sup>194</sup> See Robert and Robert (1976), 210–14.

<sup>195</sup> See Robert and Robert (1976), 197–9.

<sup>196</sup> Robert and Robert (1976), 197.

<sup>197</sup> Compare the similarly defensive regulations, much more explicitly tied to the protection of democracy in particular, from third-century Kyme, which appear to entertain the possibility of anti-democratic treachery of multiple severe kinds by potentially *any* elected *strategos* (*SEG* 54.1229, esp. ll. 11–27; see also the text and restorations of Hamon (2008), 94). The citizens of Kyme thus showed realist ambivalence about the trustworthiness of their principal body of magistrates, perhaps as a result of recent bad experience (cf. Hamon (2008), 96–7, 105–6).

<sup>198</sup> *SEG* 26.1306, ll. 2–8, 40–61.

acceptable and legitimate. Interestingly, a formal record is to be kept of which citizens at Kyrbissos have sworn the oath.<sup>199</sup>

Moreover, there does not appear to have been any attempt at thorough-going integration of the two communities through the settlement. At any rate, most of the inhabitants of Kyrbissos opted to stay in their homes, rather than to migrate and mingle with the Teians.<sup>200</sup> This represents a striking contrast with, for example, the extremely integrative provisions included in the fourth-century union of two other poleis of western Asia Minor, Latmos and Pidasia. That settlement includes the quite extreme regulation that daughters of citizens of one community could marry only citizens of the other during the first seven years of the union. That striking provision forms part of a broader ‘Nakonian’ project to bind the communities in *ὁμόνοια*, leaving nothing ‘particular’ (*ἴδιον*) to either.<sup>201</sup>

Against this wider background, it becomes likely that at least some authors of the Teos-Kyrbissos settlement considered the fortification of the limitation on tenure and similar checks and balances necessary safety valves, which would make straightforward and risk-free a positively desirable form of political interaction: strenuous competition between and within the two communities and their individual members, now prudentially united in a single ‘Dikaio-politan’ community. Expulsion and exclusion would be imposed, not, as at Phthiotic Thebes, for any deviation from the impeccable virtue and justice theoretically expected of garrison-commanders, but only for the gravest breaches of faith. Confident that safeguards were in place to prevent schism or collapse, citizens could confidently pursue with freedom and vigour contrasting economic and cultural interests, including their respective communities’ pre-existing, distinct interests.<sup>202</sup> In this they would resemble the federal citizens of Polybius’ idealized Achaian League, also assembled from varied communities into a contractual political framework, particularly appropriate for a large, multicultural unit.<sup>203</sup>

Like the Teians, the Classical Erythraians stipulated disenfranchisement as the penalty for unlawful iteration of the office of secretary (*γραμματεὺς*) (see Table 3.3).<sup>204</sup> An objection to regarding these two cases as mirroring ‘Dikaio-politan’ moves would be that the severe restrictions on long-term or repeated office-holding could be interpreted as ‘Nakonian’: they could be seen as specifically democratic, or, at least, anti-oligarchic or anti-tyrannical, moves

<sup>199</sup> SEG 26.1306, ll. 57–9.

<sup>200</sup> Robert and Robert (1976), 191.

<sup>201</sup> SEG 47.1563 (with 53.1198); compare van Bremen (2003), 313–17.

<sup>202</sup> Even if inhabitants of Kyrbissos could not become garrison-commanders, which is a possibility, a Teian garrison-commander could still potentially collaborate with dissident inhabitants of Kyrbissos.

<sup>203</sup> See especially Polybius 2.37–8, 4.60, with Gray (2013b).

<sup>204</sup> *Nomima* I, no. 84, ll. 9–13.

to check the power of individual magistrates.<sup>205</sup> However, 'Nakonian' language and principles are not given prominence in either case, outside the exceptional Teian lines about appointment of garrison-commanders. In the Erythraian case, there is no reference to the common good or even to 'the people'.

Moreover, systematic restrictions on office length are not strictly consistent with 'Nakonian' ideals. In a well-organized 'Nakonian' polis, citizens are so well-educated and virtuous that they can, and sometimes should, be entrusted with continuous or repeated office, even though sharing of power and preparedness to obey others in turn are themselves important elements of 'Nakonian' virtue. Notably, Hellenistic poleis frequently did follow this 'Nakonian' line of thinking: they often tolerated continuous office-holding by major benefactors.<sup>206</sup> In a Prienian decree of the later first century BC, the Prienian people explicitly stated, in honouring their great benefactor Moschion, that they had re-elected him to the financial office of *antigraphheus* for a second term, knowing that he was showing all concern for common affairs (εἰδὼς τὴν πᾶσαν [ἐπιμέλειαν πρ]οσφερόμενον τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς κοινοῖς πρᾶγμα[σιν]).<sup>207</sup> This is not simply a question of a contrast between civil and military magistracies. A financial office such as Moschion's would have offered opportunities for fraud and betrayal not entirely unlike those available to a garrison-commander.

Unlike the Prienians, the citizens of Teos-Kyrbissos and Erythrai who voted for the restrictions discussed here treated active citizens of their respective poleis principally as potential threats to their own security or opponents in civic competition, debates, and power struggles. They did not treat them as partners in the pursuit of virtue and collective flourishing, who should each be given the opportunities for public-spiritedness and self-improvement offered by prolonged civic service. They used the inflexible threat of expulsion or exclusion to protect themselves at all costs, even the loss of a chance at such 'Nakonian' interaction, from one another's potential aspirations to domination or exploitation.

There is a partly parallel use of the threat of disenfranchisement to give special weight to magistrates' preservation of a relevant type of good faith, this time in administering institutions which were profitable rather than merely defensive, in a second-century document from Delphi, regulating the use of a fund donated by Attalus II. This document makes detailed provisions for loans to be given at interest from the fund. The provision relevant here is the stipulation of disenfranchisement, mentioned in Table 3.3, as the penalty for particular magistrates who fail to exact and pay to the polis the prescribed fine

<sup>205</sup> On Teos: Robert and Robert (1976), 205–6. On Erythrai: van Effenterre and Ruze (1994), 316. Modern parallels: Cain and Levin (1999), 168–71.

<sup>206</sup> See, for example, *I.Priene* 4, ll. 15–21.

<sup>207</sup> *I.Priene* 108, ll. 217–21.

from those who do not pay interest on loans from the fund punctually.<sup>208</sup> In this case, fines and the threat of disenfranchisement were used to underwrite the efficient and impartial administration of public loans to individuals: strongly to deter attempts at unjust self-enrichment and strongly to encourage punctual payment of interest. No reliance was placed at any point in the system on the good character, goodwill, or good judgement of individual magistrates or private citizens. Rather, disincentives and incentives were to make the system function, channelling fear and self-interest.

As in the Teian case, these Delphian regulations might be taken to indicate only reluctant, realist acceptance of 'Dikaiopolitan' institutions. However, that their authors were not covert full-blooded 'Nakonians' is evident from their failure to make any positive attempt to foster good character, goodwill, or good judgement; they were content with Delphian citizens' current habits and priorities. In addition, they made no 'Nakonian' provisions to protect or assist weaker or poorer citizens: for example, those who were temporarily unable to make interest payments. On the contrary, relevant magistrates would face loss of citizenship if they did not strictly enforce the terms of loan contracts, regardless of particular circumstances.

It might be objected that this whole Delphian scheme did have communal ends, particularly beneficial for poorer citizens, which were separate from the satisfaction of individual citizens' private needs for capital. The interest collected through the scheme was to be used to pay the salaries of public teachers and to fund collective honours and sacrifices for Attalus. Nevertheless, under the scheme, citizens were not expected to support those collective projects directly, voluntarily, or disinterestedly. Rather, the coincidental proceeds of a scheme for mutual financial advantage, organized on principles of regulated self-interest and strict material reciprocity, were to be ploughed back into civic education and cult, themselves mutually beneficial even for self-interested citizens.<sup>209</sup>

To sum up, regulatory 'Dikaiopolitan' justifications of citizen expulsion and exclusion often gave the impression that citizens should, first and foremost, respect civic rules. They should not necessarily, however, show supererogative concern for communal affairs, to the detriment of their own narrow interests, or place the kind of trust in fellow citizens which could leave themselves vulnerable to exploitation. It is now possible to turn to justifications of citizen expulsion as a means of upholding the second principal set of 'Dikaiopolitan' civic institutions, regulations, and citizen obligations: those grounded in strict reciprocity.

<sup>208</sup> Ameling, Bringmann, Schmidt-Dounas, and von Steuben (1995), no. 94, ll. 76–89; for translation, see Austin (2006), no. 242. For interpretation, see this chapter's n. 77 above.

<sup>209</sup> Compare the underlying logic of systems of tax-farming (see, for example, Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 19, 58).

Expulsion and exclusion were sometimes presented as means of enforcing, or enabling the maintenance of, strict reciprocal justice in citizens' relations with one another. For example, in the *Laws*, Plato's Athenian speaker argues that the justification for a penalty of one-year exile for unintentional homicide is that the dead man's spirit cannot tolerate his killer walking in the places with which the dead man was familiar, and so agitates the mind of the killer.<sup>210</sup> This may be a vivid metaphorical way of expressing the view that the penalty of one-year exile is a way of satisfying the individual claims to justice of the dead man, by inflicting a burden on his killer consonant with the dead man's perceived posthumous interests. More prosaically, temporary exile of this kind was probably conceived by some as a legitimate means of achieving a just balance between the interests and honour of different citizen families.<sup>211</sup> As will be argued in Chapter 4.4, citizens often put into practice this kind of 'Dikaiopolitan' approach in speeches seeking the exile or disenfranchisement of an opponent: they commonly explicitly claimed to be seeking revenge for a slight to personal or family honour.<sup>212</sup>

Parallel concern for the enforcement of strict reciprocal justice or *χάρις* in individual citizens' relations with the citizen-body as a whole is evident in some aspects of Greek law concerning citizen expulsion and exclusion. As discussed in Section 3.3, disenfranchisement could be the penalty for unlawful extension or iteration of office: it could be the penalty for citizens who claimed more than their fair share of political power, disrupting the civic contract by failing to balance 'ruling' and 'being ruled'.

Moreover, disenfranchisement was the penalty, in Athens and other cities (cf. Table 3.3), for those in debt to their polis, usually through non-payment of fines. Significantly, this type of disenfranchisement was commonly reversible on settlement of the public debts concerned.<sup>213</sup> Underlying the common stipulation in civic law codes of this penalty, and its reversibility, was the 'Dikaiopolitan' assumption that civic protections and privileges are granted and upheld in exchange for contributions to the polis, especially financial contributions. Those who have defaulted on such contributions have defaulted on their part of the civic contract; they should be excluded from citizenship until, but only until, they have settled their debts. Those expelled in accordance with the 'Nakonian' legislation considered in Section 3.3, removed from their poleis for 'injustice to the polis' or a lack of civic virtue, could not have made good their errors by making a straightforward monetary payment.

Conversely, on this view, those who make contributions to civic finances are entitled to substantial financial rewards. This entitlement could be entrenched through the threat of disenfranchisement in Hellenistic democracies. At third-

<sup>210</sup> Plato *Laws* 865d3–e9.

<sup>211</sup> Cf. Saunders (1991), 223–4.

<sup>212</sup> e.g. Lysias 14.2; cf. Demosthenes 58.1–2.

<sup>213</sup> In Athens, double the original debt had to be paid: Todd (1993), 143; cf. Demosthenes 58.1.



century Iliion, ἀτιμία was to be the penalty for magistrates or councillors who failed to ensure that due financial compensation was paid to those involved in overthrowing a non-democratic regime.<sup>214</sup> Disenfranchisement was thus used to give weight to the entitlement of even heroic ‘tyrannicides’ to insist personally through a legal intervention (ἐπικαλοῦντες) on financial compensation, probably quite carefully calibrated to match the expenses they had incurred.<sup>215</sup> Such tyrannicides might have been expected to have more self-sacrificing, ‘Nakonian’ instincts.<sup>216</sup>

Moreover, at Miletus in 211/10, disenfranchisement was made the penalty, until they paid the stated fine, for citizens who proposed, or enabled as a magistrate, a reduction in the fixed interest to be paid annually for their whole lives to citizens who responded to an appeal to give loans to the polis.<sup>217</sup> This concern to protect unconditionally the incentives and rewards offered to benefactors of the Milesians, almost as the bedrock of civic life, recalls the approach of Demosthenes’ *Against Leptines* of 355, which contested as illegal Leptines’ proposal of a law to revoke and prohibit immunities from taxation and liturgies for benefactors, citizens as well as outsiders.<sup>218</sup> For Demosthenes, preserving incentives and rewards is a matter of preserving the key ‘Dikaio-politan’ virtues of strict good faith (πίστις) and gratitude (χάρις).<sup>219</sup> This approach licenses ‘Dikaio-politan’ hard bargaining: it is much more shameful to envy other recipients of honours than to claim rewards for oneself, in return for liturgical services. Indeed, Demosthenes makes clear that benefactors need not be passive with regard to honours: it is legitimate for them actively to seek recompense (τιμὴν ἀξιοῦν or χάριν ἀπαιτεῖν).<sup>220</sup>

Demosthenes’ concern here with the strict preservation of rewards and incentives reflects a quite different conception of civic obligation and citizenship from the more idealistic one he advocates in, for example, the *On the Crown*. Whereas he there chastises Aeschines for giving weight to any private motives or interests at the expense of the common good and civic unity (see Section 3.3), he here presupposes far lesser levels of purely disinterested civic

<sup>214</sup> See *I.Iliion* 25, ll. 140–4 (also included in Table 3.3).

<sup>215</sup> See Frisch’s commentary on *I.Iliion* 25, p. 79; Teegarden (2014), 197. For the prominent role of incentives in this text, directed especially at those who remain in the city under a non-democratic regime: Maffi (2005), 143; compare Teegarden (2014), 210–11.

<sup>216</sup> On the wider use of different types of financial reward for tyrannicides, see Teegarden (2014), 73, with n. 42; 79–80.

<sup>217</sup> Migeotte *Emprunt*, no. 97, ll. 8–29.

<sup>218</sup> Demosthenes 20, e.g. 45–7, 57, 64–5, 87, 154. It is unclear whether Leptines’ proposal concerned only honorific immunities or all immunities.

<sup>219</sup> See Demosthenes 20.10, on the risk that the Athenians will be seen to be lacking these virtues.

<sup>220</sup> See Demosthenes 20.151, 158.

devotion, even on the part of citizens actively engaged in making benefactions.<sup>221</sup> To judge from Demosthenes' attempts to pre-empt objections, opponents would have argued partly in 'Nakonian' vein for the abolition of immunities, through appeal to Spartan and Theban models, Athenian traditions, and ideals of altruistic civic service. For example, Demosthenes admits that there is a possible counter-argument that earlier benefactors of the Athenians did not gain privileges of the kind in question, but were satisfied with nothing more than the inscription of their names in the agora.<sup>222</sup>

Perhaps partly in order to disarm such objections, Demosthenes sometimes includes more idealistic interpretations of the honorific process in the *Against Leptines* itself, eliding them with more 'Dikaioopolitan' arguments. At one point, he argues, in 'Nakonian' vein, that it is 'fine' in itself for an individual to be honoured by his free peers, who freely judge him worthy through democratic institutions which give equal opportunity for all to speak (*ἰσηγορία*). Immediately afterwards, he insists on the pragmatic value of honours in imbuing and maintaining loyalty to the prevailing constitution,<sup>223</sup> in a way which chimes with the broader interest of the speech in incentives and requital.

It might be objected that Demosthenes in the *Against Leptines*, and other authors of Greek rhetoric about honours, favoured, not strict 'Dikaioopolitan' reciprocity, but more diffuse ongoing chains of favour and counter-favour involving the polis, the specific benefactor concerned, and other wealthy citizens.<sup>224</sup> However, both Demosthenes and most honorary decrees perpetually invoke direct relations of *χάρις*, involving tangible requital of identifiable services, between the polis and the honorand, which can be recreated in future between the polis and any potential benefactors incentivized by grants.

The conception of citizenship evident in the preceding examples, based on principles of strict reciprocity, could also be reflected in a polis' treatment of exiles' confiscated land: a later fourth-century inscription attests the sale of exiles' land by the polis of Zeleia.<sup>225</sup> This measure reflected the assumption that possession of land within civic territory, like citizenship itself, was conditional on fulfilment of certain civic obligations. Under this assumption, land owned by exiles, citizens who had defaulted on their civic obligations, could legitimately be confiscated by the polis and sold, through a market transaction, to individuals more willing to maintain a reliable contractual bond with the polis. It may have been intended that the buyers would all be existing citizens of Zeleia. However, the contemporaneous inscription of citizenship grants to

<sup>221</sup> Compare Wilson (2000), 59.

<sup>222</sup> Demosthenes 20.112–15; cf. 105. At least one supporter of Leptines' law was advocating the abolition of his own immunities (20.148).

<sup>223</sup> Demosthenes 20.15–17.

<sup>224</sup> Compare the discussion of different types of reciprocity in my Introduction.

<sup>225</sup> *SGDI* 5533f.

outsiders could indicate that it was intended that the buyers would be, or could include, foreigners, who might become eligible for enfranchisement as citizens of Zeleia at least partly by virtue of possessing the land.<sup>226</sup> If so, it was effectively the exiles' vacated citizenship which was put on the market.

To sum up, there is good evidence among attested justifications of civic expulsion and exclusion that the basic political norms central to the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm all legitimated citizen exclusion and expulsion in some circumstances. Lawful exclusion and expulsion were almost demanded by regulatory norms and norms of strict reciprocity: even an ideal 'Dikaiopolitan' polis-association for mutual security, advantage, and justice could not survive without sometimes removing members, not least because of the qualified self-assertion by individual citizens which it itself promotes.

Many of the examples considered in this section confirm the radical, uncompromising character of the underlying 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm, and of its many local variants and applications. The cases in which outlawry or disenfranchisement was the penalty for transgressing arbitrated civic settlements, or failing to pay a civic fine, reflect an uncompromising insistence on the enforcement of established rules, regardless of possible mitigating circumstances.

Similarly, there are various signs of a particularly materialistic and particularly harsh attitude to the enforcement of principles of strict reciprocity. The common stipulation of disenfranchisement for public debt, reversible on settlement of the debt, arguably even partly assimilated citizenship to a market commodity: default on payments entailed its loss, which might be temporary. It partly prefigured literal sales of citizenship by some Hellenistic poleis, carried out in certain circumstances.<sup>227</sup> It also reflected uncompromising notions of personal desert and entitlement. Indeed, the use of strict financial criteria for continued citizenship did not permit any allowances to be made for special circumstances, very likely to arise in a relatively unregulated economic and financial system: for example, cases where public debts had been incurred at least partly through individual misfortune or disabilities, or where the debtor had made mitigating wider civic contributions or demonstrated mitigating broader public-spirited dispositions.<sup>228</sup>

<sup>226</sup> See *SGDI* 5533a–d; Lolling (1884), 58–60.

<sup>227</sup> See, for example, *I.Ephesos* 2001, ll. 9–12; compare Robert (1940), 37–42; Gauthier (1985), 201.

<sup>228</sup> Compare the argument of the speakers of *Lysias* 18 that their disenfranchisement for public debt would involve unreasonable neglect of their and their relatives' broader civic virtues and past or potential civic contributions (see especially 18.20–7).

## 4. CONCLUSION

Far from indiscriminately stigmatizing them as symptoms of tyranny, Greek citizens offered or implied a wide range of positive justifications for penalties of citizen expulsion and exclusion in the later Classical and Hellenistic periods. The nature of these justifications suggests answers to the question posed by Lewis in his review of Seibert (1979): why was exile so strongly preferred to imprisonment as a punishment in Greek poleis?<sup>229</sup> First, imprisonment represented a violation of the symbolic order in the distribution of civic benefits: within polis culture, as the irony of Socrates' proposal for his own 'punishment' in 399 make clear,<sup>230</sup> it was civic benefactors, not murderers or political criminals, who were awarded prolonged maintenance at state expense. Second, imprisonment kept the offender within the boundaries of the polis, where he could continue to corrupt others' dispositions and behaviour<sup>231</sup> or make unjust claims on civic resources. By contrast, exile represented the unmitigated removal from civic life of a deviant from civic ethical standards, or of a defaulter on the civic contract. This practical and symbolic exclusion could often have had the incidental benefit of reinforcing the polis' physical and conceptual borders.<sup>232</sup>

To Greek ways of thinking, exile was a far more severe penalty than imprisonment. In particular, citizens could conceive separation from one's home polis through exile as a crippling state, or even a form of social or political death: to lose one's polis is to lose a significant part of one's own identity and self-worth. For example, when prosecuting Leocrates for deserting Athens when Macedonian conquest appeared to loom in 338, Lycurgus quoted Tyrtaeus' pitiful description of the wretched, meaningless, deracinated life of the man who flees into exile rather than choosing to die for his polis.<sup>233</sup> This Greek approach to exile reveals with particular clarity the force of assumptions crucial to 'Nakonian' thinking: a citizen is inextricably embedded in his home polis.

This chapter has also reinforced and enriched the picture of Greek civic political cultures developed in Chapters 1 and 2: 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigms, not accompanied by significant proto-Kantian norms, exerted the predominant influence on Greek practical and theoretical approaches to civic membership and exile. In addition, certain widespread attitudes to

<sup>229</sup> Lewis (1981). For more detailed comparative discussion of ancient Greek exile, in connection with the modern decline of exile and rise of deportation of non-citizens, see Gray (2011).

<sup>230</sup> Cf. Plato *Apology* 36d1–37a1.

<sup>231</sup> Cf. Gernet (1968), 288–90; Parker (1983), ch. 9.

<sup>232</sup> Some civic practices or traditions vividly symbolized the exclusion of the exile from civic borders: consider, for example, the Athenian court on the coast at Phreatto, at which exiles charged with a new offence while in exile were expected to make a defence from a boat to judges on the land (see [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 57.3–4; Pausanias 1.28.11).

<sup>233</sup> Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 107; compare Andocides 1.5.

political institutions not prominent in Chapters 1 and 2 have emerged here: for example, high evaluation of individual voluntary initiative in making use of political institutions. Another significant point to emerge, previously mentioned in Chapter 1's conclusion and developed in Chapters 5-6, is that more specific incarnations of the main paradigms within particular institutions, ideologies, or philosophies could take both egalitarian and in- or anti-egalitarian forms: neither paradigm was intrinsically democratic or oligarchic. Moreover, both paradigms could be adopted and adapted by a wide range of regimes across the spectrum of Greek 'democracies'.

The evidence considered in this chapter has also confirmed that it was common for 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' norms to exercise parallel, competing influence within a single polis' political culture: for example, Classical Athens and Chios and Hellenistic Phthiotic Thebes and Teos. Sometimes the dialectical relationship between the paradigms and related assumptions is evident: note, for example, the Phthiotic Thebans' uncertainty about whether it would be necessary to bind Eurydamas with an oath, or whether he would be trustworthy unsworn. As in the cases considered in Chapter 2, however, citizens probably often remained unaware of, or consciously overlooked, inconsistencies or tensions between the different ways of thinking. Indeed, they often mixed them freely in their rhetoric, even the technical, systematic rhetoric of legislation. It was also common for citizens to share an aspiration to far-reaching, substantial cultural, ethical, and political consensus, the formal 'Nakonian' ideal, but to tolerate indeterminacies in specific shared cultural, ethical, and political notions and standards. As will be argued in the next chapter, such approaches to contradictions and ambiguities were crucial to the establishment and maintenance of civic stability and prosperity: civic order relied on indeterminacy, and on citizens' tolerance and imaginative exploitation of indeterminacy.



## Paradigms in Action

### ‘Nakonian’ and ‘Dikaiopolitan’ Political Interaction and Debate

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

A very important possible objection to the method and argument of the past three chapters is that their picture of Greek civic political cultures is skewed by the fact that they consider only static products of civic interaction, not dynamic civic interaction itself. Lapidary statements of legal principles concerning exile or exiles, or abstract, self-contained discussions by philosophers and orators of associated theoretical problems, may be dominated by radical norms, ‘Nakonian’ and ‘Dikaiopolitan’. This is, however, according to this objection, a predictable consequence of the tendency of these types of rhetoric to simplify political realities into systematic frameworks. In reality, the objection continues, many of the truly dynamic modes of interaction between citizens of Greek poleis reveal the influence of quite different ways of understanding the basic nature of a good polis.

First, a sceptic could claim that peaceful everyday interaction between diverse citizens, especially the deliberation characteristic of Greek political meetings, reveals the influence of significant intermediate, proto-Kantian norms. According to this view, the stability of the polis as a political form, and especially the stability of the Classical Athenian democracy, can be explained only if citizens were guided in their everyday political interactions by strong norms requiring both unconditional respect for fellow citizens as ends in themselves and wide-ranging tolerance and pluralism. According to this view, such norms inculcated in citizens an openness, indispensable for mutual understanding, to the possibility that several competing worldviews and policy proposals might simultaneously have considerable ethical and political weight. Unless such norms were strongly influential, the sceptic might claim, diverse citizens could never have achieved the level of consensus necessary to pass decrees which were seemingly unanimously approved (ἐδόξε

τῷ δήμῳ) and at least universally tolerated. Such an objection would have some affinity with Osborne's argument that finished, inscribed Classical Athenian decrees and laws 'depoliticize', giving a misleading impression of perfect unity within the polis. In his view, the Athenians sought to downplay, in their presentations of their decisions to the gods and to posterity, the complex processes of explicit disagreement, debate, and negotiation which, he suggests, must usually have preceded final decisions.<sup>1</sup> Second, a sceptic could argue that more conflictual relations between citizens, especially those which culminated in legal disputes, attest the strong influence of the other main set of individualistic norms, canvassed in the Introduction, whose influence has been downplayed in the last three chapters: norms legitimating vigorous, almost anarchic self-assertion, competition or even feuding.

This chapter attempts to respond to this challenge, by showing that 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' ways of understanding politics strongly shaped even dynamic interactions between citizens. Sections 2 and 3 address peaceful, cooperative interaction. Section 2 addresses socio-economic interaction between citizens, including much interaction which took place outside political and legal institutions. It argues that the frequent coexistence of clashing 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' norms within individual political cultures did not inevitably inhibit sustained, profitable socio-economic interaction between citizens, but commonly actively enabled and encouraged it. Indeed, the socio-economic life of many poleis arguably often relied on the two sets of norms holding each other in balance.

Section 3 addresses the most difficult part of the objection raised above, that concerning communication between diverse citizens in formal deliberative contexts. It argues that, even when they reached out to fellow citizens through peaceable contributions to civic deliberations, free of dogmatism and 'grudgingness', citizens usually drew on 'Nakonian' or 'Dikaiopolitan' conceptions of politics, or a combination of the two, in formulating their arguments and appeals. Soaring appeals to 'Nakonian' ideals of unity and brotherhood, in particular, could rouse diverse citizens to collective action, especially when combined with 'Dikaiopolitan' sensitivity to self-interest and incentives. Section 3 argues that a frequent key to successful persuasion was intelligent, benevolent maintenance of studied indeterminacy. This could be achieved through subtly unspecific application of 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' ideals, and sometimes also through blending of the two. The motivating, even inspirational qualities of the interlocking architecture of the two paradigms could be harnessed effectively by speakers who also made use of rhetorical or even theatrical skill, blending sensitivity, imagination, ambivalence, and irony.

<sup>1</sup> Osborne (1999), e.g. 343. For quite pluralistic pictures of Athenian political debate, see, for example, Ober (2003a) or (2008).



It is important to make clear that this denial of a proto-Kantian middle in Greek norms of deliberation is not intended to dispute the view that debate and disagreement, often in vigorous forms, were stock features of Greek assemblies and other deliberative institutions, and widely regarded as acceptable or even desirable. The central point is, rather, that even peaceful debate in Greek political institutions usually far from resembled anything like the more explicitly pluralistic and aporetic parts of Platonic dialogue. There is little sign of Greek political deliberation in which the participants explicitly questioned the very possibility of a coherent consensual solution to the political problem addressed, showing a strong consciousness of a need to take simultaneous account of competing, equally valid voices and values.

These two sections' argument necessarily departs quite far from the central theme of *stasis* and exile. This is necessary in order to respond fully to the objection sketched above, and to justify this book's claim to analyse the workings of Greek civic political cultures in times of stability as well as *stasis*. Nevertheless, the discussion is kept quite brief and schematic, and the number of examples quite limited.

Section 4 responds to the other half of the objection, arguing that, even in times of conflict between citizens, 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' claims were never far from the surface. In this case, it is possible to select a case-study directly relevant to the main concerns of this book: the disputes attested in Athenian legal speeches from cases in which one of the parties was facing possible formal or de facto exile. In analysing this evidence, Section 4 argues that citizens frequently appealed to 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' considerations or grievances, opportunistically or sincerely, in the course of such disputes. In particular, in the speeches themselves, orators frequently drew on 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' tropes in attacking opponents, rather than simply openly rejoicing in ferocious competition for its own sake. This section represents a type of introduction to the discussion of full *stasis* in Chapter 5, because it analyses lower-level conflicts between citizens which themselves often partly resemble *stasis*.

## 2. THE COEXISTENCE OF 'NAKONIAN' AND 'DIKAIOPOLITAN' NORMS AS A KEY TO CIVIC FLOURISHING: CLASSICAL ATHENS AND HELLENISTIC ASIA MINOR

'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' norms could interact with each other to ensure and promote civic cohesion and prosperity in a polis, provided that citizens engaged in the necessary doublethink. Aristotle captures well the reasons for

this, and the mental operations involved, in his philosophy of property.<sup>2</sup> Aristotle rejects Plato's Socrates' advocacy of communism, on the grounds that the abolition of private property will lead to poverty and division rather than prosperous unity. In place of communism, Aristotle suggests a compromise. In 'Dikaiopolitan' vein, he proposes that citizens should be permitted to possess private property, for no one takes proper care of communal property. However, he then insists, in 'Nakonian' vein, that citizens should *treat* their property as common to all citizens: solidarity and generosity should sublimate self-interest.<sup>3</sup> Aristotle here captures a line of thought which Peter Brown identifies as prominent throughout antiquity, finally exerting a strong influence on Christian ideas about wealth and property: wealth was always, 'as it were, on parole'.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, it was not only in the economic sphere that the two paradigms could be expected to compensate for each other's deficiencies, respectively discouraging mindless conformity, apathy, or clique-formation and blunting aggressive self-assertion. Indeed, as Schofield has shown, the discussion in Book III of Plato's *Laws*, which contains more realist suggestions than most other parts of the work, dwells on the importance for political stability and cohesion of ensuring that principles of freedom and wisdom balance each other within the constitution, something achieved in different ways in Athens, Persia, and Sparta. Citizens should have wide-ranging freedoms, but they should be constrained in exercising them by 'wise' institutions, rules and leaders, encouraging self-restraint and concern for the greater good.<sup>5</sup>

This section argues quite briefly for the historical validity of these philosophical attempts at sociological analyses of the benefits of Greek citizens simultaneously embracing contrasting 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' norms. It uses two case-studies: the Classical Athenian democracy and the poleis of mid- and later Hellenistic western Asia Minor. Concerning the former, many scholars have argued strongly, in a tradition to which Ober (1989) is central, that norms close to this book's 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' ones interacted very fruitfully in Athens. The Athenian 'mass' tolerated wealthy Athenians preserving, increasing, and displaying their wealth, like ambitious 'Dikaiopolitans', provided that they devoted a substantial proportion of resulting resources to public ends through liturgies and other more genuinely voluntary services, like committed 'Nakonians'.<sup>6</sup> The civic community interfered only

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1263a21–39; cf. Irwin (1991); Kraut (2002), 327–39. Compare Aeneas Tacticus 14.1, with Hornblower (2011), 191.

<sup>3</sup> Admittedly, as Kraut (2002), 337, points out, Aristotle thought that citizens take greater care of private property than of public property, not only because they take pleasure in owning property and in the resulting material benefits, but also because of a more 'Nakonian' disposition: pleasure in making voluntary, individual contributions to the common good.

<sup>4</sup> Brown (2012), 53.

<sup>5</sup> Schofield (2010), 19–21.

<sup>6</sup> See Ober (1989). Ober appears to have adapted this approach in later works (e.g. Ober (1996); (2005); (2008)), in which he tends to suggest that the Athenians harmoniously reconciled

quite minimally with private estates through direct taxation, respecting the boundaries of a private sphere, but expected those with the required means to make many quasi-voluntary or voluntary contributions.<sup>7</sup> This basic argument needs to be made more complex in light of the fact, emphasized by Wilson, that liturgies, especially highly visible festival liturgies, which brought great personal prestige to liturgists, themselves had a double aspect: in the democratic liturgical system, 'service to the collective good and self-assertion are in a constant tension'.<sup>8</sup>

This overarching normative situation had the effect that 'Dikaiopolitan' norms permitted the efficient exploitation of Athenian natural and human resources. Those norms also provided obvious incentives for individual initiative, civic engagement, and unorthodox thought.<sup>9</sup> This was all achieved at the price of inequality and some dispassionate or even exploitative treatment of citizens by citizens. On the other hand, 'Nakonian' norms ensured the partial redistribution of resulting wealth and the easing of associated social tensions.

Thucydides' Pericles finds a succinct way to make this social system appear unexceptionable: in the democracy, it is possible simultaneously to show the same kind of concern (*ἐπιμέλεια*) for one's household affairs and for civic affairs.<sup>10</sup> Fourth-century Athenian orators could also expect benefactors to blur the distinction between public and private property. Isocrates praises earlier Athenian leaders for having treated public property as neither entirely their own nor entirely the property of others: they took care of public resources as if they were household resources (*ὡς οἰκείων*), but did not profit from them as if from private property (*ὡς ἰδίων*).<sup>11</sup> Conversely, Demosthenes praises a benefactor for having treated his formally private property in the complex, ambivalent way advocated by Aristotle: he praises the foreign benefactor Epikerdes of Cyrene for possessing his property 'in common with the people' (*κοινὰ τὰ ὄντα πῶ δήμῳ κεκτημένον*) at times of public need.<sup>12</sup>

In order for the two sets of norms to counterbalance each other fruitfully, citizens had to engage in studied doublethink, or negotiation of the rival 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' civic expectations. For example, Thucydides

conflicting values in coherent composites. For democratic 'Nakonian' norms blunting the divisive effects of harsh (especially economic) 'Dikaiopolitan' norms, compare Moreno (2007); Lape (2010), 43–4, 202–3; cf. Ludwig (2002), 332; Shanske (2007), 45–6. For a denial that the 'Nakonian' generosity of wealthy Athenian citizens served to secure social equilibrium: Veyne (1976), 200; cf. 218–19; compare Wilson (2000), 113.

<sup>7</sup> See Hansen (1999), 110–15, on liturgies and *εἰσφορά*.

<sup>8</sup> See Wilson (2000), 120; compare 25–6, 59, 92, 109.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Whitehead (1983); Ober (2008), e.g. 105–6.

<sup>10</sup> Thucydides 2.40.2. <sup>11</sup> Isocrates 4.76, with Brock (2013), 27.

<sup>12</sup> Demosthenes 20.44; for the overlap with Aristotle, compare Kremmydas (2012), 272–3.

makes his Nicias acknowledge the two contrasting models' simultaneous potency in his contribution to the Sicilian debate. Thucydides' Nicias claims that he himself is not particularly worried about sacrificing his own safety for the polis, like a committed 'Nakonian'. However, he then insists that it is also possible to be a 'good citizen' while taking care to protect one's own safety and property, in more 'Dikaiopolitan' vein. Such people may even be the most concerned for common welfare, because, like good 'Dikaiopolitans', they are committed to the prosperity of the polis, at least as the vehicle for the success of their own interests.<sup>13</sup>

The types of hard bargaining and self-seeking, coincidentally materially beneficial for many other citizens, which 'Dikaiopolitan' norms authorized leading Athenians to pursue were sometimes quite extreme. Even bribes could be presented in a democratic speech as potentially a legitimate reward for diplomatic services to the polis.<sup>14</sup> Athenian democrats probably sometimes recognized the benefits for themselves. Aristophanes in the *Knights* not only makes the Sausage-Seller allege large-scale embezzlement by the figure of Paphlagon (or Cleon), but also makes the personified Demos rejoice in its ability to build up a thieving political leader, then strike him down. At this, the respectable chorus of knights ironically attribute to the personified Demos self-conscious prudence in allowing politicians to enrich themselves, before 'sacrificing' them.<sup>15</sup> Crucially, while tolerance or encouragement of self-enrichment by politicians provided incentives and a sense of just reward for the politically active, leading citizens must have often been held back from pursuing resulting opportunities in the most provocative possible ways by 'Nakonian' norms making receipt of bribes or embezzlement derelictions of civic duty.<sup>16</sup>

A similar pattern is evident in Athenian approaches to foreign policy. In an early fourth-century case, one of Lysias' speakers asks the jury, in attempting to justify the conduct of the adventurer Aristophanes, who had been involved in reviving Athenian imperial ambitions in the 390s, what 'honour-loving' (*φιλότιμος*) man would not take all his resources with him on a trip to a foreign king, in the hope of obtaining a handsome return.<sup>17</sup> The language of *φιλοτιμία*, which elsewhere had more 'Nakonian' overtones of devoted public service, was thus here co-opted to make palatable the determined pursuit of personal profit and reward.<sup>18</sup> A comparison might be made with rhetoric about 'aspiration' in modern liberal democracies. A further complicating

<sup>13</sup> Thucydides 6.9.2. <sup>14</sup> Hyperides 5.24–5, with Brun (2000), 169.

<sup>15</sup> Aristophanes *Knights*, ll. 823–7, 1121–40; compare Yunis (1996), 57.

<sup>16</sup> For these alternative norms, see, for example, Demosthenes 19, e.g. 68–9.

<sup>17</sup> Lysias 19.23.

<sup>18</sup> For another use of *φιλοτιμία* to express a clearly self-interested 'desire for honour', compare Demosthenes 20.41. On the variable meaning of *φιλοτιμία* in general, see Whitehead (1983); Wilson (2000), 189–92; Ferrucci (2013).

factor is that even personal extravagance overseas could be represented as a bolster to the prestige of the home city.<sup>19</sup> In general, individual and collective interests were often closely entwined in Athenian foreign missions<sup>20</sup> and imperialism.<sup>21</sup>

Significantly, Ober's basic approach can also be inverted: it was not only members of the Athenian elite, but also members of the 'mass', who were encouraged by 'Dikaiopolitan' norms energetically to seek their own material interests and perceived deserts, but restrained by 'Nakonian' norms from the most provocative forms of self-assertion. Individual non-elite Athenians were sometimes at least tacitly encouraged to seek to defend their personal and sectional interests through civic institutions, especially the law-courts. Indeed, the Athenian legal system was constructed to provide an avenue, principally through non-public suits (*δίκαι*), for all citizens to seek redress for personal or familial wrongs.<sup>22</sup> Democratic political culture may even, to some degree, have encouraged some individuals to use the legal system particularly aggressively for personal and sectional advantage, through sycophancy.<sup>23</sup>

In the case of the *δημος* as a collective group, orators' emphasis on the sovereign power of the people to decide matters of law and policy must often have been intended and interpreted as a call for the poorer sections of the population to make political and legal decisions in their own interests. Plato's Socrates' representation of the people in assembly in the *Gorgias* as irredeemably self-interested, and determined to strike very hard bargains with their political leaders,<sup>24</sup> is undoubtedly exaggerated. It is, however, unlikely that sceptics about democracy would have needed to criticize the people in this way unless the people in assembly were indeed skilled at lobbying for their sectional interests, with a sense of legitimacy.<sup>25</sup>

At the same time, 'Nakonian' norms requiring virtue, self-sacrifice, and respect for the long-term or even timeless, pristine harmony of Athens and its traditional laws, customs, and religion must have often deterred poorer Athenians from pursuing their narrow, immediate self-interest in the most opportunistic and provocative ways. The stigmatization of sycophancy<sup>26</sup> and

<sup>19</sup> See especially Thucydides 6.16.2–3; Wilson (2000), 152–5, with other bibliography.

<sup>20</sup> Compare Herodotus 6.132.

<sup>21</sup> See, for example, Moreno (2007), esp. ch. 3.

<sup>22</sup> Note Aeschines' claim at 1.5 that democratic laws protect *σώματα*, as well as the constitution. Compare the discussion of Demosthenes 21 in Chapter 3.3.4.

<sup>23</sup> For this possible aspect of the sycophant phenomenon, see Osborne (1990a).

<sup>24</sup> See Plato *Gorgias* 515b6–521b1.

<sup>25</sup> Note, for example, that, in Demosthenes 20.125, Demosthenes appears to suggest that even a decision of the people to grant otherwise impious exemptions from religious duties would be tolerable. Mirko Canevaro suggested this point to me. On democratic regulation of religion in general, compare Ostwald (1986), ch. 3.

<sup>26</sup> On hostile representations of the sycophant in Athenian culture, see, for example, Osborne (1990a), with Harvey (1990).

demagoguery in some mainstream democratic discourse, especially comedy,<sup>27</sup> probably served partly to curtail narrow partisanship on the part of poorer Athenians and their leaders in the course of legal and political decision-making, in a way crucial for the balance of Athenian political life. Similarly, when exercising wide-ranging popular sovereignty in voting on changes to the laws, members of the fourth-century *δημος* selected to serve on boards of *nomothetai* must have been constrained in their decision-making by the powerful, widespread assumption that Athenian laws represented a long-established, quite unchanging code, ultimately derived from the moderate wisdom of Solon.<sup>28</sup>

At a deeper level, tribal and civic festivals helped to keep the self-protection, self-assertion, and hard bargaining of poorer Athenians within peaceful bounds. Those festivals gave legitimacy to differences of status and wealth through their dynamics and symbolism,<sup>29</sup> but also placed poorer Athenians in relations of conviviality and friendly competition with wealthier citizens.<sup>30</sup> Such festivals, mingling citizens together in different combinations on a regular basis,<sup>31</sup> would also have helped to offset distrust between citizens prompted by rigorous procedures of scrutiny.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, the very exclusivity of the citizen-body and its rituals, closed to foreigners and women, probably helped to ease and reinforce relations between those within the citizen group, despite their socio-economic differences.<sup>33</sup>

It was partly the very indeterminacy of 'Nakonian' ideals which enabled the kinds of open-ended negotiation of contradictions discussed so far in this section: the processes associated in Chapter 2 with the Athenian amnesty of 403 and its aftermath had wider relevance for Athenian democratic civic life. It was also that indeterminacy which allowed 'Nakonian' ideals to perform their crucial constraining functions. It normally made it possible for a wide range of both elite and non-elite Athenians, with quite different perspectives,<sup>34</sup> to endorse and respect those ideals' constraints, treating one another as members of an ethnically pure Athenian community of virtuous citizens, committed to their city and its gods.

Significantly, that indeterminacy allowed Athenian incarnations of 'Nakonian' ideals to be temporarily subtly inflected, when necessary, in such

<sup>27</sup> See, for example, Yunis (1996), 50–8; compare also his ch. 4 (on Thucydides).

<sup>28</sup> Canevaro (forthcoming) argues that the fourth-century Athenians developed institutions and norms concerning legislation which enabled and legitimated radical popular sovereignty, while also setting it in balance with, or even systematically reconciling it with, respect for constraints of tradition, ethics, religion, and existing law. For the continuing constraining force of ideals of legal continuity in the fourth century, compare also Harris (2013b), 98–9.

<sup>29</sup> Compare Wilson (2000), 25–6.

<sup>30</sup> Compare Parker (2005), e.g. 261–3 (on the Panathenaea).

<sup>31</sup> Osborne (2010), 13–14.

<sup>32</sup> Compare Chapter 1.3.

<sup>33</sup> See Osborne (2010), esp. ch. 2.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Connor (1994), 38–40.

a way as to serve as checks on popular, as well as elite, self-assertion. The probably fourth-century author of [Andocides] 4, for example, makes his supposedly fifth-century speaker claim that the bad leader is the one who thinks about the present but not the future, and advises what is most pleasant for the people, rather than what is best.<sup>35</sup> In the mid-fourth-century, arguments that greater responsibility for financial and policy decisions should be assigned to the Areopagos and to expert, elected, long-serving magistrates, presiding over revenues protected from impulsive popular votes for military expenditure,<sup>36</sup> probably often relied on inflections of 'Nakonian' ideals of far-sighted, disinterested decision-making. At one point in the *Against Leocrates*, for example, Lycurgus praises the Areopagos for having been the 'salvation' of the city in 338, with an evident expectation of opposition from the audience.<sup>37</sup> The implication is that the Areopagos took decisive, wise action in a crisis, in a way the council and assembly could not.

The most crucial indeterminacy in this respect was, however, that in the word *δημος* itself. On the one hand, the *δημος* was the entire civic community,<sup>38</sup> an indivisible whole of mutually supportive citizens. On the other hand, the *δημος* was the community of the non-wealthy: a factional group which needed to promote and protect its distinct interests by legal and political means.<sup>39</sup>

Classical Athenian political culture certainly encouraged less wealthy Athenians to consider themselves, from one valid perspective, a distinct part of the polis. For example, Euripides' Theseus emphasizes how written law protects the weak as well as the strong.<sup>40</sup> He thus presupposes that weaker citizens have special interests and needs, which require protection from encroachments by fellow citizens. This attitude could be reflected in actual political rhetoric. Demosthenes suggests in the *Against Meidias* that the laws protect 'our common possession' of security (*ἄδεια*), which the wealthy must tolerate, since nobody questions their advantages.<sup>41</sup> Even the language of the 'common' thus here takes on a clearly partisan form. An orator could also sketch a division of this kind between parts of the *δημος* with even more clearly political contours: at one point in his speech *Against Eratosthenes*, which denounces Eratosthenes' involvement in the Thirty, Lysias urges the

<sup>35</sup> [Andocides] 4.12.

<sup>36</sup> For the probable role of such arguments in mid-fourth-century Athenian politics, and their probable practical effects, see especially Cawkwell (1963); compare Humphreys (1985). For resistance in the mid-fourth century to reliance on political leadership by an elite, see (for example) Demosthenes 2.30–1.

<sup>37</sup> Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 52.

<sup>38</sup> Compare the Syracusan Athenagoras at Thucydides 6.39.1.

<sup>39</sup> Compare Yunis (1996), 26–7, discussing Finley (1983), 97–121. On the two Athenian notions of the *δημος*, and the uneasy relationship between them in Classical Athens, see Loraux (2001), 70.

<sup>40</sup> Euripides *Suppliant Women*, ll. 429–39.

<sup>41</sup> Demosthenes 21.210.

Athenians to be wary of those (implicitly, elite anti-democrats) who might exploit their position as citizens to instigate clemency for Eratosthenes, hoping to enjoy similar clemency themselves.<sup>42</sup>

Maintaining ambiguity between the two notions of the *δημος* would have been crucial to the civic balancing act examined above. Less wealthy citizens were emboldened by the latter meaning to pursue their sectional interests vigorously, but constrained by the former meaning to keep the collective, long-term interests of the whole polis firmly in mind when asserting the sovereignty of the *δημος*.

The fruitful mutual counterbalancing of 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' norms within the political culture of the Classical Athenian democracy also exerted its influence on other types of dynamic interaction between citizens, further removed from strictly political and economic relations. For example, scholars have noticed the coexistence of similar polarized expectations in Athenian discourse about homosexual love,<sup>43</sup> and in the institutional structures of the Athenian theatre and the plays produced within it.<sup>44</sup> Theatre even offered a safe space to explore actual or potential tensions between norms, without attempting any resolution of contradictions or systematic moralizing.<sup>45</sup> This involved the temporary suspension of the assumption that all cherished assumptions were compatible, which had to be maintained in more formal political contexts.

It is now possible to turn to this section's second case-study, the political cultures of the poleis of western Asia Minor in the mid- and later Hellenistic period. These cities were often themselves democracies of their own kinds,<sup>46</sup> with at least a participatory assembly. Nevertheless, partly because of the indeterminacies in the meaning of 'democracy' and *δημος*, they were able to offer wider scope even than the Classical Athenian democracy for elite self-assertion, which they could then hope to sublimate for the common good. Indeed, some evidence for their political cultures reveals particularly starkly profitable interactions, similar to those at Athens, between 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' norms. One second-century honorary decree of Priene even echoes Aristotle's philosophy of property, discussed at the start of this section. In a striking section concerning Moschion's contributions of money to Priene in a financial crisis, he is praised for treating his private property, or, at least, the donated part, as 'common to all the citizens' (*διδάλαβ[ὸν κ]οινὴν εἶναι τῇ[ν]*

<sup>42</sup> Lysias 12.84–6; Andrew Wolpert suggested this point to me.

<sup>43</sup> Davidson (2001), 47. See especially Aeschines 1.137; Plato *Phaedrus* 230e6–257b6, with Yunis (1996), 192–3.

<sup>44</sup> See Wilson (2000), e.g. 4, 107–8, 111; Goldhill (2000), both with earlier bibliography.

<sup>45</sup> Compare the argument of Williams (1993) that Classical Greek poetry and tragedy show particular sensitivity to ethical complexity and the difficulties of systematic ethical theorizing.

<sup>46</sup> On the varieties of Hellenistic democracy, especially in the western Aegean and Asia Minor, see Hamon (2009), esp. 370–9.



οὐσίαν πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν).<sup>47</sup> The implication is that, though he possessed great private wealth, Moschion treated at least a significant part of his private property as common to all citizens in a crisis, or ‘common in use’.

This piece of Prienian honorific rhetoric captures well something of the essence of the whole phenomenon of Hellenistic euergetism. As scholars have noted,<sup>48</sup> that phenomenon relied on productive interaction between something like what I call ‘Nakonian’ and ‘Dikaiopolitan’ norms. Elite citizens, such as Moschion, were enabled or encouraged by ‘Dikaiopolitan’ norms to amass and reinforce large estates. This represented a straightforward and efficient way to ensure that a large amount of capital would be accumulated within the polis, albeit in the hands of a select few. It also provided straightforward incentives for elite citizens to engage in civic life. On the other hand, at the same time, elite citizens were constrained by expectations of supererogative civic virtue and benevolence to dedicate large amounts of their resulting wealth to communal ends.<sup>49</sup> The good benefactor was thus required simultaneously to exercise *φιλοτιμία* in its two contrasting senses of self-interested love of honour and civic pride.

Another citizen of Priene, Athenopolis, is shown by Prienian epigraphy to have perfected the required variety of doublethink. When Athenopolis made a large payment for a priesthood in return for immunity from all liturgies, he grudgingly paid only 12,002 drachmas, two drachmas above the minimum required for full exemption.<sup>50</sup> In this context, therefore, he acted as a hard-bargaining ‘Dikaiopolitan’ citizen, exploiting civic rules to extract the maximum possible return on his contributions. However, the other evidence for Athenopolis’ civic career shows that in other contexts he was obliged to act, and allowed himself to be represented, as a public-spirited, self-sacrificing, supererogative ‘Nakonian’ benefactor: a virtuous man who, like a good Aristotelian, regarded as his most defining possession, not his wealth, but his energetic engagement (*ἐκτένεια*) on behalf of his fellow citizens.<sup>51</sup>

The evidence for relations of credit and debt in the Hellenistic poleis of western Asia Minor suggests a similar pattern. Harshly ‘Dikaiopolitan’ norms gave the wealthy licence to attempt to maximize their income from credit, thereby increasing their resources for future euergetism. At the same time, strongly ‘Nakonian’ norms constrained them from using that licence in the most provocative possible ways. This whole pattern is reflected in the

<sup>47</sup> *I.Priene* 108, ll. 89–97 (quotation from ll. 91–2).

<sup>48</sup> For this phenomenon, see especially Gauthier (1985); more recently, see, for example, Zuiderhoek (2009) or Ma (2013).

<sup>49</sup> Note, however, the objections of Veyne (1976), 218–19, 238, who argues that the generosity and self-denial of wealthy Hellenistic citizens served principally to mark social distance, not to redistribute resources or to defuse tensions.

<sup>50</sup> *I.Priene* 174, ll. 35–8, with ll. 27–30. Charles Crowther drew this example to my attention.

<sup>51</sup> *I.Priene* 107, ll. 19–21.

numerous attestations from Hellenistic Asia Minor of the remission or mitigation of the debts of impoverished citizens, by a polis as a whole<sup>52</sup> or by individual wealthy citizens.<sup>53</sup>

Even if some such remissions were made necessary by the sudden impoverishment of debtors through ravaging in war, the crippling debts and obligations involved had nonetheless been allowed to build up in the first place, in peacetime and in accordance with civic regulations and expectations.<sup>54</sup> The attestations of such remissions thus suggest that capital-owning citizens had considerable freedom to grant loans to poorer citizens, as well as foreigners, with an eye to substantial profit, regardless of the potential consequences for the long-term welfare of the recipients or for civic harmony.<sup>55</sup> Walser identifies several relevant specific factors: a lack of clear, enforceable legal constraints on the form of credit contracts transacted through bargaining between the parties involved; a tendency to leave the determination of interest rates on loans to market forces; and a written or unwritten rule that securities in land could or should far exceed in market value the value of the loan secured.<sup>56</sup> In addition, the fact that the remissions and measures of mitigation were ad hoc and voluntary indicates that civic laws and regulations did not automatically protect those who became severely indebted, or bar their creditors from seeking to protect their income. Moreover, the fact that poleis were content to advertise such remissions and measures of mitigation in public epigraphy itself represented implicit authorization for wealthy citizens to engage in profit-oriented lending.

On the other hand, the evidence for the remissions confirms that 'Nakonian' ideals obliged creditors to give priority to civic harmony and solidarity in some contexts, forsaking their strict entitlements.<sup>57</sup> This is

<sup>52</sup> *I.Ephesos* 4; cf. now Walser (2008), text, pp. 26–36. At the beginning of a so-called 'federal war', the Ephesians had established a moratorium on debt repayments. After the war, when the moratorium expired, there was an acute debt crisis, partly due to deflation in land prices. Creditors began to seize debtors' land: by law and convention, creditors could normally lay claim, when debtors defaulted, to all land earlier provided as security, even though its value usually far exceeded the initial debt. The law recorded in *I.Ephesos* 4, probably dating to c.299 (Walser (2008), 104), attempted to mitigate the effects of this norm in this case: it established procedures for determining a reasonable division between creditors and debtors of land potentially liable to seizure, designed to prevent debtors becoming destitute (Walser (2008), 2–3, 37; ch. 7).

<sup>53</sup> e.g. *SEG* 39.1243, col. III, ll. 35–47, with Robert and Robert (1989), 43–4; *I.Mylasa* 109, ll. 7–10.

<sup>54</sup> In the case of early Hellenistic Ephesus, for example, a debt moratorium (cf. this chapter's n. 52) was called at the *start* of the war mentioned in the later debt law. For the interaction in this case of the effects of war with the underlying economic situation, see Walser (2008), 280–6, 317 (on the effects of 'die harschen Bedingungen des Schuldrechts' in Ephesus).

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Davies (1984), 293–4; Dössel (2003), 265–6.

<sup>56</sup> Walser (2008), 109–11; 184–6; 123–32; cf. Crowther (1995), 121–2.

<sup>57</sup> For a fourth-century Peloponnesian parallel, see Aeneas Tacticus 14.1, with Hornblower (2011), 191.

confirmed by the rhetoric of honorary decrees for foreign judges summoned to resolve debt disputes. It was quite common for such decrees to praise foreign judges for solving some cases by arbitration and some by just judgement in accordance with law.<sup>58</sup> This suggests that it was part of the role of foreign judges, and the citizens with whom they interacted, to balance out strict justice with concern for harmony.<sup>59</sup> In some cases, relevant decrees implied a clear preference for the latter. A formula used in some such decrees passed by the polis of Iasos, which resembles the rhetoric of some other poleis,<sup>60</sup> praises foreign judges for, on the one hand, putting all their enthusiasm into reconciling some opposed litigants through arbitration, so that they could be citizens in *δμόνοια*, and, on the other hand, ‘judging other disputes justly’.<sup>61</sup> The order of the two alternatives, and the elaborate and idealistic description of the former contrasted with the pithy description of the latter, implies that arbitration, involving compromise and compassion, was the preferred solution. The implication is that strict judgement according to the laws was a last, potentially destabilizing<sup>62</sup> recourse in intractable cases, which itself confirms the harsh, ‘Dikaiopolitan’ orientation of relevant debt laws themselves. It was deemed preferable in such cases for all citizens to rally around a vague, depoliticized ideal of *δμόνοια*, which concealed disagreements and tensions.<sup>63</sup>

The self-regulating, quite stable dialectic between ‘Dikaiopolitan’ and ‘Nakonian’ norms within the political cultures of post-Classical poleis of Asia Minor such as Iasos went beyond the sphere of citizens’ private finances, to shape questions of political participation and opportunity. For example, the post-Classical Iasians sold priesthoods,<sup>64</sup> necessarily to those able to pay, but also, in a strikingly democratic move, provided pay for those attending the assembly.<sup>65</sup> This latter measure was presumably designed to enable participation in the assembly by all citizens, irrespective of wealth or previous civic contributions. For this system to function smoothly, providing incentives to different groups and balancing their interests, Iasian citizens had to preserve a

<sup>58</sup> Crowther (1995), 92; Roebuck (2001), 24–5, 282; Dössel (2003), 256, 262–3; Johnstone (2011), 90–2.

<sup>59</sup> Perhaps compare the mixed manner of reconciliation attested in the second Mytilenian decree considered in Chapter 2.2.1. In a case from Thessaly, a foreign judge was even praised for showing *φιλανθρωπία* in his approach to debt contracts, as well as being punctilious about details and justice: *IG IX 2 1230* (Phalanna, second century), esp. ll. 1–13.

<sup>60</sup> Compare the decree of Kalymna (*I.Iasos* 82) discussed in Chapter 1.4.2.

<sup>61</sup> e.g. *I.Priene* 531, ll. 8–11; compare the restored *I.Priene* 54, ll. 8–10. Compare the restored *I.Iasos* 75, ll. 7–11; 78, ll. 8–10.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *I.Iasos* 82, ll. 39–42, a decree of Kalymna inscribed at Iasos, discussed in Chapter 1.4.2.

<sup>63</sup> Compare Dössel (2003), 270.

<sup>64</sup> *I.Iasos* 245, ll. 12–16 (compare the restored *I.Iasos* 246, ll. 28–33); Debord (1982), 63–4; Dignas (2002), 252.

<sup>65</sup> *I.Iasos* 20; Fabiani (2012), 115.

studied ambivalence about strict reciprocity, and whether it should be punctiliously enforced or triumphantly transcended.<sup>66</sup>

This section has argued that the dialectic between 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' norms studied in earlier chapters had a pronounced, often beneficial effect on actual citizen interaction. The importance of the mutually counterbalancing interaction between the norms was probably even embedded in the geography of a typical Greek polis. The physical centre of a polis, the civic agora, usually served simultaneously as a marketplace, a site of material exchange for mutual egoistic advantage, and a supposed centre of free, egalitarian social and political interaction between citizens, unconstrained by narrowly egoistic considerations. Interestingly, Aristotle, elsewhere in favour of relevant types of citizen doublethink, criticized the ethical ambiguity of the typical agora. He advocated imitation of the Thessalian practice of physically separating the commercial agora from a 'free agora', one which must be 'pure' of buying and selling (*αὐτῇ δ' ἐστὶν ἥν δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὀνίων πάντων*).<sup>67</sup>

### 3. GREEK MODES OF CONSTRUCTIVE POLITICAL RHETORIC AND COMMUNICATION: CONSENSUS WITHOUT PROTO-KANTIANISM

As far as oratory is concerned, 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' assumptions and ideals were not appropriate only to the lapidary rhetoric of laws or philosophical treatises. They could also be woven into persuasive speeches, central to dynamic civic interaction, by skilled, imaginative, and flexible orators. Thucydides captures this well in his portrayal of Pericles' Funeral Speech.

Thucydides' Pericles gives great prominence to a 'Nakonian' ideal of the Athenian polis as a timeless,<sup>68</sup> homogeneous community of individually anonymous 'good men' (*ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί*), sharing love (*ἔρως*) for the power of their city,<sup>69</sup> whose virtue consists in their subordination of their individuality to communal military needs.<sup>70</sup> He also places a 'Nakonian' stress on collective civic cultural life and on the educational power of Athenian politics

<sup>66</sup> Fabiani (2012), e.g. 153, sees a progression in Hellenistic Iasos from a quite democratic political culture to a more elite-dominated one (from the mid-third century onwards). Even though this may well have been the general trend, more democratic and more oligarchic features probably coexisted, in different strengths, both before and after the transition.

<sup>67</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1331a30–b4; compare Schofield (1999a), 97–8.

<sup>68</sup> Thucydides 2.36.1.

<sup>69</sup> Thucydides 2.43.1. Cf. Ludwig (2002), Parts II–III; contrast Monoson (2000), ch. 3.

<sup>70</sup> Loraux (1981), esp. 281–4.

and culture.<sup>71</sup> He reaches out to a wide audience, not through explicit, pluralist recognition of the simultaneous validity of contrasting approaches, but by keeping his stirring 'Nakonian' ideal quite abstract and amorphous: he does not make explicit the precise characteristics of *ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί*, or make particular, contestable choices of episodes of Athenian history for celebration or emulation. Admittedly, he may strike a quite proto-Kantian note by arguing that the Athenians give particular weight to those laws which benefit the victims of injustice.<sup>72</sup> However, even if that comment reflects concern for the welfare of some vulnerable individuals, the promise of aid is not unconditional: injustice is the criterion. Moreover, that comment does not suggest pluralism about value: for example, recognition of contrasting legitimate notions of injustice itself.

Thucydides' Pericles' strategy of imaginative indeterminacy yields an inspiring vision around which many varied citizens could rally, while retaining their own distinctive, contentious conceptions of civic virtue and history. It also allows Pericles himself to include within his speech contrasting approaches to the nature of Athenian democracy. He emphasizes, for example, both its militaristic virtues and its gentler, cultural ones. Thucydides' Pericles also keeps democratic ideals sufficiently capacious to allow him to make varied more specific 'Dikaiopolitan' claims and concessions. Indeed, some of the speech's varied claims are tailored to the 'Dikaiopolitan' perceptions of entitlement of different sections of the population. As a result, the speech reveals how a skilful orator could himself trigger in different parts of the population the competing, simultaneous impulses to self-assertion and self-denial whose importance was discussed in Section 2.

In one 'Dikaiopolitan' move, Pericles at one point emphasizes the importance of personal freedom, at least in private life, in the Athenian democratic system.<sup>73</sup> Significantly, he does so after making the comparably 'Dikaiopolitan' argument that the Athenian political system gives wide scope for the talented to achieve proportionate rewards, competing on the level playing field of equal access to the law. Good reputation (*ἀξίωσις*) is rewarded with power and honour, significant personal privileges: anyone who has a good reputation in some respect is honoured in accordance with his virtue (*ἀπ' ἀρετῆς προτιμᾶται*). The language of 'honour' brings into play the more 'Dikaiopolitan' sense of the common claim that the virtuous should receive greater power and resources, contrasted with a more 'Nakonian' sense in Chapter 1.4.3.<sup>74</sup> Along similar lines, Thucydides' Pericles later emphasizes the lasting glory which derives from courageous military activity,<sup>75</sup> which

<sup>71</sup> Thucydides 2.38, 41.1.

<sup>72</sup> Thucydides 2.37.3.

<sup>73</sup> Thucydides 2.37.2–3.

<sup>74</sup> Contrast Ober (1999), 86–7.

<sup>75</sup> Thucydides 2.43.3–6; cf. 35.1.

can be interpreted as a reward for self-sacrifice. In a related desert-oriented argument, he argues that, in the Athenian democracy, it is expected that individuals should strive to escape poverty through 'action', presumably by earning rewards for hard work.<sup>76</sup> Thucydides thus shows Pericles weaving into his speech subtle retorts to anti-democratic critics of the levelling effects of Athenian egalitarianism.<sup>77</sup>

On the other hand, Thucydides' Pericles also incorporates subtle concessions to the 'Dikaiopolitan' perceptions of collective entitlement of the less wealthy majority. As Loraux argues, he paradoxically blends pointedly democratic praise of majority rule and the anonymous democratic heroism of the ordinary soldier into his wider vision of the Athenian polis as a coherent, integral whole, without factional parts.<sup>78</sup> In achieving this effect, Pericles partly relies on the contrasting senses of the word *δημος* explored in Section 2. He at one point alludes to the partisan notion of the word *δημος*, setting up an antagonistic dichotomy between the many and the few: the Athenian system is called a 'democracy' because it is run in the interests of the majority, not the few.<sup>79</sup> However, he also alludes in the speech to the more 'Nakonian' notion of the *δημος*: he uses the adjective *δημόσιος* to evoke a public sphere in which citizens have solemn obligations to obey written and unwritten law, and in which self-sacrifice for the polis in battle is recognized through the civic ritual of communal public burial and through communal rearing of war orphans.<sup>80</sup> He thus himself both encourages and discourages vigorous partisan self-assertion by the Athenian majority.

It might be objected that analysing Pericles' Funeral Speech does not represent an effective response to the main prongs of the objection set out in the introduction to this chapter. A Funeral Speech represented a self-conscious attempt to emphasize and promote civic unity, not far removed from types of rhetoric analysed in Chapters 1 and 2: its typical content can be compared with indeterminate talk of *ὁμόνοια* in the context of civic reconciliation, attested at Nakone and Mytilene, and in the Hellenistic decrees for foreign judges discussed in Section 2. Moreover, Thucydides' version of a Funeral Speech has a markedly theoretical slant, which makes it resemble also some of the philosophical discussions of civic unity examined so far in this book. According to this objection, it is, therefore, unremarkable that the Funeral Speech rests on 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' assumptions. The challenge remains to show that participants in practical political deliberation succeeded in reaching mutually acceptable decisions by speaking and interacting in ways inspired by 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' assumptions: to

<sup>76</sup> Thucydides 2.40.1. <sup>77</sup> Cf. Hornblower (1991–2008), vol. I, 300–1.

<sup>78</sup> See, for example, Loraux (2001), 27–8. <sup>79</sup> Thucydides 2.37.1; Ober (1999), 86–7.

<sup>80</sup> See Thucydides 2.35.1, 37.3, 46.1.

show that proto-Kantian pluralist assumptions are not the only viable basis for constructive civic deliberation.

The nature of the evidence creates significant problems in responding to this challenge. Even for Athens, it is very difficult to gain a reliable picture of how the different parties to any particular open, constructive deliberation interacted. However, the evidence for individual contributions to such deliberations, speeches which sought to reach out to a broad audience and build support for particular proposals, suggests that 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' claims could form the basis for non-dogmatic, constructive interventions, characterized by the kind of rhetorical skill, subtlety, ambivalence, and imagination which Thucydides attributes to Pericles.

Indeed, speakers could engage in the rhetorical equivalents of the types of socio-economic interaction discussed in Section 2. They could attempt to advance their interests through 'Dikaiopolitan' hard bargaining, frank exchange of opinions, and appeals to contingent overlaps in self-interest, themselves possible sources of consensus. Indeed, Thucydides depicts Athenian assembly speeches on practical questions which concentrate on the contingently overlapping narrow interests of those in the assembly.<sup>81</sup> Among the types of mutual self-interest invoked could be that deriving from fair, strictly reciprocal exchanges of honour and goodwill with internal and external benefactors.<sup>82</sup> Fourth-century oratory more generally contains much similar 'rational', 'Dikaiopolitan' estimation of costs and benefits, of mutual interest for calculating citizens.<sup>83</sup> It also contains much punctilious, even legalistic insistence on formalized requirements and rules, of a 'Dikaiopolitan' type.<sup>84</sup>

It could also prove necessary for speakers to combine 'Dikaiopolitan' claims with 'Nakonian' idealism and warmth, curtailing or manipulating their proposals and demands in order to make them at least appear to accord with rousing 'Nakonian' notions of collective interests, values, and religion. Among other things, this could encourage consensus and collaboration precisely by helping to make citizens believe, at least in the abstract, that they had more in common than overlapping material interests: not least, shared experience and a communal religious life of rituals and myths.<sup>85</sup>

It might be thought that any appeal to 'Nakonian' ideals in such practical contexts, as opposed to the more reflective context of a funeral speech, would inevitably have a dogmatic, uncompromising character: it would inevitably

<sup>81</sup> e.g. Thucydides 1.143.5–144.3; 3.39–40, 44–8 (esp. 44.1–2). For an argument that there is a strong expectation in Thucydides' Athenian assemblies that speakers should concentrate on the public interest, conceived in quite a hard-headed way as principally a matter of revenues and power, see Harris (2013b), esp. 96, 105.

<sup>82</sup> Compare Harris (2013b), 106–7, discussing Thucydides 3.47.3.

<sup>83</sup> Compare Murray (1990c), 16–17.

<sup>84</sup> Consider the approach of, for example, Harris (2006); (2013a).

<sup>85</sup> On these factors as sources of Athenian unity, see Osborne (2010), e.g. 12–14, 37–8.

involve wholehearted insistence on the unique legitimacy of a single answer to immediate problems. In fact, however, it was possible even in such contexts to remove the provocative sting from 'Nakonian' rhetoric by applying in more practical ways Thucydides' Pericles' strategy of indeterminacy. As Ober puts it, Athenian courts and deliberative institutions allowed for 'ambivalence and balance': citizens could craft vague consensual ideals or 'dramatic fictions', suitable for 'smooth(ing) over . . . ideological dissonance', around which to unite.<sup>86</sup> Such 'fictions' could be promoted with unreflective sincerity or ironic awareness of their artificiality or unrealisability, of the kind identified by some in Plato's (or the Platonic Socrates') apparently wholehearted advocacy of extreme civic unity as an ideal.<sup>87</sup> In either case, such 'fictions' could both command consensus and leave room for debate and negotiation.

Thucydides provides an example of an Athenian orator palliating 'Dikaiopolitan' self-assertion through appeal to indeterminate, widely acceptable 'Nakonian' ideals in a practical political context. He presents his Pericles closing his controversial, idiosyncratic arguments in favour of moderate naval imperialism on the eve of the Peloponnesian War with a rousing appeal to the Athenians' collective achievements during and since the Persian Wars. This appeal is couched in sufficiently open-ended terms not to alienate any particular group of the citizen-body, and also to ground vague imperatives both to resist 'enemies' by all possible means and to hand Athens over to subsequent generations undiminished.<sup>88</sup> This strategy can be compared with the pervasive appeal in Athenian rhetoric from throughout the Classical period to vague Athenian patriotic myths, about, for example, Theseus or the Heraclidae, and to similarly open-ended constitutional traditions, such as 'the ancestral constitution' or 'Solon's laws': stirring notions, with rich imaginative force, which different hearers could interpret in contrasting ways.<sup>89</sup>

Some of the rhetoric of Demosthenes' earlier speeches, delivered in the 350s and early 340s, a period of relatively constructive political debate, compared with the far more acutely anxious period of his later speeches, well illustrates relevant strategies of often imaginative vagueness. For example, in the *Third Olynthiac*, Demosthenes offers a vague, uncontroversial account of past Athenian heroism, comparable with Thucydides' Pericles', to give an uncontroversial veneer to controversial foreign-policy proposals.<sup>90</sup> Demosthenes also argues in a similar way, in relation to domestic policy, in his attempt to portray Leptines' proposed law as unlawful in his *Against Leptines*. That was a speech before jurors rather than the assembly, but nonetheless a constructive contribution to wider civic debates, in so far as it attempted to offer solutions to pressing practical problems of civic finance and organization. As discussed

<sup>86</sup> Ober (1989), 187–91.

<sup>88</sup> Thucydides 1.144.4.

<sup>90</sup> Demosthenes 3.23–6.

<sup>87</sup> Consider, for example, Gadamer (1983).

<sup>89</sup> Compare Carawan (2013), 8.



in Chapter 3.3.4, Demosthenes presses hard for the 'Dikaiopolitan' entitlements of benefactors to formally agreed reciprocal privileges, rewards for contribution and incentives for future benefactors, which Leptines is seeking to overturn and curtail.<sup>91</sup> However, he softens the force of these partly self-interested, sectional claims by attempting to show that their fulfilment is necessary for the maintenance of the collective sovereignty of the people: Leptines is denying the people the freedom to decide whom to honour.<sup>92</sup> He thus appeals to the unifying potential of a widely shared and cherished skeletal picture of the Athenian δῆμος as a 'Nakonian' unity with a single will, without having to define precisely the boundaries of the δῆμος or the concerns which unify it.

Along similar lines, Demosthenes then seeks to show that the rejection of Leptines' law is necessary for the preservation of the traditional 'character' (ἥθος) of the Athenian polis. His outline account of this Athenian ἥθος is carefully constructed to be open-ended and widely palatable. Indeed, as Kremmydas suggests, the notion of the ἥθος of the polis could serve in Attic oratory as an 'ideological catchword', 'a multi-faceted concept comprising several moral principles and attributes'.<sup>93</sup> Demosthenes first appeals to a widely cherished moment of 'Nakonian' δμόνοια in opposition to uncontroversial villains, the reconciliation of 403 and repudiation of the Thirty, in order to emphasize the Athenians' history of fidelity to formal agreements.<sup>94</sup> After this single example, he then refers vaguely to 'many other' cases which demonstrate the same thing, without identifying them. He concludes his sketch of the Athenians' collective ἥθος by using abstract, undefined ethical concepts: the Athenians are honest and good and do not consider how to maximize financial profit, but what is the fine thing to do.

This section on the ἥθος of the polis allows Demosthenes to avoid or defer the difficult question of what exactly makes a good citizen, and in what respects Leptines falls short of the ideal. In a move reminiscent of Socrates' insistence in the *Republic* that the close analogy between cities and individual souls means that the nature of a just individual soul can best be learned by considering the larger model of a just city, Demosthenes simply argues that Leptines ought to make his own ἥθος resemble that of the polis.<sup>95</sup>

<sup>91</sup> See especially Demosthenes 20.8–13.

<sup>92</sup> Demosthenes 20.2–6.

<sup>93</sup> Kremmydas (2012), 202.

<sup>94</sup> Compare the later insistence on the need to preserve the privileges of benefactors who provided much needed help to the Athenians in the troubled circumstances of the late fifth century: unambiguous, uncontroversial heroes, such as those who helped victims of the Sicilian disaster or fought against the oligarchic regimes (see Demosthenes 20.41–8). When Demosthenes subsequently offers more recent examples of admirable benefactors, he is often quick to emphasize their role in resisting uncontroversial villains, especially the Spartans (see 20.52, 59–60, 68–74, 77).

<sup>95</sup> Demosthenes 20.11–14 (compare 64, 141–2), with Hesk (2000), 43; compare Plato *Republic* 368d8–369b3. The similarity with Plato's argument is very unlikely to reveal direct philosophical

Comparably indeterminate 'Nakonian' virtue rhetoric features later, when Demosthenes argues that the 'freedom' of a democracy is protected by the rivalry of 'good men' in pursuit of the rewards bestowed by the people.<sup>96</sup> In a sign that some of Demosthenes' unspecific 'Nakonian' rhetoric may have a knowing irony about it, Demosthenes even himself admits that there is wide scope for orators to manipulate the indeterminate resources of Athenian political culture to maintain patriotic consensus: even if it were proven that earlier Athenians had failed to reward benefactors adequately, it would be fitting for all Athenian orators to deny the fact.<sup>97</sup>

Admittedly, it is quite difficult to find purely constructive contributions to Athenian civic debates: even Demosthenes' *Against Leptines* includes strong attacks on Leptines' integrity.<sup>98</sup> Hesk even argues that the tendency of Athenian orators to denigrate opponents in straightforward ethical terms, as deceitful or vicious, gives the lie to Ober's argument that civic rhetoric created a space for 'ambivalence and balance'.<sup>99</sup> There is undoubtedly some truth in this objection. Nevertheless, it is also true that even vitriolic 'Nakonian' denunciations could be kept vague and open-ended, rather than *ad hominem*, in such a way as to gather support rather than alienate fellow citizens. For example, Thucydides' Cleon does not specify exactly which orators he thinks indulge in the kinds of excessively clever sophistic rhetoric he disparages in general terms.<sup>100</sup> Similarly, Demosthenes is sometimes unspecific about which orators he thinks mistaken, egotistical, or corrupt.<sup>101</sup> Another kind of denunciation with the potential to be rallying rather than divisive was denunciation of the *δημος* as a whole for falling short of its own generic, uncontroversial ideals of probity, intelligence, courage, or self-sacrifice, in ways which could be made good through collective effort.<sup>102</sup>

For cities other than Athens, it is very difficult to obtain a picture of the nature of contributions to constructive political debate which issued in decrees. The best guide is the rhetoric of decrees themselves, which must often have included quotations or summaries of the speeches delivered in favour of the relevant proposal.<sup>103</sup> As noted in Chapter 1, honorific rhetoric often included clear, generic 'Dikaiopolitan' appeal to strict reciprocity between

influence. It probably shows, rather, that the city-soul analogy was one of the deeply embedded shared conceptual resources of Athenian political culture.

<sup>96</sup> Demosthenes 20.108.

<sup>97</sup> Demosthenes 20.119, with Hesk (2000), 172–3. The other method of reaching out to a wide audience attested in this speech is cruder appeal to shared material interests: for example, the security of the Athenian grain supply (see, for example, Demosthenes 20.29–40, on King Leukon of Bosphoros).

<sup>98</sup> Compare Hesk (2000), 40–5. <sup>99</sup> Hesk (1999), 218.

<sup>100</sup> Thucydides 3.37.3–4. <sup>101</sup> Consider Demosthenes 3.1, 3, 12–13, 29.

<sup>102</sup> See, for example, Thucydides 3.38.4; Demosthenes 3.30–6.

<sup>103</sup> See Fröhlich (2005), 255, with n. 118 (on later Hellenistic honorary decrees).

benefactor and beneficiaries. This made it possible to set particular individuals on a pedestal through rhetoric in a way far more consistent with 'Dikaiopolitan' than with 'Nakonian' ethics.

On the other hand, however, such rhetoric was very often entwined with soaring, but quite abstract, 'Nakonian' arguments: consider, for example, frequent open-ended praise for the benefactor's piety towards locally significant gods, or for his ongoing virtue (*ἀρετή*), goodwill (*εὖνοια*), and other abstract qualities towards the honouring polis. Along similar lines, the honouring polis or *δῆμος* is usually presented unquestioningly, but also unspecifically, as a homogeneous entity capable of exercising a single authoritative will.

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, in relation to Athenian decrees, Osborne interprets decrees' frequent vagueness and impression of unity as a result of their 'depoliticizing' before publication: any signs of disagreement and uncertainty were removed, to give an air of solemnity and permanence.<sup>104</sup> Although this did surely often occur, it is not necessarily the case that the original speeches in the assembly debates leading to such decrees were always or mostly far more detailed, specific, and contentious than the decrees themselves. It could have been a very effective strategy for gaining support, and permitting peaceful negotiation, to couch arguments in emotive but vague or equivocal terms, emphasizing virtuous concern for the civic community and its gods. Indeed, the most significant point of intersection among the many rival political attitudes represented in any civic assembly would surely often have been instinctive commitment to generic ideals of civic community, civic virtue, and reciprocity; to the sovereignty of the community, increasingly universally represented as *δημοκρατία*; and to an amorphous shared patriotic conception of local history and religion.<sup>105</sup> More specific notions of virtue, dependent on more concrete visions of civic history and ethics, could easily prove contentious.<sup>106</sup> A parallel can be drawn in this respect with local histories of poleis produced throughout the Hellenistic world, often recited or cited in public rhetorical contexts.<sup>107</sup> Those histories tended to concentrate on uncontroversial or ambiguous mythological and long-past events, rather than recent politics and controversy. These distant points of

<sup>104</sup> See Osborne (1999), 343, 350; compare Osborne (2010), 8, on deme honorific decrees.

<sup>105</sup> Compare Johnstone (2011), 162–3, on the pragmatic advantages for Attic orators in simplifying arguments as far as possible, even to the extent of offering 'reductive dichotomies' concerning individuals' characters and the good of the city. Johnstone suggests (e.g. p. 111) that deliberation would have been more open-ended and pluralistic in small boards, but there is very little evidence available to test this hypothesis. Johnstone's case-study from Xenophon's *Anabasis* (his p. 123) involves quite familiar forms of prudential reasoning.

<sup>106</sup> See Section 5 of this chapter and Chapter 5.5.2.3, on the contested later fourth-century Athenian honorary decrees for the younger Euphron of Sikyon, one of the principal examples of substantial civic history in a decree presented in Luraghi (2010); compare *SEG* 28.60, ll. 79–83, discussed in Chapter 6.4.2.1.

<sup>107</sup> See Chaniotis (1988).

shared imagination were sufficiently unprovocative, or open to different interpretations,<sup>108</sup> to serve as the focus of imitations of 'Nakonian' unity.<sup>109</sup>

It might be objected to this interpretation of constructive political rhetoric in Athens and beyond that the kinds of studied indeterminacy and triangulation identified here themselves involved something resembling proto-Kantian political interaction: relevant speakers had to show sensitivity to differences of opinion and willingness to negotiate. This is debatable: it is not clear that avoidance or imaginative smoothing over of controversial topics can really be considered a form of pluralist engagement, even if it often involves considerable sensitivity to others. Moreover, even if this were the case, that fact would not be sufficient grounds for identifying the workings of a strong proto-Kantian paradigm within Greek civic political cultures. This is because neither of the two possible criteria for deducing the existence of underlying norms from political action alone identified in my Introduction (see p. 19) would be met. First, it would be quite possible to explain the relevant behaviour without assuming that relevant citizens were guided by proto-Kantian assumptions. Indeed, as argued previously, relevant citizens can be seen to have been flexibly applying indeterminate 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' assumptions. If any additional norms were exerting a strong influence, they were norms directly encouraging vagueness and triangulation in political rhetoric.

Second, comparison with the surviving evidence for contemporary Greeks' explicit reflections about the function and nature of practical political oratory does not indicate the existence of a strong proto-Kantian paradigm which could have inspired rhetorical triangulations. There is little evidence for Athenian orators explicitly recognizing the complexity and indeterminacy of shared values, or their very varied possible applications and interpretations. Similarly, there is little evidence for Athenian orators explicitly recognizing the inevitable diversity of the citizen population and the need for sustained, pluralistic dialogue in order to arrive at mutual understanding.

As far as more abstract Greek theorizing about rhetorical persuasion is concerned, it is true that some fifth-century intellectuals may have been gesturing towards more pluralistic models of political deliberation.<sup>110</sup> Other thinkers, however, seem to have conceived rhetorical persuasion mainly in the ways discussed in this section. Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* disparages ambiguity of language, unless the speaker is deliberately trying to hedge his bets. His words do, however, suggest an awareness of ambiguity's potency as a rhetorical tool: he warns against it, and acknowledges that it is a common

<sup>108</sup> Compare Forsdyke (2012), ch. 2, on ambiguous stories about slaves, such as those told about Drimakos, leader of a Chian slave revolt, which could be interpreted in contrasting, satisfying ways by powerful and powerless respectively.

<sup>109</sup> Compare Clarke (2008), esp. 313–25; also the forthcoming work of Rosalind Thomas on Hellenistic local polis histories.

<sup>110</sup> Consider Farrar (1988), chs. 2–4, 6; Apfel (2011).

persuasive technique of, for example, the philosophical poet or seer.<sup>111</sup> Moreover, some of his own recommendations for successful persuasion in the work overlap with some of the flexible 'Nakonian' methods discussed above. He advocates, not recognition of the validity of contrasting ideas or proposals, but flexible appeal to overlapping assumptions and habits: first, the quite generic ethical assumptions and habits which Aristotle holds to be uniformly characteristic of particular constitutions and audiences; and, second, wider Greek shared assumptions about the general form of virtue, vice, and happiness. This involves forms of self-presentation, and emotional appeal, which go far beyond crisp rational argumentation.<sup>112</sup>

Other abstract Greek theorizing about political rhetoric itself attests a strong polarization between 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' approaches. A revealing fourth-century Athenian passage is the final part of Plato's Socrates' argument against the extreme egoist argument of the Callicles of the *Gorgias*, one aspect of which was considered in Chapter 3.3.4, that it is by nature just for the strong to overwhelm the weak. Socrates has attempted several replies, designed to show that it is never beneficial to commit injustice. His final move is to argue that, if Callicles' approach were correct, the best way to reliably protect oneself against possible mistreatment by fellow citizens would be to assimilate oneself to a tyrannical despot: that is the best way to befriend dominant individuals, who themselves possess 'tyrannical' characteristics and appreciate them in others. Socrates uses this extension of Callicles' argument to undermine Callicles by arguing that assimilating oneself to a tyrant cannot be good for oneself. On the one hand, it will harm one's soul. On the other, all apparently dominant political leaders are in fact subservient and vulnerable: they have to flatter the people to survive; and the people's capricious will can turn at any time. The only reliable way to ensure true security is to educate the people in virtue, for virtuous people will never attack their teacher in virtue.<sup>113</sup>

Socrates implicitly suggests that there is no middle way between the two approaches and types of rhetoric. At one point, he sets out his dichotomy with brutal clarity:

Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίους ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσονται καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὀμιλήσονται;

To which form of care of the polis are you calling me? Distinguish them for me: the route of struggling with the Athenians so that they will become as good as possible, like a doctor; or the route of ministering to them and conversing with them for their gratification?<sup>114</sup>

<sup>111</sup> Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1407a32–b6.

<sup>112</sup> See, for example, Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1365b21–1366b22; also 1360b4–1362a14.

<sup>113</sup> Plato *Gorgias* 510a6–521b1; Schofield (2006), 66.

<sup>114</sup> Plato *Gorgias* 521a2–5.

According to Plato's Socrates, therefore, the best option open to a politically active citizen is a 'Nakonian' one: he should seek to direct his fellow citizens' souls towards virtue, with the kind of zeal which can be described as 'struggling' or 'fighting'. The only alternative is a crudely 'Dikaiopolitan' one: an attempt to protect and further one's own narrow self-interest by appealing to the narrow self-interest and instincts for pleasure of fellow citizens, in the hope of establishing a crude form of reciprocal favour and obligation (another form of χάρις).<sup>115</sup>

This dichotomy might be thought to reflect only the hardened cynicism of an anti-democratic philosopher. However, Yunis has argued effectively that the same dichotomy pervades the explicit abstract reflections about the function of political rhetoric in the works of authors less hostile to democracy, especially Thucydides and Demosthenes. As Yunis shows, they too routinely treat the choice available as a stark one between idealistic rhetoric, aimed at improving the audience and discovering the true good for the community, and realist, interest-oriented rhetoric, aimed at advancing personal interests, striking bargains, and calculating immediate mutual advantage.<sup>116</sup> The main difference from the Platonic picture is not in their conception of the possibilities, but in their application of the categories to contemporary Athenian democratic politics.

For cities outside Athens, it is more difficult to obtain clear statements of rhetorical principles. However, some can be reconstructed from epigraphy. For example, Iasos' Hellenistic inscriptions reveal familiar polarized options. A reason sometimes given for praising, and granting citizenship to, a foreign benefactor in Iasian honorary decrees is that the honorand has continued 'speaking and doing whatever good he can' (λέγων καὶ πράσσων ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἂν δύνηται), sc. for the Iasian polis.<sup>117</sup> This clause reflected and reinforced an expectation that those worthy of citizenship or civic recognition should speak for the good of the city to the best of their ability in political contexts. However, other honorary decrees for foreigners, passed by the Iasians or inscribed at Iasos, contained grants of access to the civic assembly 'first after the sacred matters', alongside grants of personal privileges concerning status, honour, or mobility.<sup>118</sup> The juxtaposition of these different privileges implied

<sup>115</sup> Compare Socrates' identification of two alternatives for the rhetorician at *Phaedrus* 273d2–274a5: the rhetorician should choose to 'do favour to' (χαρίζεσθαι) good superiors (namely, the gods), by speaking in an ethically and intellectually superior way, not to do favour to 'fellow slaves' (namely, fellow flawed men).

<sup>116</sup> Yunis (1996). Compare Christ (1998), 161–6, on Athenian ideas about appropriate uses of forensic rhetoric.

<sup>117</sup> *I.Iasos* 50, ll. 7–8; 56, l. 9.

<sup>118</sup> *I.Priene* 53I, ll. 27–37; cf. *I.Iasos* 44, ll. 0–1 (part restored). Compare grants made to Iasian foreign judges by the citizens of Hellenistic Colophon and Kalyrna: *I.Iasos* 80, ll. 22–8; 82, ll. 59–64.

that public speech in a civic assembly was, at least for foreigners worthy of citizenship or civic recognition, itself a privilege, of personal benefit to the recipient. According to this understanding, such public speech was at least partly an opportunity to advance personal or sectional interests and prestige, within procedural limits.

To sum up, therefore, both Greek rhetorical practice and much Greek rhetorical theory from this period confirm, rather than undermining, the picture of civic political cultures offered in earlier chapters. The situation can be summarized with reference to Habermas' theory of political communication. In Habermas' terms, there was considerable room in practical political debate in Greek poleis in this period for 'procedurally regulated bargaining' and for 'ethical-political discourses' of collective self-definition. There was, however, limited scope for anything resembling universalistic, egalitarian 'moral discourses': debates based on appeals to inalienable, equal individual rights, to individual dignity and need, or to an ideal of unconstrained, pluralistic, egalitarian deliberation and communication, leading to mutual understanding.<sup>119</sup>

The closest thing to a pluralist middle ideal in a mainstream speech features in a work discussed in detail previously, Demosthenes' *Against Leptines*. At one point, Demosthenes claims that in Athens, unlike in Sparta, a citizen has the freedom to praise any constitution. He then almost exemplifies this freedom himself, by admitting that Spartan honorific arrangements are well-suited to an oligarchic constitution.<sup>120</sup> This might be interpreted as praise for Athenian pluralistic tolerance. It is, however, probably better interpreted as praise for Athenian 'Dikaiopolitan' freedoms. Demosthenes makes no suggestion that two contrasting constitutions or proposals for Athens might simultaneously have gripping arguments in their favour: he does not express any pluralism about value.

Demosthenes' underlying assumption about public deliberation, also evident in much of the other rhetoric considered in this section, is that the components of a final, consensual decision are already fixed. There are fixed ideals, communal interests, or public opinions to be discovered, interpreted, sharpened, or promoted, or fixed personal and sectional interests and opinions to be scrutinized, compared, and balanced out or aggregated. Insistence on these alternatives leaves relatively little space for the view that such components of a final decision may need to be created through pluralistic dialogue aimed at mutual understanding of simultaneously potent, but divergent, values and perspectives.

<sup>119</sup> For these categories, see Habermas (1996), 165–8; compare 95–8.

<sup>120</sup> Demosthenes 20.106–108.

#### 4. CITIZEN INTERACTIONS AND RHETORIC IN CLASSICAL ATHENIAN DISPUTES INVOLVING ATTEMPTS AT EXILING

According to the second part of the objection sketched in the introduction to this chapter, more conflictual relations between citizens of poleis, especially Athens, reveal the strong influence of norms of ferocious, almost anarchic competition, deriving from neither the 'Nakonian' nor the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm. This section attempts to respond to that point, by arguing for the importance of 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' behaviour and rhetoric even in some intense disputes between Athenian citizens which led to at least one party seeking the exile or disenfranchisement of the other. The argument is that it was sometimes a central feature of such disputes that two or more citizens failed, or refused, to maintain the delicate balancing act and studied indeterminacy and toleration of contradictions analysed in Sections 2 and 3: they made concrete, specific, unambiguous, and coherent claims or proposals, 'Nakonian', 'Dikaiopolitan', or both at once, which could not command easy consensus.

This argument is based on analysis of surviving legal speeches resulting from such disputes. It is rarely, if ever, possible to judge from the evidence of such speeches to what extent relevant citizens were opportunistic or sincere in applying 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' standards in provocative concrete ways. On the one hand, relevant rhetoric can often be well explained as a case of a citizen instrumentalizing and concretely applying available political norms and language to serve the predetermined end of convincing others, especially a jury, of a case he has already resolved upon. Basic 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' norms were thus, at the very least, useful material for distortion and instrumentalization.<sup>121</sup>

However, it is also probable that, at least in some cases, those basic norms themselves shaped litigants' ends. First, in some cases, citizens probably began from a simple sense of grievance, or hostility to an opponent, and found themselves obliged to justify it before peers, and then a jury, lucidly, in terms of acceptable 'Nakonian' or 'Dikaiopolitan' norms. That required a concrete application of one or the other paradigm, or a concrete synthesis of the implications of the two. Expressing a sense of entitlement or hostility in such terms often intensified it into a totalizing claim to virtue or attack on opponents' characters, of the kind which could underpin or provoke a call for the heavy punishment of expulsion or exclusion. Second, in some cases, individual litigants were probably guided from the outset by 'Nakonian' or

<sup>121</sup> Compare Arena (2012), 7–10, on political ideas as, at the very least, 'linguistic resources', ripe for instrumentalization, in the late Roman Republic.



'Dikaiopolitan' norms, or both combined, in developing the concrete sense of grievance and animosity which sustained and escalated disputes.

As will be argued in Chapter 5, there are strong grounds for insisting on the importance of the latter two types of explanation in the case of the rhetoric of those engaged in conflicts leading to expulsion through full *stasis*. In cases before the courts, by contrast, citizens almost always tried to reach out to as yet unsympathetic or unpersuaded members of the jury, by appealing to their preconceptions in a way which almost necessarily involved some degree of instrumentalization of available tropes.

A relevant dispute could arise when a citizen insisted too singlemindedly on 'Dikaiopolitan' entitlements, allowing tensions between 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' expectations to come into the open. This is evident, for example, in the rhetoric and reported behaviour of the speaker of Lysias 4,<sup>122</sup> defending himself against a charge of premeditated wounding, an offence punishable by exile.<sup>123</sup> The seeds of the animosity between speaker and opponent lay partly in an *antidosis* challenge which the speaker had raised against his opponent: he had challenged his opponent either to undertake a liturgy in his place, or to prove that he was less wealthy by accepting a full exchange of property. His opponent had agreed to an exchange, allegedly because he wanted to gain possession of a slave-girl then in the possession of the speaker. However, the exchange was aborted before it was completed, because the two men were reconciled by their 'friends' (*φίλοι*). According to the speaker, his opponent acknowledged that they were reconciled by hatching an (unfulfilled)<sup>124</sup> plan to vote for the speaker's tribe as a judge at the Dionysia. It was after this that the speaker went to his opponent's house, to the party at which the brawl which is the subject of this suit occurred.<sup>125</sup>

By making his *antidosis* challenge, the speaker had acted or posed as a wholehearted 'Dikaiopolitan' defender of his personal wealth, exploiting the opportunities offered by civic institutions to avoid expenditure. In so doing, he had breached more 'Nakonian' expectations of cooperative, non-confrontational relations between fellow citizens. Indeed, he had probably even asserted his personal interests and perceived entitlements at the expense of a personal 'friend' (*φίλος*), in relation to whom such an antagonistic move was particularly inappropriate by 'Nakonian' standards. The claim that 'our *φίλοι*' reconciled us could be a collective reference to distinct respective friendship groups, but it probably indicates that the two men were both members of a single network of *φίλοι*. Indeed, the vocabulary of the claim that the *φίλοι* 'reconciled' them (*συνήλλαξαν*), in a 'reconciliation' (*διαλλαγαί*),<sup>126</sup>

<sup>122</sup> Todd (2000), 53, argues against the view that this speech is an adaptation of Lysias 3 produced as a rhetorical exercise.

<sup>123</sup> Todd (2007), 347: exile was most probably the statutory penalty for this offence.

<sup>124</sup> He was not selected by lot as a judge.

<sup>125</sup> Lysias 4.1–8.

<sup>126</sup> Lysias 4.1–2.

implies that they were previous friends, returned to friendship through the reconciliation.

The reconciliation appears to have restored a measure of easy-going harmony, free of pointed insistence on specific entitlements and political or cultural ideas. Indeed, the plan for the opponent to put friendship and reconciliation above impartiality, by giving a premeditated vote to the speaker's tribe at the Dionysia, suggests a mutual willingness to set aside punctiliousness. However, resentments persisted under the surface, to culminate in the brawl.<sup>127</sup> This example illustrates a kind of dispute which Yack thinks Aristotle regarded as an important general cause of acrimony between supposed 'friends': disputes arise when members of a group of supposed character friends behave only as utility friends, arousing the resentment of fellow group members.<sup>128</sup>

A partly similar clash of norms might well underlie another speech from a trial in which the defendant was facing the prospect of exclusion from the citizen-body: Lysias 21. The speaker was facing a possible fine, for alleged receipt of bribes or embezzlement of public funds, which would lead to apparently inevitable ἀτιμία for inability to pay.<sup>129</sup> It is quite probable that the speaker would have regarded as legitimate 'Dikaiopolitan' rewards for his civic contributions, proper χάρις, the payments, hospitality, or privileges which his prosecutors were now denouncing as bribes or embezzled benefits, incompatible with 'Nakonian' self-restraint. In any case, his speech itself reveals the simultaneous importance of the competing paradigms: he starkly juxtaposes perceptions of 'Dikaiopolitan' entitlement with a self-portrait as a devoted 'Nakonian' civic benefactor.

On the one hand, he relies on 'Dikaiopolitan' strict reciprocity: he appeals for χάρις in return for his many public contributions, pointing out that his contributions would be 'unrequited' (ἀχάριστα) if he were convicted and punished. If he is not acquitted, others will think themselves justified in having made minimal civic contributions.<sup>130</sup> It is quite probable that many of the speaker's benefactions had indeed been motivated by hopes of χάρις: Davies suggests that they may have been attempts to compensate for the earlier oligarchic associations of his family.<sup>131</sup> In the speech itself, the language of χάρις is combined with other 'Dikaiopolitan' language about honour and ὕβρις: the speaker claims not to be able to tolerate suffering ὕβρις.<sup>132</sup>

<sup>127</sup> Jealousy concerning the disputed slave-girl was an important factor in this, alongside bad feeling remaining from the *antidosis* challenge.

<sup>128</sup> Yack (1985), 105–7, 109, discussing in particular Aristotle *Eudemian Ethics* 1242b31–1243a2, 1243a34–7; compare Schofield (1998), 48–50.

<sup>129</sup> See Todd (2000), 228. <sup>130</sup> Lysias 21.12, 25; Millett (1998), 231–2.

<sup>131</sup> Davies (1971), 592–3; Todd (2000), 229; Wilson (2000), 89–92.

<sup>132</sup> Again Lysias 21.12.

On the other hand, the speaker also appeals to radically 'Nakonian' standards. In an abstract 'Nakonian' remark, he claims that polis life depends on those who make civic contributions *voluntarily*. More concretely, he also boasts that he himself has fulfilled utopian 'Nakonian' standards: he suggests that he took *pleasure* in his civic contributions; claims that he has contributed far more to the polis than required by law; and insists that he was so emotionally devoted to his polis that he *never even considered* the actual or possible harm to his family resulting from his financial contributions and military service for the Athenian polis.<sup>133</sup> These abstract claims about his own virtue are illustrated with a strikingly long description of his own lavish civic contributions.<sup>134</sup> As mentioned in Chapter 1, the speaker even strikes a note slightly in tension with his own appeal to *χάρις*, by implicitly disparaging those who expect a 'gift' in return for their contributions to the polis.<sup>135</sup>

In this case, it was not only the simple contradiction between 'Dikaiopolitan' self-protection and expectation of compensation and extreme 'Nakonian' claims to civic-minded selflessness which invited opposition. In addition, this speaker's rhetoric offers a vivid example of the most common means by which the civic balancing act considered in this chapter broke down. This often occurred when Athenian litigants appealed to concrete, *ad hominem* applications of shared 'Nakonian' ideals of demanding political virtue, purity, and probity. Such concrete applications were almost necessarily partisan and provocative. In this case, for example, the speaker's unusually extensive list of his own benefactions was particularly likely to alienate hearers, by giving an impression of boastfulness. The emphasis on theatrical and athletic liturgies as evidence for the speaker's civic virtue also provocatively presupposed straightforward legitimacy and importance for an idiosyncratic political stance: the controversial view that festivals, sport, and culture are fundamental to civic life, rather than contingent additions to war, finance, and diplomacy.<sup>136</sup>

Another reason why specific attributions of 'Nakonian' virtue and vice were almost automatically provocative was that they raised the stakes of disputes: opponents had to emphasize equally demanding 'Nakonian' ideals, in order to avoid appearing to be less devoted to the polis. This is evident from the handful of cases in which it is possible to reconstruct the 'Nakonian' rhetoric and behaviour of both sides in a dispute over which the threat of exile or loss of citizenship loomed. Such a dispute is attested in Demosthenes 57. The speaker, Euxitheos, had been removed from the citizen roll, due to a charge of foreign ancestry. As he presents the situation, in monopolistically 'Nakonian'

<sup>133</sup> Lysias 21.13, 16–17, 5, 23–4.

<sup>134</sup> Lysias 21.1–11. On the unusual scope of this defendant's contributions, see Davies (1971), 592–3; Todd (2000), 229.

<sup>135</sup> Lysias 21.11, cf. 13.

<sup>136</sup> Compare Liddel (2007), 269–70.

terms, this was the result of conspiracy<sup>137</sup> by fellow members of the deme of Halimous, which led to a late night vote on the legitimacy of his citizenship in a deme assembly.

Euxitheos had provoked the animosity of his main opponent, Euboulides, by giving evidence hostile to an *ἀσέβεια* prosecution brought by him.<sup>138</sup> That move would itself have implied criticism of Euboulides' suitability as a defender of the 'Nakonian' religious conformity of members of the community. Moreover, Euxitheos had also alienated a broader section of the deme community through his conduct as demarch, in particular through his demand for payment of outstanding rents on leased sacred land. In the speech, Euxitheos justifies this action in absolutist 'Nakonian' terms: he vilifies the non-payers as those who not only had failed to pay rents on sacred land, but also 'had plundered (other money) from common resources' (*τῶν κοινῶν διηρπάκεσαν*).<sup>139</sup> Significantly, he did not allow any hint that he might have been insisting on strict 'Dikaiopolitan' enforcement of law and contracts, possibly through the procedure of *ἐνεχυράσας*,<sup>140</sup> in a way which might even have disadvantaged poorer debtors reliant on leniency. He preferred to pose as a spirited, spontaneous defender of the common good. Euxitheos' 'Nakonian' characterization of his policy, as a 'crusade against... avarice and corruption',<sup>141</sup> left very little scope for debate or negotiation.

Also during his demarchy, Euxitheos had dedicated shields to Athene in a deme sanctuary. This step was presumably designed to make clear a desire to promote communal religious life and the dignity of the deme. Favourable demesmen had apparently recognized Euxitheos' self-ascribed 'Nakonian' qualities: he received an honorary decree from his fellow demesmen, a token of appreciation probably at least partly phrased, like most honorary decrees, as a recognition of 'Nakonian' virtues. This honour appears to have been, like Euxitheos' policy regarding deme rents, provocative to some deme members: in a combination of symbolism and opportunism, his opponents allegedly chiselled out the honorary decree.<sup>142</sup>

Euxitheos' opponents' opposition was not, however, purely negative. They were also able to appeal, in their prosecution of him for foreign ancestry, to alternative criteria of 'Nakonian' solidarity, excellence, and exclusion: ethnic ones. The phenomenon of citizens exchanging alternative charges of deviation from 'Nakonian' standards of conformity<sup>143</sup> makes clear the importance of a feature of generic and local 'Nakonian' paradigms emphasized earlier in this book: they tended to be very well-defined in form, but quite indeterminate in content. It was often self-evident that citizens had to justify their conduct by

<sup>137</sup> On the rhetoric of conspiracy in the speech, see Sommerstein and Bayliss, (2013), 127–8.

<sup>138</sup> Demosthenes 57.8. <sup>139</sup> Demosthenes 57.63. <sup>140</sup> Whitehead (1986), 125–6.

<sup>141</sup> Whitehead (1986), 298–9. <sup>142</sup> Demosthenes 57.64; Liddel (2007), 162.

<sup>143</sup> Compare Wilson (2000), 89–92.

reference to the ideal of a homogeneous community devoted to objective, demanding political and ethical standards. There was, however, no consensus about the membership of that community or the nature of those standards. In applying 'Nakonian' ideals concretely, therefore, citizens were able to, indeed had to, supply their own idiosyncratic, often highly contentious interpretations, derived from the very wide range of options available within their political cultures. At the very least, this means that 'Nakonian' arguments were ripe for being turned into weapons. In fact, it probably also means that they could not but be turned into weapons when tense circumstances demanded clarity, specificity, and resolution of contradictions, a phenomenon discussed in detail in relation to *stasis* in Chapter 5.

Perhaps the best example of the process of rival orators promoting their own specific, provocative interpretations of indeterminate collective ideals of Athenian solidarity and virtue is offered by Demosthenes and Aeschines' opposing speeches of 330. These were delivered at the trial of Ctesiphon for allegedly unlawfully proposing and arranging the honorific crowning of Demosthenes in 336. In them, Demosthenes and Aeschines each fleshed out the shared Athenian basic 'Nakonian' paradigm with rival idiosyncratic, contentious visions of Athenian civic virtue and civic organization<sup>144</sup> and of Athenian history.<sup>145</sup> As part of this process of fleshing out the shared skeletal paradigm, they necessarily stigmatized each other as treacherous anti-citizens and opponents of Athenian interests; men who were ethically flawed in character<sup>146</sup> and divorced from the patriotic civic community.<sup>147</sup> Balot sees these speeches as evidence for the distinctive, enviable 'virtue politics' of the Classical Athenian democracy, in which questions of character were openly discussed.<sup>148</sup> It is, however, also possible to see them as evidence for the difficulties of sustaining the balancing acts necessary for constructive debate in a political culture with strong 'Nakonian' elements, at moments when tension demanded clarity and coherence. Indeed, they can even be seen as signs of incipient *stasis*: Aeschines' ignominious defeat led to his semi-voluntary exile from Athens.

<sup>144</sup> Aeschines criticizes Demosthenes' wide-ranging political engagement, almost as a professional politician; Demosthenes emphasizes his own role as a quasi-permanent political leader. This basic difference has been interpreted in opposing ways by modern scholars: as evidence that Aeschines was more egalitarian and Demosthenes more amenable to the principle of specialist leadership (Liddel (2007), 238–42); or as evidence that Aeschines favoured leadership by a leisured elite and Demosthenes full democracy (Allen (2010), 102–3).

<sup>145</sup> Clarke (2008), 252–61.

<sup>146</sup> e.g. Aeschines 3.51–4, 130–1 or 165–7; Demosthenes 18.126–8. Compare the common embedding of partisan foreign-policy claims in accusations of *ἀσεβεία* around this time: Mari (2003).

<sup>147</sup> See, for example, Demosthenes 18.291–2. For a similar recent analysis, see Cook (2009); (2012), 227–51.

<sup>148</sup> See Balot (2009c), 283–8.

These speeches also confirm another crucial pattern: the partisan, provocative character of concrete applications of 'Nakonian' standards could be greatly intensified by the fact that speakers often tailored them to their own concrete interests, perceived entitlements and deserts, and idiosyncratic opinions, all nurtured by 'Dikaiopolitan' norms. Doing so, was a quite straightforward means for a speaker to appear to harmonize into a simple, internally consistent debating stance competing practical 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' demands. In this case, for example, a fundamental purpose of Demosthenes' otherwise strongly 'Nakonian' speech was to uphold his reciprocal entitlement to a crown in return for his prolonged civic service, a way of asserting his own position in a protracted competition for honour with Aeschines.

'Dikaiopolitan' assumptions and rhetoric even sometimes come to the surface in Demosthenes' speech. Demosthenes begins with an appeal to strict reciprocity, praying that he will receive from the jury the same goodwill which he has always held towards Athens. He then continues, in regulatory vein, by emphasizing the need for the court to judge justly and impartially, giving equal consideration to the arguments of both sides.<sup>149</sup> This is something best suited to a conflictual polis in which citizens compete for deserved entitlements.<sup>150</sup> The most striking, programmatic statement of 'Dikaiopolitan' commitment to strict reciprocity comes later in the speech, when Demosthenes dismisses as a technicality Aeschines' charge that Demosthenes received his crown at a time when he had not been held to account for all his contributions to the polis. At this point, Demosthenes insists that the polis must show full *χάρης* towards voluntary benefactors who use their private wealth for public ends, even excusing them from formal scrutiny.<sup>151</sup> Demosthenes makes this claim despite the fact that it might have been thought especially necessary in a democracy to scrutinize ostentatious public use of wealth by elite citizens. He even admits that honours are personally welcome to those who receive them,<sup>152</sup> rather than solely means of promoting self-sacrificing civic virtue. This insistence on strict reciprocity, despite the potential special advantages it brings to the wealthy, recalls Thucydides' Pericles insistence, amid much egalitarian and 'Nakonian' rhetoric, that the Athenian democracy rightly honours those who contribute the most.

Nevertheless, Demosthenes must have been aware that purely 'Dikaiopolitan' arguments in favour of his own crowning could provoke allegations of egoism: he apologizes at the outset for the necessarily self-regarding character of his speech.<sup>153</sup> He must also have been aware of possible 'Nakonian'

<sup>149</sup> Demosthenes 18.1–2, 6.

<sup>150</sup> Compare Demosthenes' regulatory account of Athenian public speech norms at 20.106, discussed previously at the end of Section 3.

<sup>151</sup> Demosthenes 18.112–14, 119.

<sup>152</sup> See Demosthenes 18.120.

<sup>153</sup> Demosthenes 18.3–4.

objections to the confirmation of the crown. For example, opponents could have argued that, in view of the civic discord which the crown had provoked, Demosthenes, as a committed, self-sacrificing citizen, should voluntarily relinquish it, for the sake of civic harmony. They could also have argued that Demosthenes should have been willing to spare the city the expense of his crown, and of future crowns for which it set a precedent. Indeed, he should have been content with the successes which he had achieved for his polis, and with his existing integration within a close-knit community of civic patriots. The likelihood that Demosthenes was aware of such potential challenges is greatly increased by the fact that he had himself responded to a proposal to curtail benefactors' rewards for the sake of the common good in his *Against Leptines*.

Probably partly as a result of this awareness, Demosthenes channelled his sense of earned entitlement in the *On the Crown* into monopolistic 'Nakonian' rhetoric. The speech emphasizes his own flawless civic virtue in a way which implies that the upholding of the honours for him, or other benefactors, equates to the upholding of civic unity and of rigorous standards of civic virtue, as well as to the encouragement of others to be virtuous.<sup>154</sup> Indeed, Demosthenes attempts at one point to focus the debate on the question of which life the jurors would rather have, his or Aeschines'.<sup>155</sup> He thus makes the debate a question of the definition and protection of civic standards of public service and good character. He even ties the upholding of the honours for him to the dignity of the people themselves, which Aeschines now threatens: they voted for the measures which Demosthenes successfully promoted. Aeschines must be prosecuting due to a lack of patriotism.<sup>156</sup> By implication, there can be no good 'Nakonian' grounds for denying Demosthenes the crown: anyone who opposes it is indulging his own private motives and showing his detachment from 'Nakonian' civic community.

The same phenomenon of speakers embedding a 'Dikaiopolitan' sense of entitlement in 'Nakonian' claims is quite widely attested in other speeches of the type under consideration in this section. In prosecution speeches seeking the expulsion or exclusion of a citizen, relevant rhetoric usually involves attempts to harmonize competing imperatives to protect personal honour and desert and to give priority to the common good.<sup>157</sup> This is evident, for example, in Lysias' first speech against the younger Alcibiades. Probably partly because the speaker wished to avoid allegations of sycophancy, the speaker is very explicit in his appeal to desert norms: the speaker claims that his father had previously engaged in feud with Alcibiades' father, and that he himself

<sup>154</sup> See, for example, Demosthenes 18.108–10, 120.

<sup>155</sup> Demosthenes 18.265.

<sup>156</sup> See Demosthenes 18.123–5.

<sup>157</sup> On these competing imperatives in Athenian litigation, and different ways of responding to them, compare Christ (1998), 161–6, 191–2.

had suffered bad experiences at Alcibiades' hands. Nevertheless, probably partly in order to counter suspicions of self-interest, the speech subsequently couches the speaker's pursuit of retribution in *ad hominem* 'Nakonian' rhetoric. The speaker represents Alcibiades as a civic villain, distinguished by 'badness' (κακία), 'viciousness' (πονηρία), cowardice, and disrespect for the laws, whose character disqualifies him from citizenship.<sup>158</sup> Wilson identifies a similar dynamic in Demosthenes *Against Meidias*: Demosthenes seeks to present the defence of his personal honour, compromised by the assault he has suffered in the theatre, as a defence of the 'democratic Everyman' and of the common good against a concrete threat.<sup>159</sup>

In a similar example from a defence speech designed to avert exile or disenfranchisement, the speaker of Lysias 7, on trial for impiety and facing possible exile, claims to have performed his civic obligations (τὰ ἐμοὶ προστεταγμένα) 'more enthusiastically' (προθυμότερον) than he was 'forced' (ἡναγκαζόμεν) to do by the polis.<sup>160</sup> Such emphasis on his own far-reaching, 'Nakonian' virtue would have been provocative in itself: as the speaker himself claims, ostentatious largesse could provoke animosity as well as gratitude.<sup>161</sup> Wilson even sees in this claim a provocative attempt to import wealth at a liturgical level into the criteria for good, engaged citizenship.<sup>162</sup>

Moreover, the speaker here intensifies the provocative effects of his rhetoric by failing to concede an obligation to go beyond the obligations of circumscribed, 'Dikaiopolitan' citizenship. Rather than admitting such an obligation, he controversially presents his satisfaction of formal requirements as itself supererogative, engaged euergetism: he calls his supposedly 'Nakonian' acts προστεταγμένα, and goes on to list obligatory payments and liturgies (trierarchies, εἰσφορά and χορηγίαι).<sup>163</sup> This fits into a more general tendency for Athenian speakers to 'present the fulfilment of their duties as if they were carrying out supererogatory acts of euergetism'.<sup>164</sup> Such rhetoric almost invited criticism for falling short of the 'Nakonian' expectations of going beyond the necessary which it itself invoked.

A comparison in this respect can be made with an inscription from the deme of Halai Aixonides, dating to the 360s. A text of 368/7<sup>165</sup> contains a new deme regulation, probably a response to corruption and unrest in the deme,<sup>166</sup> which establishes a 'Dikaiopolitan' distrustful, impersonal check on corruption: deme magistrates must in future deposit accounts in a box at the

<sup>158</sup> Lysias 14.1–2, 9–10, 23, 31, 43–4.

<sup>159</sup> Wilson (2000), 156–8.

<sup>160</sup> Lysias 7.31.

<sup>161</sup> Lysias 7.32: if I had been only moderately generous, I would not now be facing exile.

<sup>162</sup> Wilson (2000), 183.

<sup>163</sup> Lysias 7.31.

<sup>164</sup> Liddel (2007), 266.

<sup>165</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1174.

<sup>166</sup> Wilhelm (1984), 209. Note a near contemporary decree referring to something which must not be repeated (IG II<sup>2</sup> 1175) and a near contemporary dedication to Aphrodite, possibly in her capacity of patron of concord, by twenty-four deme members, appointed and praised by the demesmen (IG II<sup>2</sup> 2820); see Whitehead (1986), 112.



end of each month. They will be able to rely only on these documents when they face formal scrutiny. Notably, the drafters of this decree praised compliance with this 'Dikaiopolitan' requirement in terms more familiar from praise of 'Nakonian' generosity, in a way which recalls the rhetoric of Lysias 7: the magistrates in Nausigenes' archonship are already depositing such accounts as willing volunteers (*ἐθελονταί*).<sup>167</sup>

This bold attribution of unimpeachability to these magistrates may well have exposed them to hostility from rivals or from sceptical demesmen. This is the case not least because the rhetoric provocatively implied that the mere avoidance of corruption was a substantial civic contribution. In practice, representation of the magistrates' respect for procedure as something like 'Nakonian' generosity would have only made plain the limits of the virtue the magistrates had shown: it did not involve financial sacrifice of the kind normally expected of 'willing' civic benefactors.<sup>168</sup> Moreover, this rhetoric would have been provocative to all those in whom it implied a relative lack of civic virtue: not only those who were suspected of embezzlement, but also those who had simply previously failed to submit accounts voluntarily. It also left little room for peaceful 'Nakonian' objections to the new measure as a bureaucratic constraint on free, trusting interaction between demesmen, because it gave a semblance of monopolistic 'Nakonian' legitimacy to the essentially 'Dikaiopolitan' measure itself. It may not be coincidental that the magistrates mentioned in the decree were the objects of curse tablets, which Wilhelm interpreted as a sign of the 'ohnmächtige Hass' of poorer deme members against pretentious superiors.<sup>169</sup>

## 5. CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' assumptions were central reference points for citizens of Greek poleis, especially Athens, not only when they were framing static laws, regulations, and theories, but also when they were engaging in dynamic political interaction and debate. Indeed, this chapter has argued that the two paradigms sustained and reinforced each other as a pair in practice as well as in theory. It was practically necessary that community-oriented norms should take a radical, 'Nakonian' form, in order to compensate for the self-assertion and inequalities resulting from the workings of individualistic norms which had radical, 'Dikaiopolitan' forms.

<sup>167</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1174, ll. 7–10.

<sup>168</sup> Compare Whitehead (1986), 359, on expectations of elite euergetism at deme level.

<sup>169</sup> Wilhelm (1984), 209–10.

The radical character of the two paradigms, and contradictions between them, had a very important consequence, explored in this chapter. In order to make persuasive, constructive contributions to political debate, which reached out to and unified a varied audience, citizens had to apply the two paradigms subtly, often imaginatively combining the two, tolerating and exploiting indeterminacies and contradictions. Aristotle suggests in his account of political expertise in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the active citizen must maintain flexibility and vagueness. He insists that political skill is the same state as 'prudence' (*φρόνησις*), which is not a form of 'knowledge' (*ἐπιστήμη*), concerned solely with concepts and universal truths. Rather, it is an ability to reach practical conclusions about particular contingent questions, open to deliberation and debate, about the good life for self, community, or species. This ability, which can be acquired only through experience, requires subtle application of universal ethical truths about the good for man, which can themselves be acquired only through experience.<sup>170</sup>

Aristotle's discussion makes it appear itself a universal truth that the active citizen should tolerate indeterminacy and exceptions to rules. Similarly, Williams saw as a crucial, universally relevant insight of some Greek ethical thinkers the view that particular ethical problems are unavoidably complex, and resistant to resolution through systematic rules.<sup>171</sup> The discussion in this chapter suggests a different conclusion: it was the particular nature of Greek civic political cultures in the fourth century and Hellenistic period which made it necessary for active citizens to engage in relevant types of doublethink. This was because it was very difficult to apply either 'Nakonian' or 'Dikaiopolitan' tropes concretely and unadulteratedly while maintaining consensus. In a similar way, it was arguably precisely the particularly rigid form of Greek personal status distinctions, between slave and free and between citizens of different ethnic origins, which made necessary the kinds of day-to-day ignoring or blurring of those distinctions, in socio-economic or artistic interactions, recently emphasized by some scholars:<sup>172</sup> doublethink and studied indeterminacy were necessary to Greek social cohesion. Despite the views of Williams and other sceptics about certain Enlightenment ideals, it remains at least a strong possibility that a political culture strongly dominated by proto-Kantian middling norms, of the kind found here to be quite weakly attested in Greek evidence, would allow much more scope for principled ethical and political clarity, precision, and consistency to be neither socially divisive nor insensitive to complexity.

In order to preserve constructive ambiguities, Greek citizens had to hold back from unambiguous, singleminded 'Dikaiopolitan' demands for just entitlements and 'Nakonian' aspirations to unity and purity, or unambiguous,

<sup>170</sup> Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1140a24–1142a30.

<sup>171</sup> See Williams (1993).

<sup>172</sup> See Cohen (2000); Vlassopoulos (2007b); compare Osborne (2011), esp. chs. 3–5.

singleminded fusions of the two. Partly because of the mutually reinforcing inherently radical natures of the two major paradigms, precise, systematic interpretations and applications of them could be very hard to accommodate. An extreme example of this is offered by the uneasy relationship between the Classical polis and its probing or systematizing philosophers, symbolized by Socrates' trial and death. However, relevant types of disruptive specificity were also characteristic of acute disputes between non-philosopher citizens, of the kind which could lead to attempts to exile opponents. Such disputes can be seen as circumscribed, relatively mild versions of the phenomenon analysed in the next chapter: *stasis* leading to citizen expulsion. As argued there, such *stasis* often involved the most extreme collapses of the civic balancing act examined in this chapter, when tense circumstances left citizens little choice but to crystallize the varied demands of their political cultures into coherent, unequivocal, practical ideologies.



## Expulsion through *Stasis* and Civic Political Cultures

### 1. INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1. Approaches to Exclusionary *Stasis* and Civil War

Acute civic war, full-scale *stasis*, was a hallmark of the Greek polis across the whole period covered by this book, Hellenistic as well as late Classical. *Stasis* can be interpreted in many different ways: banal or heroic, interest- or value-driven, regressive or revolutionary. This chapter attempts to contribute to a complex characterization of *stasis*, taking as its focus what can be called ‘exclusionary’ *stasis*, namely, *stasis* which involved the expulsion of citizens. In accordance with the aims of this book, evidence for the rhetoric, ideologies, and behaviour of factionaries in exclusionary *stasis* is used to probe influential underlying assumptions, ambiguities, and contradictions, and identify their place in Greek civic political culture and their effects on practical politics.

Three questions are addressed in tandem. First, on what political assumptions and ideas did factionaries in exclusionary *stasis* rely? Second, what was the relationship between those ideas and those dominant in times of civic peace, in the relevant poleis and in the wider Greek civic world? Comparison is made with the peacetime ideas of citizenship identified and discussed in Chapters 1–4, but also, where possible, with additional contextual evidence from relevant poleis.

Answering these first two questions is important in its own right, not least in order to further enrich the picture of poleis’ political cultures, but also as a prerequisite for tackling a third, more difficult question: can political culture be counted among the causes of exclusionary *stasis*, and, if so, how did it exert an impact? Answering this question makes it necessary to engage in contentious debates about the causes of Greek *stasis*, which tend to focus on the Classical rather than Hellenistic evidence, and of civil war in general.

Modern political scientists have attempted to design rigorous methods for determining the causes of civil war, by testing for statistically significant

factors. For example, Fearon and Laitin have attempted to show that factors such as ethnic diversity or socio-economic inequality do not correlate statistically with a country's susceptibility to civil war.<sup>1</sup> There is not sufficiently comprehensive data concerning Greek *stasis* to attempt social scientific causal analysis. In any case, those methods are suited to studying certain types of cause much better than others. They are well-suited to identifying significant factors which are external to human minds and easily quantifiable, such as, in Fearon and Laitin's case, the percentage of 'rugged' territory in a country.<sup>2</sup> They are also well-suited to revealing the relevance of strategic considerations in determining when and where factionaries strike, as Kalyvas' work on the modern Greek Civil War shows.<sup>3</sup>

Those methods are, however, much less well-suited to identifying and analysing the factors which imbue individuals with intellectual and emotional motivations to perpetrate or support civil war violence. Fearon and Laitin regard this as unnecessary: they claim to be following a 'Hobbesian' approach, which treats vicious conflict as the normal state of human interaction.<sup>4</sup> This Hobbesian approach is, however, very difficult to reconcile with the complexity and variety of observable human motives, especially pervasive tendencies to identify with fellow humans and abhor violence.

Giving a greater role to factionaries' psychology, many modern ancient historians have interpreted *stasis* as a result of competition for power between ambitious members of relatively narrow civic elites.<sup>5</sup> Also in a way which allows a psychological dimension, others have interpreted *stasis* as a form of class conflict, resulting from deeper inequalities, which involved broader competition for power and resources between richer and poorer citizens.<sup>6</sup> These rival analyses are not incompatible alternatives: there were Greek cases consistent with each. Moreover, in some cases, intra-elite struggle ran in parallel with, or led to, broader civic conflicts.<sup>7</sup> In connection with these general approaches, some scholars have emphasized the role of the multipolar and unstable Greek interstate system in exacerbating conflicts: factionaries frequently became partisans of rival external powers.<sup>8</sup>

Many arguments have also been offered to explain the cohesiveness of factions in *stasis* and their tendency to make extreme, destabilizing demands. For example, Gehrke adds a more complex psychological dimension by arguing that the 'Bipolarität' and 'Exklusivität' of *stasis* factions were a predictable psychological response to the competitive pursuit of interests and

<sup>1</sup> See Fearon and Laitin (2003).

<sup>2</sup> See Fearon and Laitin (2003), 80, 85.

<sup>3</sup> See Kalyvas (2006).

<sup>4</sup> See Fearon and Laitin (2003), 76.

<sup>5</sup> e.g. Ruschenbusch (1978), 34–41; Gehrke (1985), 328–39; Forsdyke (2005), chs. 1–3 (emphasizing the importance of an elite 'politics of exile' in the Archaic period, and outside Athens in the Classical period).

<sup>6</sup> e.g. de Ste Croix (1981); Fuks (1984).

<sup>7</sup> Gehrke (1985), 339–51.

<sup>8</sup> e.g. Ruschenbusch (1978), 29–34; Gehrke (1985), ch. 2.

honour inherent in Greek politics,<sup>9</sup> intensified by *stasis* itself. The internal solidarity of factions was due to leaders' personal charisma and factionaries' personal connections.<sup>10</sup>

All of these interpretations rely on the view that *stasis* was almost always due to factors external to the normal functioning of Greek poleis in this period,<sup>11</sup> in peace and war: most elements of political cultures and most civic institutions were a brake on, not a stimulus to, the ambition and struggle held to be characteristic of *stasis*. This attitude has been sustained by, and itself sustained, confidence in the exemplary qualities of Classical civic practices and values.<sup>12</sup> It has also cohered with more general narratives of the 'decline of the polis', now commonly challenged,<sup>13</sup> which make *stasis* a sign of declining civic commitment and a turbulent interstate situation from the Peloponnesian War onwards.

This general approach has great intuitive force as an explanatory model of Greek *stasis*; this chapter is not intended to question the importance of the factors mentioned above. However, this approach cannot fully explain all cases of *stasis*. It would be easy to believe that some civic Greeks were not temperamentally immune to engaging in *stasis* in ways which were narrowly self-interested, ambitious for power, competitive, unscrupulous, and manipulative. However, *stasis* was a pervasive phenomenon, in which a high proportion of civic Greeks became embroiled at some point in their lives.

Moreover, this general approach is hard to reconcile with the argument in my Introduction that at least some of the fundamental political assumptions which provide political agents with basic orientation are almost inevitably at least implicit in almost any of their political action and rhetoric. It also does not allow most participants in *stasis* to be seen as complex, rounded individuals, shaped by a wide range of experiences and mentors. Nor does it allow relevant poleis to be seen, even in the midst of *stasis*, as complex political communities with sophisticated political cultures, integrated in networks of such complex political communities, influential on citizens' perspectives through a multifaceted collective life encompassing religion, education, culture, commensality, and consumption, as well as politics and war. As a result, it cannot account fully for the sense of political and cultural *legitimacy* necessary to give many factionaries sufficient confidence and ideological conviction to perpetrate political violence and expel opponents, as well as the means to attract wider support among fellow citizens.

<sup>9</sup> Compare Ruschenbusch (1978), 34–41; Finley (1981), 80; Gehrke (1985), 343–50; Fisher (2000); cf. Cartledge (2009), 23.

<sup>10</sup> Gehrke (1985), 245–9, 344–51.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Gehrke (1985), 6.

<sup>12</sup> For example, it is a fundamental claim of Forsdyke (2005) that the Classical Athenian democracy's practices and values were conducive to both justice and political stability, including a reduction in exilings.

<sup>13</sup> e.g. Gauthier (1985); Ma (2002a).

Moreover, an explanation in terms of pure self-interest, competitiveness, and greed cannot explain some specific features common to many *staseis*. It cannot fully explain cases in which factionaries engaged in savage, ultimately self-destructive<sup>14</sup> violence in the name of extremist ideologies without wide appeal, which had the potential to sustain only brief new regimes. For example, it cannot fully explain why some factionaries were so committed to their causes that they continued to fight even when their situation became hopeless, or resorted to collective suicide to avoid an accommodation with their civic enemies.<sup>15</sup> In such cases, narrowly self-interested calculation would usually have urged restraint rather than escalation. It would also usually have urged the adoption of different ideological claims, more suitable, like ideologies in Classical Marxist theory, for lulling opponents into acquiescence in the harming of their own interests.

Admittedly, a raw self-interest approach is probably the most common one in ancient Greeks' own accounts. It is clear, for example, in the emphasis in ancient historiography on personal ambition, acquisitiveness, envy, and irrationality as causes of *stasis*: for example, Thucydides' and Polybius' set-piece accounts of *stasis* in Corcyra and Kios respectively.<sup>16</sup> This consideration gives some support to that approach. However, it is not surprising that ancient thinkers habituated into dominant civic norms regarded destructive *stasis* as a result of the failure, setting aside, or perversion of those norms, a 'disease of the body politic',<sup>17</sup> not a result of the influence and application of those norms.

What is required to account for many *staseis* is an explanatory model which gives weight to the role of civic ideals in shaping how at least some factionaries conceived and represented their material and political interests. This model should incorporate factors commonly emphasized in ancient and modern explanations of *stasis*, especially greed, ambition, rivalry, and inequality, but show how those factors interacted with norms, assumptions, and emotional impulses imbued in citizens by their political cultures.

## 1.2. Civic Political Cultures as Causes of *Stasis*

There are two principal possible ways in which political cultures could have influenced factionaries. First, suppressed or marginal norms in poleis' political cultures may have come to the fore in *stasis*: for example, norms authorizing the 'rule of the strongest' or encouraging untrammelled pursuit of self-interest,

<sup>14</sup> On the tendency for *stasis* to weaken the power of affected states severely, see Gehrke (1985), 358–9.

<sup>15</sup> For this phenomenon, see Gehrke (1985), 251–2.

<sup>16</sup> Thucydides 3.70–85, with Price (2001); Polybius 15.21 (compare 4.16.11–21.12 on Peloponnesian Kynaitha), with Eckstein (1995), 134.

<sup>17</sup> See Brock (2013), 74–6.



or making gang-like cliques a paradigm of political organization. There is some good evidence for this phenomenon: for example, Aristotle reports that certain oligarchs swear gang-like oaths to be hostile to the people and to devise whatever bad things they can against them.<sup>18</sup> However, this chapter, which builds on the arguments of Chapter 4 about less intense civic conflicts leading to exile, examines the second relevant possibility: that the very same norms which were dominant in peacetime, and ambiguities and tensions within and between them, could provoke and escalate *stasis*.

Explanations of this latter kind feature in a line of thought in existing ancient and modern discussions of *stasis*, less prominent than that discussed in the previous sub-section, which makes *stasis* an intrinsic feature of Greek civic life, not a symptom of the fragility of polis values or of post-Classical civic decline. In explaining *stasis* in Book V of his *Politics*, Aristotle gives considerable scope to pursuit of honour and gain, as well as factors such as political corruption and plotting. However, he also stresses the importance of participants' mindset, especially their ideas of equality. According to him, citizens engage in *stasis* because they perceive that they do not possess a share in civic power and resources consistent with their own 'conception' (*ὑπόληψις*) of equality, either democratic and absolute ('arithmetic equality') or aristocratic and proportional ('geometrical equality').<sup>19</sup> For Aristotle, these conceptions of equality are imbued in citizens through exposure to the ethos of their polis or their sub-group within it.<sup>20</sup>

In recent scholarship, the view that *stasis* in the fourth century and later was a predictable product of prominent notions of citizenship has been most forcefully promoted by Loraux. Loraux suggests that citizens of Classical poleis were (often subconsciously) committed to a paradigm of the good polis as a site of intense political debate and competition. She argues that this often subconscious paradigm reflects the nature of truly political interaction. Accordingly, the principal way in which *stasis* is integral to the polis for Loraux is as a positive, paradoxically unifying force, the genuinely collective activity of intense political conflict.<sup>21</sup> However, there are also hints in Loraux's

<sup>18</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1310a2–12.

<sup>19</sup> Aristotle *Politics* Book V, esp. 1301a25–39, 1302a20–31; Balot (2001), esp. 47. Compare Xenophon *Agasilaos* 7.2.

<sup>20</sup> As Weed (2007), 19, 99, 124–9, 213–14, points out, in Aristotle's moral psychology, it is relevant vices of character which directly give rise to the flawed perceptions of equality or justice relevant in *stasis*: specifically, democratic factionaries' envy and oligarchic factionaries' vanity (pp. 118–24). Nevertheless, according to Aristotle's political theory, citizens' character states are in turn shaped by their civic environment: character states are obtained through habituation (e.g. Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1105a17–1105b18; Burnyeat (1980)); and, for citizens, such habituation necessarily takes place principally in the polis, conditioned by the polis' 'character' (*ἡθός*) (see Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1366a2–16; cf. *Politics* 1337a11–18).

<sup>21</sup> Loraux (2001), esp. Part II; Loraux (2005), e.g. 48, 79. Compare Finley (1981), 82; (1983), 105–6.

work that not all civic unrest took this positive, unifying, and rejuvenating form: civic unrest could also take the form of brutal struggle, of a kind which could dissolve a polis. Cases involving exilings almost necessarily fell into this second category.

Loraux hints that what she sees as the dominant fundamental Greek civic paradigm in the Classical period, especially from the later fifth century onwards, that of the fraternal, indivisible polis, could be a cause of problems and exclusivity. She implies that this is true even in the case of Athens after 403, where there was no further outright *stasis* for many years. She suggests that there was a 'price to pay' for the Athenians' successful, unifying 'forgetting' of the events of 404–3, and that the suppression of recent trauma was hardly a way of conclusively overcoming it. Significantly, her final book, Loraux (2005), was entitled *La tragédie d'Athènes*.<sup>22</sup> Loraux also hints that this prominent paradigm contributed, in other cases, to outright, destructive *stasis*. She gives or implies two main explanations.

First, Loraux argues on the basis of psychoanalytic theory that, when they did break out, conflicts between artificial 'brothers' were much more intense, because of the perceived betrayals involved, than comparable political conflicts in societies whose members perceive themselves as less closely related.<sup>23</sup> Second, she implies that ideals of unity inhibited pluralistic political interactions, which are a prerequisite of sustainable political life.

Loraux thinks that this latter diagnosis of Greek political problems, which has also been elaborated by Saxonhouse in her study of Greek 'fear of diversity',<sup>24</sup> was made by some ancient Greeks.<sup>25</sup> Loraux interprets along these lines Heraclitus' claim that a barley mixture (*κυκεών*) separates into its component parts (*δίσταται*) if not kept in motion, a phenomenon which Heraclitus reportedly physically demonstrated before the Ephesian assembly when asked for advice about *δμόνοια*. According to Loraux, the implication is that a polis of diverse parts can be held together only through constant 'motion', a metaphor for intense debate and competition. A lack of such 'motion' produces destructive factionalism.<sup>26</sup> This appeal to Heraclitus forms part of Loraux's broader argument, shared with Detienne, that Archaic political cultures and some Pre-Socratic philosophy gave much greater scope to pluralism and ambiguity than their Classical successors.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Loraux (2001), 193, 261.

<sup>23</sup> e.g. Loraux (2001), 213; compare 196.

<sup>24</sup> Saxonhouse (1992), e.g. 51.

<sup>25</sup> Compare Saxonhouse (1992), 1–19, 63–4, 155–7 (on Classical Athenian drama and philosophy).

<sup>26</sup> Loraux (2001), 108–11, 122, discussing Heraclitus fr. 125 DK and Plutarch *De garrulitate* 511b9–c5; compare Saxonhouse (1992), 33–7. Compare Loraux's previous scepticism about Athenian idealization of civic homogeneity in Loraux (1981), e.g. 200–1, 281–4; (1993).

<sup>27</sup> Loraux (2001), chs. 4–5; cf. Detienne (1996), chs. 4–5, 7. Compare Shanske (2007), 129–42, identifying a contrast between a 'Heraclitean' Thucydides and Plato.

Loraux's and Saxonhouse's association of *stasis* with the suppression of pluralism echoes Machiavelli's insistence on the need for vigorous competition in a healthy republic. It also recalls Hegel's more directly relevant claim that the instability of Greek poleis, especially in the fourth century and later, was largely due to the tenacity of the ideal of substantial unity, whose implementation was hard to reconcile with subjectivity and diversity.<sup>28</sup>

This chapter concentrates on developing some of Loraux's and Saxonhouse's, and Aristotle's, insights, while keeping the focus specifically on cases of exclusionary *stasis*. It goes beyond those insights by identifying a more complex and multifaceted set of causal processes. Diverse 'Nakonian' ideals could contribute to causing exclusionary *stasis* through processes more varied and complex than those summarized above. Moreover, 'Dikaiopolitan' and civic voluntarist norms, and their interaction with 'Nakonian' ideals, could also be crucial contributory factors in exclusionary *stasis*. The whole complex picture of civic political cultures developed in previous chapters, and refined in this chapter, is necessary to account for civic political cultures' contribution to exclusionary *stasis*.

The result is an ambivalent picture. Visions of the good polis, conscious or unconscious, were often at stake in exclusionary *stasis*. Episodes could involve a combination of idealism and partisanship, political passion and violence, principle and exclusivity. Such combinations are open, like their equivalents in modern episodes of political revolution, to very varied moral assessments. Some ancient factionaries who promoted more democratic or egalitarian institutions and ideals in such contexts might even be relatively sympathetic figures for modern observers: they resisted moves towards elite monopolization of political power. However, it cannot be overlooked that even those factionaries perpetrated violence and advocated dogmatic ideologies, which might drive exclusion even of others with democratic or egalitarian aspirations, during the *stasis* itself or after the subsequent establishment of a democratic regime. Such ideologies precluded or hindered solutions to problems based on education, discussion, persuasion, and institutions, preference for which helped, probably more than simple conservative fear of revolution, to make figures such as Thucydides, Aristotle, and Polybius almost entirely hostile to *stasis*.

The following section analyses a particularly revealing case-study, *stasis* and exile in early fourth-century Phlius in the north-east Peloponnese. Subsequent sections then examine thematically in turn the main processes identified in the Phliasian case, merging the evidence of other case-studies.<sup>29</sup> In each case, it is

<sup>28</sup> Hegel *Philosophy of Right* 185. Compare Treves (1943), 134; Grasmück (1978), 26; Murray (1990c), 21; Balot (2001), ch. 6; Cartledge (2009), 23.

<sup>29</sup> For more comprehensive catalogues of episodes of *stasis*: Seibert (1979), A I and II; Gehrke (1985), Part I; Berger (1992).

mainly the rhetoric and behaviour of *stasis* leaders which are accessible to study. However, even that rhetoric gives important insights into the ideological claims to which less prominent faction members and supporters were sympathetic.

The method employed in each of the case-studies is the one identified in the Introduction: the reconstruction of the basic political assumptions and beliefs which provide the best explanation for the attested surface rhetoric and action, including often quite extreme political conviction and violence. There is some direct evidence for the rhetoric of Greeks with a stake in political conflicts, especially that of engaged historians: Thucydides, Polybius and, above all, Xenophon. Relevant examples of their rhetoric are encountered in this chapter mainly in the form of their portrayals and praise of factionaries with whom they at least partly identified, in their narratives of full exclusionary *stasis*.

The factional activities set out in those narratives, the other principal evidence for this chapter, are much less straightforward to use as evidence for factional ideologies and assumptions, precisely because of the shaping influence of those historians' own political positions and interpretations of *stasis*. Both scepticism and imagination are required to reconstruct factionaries' rhetoric and behaviour. Even after this stage, it is particularly difficult, as mentioned in the Introduction, to apply the method of interpretation followed here to bare action. As a result, care is taken in this chapter to apply the main checks set out in the Introduction. It should be possible to show at least one of two things: first, that it would not have made sense to the factionaries in question to act as they did unless guided or inspired by the underlying assumptions and attitudes reconstructed; or, second, that those assumptions and attitudes were made explicit in other contexts by these or contemporary Greeks, comparable in their circumstances in significant ways with the factionaries concerned, and that they represent at least part of the best explanation of the factionaries' behaviour and rhetoric.

The use of the case-study method raises the risk that this chapter could be attacked for selecting only cases in which the factors emphasized here were prominent. It should be emphasized, however, that the argument is not that those factors were exclusively responsible for exclusionary *stasis*, only that they played a significant role in important cases, such as those examined here. Moreover, even if it does not use statistical testing or experiment with counterfactuals, the chapter does use another common, recognized method of establishing causation in political studies: it identifies complex causal mechanisms<sup>30</sup> by which 'Nakonian', 'Dikaiopolitan', and civic voluntarist norms contributed to causing exclusionary *stasis*.

<sup>30</sup> Compare Brady (2008), esp. section 7.

## 2. STASIS IN FOURTH-CENTURY PHLIUS

### 2.1. Narrative of Early Fourth-Century Phliasian Stasis and Exilings

The evidence for early fourth-century Phliasian *stasis* and exilings is Xenophon's account in his *Hellenica*. Although heavily shaped by ideological, philosophical, and rhetorical factors,<sup>31</sup> Xenophon's account nonetheless offers good material for reconstructing early fourth-century Phliansians' ideologies. Since Xenophon was himself a partisan, pro-Spartan, oligarchically-minded resident of the Peloponnese in this period, his interpretations and claims give a direct insight into relevant oligarchic thinking, which gives weight to the ideological implications of his narrative of Phliasian oligarchic behaviour. Admittedly, Xenophon could easily have distorted particularly strongly the behaviour of Phliansians less committed to the Spartan cause. Nevertheless, the details which Xenophon offers, which are not obviously products of tendentious distortion, can be used to reconstruct those other Phliansians' own more positive self-representation.

Phlius had long been a loyal Spartan oligarchy. However, the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War saw the disintegration of the Spartan-enforced oligarchic order. There were already Phliasian pro-Spartan exiles during the Corinthian War, when, afraid of invasion by the Athenian Iphikrates' forces in 392, the Phliansians entrusted their acropolis to the Spartans. Xenophon claims that, despite their good relations with the exiles, the Spartans did not raise the question of the exiles' restoration while holding the acropolis, but departed when the Phliansians rallied, leaving the polis and the constitution intact.<sup>32</sup> Xenophon's presentation of the opposition between the Spartans' expected and actual behaviour implies that the exiles had initially been expelled in connection with the foundation or preservation of a new, more democratic constitution in Phlius.<sup>33</sup>

It was only after the King's Peace of 386 that the Spartans were sufficiently confident to impose the Phliasian exiles' restoration. In 384, after an embassy from the exiles, the Spartan ephors sent a message to the Phliansians, stating that the exiles were friends of Sparta and had been unjustly expelled. Fearing a Spartan invasion, the Phliansians voted in assembly to reinstate the exiles and restore their property, paying compensation to those citizens who had bought exiles' confiscated property from the polis; disputed cases would be settled judicially.<sup>34</sup> However, in 381, when King Agesipolis of Sparta had set off on campaign to northern Greece, the Phliansians, after long deferring the implementation of their earlier decision, denied the returned exiles 'just treatment'

<sup>31</sup> Pontier (2007).

<sup>32</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.4.15.

<sup>33</sup> Compare Cartledge (1987), 262–3.

<sup>34</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.2.8–10.

(τὰ δίκαια). The returned exiles insisted that their cases should be heard 'in an equal court' (ἐν ἴσῳ δικαστηρίῳ), probably a foreign court,<sup>35</sup> but possibly a tribunal with equal representation for the former exiles and the incumbent citizens, of the type later established at Phlius by King Agesilaos.<sup>36</sup> The incumbent, democratic Phliasians refused this demand, ruling that the cases should be heard 'in the polis itself': either in a domestic court, as opposed to a foreign court, or in the full civic assembly, as opposed to a lesser domestic court or a foreign court. As a result, the returned exiles made an unauthorized embassy to Sparta to complain about their treatment. For this they were fined by the Phliasian authorities.

By continuing their embassy after incurring the fine, the restored exiles became exiles once again, at least de facto. They persuaded the Spartan ephors to order the mobilization of Spartan forces to help them, led by Agesilaos, who had guest-friends among the exiles. In response to Phliasian embassies, he offered not to invade the city if the Phliasians surrendered their acropolis to him, as in 392, but the Phliasians refused. Consequently, Agesilaos besieged Phlius. Some Spartans complained that a city of five thousand was becoming estranged from Sparta for the sake of a few men: the incumbent citizens made their numbers clear by holding assemblies on the frontier, in view of the Spartan army. However, Agesilaos persuaded the exiles to organize common messes (συσσίτια), financed through loans, presumably from the Spartans. They incorporated into these συσσίτια the relatives and friends who left the city to join them, themselves becoming de facto exiles. As a result, a well-disciplined contingent of one thousand exiles took shape, a force sufficient to dispel Spartan doubts.<sup>37</sup>

The siege continued for twenty months, with the Phliasians avoiding capitulation by halving food rations. A certain Delphion suppressed any dissent or moves to surrender, with the aid of a force of three hundred men which he had assembled. Nevertheless, food did eventually run out, compelling the Phliasians' capitulation. Given free rein over the settlement, Agesilaos set up a tribunal composed of fifty of the exiles and fifty of the (far more numerous) men in the city, to deliberate about who should live or die and to draw up a new constitution.<sup>38</sup> In the following decades, Phlius was a model pro-Spartan polis, most probably an oligarchy.<sup>39</sup> Xenophon devoted a whole chapter to extolling its citizens' virtues as heroic Spartan allies, loyal and courageous.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Hatzfeld (1936–1939), vol. II, 90, n. 2; Lonis (1991), 106, n. 6; Loraux (2001), 243. For foreign courts in the fourth-century Peloponnese: *IPArk* 15, ll. 19–22; Rhodes–Osborne, *GHI* 101, ll. 24–35.

<sup>36</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.3.25; cf. Rhodes–Osborne, *GHI* 85B, ll. 21–2.

<sup>37</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.3.10–17.

<sup>38</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.3.21–5.

<sup>39</sup> Cartledge (1987), 265–6.

<sup>40</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.2.1–3.1.

Some of the former incumbent citizens were presumably sentenced to death by the post-capitulation tribunal. This tribunal may also have imposed sentences of exile. Others fled to pre-empt the decisions of the new regime: Delphion and a 'criminal' who had assisted him, and stolen arms from the besiegers, fled while the result of the embassy of capitulation was awaited. However their exile had come about, there were anti-Spartan Phliasians exiles in the region, settled in at least one stronghold and mobilized against the incumbent regime, in the 370s and 360s.<sup>41</sup> Wilhelm even restored 'the exiles on the Trikaranon' as one signatory to the Common Peace mentioned in the 'letter to the Satraps' of 362/1.<sup>42</sup> If Wilhelm's speculative reconstruction is correct, this text would suggest that there was even a well-organized Phliasian exile community based around the Argive fort<sup>43</sup> on the Trikaranon, the hill directly overlooking Phlius' civic centre.<sup>44</sup>

## 2.2. Overview of Existing Scholarly Explanations of Ongoing Phliasian Stasis

A wide range of factors explains the second exile of the oligarchs in 381, the exile of anti-Spartan Phliasians from 379, and the deep-seated Phliasian civic tensions which underlay both. Modern scholarship about these Phliasian civic conflicts has concentrated on the question whether they were results of internal competition within a small civic elite<sup>45</sup> or of ideological disputes involving many more citizens.<sup>46</sup> Both interpretations clearly contain some truth. Each side was championed by individual members of the Phliasian elite,<sup>47</sup> but also had far from negligible support in the wider population.<sup>48</sup>

Moreover, narrow self-interest surely motivated at least some of those involved, at least at some points. However, it is not in itself adequate to explain the two sides' sometimes desperate and extreme behaviour: for example, the exiles' decision not to bow to, but actively to alienate themselves from, their much more numerous fellow citizens, something which cannot have appeared a particularly efficient route to material security and success, even with the

<sup>41</sup> Diodorus 15.40.5; Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.2.5–9; Gehrke (1985), 56, 107–8; Pontier (2007), 371, n. 65.

<sup>42</sup> Wilhelm (1984), 101–2, restoring [οἱ ἐκ Τρικαρᾶ]νου φυνγ[άδες] in what is now l. 1 of Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 42.

<sup>43</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.2.1.

<sup>44</sup> Pritchett (1969), 72–4, 103–4.

<sup>45</sup> Thompson (1970), 226; Lintott (1982), 225.

<sup>46</sup> Legon (1967); Cartledge (1987), 262–3.

<sup>47</sup> Note the roles of Podanemos and Prokles, guest-friends of Archidamos and Agesilaos respectively (Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.3.13), and Delphion.

<sup>48</sup> One thousand Phliasians joined the exiles' makeshift *συσσίτια*; a good proportion of the five thousand citizens at home must have attended the assemblies on the frontier, to make them effective displays of strength.

prospect of Spartan help; and the incumbent citizens' surprisingly long endurance of an arduous siege, when an accommodation with the exiles and Sparta must often have seemed a more promising means of self-preservation.

Other influences on their motivation must, therefore, be sought. Fisher has shown how pursuit of individual and family honour contributed to the conflicts.<sup>49</sup> Another factor plausibly stressed in existing scholarship as responsible for the *stasis* and displacements is the destabilizing role of the hegemonic polis, Sparta, and its individual citizens.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, during the gradual early fourth-century disintegration of Spartan dominance in the Peloponnese, long-suppressed anti-Spartan resentment often found expression in democratic anger and activism, in Phlius and beyond.<sup>51</sup>

### 2.3. The Influence of Norms of Civic Voluntarism

The contribution of fundamental ideas of citizenship to the behaviour and ideologies of the parties involved has received less attention. The Phliasian *stasis* clearly illustrates the possible contribution to the creation and escalation of civic conflict, leading to expulsion and flight, of norms of civic voluntarism: norms authorizing and encouraging citizens' exercise of individual initiative in using, adapting, and inventing civic institutions. The influence of such norms, first considered in Chapter 3.3.3 but more extensively considered in Chapter 6, offers the best available explanation for the extent of the self-confidence and political initiative of the Phliasians involved in this *stasis*.

Loose civic procedures reliant on individual initiative enabled the incumbent democrats to postpone a decision about the exiles' property and entitlements until 381. Moreover, they subsequently enabled them to orchestrate a decision unfavourable to the exiles. Similarly, the democrats were later able to change the location of their assemblies, to the frontier, for political effect. When some democrats eventually themselves fled into exile in or after 379, they organized themselves as a military force and possibly also as a diplomatic 'polis-in-exile'.

An important reason for the conflict's intensity was that the oligarchs were equally adept at manipulating loose procedures, and imitating civic institutions, for strategic ends. The oligarchs possessed the practical capacity and abstract sense of legitimacy required to make unilateral embassies to Sparta. Moreover, under Agesilaos' guidance, they subsequently assumed a formal social and military structure, forming *συσσίτια*. Cartledge proposes the example of seventh-century Tiryns as a parallel for a 'private-enterprise

<sup>49</sup> Fisher (2000), 110–11.

<sup>50</sup> Legon (1967), 332; Cartledge (1987), 264; Pontier (2007), 368, 370.

<sup>51</sup> See Diodorus 15.40.



mess-system'.<sup>52</sup> In fact, however, in the light of the fluidity of public and private in Greek poleis, these *συσσίτια* probably represented an attempt to emulate a more immediate model, Sparta's 'public' *συσσίτια*: they were the exiles' improvised version of civic institutions.

#### 2.4. The Clash between Oligarchic 'Dikaiopolitan' Arguments and Democratic 'Nakonian' Arguments

Coexisting 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' basic norms also helped to create and sustain the conflicts which led to exilings. Prior to their second exile, the returned oligarchic exiles appealed uncompromisingly to norms of strict reciprocity and personal entitlement, whereas the democrats simultaneously appealed to 'Nakonian' principles.

On their embassy to Sparta in 384, the exiles emphasized that Phlius had always been loyal to Sparta while they had been in citizenship.<sup>53</sup> This was an appeal partly to Spartan self-interest, but also to strict reciprocal principles: the exiles had helped the Spartans in the past, so now deserved Spartan help. Principles of strict reciprocity also underlay their behaviour and posturing after their return to Phlius. Their insistence that their cases should be heard 'in an equal court' presupposed that the Phliasian polis was an association of disunited citizens with conflicting interests and entitlements: only an impartial body could judge the best way to preserve a fair civic contract, protecting rival citizens' separate interests.<sup>54</sup> In a way endorsed by Xenophon himself, the returned exiles made clear in this context that they perceived that they were victims of injustice, entitled to redress: there could be no justice (*δίκη*) if 'those committing injustice were to judge' (*οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δικάζοιεν*).<sup>55</sup> Underlying this demand is the view that civic institutions and regulations should give priority to protecting individual citizens' security and interests. The returned exiles probably also extended their application of strict reciprocal principles to broader political questions. Indeed, the question of their property was itself entwined with the balance of civic power.

The democrats answered the exiles' demand for an impartial tribunal by insisting that the cases should be heard 'in the polis itself'. This example presents problems which will recur in this chapter: it is necessary to use comparative evidence for Greek civic values to develop a best explanation of the deeper political assumptions, instincts, or arguments which underlay factionaries' surface rhetoric or actions. The best available candidate for the kind of justification which democrats would have sensed, intuited, or used in support of their insistence on the trials being held 'in the polis' is a 'Nakonian'

<sup>52</sup> Cartledge (1987), 229.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Loraux (2001), 242–4.

<sup>53</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.2.8.

<sup>55</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.3.10.

one, of a type well attested elsewhere: the exiles' personal interests and entitlements did not outweigh the collective interests and values of the Phliasian polis. Even if 'just' according to strict reciprocal principles, the satisfaction of the returned exiles' demands could disrupt 'Nakonian' unity and harm common interests. Indeed, it could destroy social cohesion by creating new, more wide-ranging property disputes, and increase the prospect of Spartan manipulation of Phliasian affairs. The community itself, or a representative court, was best placed to make a judgement consistent with the common good and common values. Moreover, referring the decision to a foreign court, or a tribunal with equal representation for both sides, would undermine the civic community's sovereignty.<sup>56</sup>

The underlying 'Nakonian' norms shaping the democrats' behaviour and self-presentation are also evident from their subsequent 'assemblies on the frontier'. Under the pressure of the siege, they treated their assemblies as political pageantry, opportunities symbolically to demonstrate and reinforce solidarity, rather than principally centres of debate and negotiation. Similarly, while under siege, the democrats' apparently universal self-control in tolerating half-rations reflects a culture of self-sacrifice and solidarity. 'Nakonian' norms probably also contributed to the creation and behaviour of the band of three hundred warriors, led by Delphion: it successfully used force to curb defections from the besieged community. As Cartledge points out, the band of three hundred was probably inspired by the three hundred-strong Spartan cavalry (*ἱππεῖς*),<sup>57</sup> a paradigm both of 'Nakonian' civic order and of the means to enforce it: the Phliasian democrats harnessed an elitist practice in the service of democratic order.

The conflict between the two sides was, therefore, to some extent a clash between oligarchs reliant on 'Dikaiopolitan' principles and democratic advocates of 'Nakonian' ones. This normative conflict was to lie at the heart of future Peloponnesian *staseis* and civic conflicts, reminiscent of the Phliasian case: for example, Hellenistic disputes between property-holders and reformers about the relative weight to be assigned to personal property rights, on the one hand, and to maintaining civic equality, solidarity, population and military strength, on the other, not only in revolutionary third- and second-century Sparta, where those disputes led to large-scale exilings,<sup>58</sup> but also in the Megalopolis of the 220s.<sup>59</sup> Such cases can be seen as supporting evidence for Cartledge's broader claim that a major cause of *stasis* was the contradiction between 'notional civic egalitarianism', a distinctly 'Nakonian' ideal, and

<sup>56</sup> Compare emphasis on the inviolability of popular sovereignty in Attic oratory, e.g. Demosthenes 18.123–5.

<sup>57</sup> Cartledge (1987), 229.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Shimron (1972); Fuks (1984), 230–55; Cartledge and Spawforth (1989), ch. 4.

<sup>59</sup> Polybius 5.93.5–9.

‘sometimes extreme socio-economic stratification’, partly the result of the workings of ‘Dikaiopolitan’ norms.<sup>60</sup>

## 2.5. The Two Sides’ Rival Syntheses of Conflicting Political Imperatives

Nevertheless, interpreting the Phliasian *stasis* purely as a clash between oligarchic ‘Dikaiopolitans’ and democratic ‘Nakonians’ is a simplification of the ideological picture. In the course of the ongoing *stasis*, both sides showed the influence of the rival set of fundamental norms. This is true, for example, of the democrats’ enactment of a specific, controversial interpretation of the ‘Nakonian’ unity of Phlius through their assemblies on the frontier. The precise character of their reported behaviour, and comparison with other evidence for democratic factional ideology, suggests that the best and fullest account of the basic political assumptions driving their behaviour must give a role to basic ‘Dikaiopolitan’ norms: regulatory norms which made civic assemblies and other institutions opportunities to express, protect, and advance personal and sectional interests and security; and norms of strict reciprocity which nourished perceptions of collective earned entitlement.<sup>61</sup>

According to Xenophon, the incumbent citizens held these assemblies to demonstrate the validity of some Spartans’ suspicion that the Spartans were alienating a populous city for the sake of a few exiles. It was thus a move in an implicit process of bargaining. Moreover, by holding their assemblies in full view of the exiles themselves, the Phliasian assembly-goers also symbolically expressed a bargaining position addressed to those erstwhile fellow citizens, fellow members of a temporarily fractured civic contract: as the more numerous party, the democrats were capable of greater military and economic contributions to the Phliasian polis than the minority exiles and their supporters; so they deserved superior power over civic affairs. Significantly, however, the potential for peaceful bargaining was curtailed by the fact that the democrats embedded this bargaining position in the convening of partisan but purportedly standard, official civic assemblies, a collective political act implying a monopolistic<sup>62</sup> claim to legitimacy.

Xenophon offers a similar portrayal of democratic factionalism, which more explicitly illustrates relevant ideological moves and thus offers a helpful check on the interpretation above, in his *Anabasis*. The relevant part is his account of the defection of Arcadian and Achaian soldiers from the main

<sup>60</sup> Cartledge (2009), 22–3.

<sup>61</sup> The democrats’ initial response to the return of the exiles in 384 is a separate sign that they were comfortable with ‘Dikaiopolitan’ principles of justice.

<sup>62</sup> For this word, see Chapter 3, n. 112.

army near Pontic Herakleia. Like the rest of his account of the quasi-civic political organization and affairs of the mercenaries of the *Anabasis*, Xenophon's narrative here is particularly strongly shaped, or even distorted, to make broader political points.<sup>63</sup> However, Xenophon was drawing on his experience of actual Greek political events and rhetoric. He probably also intended his readers to recognize familiar *stasis* posturing and rhetoric.

Xenophon's Arcadians and Achaians object to the appointment to leadership of the army of an Athenian and a Spartan who provided no soldiers. They first justify their resentment in terms of strict, material earned entitlement. They say that they make the effort to sustain the army, but others gain the 'benefits' (τοὺς μὲν πόνους σφᾶς ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ κέρδη ἄλλους); Achaians and Arcadians even constitute more than half the army. These soldiers are thus guided partly by hard-headed 'Dikaiopolitan' norms.<sup>64</sup> However, they are unwilling to plunge themselves into a purely 'Dikaiopolitan' world of bargaining, calculation, and merely prudential collaboration; such a move would dissolve any appearance that they and those they criticize are all members of a united 'Nakonian' community.

Rather, by a rhetorical move which preserves the appearance of unblemished unity and consensus, they dismiss the other members of the army as 'nothing' (οὐδέν): they assimilate themselves, as the majority, to the whole community. Moreover, they then claim that, if they have any sense (εἰ οὖν σωφρονοῖεν), they should rally (συστάντες) in a breakaway community to continue the march, having elected generals among themselves (στρατηγούς ἐλόμενοι ἐαυτῶν καθ' ἑαυτούς).<sup>65</sup> Their subsequent election of ten generals<sup>66</sup> recalls the Phliasians' assemblies on the frontier: the Arcadians and Achaians adopt their own quasi-civic institutions, which, though moulded to fit their partisan entitlement claims, imply a monopolistic claim to legitimacy. This creates the impression that the soldiers are not dissolving the old community for their own ends, but reconstituting it.

Participation in this breakaway community solves the dilemmas of soldiers torn between 'Dikaiopolitan' pursuit of entitlements and 'Nakonian' pursuit of consensus and community. Within the new grouping, since other soldiers are excluded, the Arcadians' and Achaians' entitlement claims can be met without any antagonistic political interaction, or merely instrumental use of fellow community members. Moreover, the new community could even have been viewed as superior to the previous army community as a 'Nakonian' quasi-polis: it was held together, not only by shared interests, but also by shared ethnicity and culture, including the Arcadian customs which Arcadian members of the army had previously cultivated on the march.<sup>67</sup> To use terms

<sup>63</sup> Compare Chapter 6.2.5.

<sup>64</sup> Compare Dillery (1995), 88.

<sup>65</sup> Xenophon *Anabasis* 6.2.9–11.

<sup>66</sup> Xenophon *Anabasis* 6.2.12.

<sup>67</sup> Compare Xenophon *Anabasis* 1.2.10; 6.1.11; Nussbaum (1967), 189.

introduced in Chapter 4.3, a piece of Habermasian ‘procedurally regulated bargaining’, involving an implicit threat to fellow army members, is thus seemingly elevated within a single short speech into an apparent Habermasian ‘ethical-political discourse’, an attempt at collective self-definition in terms of identity, origins, and culture.

A prominent kind of democratic factionalism familiar to Xenophon and his audience thus involved the inflammatory blending together of ‘Dikaiopolitan’ and ‘Nakonian’ posturing. In the Phliasian case, in a mirror image of such democrats’ behaviour, this time thoroughly welcome to Xenophon himself, the Phliasian oligarchs initially made unadulterated appeals to personal entitlements and strict reciprocal justice, but subsequently cohered, under Agesilaos’ guidance, into a solidaristic quasi-civic Phliasian community. This was partly a process of integration into a greater Spartan community of ‘fellow soldiers’ (*συστρατιῶται*).<sup>68</sup> However, the thousand-strong Phliasian exile group, strongly mobilized and well-organised, was also a self-standing quasi-civic community. Their imbuing of quasi-civic structures with partisan membership criteria can be compared with the reported decision of a restored oligarchy in Classical Megara to restrict magistracies to those who had ‘returned with the exiles and fought together against the people’.<sup>69</sup>

The oligarchic Phliasian ‘polis-in-exile’ was thoroughly ‘Nakonian’ in ideology and behaviour. Many members were bound together through friendship or kinship: those who left Phlius to join the exiles did so ‘either through friendship or through kinship’ (*ἢ διὰ φιλίαν ἢ διὰ συγγένειαν*). Moreover, formal property rights and ‘justice’ gave way to a more ‘Nakonian’ criterion for the distribution of goods: the needs of community members. According to Agesilaos’ instructions, defectors were to be issued with whatever was necessary for their everyday needs (*εἰς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἱκανόν*) and arms were to be distributed to all.<sup>70</sup>

Applied to domestic politics after their return, the oligarchs’ pursuit of enduring strict hierarchical solidarity, grounded in Spartan-style virtues, which was lavishly praised by Xenophon, left little scope for dissent. The oligarchs succeeded in bringing some potential opponents to acquiesce in, or support, their regime.<sup>71</sup> However, as noted in Section 2.1, others suffered prolonged exile and confrontation with the regime after 379.

## 2.6. Conclusion: Phliasian Political Culture and Rival Notions of Phlius as a Sparta-in-Microcosm

Both democrats and oligarchs at Phlius were influenced by the same fundamental ‘Dikaiopolitan’ and ‘Nakonian’ political norms, which must have been

<sup>68</sup> Pontier (2007), 367–8.

<sup>70</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.3.17.

<sup>69</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1300a16–19.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Legon (1967), 336–7.

central to fourth-century Phliasian political culture. Furthermore, the two sides even shared certain more specific 'Nakonian' attitudes:<sup>72</sup> high evaluation of self-sacrifice and extreme collective discipline in a crisis, especially with regard to the food supply;<sup>73</sup> and an aspiration to imitate aspects of Spartan civic organization.<sup>74</sup>

Once the returned exiles' aggressive entitlement claims destabilized the equilibrium of Phliasian civic life, the resulting stalemate demanded the derivation of clear, immediate guides to action, for individuals and the community, from the competing imperatives of Phliasian political culture. It also required the exiles to legitimate their controversial entitlement claims by the 'Nakonian' standards advocated by their opponents, and those opponents to show that their advocacy of those 'Nakonian' standards was not hypocritical.

Converting the competing imperatives of Phliasian political culture into unequivocal practical guidance and sources of legitimacy required citizens to do two things. First, it required them to precisely define the content of the indeterminate shared traditions and values underpinning 'Nakonian' unity, including the ideal of Phlius as a Sparta-in-microcosm. Second, it required them to reconcile in a straightforward way the entailments of the competing 'Dikaioopolitan' and 'Nakonian' notions of the *métier* of the good Phliasian citizen: hard-bargaining partner in a fair civic contract or devoted member of an indivisible civic community.

The two principal factions separately satisfied these requirements by embedding their bargaining positions in precise, contentious interpretations of Phliasian civic community, which they developed through, and enacted in, the formation of their own civic or quasi-civic institutions. Indeed, the democratic assemblies and oligarchic messes competing for legitimacy on the Phliasian border in 381 represent a single practical instantiation of Plato's Socrates' sweeping claim that any polis other than his ideal is really many cities, including a polis of the rich and a polis of the poor.<sup>75</sup> The two sides' interpretations probably principally alleviated individual citizens' subjective disorientation, but they could also have each appeared to their exponents to represent visions of Phliasian civic order in which the dictates of impartial reciprocal justice and the demands of community felicitously coincided.

In Phlius, in addition to the two bitterly opposed factions, there were also moderate citizens.<sup>76</sup> However, moderates were clearly short of ammunition. In

<sup>72</sup> For the construction of Phliasian patriotic civic traditions in the fifth century, compare Fearn (2003) (on Bacchylides 9).

<sup>73</sup> Compare the oligarchs' sharing of food in *συσσίτια* with the democrats' noteworthy abstinence.

<sup>74</sup> Compare the oligarchs' *συσσίτια* and post-return arrangements with the democrats' Three Hundred.

<sup>75</sup> Plato *Republic* 422e1–423a1; cf. 551d5–7 (on oligarchies in particular), with de Ste. Croix (1981), 70, 287.

<sup>76</sup> Thompson (1970), 228–9; Cartledge (1987), 263–4.

this characteristic fourth-century Greek civic context, it was very difficult for advocacy of restraint and non-confrontation to compete with conviction rhetoric about desert or community, or both combined.

### 3. OTHER REVEALING CASE-STUDIES: CLASSICAL ATHENS AND BEYOND

#### 3.1. Broader Trends

The remaining sections of this chapter argue in turn for the wider importance of the main processes emphasized in the Phliasian case-study. The argument is that exclusionary *stasis* often occurred, as at Phlius, because external pressures and uncertainties demanded that citizens put an end to the triangulations, irony, and doublethink considered in Chapter 4. Alternatively, or simultaneously, an initial decisive assertion of principle or partisanship, like the returned Phliasian exiles' interventions, might provoke intense collective soul-searching.

In some or all of these difficult circumstances, whole civic communities sorely needed concrete interpretations of collective values as useful, precise guides to the evasion of collective disaster. Moreover, individuals and interest-groups sorely needed concrete interpretations of civic values as sources of subjective certainty and reassurance and foundations of outward political legitimacy, to dispel any appearance of vagueness, doubt, or lack of commitment. These pressures compelled each citizen to derive straightforward, coherent, action-guiding ideas from the competing, swirling strands of their kaleidoscopic political cultures: to 'take a stand' behind a straightforward, concrete, often principled political manifesto. This phenomenon was partly reflected in Greek terminology itself: as Loraux has emphasized, 'taking a stand' is one meaning of engaging in *stasis*.<sup>77</sup>

This process was consistent with a tendency which Freedman associates with the conceptual universe of any political community. A society's political principles usually include indeterminacies and contradictions which are commonly concealed or suppressed. Many attempts to push shared ideals to their logical conclusions, or to interpret them univocally, lead to conflict.<sup>78</sup> Nevertheless, the nature of prominent Greek political ideals was such that any concrete interpretation was likely to be particularly inflammatory.

Evidence is drawn from many different cities, ranging across the period covered by this book. Nevertheless, there are geographical and chronological concentrations. The fourth-century Peloponnese, beyond Phlius, and Hellenistic

<sup>77</sup> See Loraux (2005), 109–23.

<sup>78</sup> Freedman (1996), 39–40, 70.

Asia Minor (compare Chapter 4.2) figure prominently. Moreover, prominence is given throughout to two cases from which the actual rhetoric of participants is particularly richly attested: the large-scale expulsions of Athenian democrats in 404–3 and 322, each results of the establishment of an oligarchic regime in Athens. Indeed, a subsidiary argument of the remaining sections is that those two large-scale expulsions should be seen as quite closely parallel in relevant ideological respects. This section offers introductions to those two large-scale expulsions, essential prolegomena to the thematic analysis in subsequent sections.

### 3.2. The Large-Scale Expulsion of Athenian Citizens in 404–3

After defeat in the Peloponnesian War, Athens underwent the brutal oligarchy of the Thirty Tyrants. In the autumn of 404, under pressure from Lysander, the Athenian assembly elected thirty citizens to compile a new law code.<sup>79</sup> These thirty citizens and their supporters took the opportunity to overthrow the democracy. They delayed proposing any legislation and requested a Spartan garrison.<sup>80</sup> They swiftly resorted to violence to enforce and reinforce their regime, targeting sycophants, political opponents, and metics. They also restricted the citizen-body to three thousand, disarming the disenfranchised.<sup>81</sup>

Theramenes, a member of the Thirty, objected to the regime's brutality, but this opposition to the policy of Critias, the leading oligarch, led to Theramenes' execution in early 403.<sup>82</sup> Many Athenians had probably been formally exiled, or fled to avoid persecution, before this point: in an account which was admittedly tendentious, as discussed later, Xenophon represents Theramenes referring shortly before his death to an earlier widespread perception of the existence of 'many' exiled opponents of the Thirty.<sup>83</sup> Nevertheless, Theramenes' removal unleashed a greater number of persecutions, including threats of death or expropriation, which caused citizens to flee.<sup>84</sup> Moreover, after Theramenes' execution, the Thirty banned those outside the Three Thousand from the city centre and confiscated their farms, causing many to flee to the Piraeus and from there, in response to further harassment, to Megara and Thebes.<sup>85</sup> Partly because weakened by the now numerous exiles' agitation, the Thirty were replaced by a new regime, the Ten, in the spring of 403. Finally, King

<sup>79</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.11.

<sup>80</sup> On the timing of the summoning of the garrison, contrast Krentz (1982), 143–4.

<sup>81</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.18–20; [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 36.2, 37.2.

<sup>82</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.22–56; [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 36.1–37.1.

<sup>83</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.42.

<sup>84</sup> Diodorus 14.5.6, 32.1; Justin 5.9.3; cf. [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 37.2.

<sup>85</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.4.1. Diodorus 14.32.4 and Justin 5.9.12 report large-scale deportation of residents from the city centre to outlying areas.



Pausanias of Sparta brokered the reconciliation agreement and democratic restoration which enabled the exiles' return, in the autumn of 403.<sup>86</sup>

Admittedly, the extent of the Thirty's expulsions was exaggerated in fourth-century Athenian propaganda: the Athenians emphasized the oligarchy's small size and political isolation by constructing a legend that the whole δῆμος had been in exile.<sup>87</sup> This legend influenced the surviving narrative accounts. Nevertheless, the Athenian legend is unlikely to have been pure invention. The most plausible view is that a relatively large number of exiles was multiplied into a vast number. On this basis, this chapter seeks to account for a historical large-scale expulsion in 404–3.<sup>88</sup> As clear from the narrative above, an explanation of this large-scale expulsion must account both for direct expulsions perpetrated by oligarchs and for persecutions which led citizens to flee Athens.

Factors other than ideology have great weight as explanations of the establishment of the Thirty and the regime's political persecutions and expulsions. Sparta was influential in establishing and maintaining the oligarchy: the regime's behaviour was partly dictated from outside.<sup>89</sup> As for the internal Athenian situation, long-term warfare had probably heightened the resentment, but also the confidence, of later fifth-century oligarchic Athenians.<sup>90</sup> Moreover, personal ambition must also have played a significant role in motivating them.<sup>91</sup> In Xenophon's portrayal, for example, calculation of material self-interest, including monetary gain, was the predominant motivation for the Thirty's purges.<sup>92</sup> Xenophon's Critias even explicitly claims that removal of opponents is a prerequisite for 'having more' (τὸ πλεονεκεῖν).<sup>93</sup>

However, Xenophon's denial of idealistic motives, or even pretexts, for the Thirty's expulsions was a product of his rhetorical aim: to isolate the oligarchs most responsible for the expulsions as vicious tyrants, divorced in their thinking from the values of both his own aristocratic milieu and the Athenian democracy. Like the author of the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia*, he contrasts these radical oligarchs with Theramenes, presented as a principled moderate oligarch:<sup>94</sup> a representative, consoling example of an elite Athenian who acted decently in 404–3.

Despite the thrust of their own interpretations, the accounts of Xenophon and Pseudo-Aristotle, set alongside those of Lysias and Diodorus, reveal traces

<sup>86</sup> For the various accounts of these events: Rhodes (1981), 416–19.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Chapter 6.2.4. <sup>88</sup> Compare Garland (2014), 94–6.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Lewis (1994), 30.

<sup>90</sup> Osborne (2003), 256–7 (emphasizing the effects of the Sicilian disaster); Herman (2006), 76–7.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. Lewis (1994), 34; Wolpert (2006).

<sup>92</sup> See Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.21.

<sup>93</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.16.

<sup>94</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.19–56; [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 36.1–37.1, with Rhodes (1981), 421, 447.

of factors which probably gave the Thirty and their supporters a sense of legitimacy in excluding or persecuting democratic Athenians. In particular, the arguments from political principles for exclusions and persecutions of opponents which Xenophon and Pseudo-Aristotle attribute to Theramenes alone were probably also made by a wider range of oligarchs, whom the two authors were less keen to present as principled. Moreover, the traces of justificatory arguments in the sources for the events of 404–3 themselves can be supplemented with other evidence for later fifth-century oligarchic ideology, especially the thinking of the Old Oligarch,<sup>95</sup> the oligarchs of 411, and Critias. This approach enables a more sophisticated portrayal of some of the oligarchs' motivations, as motivations shaped by conceptions of the just and the good.<sup>96</sup> Such motivations are of the type required for explaining how so many achieved the sense of legitimacy necessary for perpetrating wide-ranging persecutions and expulsions.<sup>97</sup>

The oligarchic ideologies which can be reconstructed in this way were not based mainly on claims about the importance of noble birth, common in the Archaic period<sup>98</sup> and still associated with some strands of anti-democratic thought in the later fifth century.<sup>99</sup> Rather, they bore the marks of Classical political thinking: they were rational, abstract, and civic. Indeed, it is argued here that those exclusionary ideologies were often the result of the processes emphasized in the Phliasian case-study. The acute pressures of war and uncertainty left none of the time and resources necessary to sustain the normative balance, vagueness, irony, imaginative political thinking, studied silences, and doublethink shown in Chapter 4 often to underpin Athenian civic life. Moreover, Athenian political culture's balance was put under strain by the emergence of a new generation unfamiliar with the founding compromises and inconsistencies of the democracy and the empire.<sup>100</sup>

The new circumstances called for a straightforward, coherent, practical ideological response. As a result, dissident Athenians made concrete, necessarily provocative applications of, or logical deductions from, the different rationalistic 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' ideals with which they were familiar. The Thirty even made explicit their intolerance of indeterminacy: they claimed to be removing ambiguous laws from 'Solon's laws'.<sup>101</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Even if Hornblower (2000) is right that the work of the Old Oligarch is a fourth-century rhetorical exercise, the work would still represent a near contemporary, informed attempt to enter a fifth-century oligarch's mindset.

<sup>96</sup> For this general approach, compare Balot (2001), ch. 6, esp. 179, 225; Osborne (2010), 287.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. Ostwald (1986), 485. <sup>98</sup> e.g. Theognis 1, ll. 183–91.

<sup>99</sup> See, for example, Euripides *Suppliant Women*, ll. 423–5; compare Yunis (1996), 39.

<sup>100</sup> See Forrest (1975); compare Canfora (2004), 41–2, 46.

<sup>101</sup> [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 35.2; Shear (2011), 172–3.

Fundamental 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' ideals influenced oligarchs partly through sources external to Athenian political culture, often decidedly anti-democratic. In particular, oligarchs were influenced by Spartan ideas<sup>102</sup> and by wider oligarchic tradition and theory, including philosophical argument.<sup>103</sup> Nevertheless, it is a reasonable hypothesis that the Athenian democracy's political culture was a significant medium through which 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' norms influenced oligarchs. This is because Athenian political culture was the one to which most had been most directly exposed: the particular political culture under whose influence most had been raised and become politically active, which provided many of their basic points of political orientation and thus helped to determine the kinds of political principle and argument, including non-Athenian ones, to which they were receptive. This hypothesis is especially strong in those cases, examined in the separate sections below, in which oligarchs invoked or presupposed particular incarnations of 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' principles closely resembling those dominant in Athenian political culture.

Part of the argument of remaining sections is, therefore, a challenge to the dominant tendency in modern scholarship: presentation of the Thirty's ideology as almost exclusively shaped by factors external to Athenian political culture.<sup>104</sup> Scholars who advocate this view effectively endorse Athenian commemoration of the rule of the Thirty as a wholly uncharacteristic interlude. This modern tendency is consistent with the wider modern view that anti-democratic thought at Athens was mainly a pure foil to democratic thought, entirely different in content and underlying motivations.<sup>105</sup> It is not denied here that most or even all oligarchs would have strongly repudiated any claim that they were influenced by the prevailing Athenian political culture, which they would have regarded as degenerate. That does not, however, exclude considerable unconscious influence on oligarchs' self-understanding and self-presentation. It would be unconvincing to claim that many practical, first-order oligarchic constitutional proposals closely resembled practical, first-order democratic ideas about civic institutions. What is argued here is that at the deeper level of basic ideas about self and community, justice and virtue, inclusion and exclusion—the main province of political culture in the sense used in this book—there are significant connections between the approaches of oligarchs and democrats at Athens.

<sup>102</sup> Krentz (1982), esp. 63–8; Whitehead (1982/3); Ostwald (1986), 485–90; Bultrighini (1999), esp. 94–105.

<sup>103</sup> Carter (1986); Osborne (2003), 262–6; Németh (2006), 71–3.

<sup>104</sup> e.g. Ober (1989), 93–4; Lehmann (1997), 84–5, 128; Herman (2006), 77–8, 396.

<sup>105</sup> Ober (1999), e.g. 28; cf. Bultrighini (1999), esp. 11–12, 34, 59, 72–3, 93. Contrast Monoson (2000).

### 3.3. The Large-Scale Disenfranchisement of Athenian Citizens in 322–318

The argument that the large-scale expulsion of 404–3 was partly an explicable product of Athenian political culture is strongly reinforced by the fact that a similar large-scale emigration of Athenian democrats occurred in a similar period of tension and uncertainty eighty years later. In 322, after the Macedonian general Antipater's victory at Crannon decided the Lamian War, Antipater granted terms of surrender to an Athenian embassy to him at Thebes: the Athenians could be free Macedonian allies if they gave up leading anti-Macedonian agitators and reverted to their 'ancestral constitution'. It was stipulated that this ancestral constitution included a census requirement.<sup>106</sup> The qualification for citizenship introduced was 2000 drachmas in total property.<sup>107</sup>

As a result of this census qualification, a large number<sup>108</sup> of Athenians lost their citizenship.<sup>109</sup> As Bayliss argues strongly, this must have been a major upheaval in itself. Even many who were not desperately poor must have been affected.<sup>110</sup> Many of the disenfranchised left Athens. They dispersed principally to Thrace, where Antipater offered them land and possibly also a city,<sup>111</sup> but probably also to the Peloponnese and elsewhere.<sup>112</sup> A single large-scale emigration in 322 was probably followed by periodic emigrations of disenfranchised Athenians, or those who sympathized with them, in the period until the democratic restoration in 318. Most of those who left Athens, in 322 or later, were not strictly 'exiles' or 'forced migrants', but neither were they 'voluntary' migrants: on the democratic restoration, emigrants flocked back to Athens.

There is limited direct evidence for Athenian citizens actively encouraging or supporting Antipater's proposal of a census requirement, which has led many scholars to see the new regime as a pro-Macedonian clique.<sup>113</sup> Some Athenians probably adopted a moderate, pragmatic attitude similar to that commonly attributed to Phocion, the long-serving general in the fourth-century

<sup>106</sup> Plutarch *Phocion* 27.5; cf. Diodorus 18.18.4–5.

<sup>107</sup> Poddighe (1997); (2002), 106. See also Dreyer (1999), 158–9.

<sup>108</sup> Plutarch *Phocion* 28.7 claims that 12,000 lost their citizenship, but Diodorus 18.18.5 claims that 22,000 were removed from Athens. Hansen (1985), 67, considers it very probable that one of the figures was originally present in both texts.

<sup>109</sup> They probably did not, however, become formal *ἀττικοί*: Poddighe (1993), e.g. 280–1; (2002), 75–107.

<sup>110</sup> Bayliss (2011), 71–3.

<sup>111</sup> Diodorus 18.18.4; Plutarch *Phocion* 28.7.

<sup>112</sup> Cf. Poddighe (2002), 69–72. For formal Athenian exiles settling in the Peloponnese at this point: Plutarch *Phocion* 29.4. Plautus *Rudens*, based on an original play by Diphilus, depicts Athenian exiles living in Cyrene around this time (cf. Chapter 6, n. 56).

<sup>113</sup> Dreyer (1999), 157–8. Cf. Davies (1977/8), 113: the settlement as 'Macedonian fiat'.

democracy who became the principal citizen of the new regime.<sup>114</sup> Others probably adapted their political rhetoric in an oligarchic direction, but only after the new distribution of interstate and internal Athenian power became clear.<sup>115</sup> The only known probable advocate of harsh anti-democratic measures on the Athenian embassy to Thebes is Kallimedon. According to one story, Kallimedon urged Antipater not to reverse his decision to impose a garrison on Athens.<sup>116</sup>

Despite the lack of direct evidence, it is very probable that a substantial number of fellow Athenians, especially among the wealthy, shared Kallimedon's strong hostility to the democracy.<sup>117</sup> In general, it would not have made political sense for Antipater to enforce the census requirement if he did not expect it to positively appeal to a non-negligible part of the Athenian citizen-body.<sup>118</sup> Moreover, the requirement could probably not have been implemented so efficiently without substantial support among Athenians.<sup>119</sup> Bayliss has even recently strongly advocated the view that the regime of 322–318 should be regarded as a doctrinaire oligarchy.<sup>120</sup>

Pre-existing internal tensions in Athens are faintly detectable in the sources. In debates preceding the Lamian War, politically active Athenians were reportedly divided into anti-war wealthy citizens and pro-war demagogues.<sup>121</sup> The disagreement between these groups may have been a symptom of deeper social and political divisions. For example, the threat of disenfranchisement against members of the Areopagos who took their seats in the event of a tyranny, in the anti-tyranny law of 337/6,<sup>122</sup> probably reflects suspicion in some quarters that members of the Areopagos harboured anti-democratic inclinations, or at least willingness to dilute democracy.<sup>123</sup>

Another argument in favour of the domestic political situation's relevance to the large-scale emigration is that, even if Antipater was the reduced franchise's principal advocate, he did not order the mass emigration of the disenfranchised. Admittedly, Antipater's offer of land in Thrace was an important inducement to leave Athens. It might not, however, have been

<sup>114</sup> Gehrke (1976), 100; Lehmann (1997), 25; Dreyer (1999), 185–6; Green (2003), 5; Rhodes (2010), 69, with n. 11. See especially Plutarch *Phocion* 29.4.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Gehrke (1976), 98–9, on Demades; contrast Williams (1989); Brun (2000).

<sup>116</sup> Plutarch *Phocion* 27.8–9; Gehrke (1976), 98.

<sup>117</sup> Poddighe (2002), 198, 283; contrast Lehmann (1997), 29–30.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Hackl (1987), esp. 66–8.

<sup>119</sup> Although Phocion and Demades heavily predominate in the literary sources, many more Athenians were involved in running the new regime: nine proposers of decrees other than Demades are known (Oliver (2003), 47–8). Many more must have supported it more passively.

<sup>120</sup> Bayliss (2011), ch. 3. <sup>121</sup> Diodorus 18.10.1; Poddighe (2002), 18.

<sup>122</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 79, ll. 11–22; compare Table 3.3 in Chapter 3.

<sup>123</sup> Compare, for example, Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 390–1. For the strong likelihood that Athenian democrats were, in general, particularly suspicious that pro-Macedonian Athenians might engage in anti-democratic activities around this time, see recently Teegarden (2014), 89–93.

enough in itself to convince large numbers to leave their homes. The pressures of life in Athens for disenfranchised Athenians probably also played a significant role in encouraging them to emigrate.<sup>124</sup> These pressures were probably at least partly exerted by fellow Athenians. Plutarch gives a hint of this when he suggests that those disenfranchised Athenians who remained in Athens ‘appeared’ (ἐδόκουν) to be suffering ‘wretched and dishonourable things’ (σκέτλια καὶ ἄτιμα), even though the Macedonian garrison ‘did not trouble the people (τοὺς ἀνθρώπους)’.<sup>125</sup> Moreover, there is no evidence that Athenians who remained as citizens used either private charity or public decision-making to mitigate the reduced franchise’s effects, even though Phokion was, by contrast, prepared to intervene with Antipater to improve the lot of some formal Athenian exiles.<sup>126</sup>

Another probable indication of hostilities is the nature of the emigrants’ return to Athens in 319/8. No joyous homecoming, it led to two acrimonious assembly meetings, at which Phocion was respectively removed from office as general and condemned to death.<sup>127</sup> At the second, the assembled returnees and other democrats reportedly called for Phocion and his associates to be stoned as ‘oligarchic and people-hating men’ (τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς καὶ μισοδήμους).<sup>128</sup> The antagonisms evident here cast their shadow over Athenian politics in following decades.<sup>129</sup>

It is not surprising that there are only hints of significant internal Athenian divisions in the surviving sources. Plutarch and Diodorus both made use of sources extremely favourable to Phocion,<sup>130</sup> which almost certainly assigned all responsibility for the Athenian catastrophe to Antipater. The incumbent regime’s epigraphy in the period 322–318 presents an image of consensus among remaining citizens, with no allusions to the disenfranchised. The subsequent restored democratic regime also downplayed internal divisions. It represented 322–318 as a temporary oligarchic interlude in the civic life of a united δῆμος, exiled in its entirety, as in 404–3, by the oligarchs: by 318, the δῆμος ‘has returned’ (ὅ τε δῆμος [κατελ]ήλυθε καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἀ[πέιλη]φε).<sup>131</sup>

Behind these ideological veils almost certainly lies a far more complex political situation. For a start, the 322–318 regime overtly preserved democratic institutions, including the assembly, within their diminished polis.<sup>132</sup> The reduced assembly continued to function, even if it was also subject to other

<sup>124</sup> Cf. Poddighe (2002), 107.

<sup>125</sup> Plutarch *Phocion* 28.7.

<sup>126</sup> Plutarch *Phocion* 29.4.

<sup>127</sup> Plutarch *Phocion* 33.2–4; 34.3–35.5. See Bayliss (2011), 92–3.

<sup>128</sup> Plutarch *Phocion* 34.6.

<sup>129</sup> Habicht (1997), 49–97.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. Gehrke (1976), 194–8; Brun (2000), 27; Poddighe (2002), 177; Lamberton (2003).

<sup>131</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 448 (in the second decree, of 318/7), ll. 62–4.

<sup>132</sup> Williams (1989), 26–7; Tracy (1995), 18–19; Habicht (1997), 44–5; Dreyer (1999), 153; Brun (2000), 121.

significant anti-democratic constraints:<sup>133</sup> it passed and inscribed decrees at a rate more commonly associated with democratic than with non-democratic government.<sup>134</sup> This institutional continuity enabled Demades to continue to behave as a traditional democratic orator-politician,<sup>135</sup> sometimes promoting or reviving concerns and policies of the pre-322 democracy,<sup>136</sup> before the reduced citizen audience. This persistence of political processes, habits, and methods is itself a striking indication that many of the basic institutions and rules of the Athenian democracy could be quite seamlessly shrunk and adapted to suit less egalitarian political arrangements.<sup>137</sup>

The precise considerations which motivated support for the census requirement itself are difficult to establish. However, those which can be reconstructed resemble those which motivated later fifth-century oligarchs: conscious or unconscious applications of, or deductions from, fundamental 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' norms. Since, as in the earlier case, Athenian political culture was the one most directly influential on the political consciousness of most relevant citizens, those fundamental norms had probably influenced most supporters of the census requirement partly through that medium, whether or not they were conscious of it. Once again, this hypothesis is reinforced by evidence for overlapping particular rhetoric and principles.

#### 4. WHOLEHEARTED 'DIKAIOPOLITANISM' AND EXCLUSIONARY STASIS

##### 4.1. Introduction

One way in which citizens could derive a coherent, straightforward, practical, principled programme from their mixed, contradictory political cultures was to seize wholeheartedly on 'Dikaiopolitan' demands and prescriptions. This move, already familiar from the early rhetoric of the returned Phliasian oligarchic exiles, is best attested for anti-democrats: many elite, wealthy, or disgruntled citizens achieved ideological clarity by emphasizing their 'Dikaiopolitan' entitlements to freedom and rewards. This involved setting aside the complicating, compensating fetters of 'Nakonian' solidarity, key to the

<sup>133</sup> See Bayliss (2011), 80 (Phocion did not always respect the assembly's will); 85–6 (the expanded role of the *anagrapheus*). Compare pp. 89–90 (on the probable disruption of sortition for magistracies).

<sup>134</sup> Oliver (2003), esp. 40–1.

<sup>135</sup> Williams (1989), 27; Tracy (1995), 20; Habicht (1997), 45.

<sup>136</sup> Brun (2000), 122–3, 125.

<sup>137</sup> Significantly, in a slightly later period, the third-century Athenian decree for Kallias of Sphettos contains a defensive reference to 'democracy from all Athenians' (*SEG* 28.60, ll. 82–3).

doublethink and normative balance considered in Chapter 4.<sup>138</sup> Relevant rhetoric and behaviour cast into relief divisive socio-economic inequalities, themselves often partly products of the workings of 'Dikaiopolitan' norms.

To the extent that relevant citizens pressed their own entitlement claims without recognizing their opponents', their behaviour resembled that of participants in a stereotypical Aristotelian *stasis*: they vigorously pursued their own notions of equality, ignoring the possible validity of rival arguments based on the same basic principles, *ἰσότης* and reciprocal justice. Importantly, Aristotle's approach makes clear that underlying 'Dikaiopolitan' norms' influence on relevant factionaries can be dissociated from that of raw self-interest: perceptions of entitlement to personal freedom, earned rewards, and property could be nourished by specific civic norms.

#### 4.2. Nature, Freedom, and Exclusionary *Stasis*

In later fifth-century Athens, one important influence on the thinking of oligarchic intellectuals, a group well-represented among the Thirty,<sup>139</sup> was Sophistic individualism. That approach was based on the claim that 'nature' (*φύσις*) has normative precedence over 'law' (*νόμος*), a mere man-made construct. Especially relevant evidence is Plato's presentation of Calicles' argument in his *Gorgias*, already discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this book. By nature, it is just for the strong to rule the weak, and to seek and gain greater material rewards than the weak. It is only conventional standards of justice which require agents to curb their self-interest for others' sake.<sup>140</sup>

The leading oligarch Critias was probably sometimes favourable to this general approach. His ideology must be reconstructed from the scattered, often indirect evidence. The result is necessarily partly speculative, but there is little alternative. Theramenes' reported claim that Critias, working together with a certain Prometheus, established democracy in Thessaly and armed the Thessalian serfs (*penestai*) in their struggle against their overlords during his pre-404 exile<sup>141</sup> has been dismissed by many scholars, mainly on grounds of a priori implausibility.<sup>142</sup> However, the story should not simply be rejected because it does not support a straightforward distinction between democrats and oligarchs, and between democratic and oligarchic ideals. Indeed, the story

<sup>138</sup> Compare Stahl and Walter (2009), 140, 144–5, on Archaic *stasis*.

<sup>139</sup> Ostwald (1986), 466–7.

<sup>140</sup> See Plato *Gorgias* 482e2–484c3. The sophist Antiphon also sharply distinguished the types of conduct consistent with nature and law respectively (Pendrick (2002), fr. 44 (a) and (b)). However, he may simply have been making sociological observations, not arguing that nature's demands have normative force (Pendrick (2002), 59–61). For the influence of such thinking on oligarchs, see Rhodes (2000), 130; Balot (2001), 179, 207, 216–17; Bertrand (2008).

<sup>141</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.36.

<sup>142</sup> See Gehrke (1985), 375–6; Robinson (2011), 63.



itself suggests that there was a grey area of overlap between oligarchic and democratic ideas about freedom, status, and legitimate rule, which made it plausible for Xenophon to represent the sympathetic character of Theramenes trying to discredit Critias as a democrat on account of an ambiguous intervention in Thessaly. It was plausible to suggest that Critias could have had a role in freeing hereditary serfs in Thessaly, an intervention which would have furthered a radical, abstract ideal of personal freedom: entitlement to self-determination is rooted in nature and not limited by contingent social status, at least for ethnic Greeks.

Moreover, Critias was probably an advocate of the 'slogan'<sup>143</sup> that σωφροσύνη ('self-control') is τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν ('doing one's own things').<sup>144</sup> In his portrayal of Critias in the *Charmides*, Plato makes Socrates claim that, though he was reluctant to admit it, Critias had advocated this notion of σωφροσύνη to the young citizen Charmides.<sup>145</sup> Plato's Critias subsequently takes over from Charmides the defence of the doctrine eagerly.<sup>146</sup> There is a strong reason for doubting the authenticity of Plato's attribution of this slogan to Critias: Plato had a strong polemical interest in the *Charmides* and elsewhere in showing that it was Critias, rather than Socrates, who imbued anti-civic ideas in impressionable young elite Athenians such as Charmides. However, it is unlikely that Plato simply invented Critias' association with this ambiguous slogan. Indeed, Plato could have hoped to achieve his rhetorical aim of showing that Critias had a deficient understanding of Socratic ideals only if he expected the compromising words which he ascribed to Critias to ring true to his audience. That audience, of early fourth-century Athenians, would have remembered Critias' actual rhetoric.

As is clear from Socrates' initial criticism of it in the *Charmides*, an implication of one interpretation of the slogan that σωφροσύνη is τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν is that the self-controlled man restricts his attention to 'his own' business. Similarly, each citizen of the self-controlled city concentrates exclusively on his own business.<sup>147</sup> Critias could well, therefore, have used this slogan as an assertion of extreme Sophistic individualism: it is ethically good for individuals to concentrate exclusively on their own affairs and welfare.<sup>148</sup>

As suggested above, there must have been significant ideological pretexts, and motivations, driving the persecutions and expulsions of 404–3. Sophistic individualism of this kind represents a highly plausible candidate. If some oligarchs thought that their obligations to poorer Athenians were grounded

<sup>143</sup> Bultrighini (1999), 50. <sup>144</sup> Cf. Schofield (2006), 24.

<sup>145</sup> Plato *Charmides* 161b3–c6, with 162c1–6.

<sup>146</sup> From Plato *Charmides* 162c onwards.

<sup>147</sup> Plato *Charmides* 161d1–162a9; Schmid (1998), 32–3.

<sup>148</sup> Note that the Old Oligarch also sometimes endorses strong egoism: seeking personally to 'do well', εὖ ποιεῖν, is perfectly respectable, apparently even for democrats ([Xenophon] *Athēnaion Politeia* 2.20).

only in νόμος, which illegitimately curtailed the workings of φύσις, they could easily have concluded that it was legitimate to exclude poorer citizens from citizenship, or even to kill them or remove them from the polis. This individualistic line of reasoning could also have appealed to those probably numerous supporters of the Thirty who were not themselves particularly well-born or wealthy, but had suffered prosecution or harassment under the democracy:<sup>149</sup> their entitlement to freedom from external constraint could best be realized by the forced removal of those whose participation sustained democratic institutions.

It is conventional to regard Sophistic individualism as an immoralist, amoralist, or 'inverted moralist' reaction against democratic values.<sup>150</sup> However, its use to legitimate citizen expulsions would have represented a concrete, extreme application of the 'Dikaiopolitan' justification of expulsion considered in Chapter 3.3.4, attested for democratic Athens and other poleis: expulsion or disenfranchisement is a legitimate means for self-reliant, law-abiding citizens to avoid the undeserved burden of supporting needy citizens.

Moreover, the underlying Sophistic individualist principles which would have animated this exclusionary logic were closely entwined with assumptions about individuality and self-interest which underlay pervasive 'Dikaiopolitan' norms. Relevant assumptions and norms were prominent in the fifth-century Athenian democracy's political culture. Thucydides' Pericles, for example, presupposes that individual Athenian citizens have divergent particular interests, which can represent legitimate motivations for their political action, in his most explicitly 'Dikaiopolitan' argument for civic contributions.<sup>151</sup> According to this argument, making contributions to the polis is a form of social insurance, which serves the distinct interests of egoistic citizens. In other words, pre-established, natural self-interest is served by constructed social institutions. Civic contributions work in this way partly because even individuals successful in private affairs can be harmed if their polis is struck by crisis. They also do so because collective success makes it easier for an individual struggling in his private affairs to recover. This argument leaves a wide opening for civic obligation's repudiation: if making civic contributions ceases to serve one's narrow self-interest, why continue to make them?

Closely related to Thucydides' Pericles' 'Dikaiopolitan' style of argument and its assumptions about individuality and self-interest was the characteristic democratic emphasis on personal freedom,<sup>152</sup> famously identified by both Thucydides' Pericles and Aristotle.<sup>153</sup> Some practical effects of that ideal in everyday democratic debate, more easily detectable for the fourth century, are

<sup>149</sup> Cf. Lewis (1994), 34.

<sup>150</sup> e.g. Forrest (1975); Balot (2001), 200–1; Taylor (2007), 10.

<sup>151</sup> Thucydides 2.60.2–3; Christ (2006), 30.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Christ (2006), 24–7.

<sup>153</sup> Thucydides 2.37.2; Aristotle *Politics* 1317a40–b17.

evident in phenomena explored in Chapter 4.2: Athenian citizens' positive licence to engage in energetic 'love of honour' (*φιλοτιμία*),<sup>154</sup> but also their negative freedom from undue interference by other citizens or by the polis. They could legitimately defend their own private sphere, their property, bodies,<sup>155</sup> and household,<sup>156</sup> through resort, or the threat of resort, to legal and political process. A certain suspicion of fellow citizens, and their potential for exploitation, was thus inherent in Athenian civic relations.

This approach to citizenship could be expressed in democratic debate in terms which overlap interestingly with oligarchic approaches. Carter argued that the model of the non-interventionist, even 'quietist', citizen was most forcefully promoted at Athens by anti-democrats, as a foil to the interventionist, even 'interfering' (*πολυπράγμων*) democratic participator.<sup>157</sup> By contrast, Christ has recently emphasized democratic ideals of citizenship 'which placed a premium on citizens leaving each other alone as free and equal persons, rather than on their engaging in mutual support'.<sup>158</sup> Although Christ goes too far in regarding this as an overriding Classical Athenian attitude, he does plausibly identify a significant strand in Classical Athenian political culture.

Participants in Athenian democratic civic life could explicitly claim credit before democratic juries for living a blameless, relatively non-interventionist life, or criticize others for excessive meddling. For example, in quasi-quietist vein, the democrat Aeschines appealed before a fourth-century democratic jury to the 'moderation' (*μετριότης*) of his life to explain why he had not intervened more often to oppose Demosthenes previously: he is guided by deliberation, not by desire for short-term gain. When it comes to the assembly, Aeschines claims, it is possible that a good citizen may abstain from participation, except on occasions when he has something to say of particular importance for the common good, unlike the endless meddler who speaks for financial reward.<sup>159</sup> This does not sound at all far removed in tone from oligarchic critiques of many democrats' political engagement as hyperactive, ill-considered, and egoistic.<sup>160</sup> The implication is that it is perfectly acceptable to live a predominantly private life, concentrating on a sphere detached from collective civic projects.

<sup>154</sup> For such licence in the later fifth century, consider Morris (1994), on the resurgence of ostentatious elite burials after c.430.

<sup>155</sup> See, for example, Wilson (2000), 135.

<sup>156</sup> Cohen (D. J.) (1995), 53; note especially Demosthenes 18.132.

<sup>157</sup> Carter (1986).

<sup>158</sup> Christ (2012), quotation from p. 2; compare his ch. 2. Christ himself admits (e.g. p. 2) that Athenian democratic ideals demanded extensive contributions to the polis, which represented at least indirect benefactions to fellow citizens.

<sup>159</sup> Aeschines 3.218–20.

<sup>160</sup> Allen (2010), 102–3, sees overlaps with Platonic hierarchical ideas about political participation; contrast the more democratic reading in Ober (1989), 233.

Participants in democratic civic life could even express a 'Dikaiopolitan' approach to freedom, self-protection, and self-restraint in terms similar to Critias'. The speaker of Lysias 19 appeals to a non-interventionist interpretation of 'doing one's own things' very close to Critias': he portrays his father as an admirable non-interfering citizen, who stuck to τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.<sup>161</sup> Moreover, the ideal of the citizen who respects the constitution and other citizens' basic freedoms, but also exercises his own freedom not to dedicate himself tirelessly to civic affairs, could be expressed using the language of σωφροσύνη. The speaker of Lysias 21 claims credit for having fulfilled the 'liturgy' of living a 'self-controlled' (σώφρων) and 'orderly' (κόσμιος) life: he has not profited through multiple office-holding, provoked lawsuits, or rejoiced at Athenian misfortune.<sup>162</sup> In a similar way, the virtue of σωφροσύνη could be associated in Athenian drama with 'quietness' (ἡσυχία), and presented as a tendency to avoid the limelight and meddling with the unknown.<sup>163</sup> A corollary of this was that σωφροσύνη could also be treated in drama as the ability to calculate and pursue self-interest with prudence.<sup>164</sup>

Because personal freedom was a fundamental democratic value, it must sometimes have been difficult to justify constraints on it even within Athenian democratic discourse itself.<sup>165</sup> This was true despite Athenian attempts to distinguish a private sphere of personal freedom from a public sphere of obligation:<sup>166</sup> if unfettered personal freedom was appropriate in private life, on what grounds should law constrain it in public life, especially given that a citizen's public and private life were inevitably closely intertwined? As if aware of this, Thucydides' Pericles implies, through his antithesis between Athenian easy-going tolerance in the private sphere and strict obedience to law in the public sphere,<sup>167</sup> a defensive awareness that the private freedom which he praises might be suspected of anarchic consequences.

Certain later fifth-century Sophists and oligarchs can thus be seen to have been exploring the extreme logical consequences of certain forms of democratic idealization of personal freedom. To some extent, they were mirroring later fifth-century explorations by some democrats of the scope for extreme democratic freedom in the exercise of popular sovereignty in the assembly, of the kind which was soon to make necessary a sharp distinction between relatively stable laws and mutable decrees.<sup>168</sup>

It is not an unassailable objection to this general argument about oligarchic approaches that democratic individualism, unlike oligarchic individualism, was never based on arguments from φύσις.<sup>169</sup> It is likely that one strand in

<sup>161</sup> Lysias 19.18. <sup>162</sup> Lysias 21.18–19.

<sup>163</sup> See, for example, Euripides *Children of Heracles*, ll. 476–7; *Medea*, ll. 636–44 (concerning women).

<sup>164</sup> e.g. Euripides *Children of Heracles*, ll. 1009–1013.

<sup>165</sup> Compare Ober (1989), 296–7.

<sup>166</sup> Cf. Humphreys (1977/8); Wallace (1994). <sup>167</sup> Thucydides 2.37.3.

<sup>168</sup> See Ostwald (1986), esp. Part III. <sup>169</sup> Cf. Ober (1996), 101.

fifth-century Greek democratic thinking attributed value to personal freedom and self-insulation on the basis of a purportedly objective view of the universe and human nature. An interesting figure in this regard is Democritus, a probable democratic sympathizer.<sup>170</sup>

Particularly interesting in this regard are two of Democritus' ethical fragments, 3 and 191 DK, which have a strong claim to authenticity: they are discursive passages, rather than bland aphorisms.<sup>171</sup> The starting point of the two fragments is, paradoxically, the claim that nature places constraints on particular individuals' capacity for action. Nature is configured in such a way that individuals' well-being is dependent on them achieving self-sufficiency, by observing these limits.<sup>172</sup> As Farrar suggests, this type of high evaluation of self-sufficiency was conducive to advocacy of highly 'atomistic' political norms, incorporating ideals of both freedom and independence. Such norms give the greatest possible scope for individuals to exercise freedom in taking responsibility for conforming with their own natures, without reliance on external aid.<sup>173</sup> In a sign of the individualistic tendencies of Democritus' advocacy of self-sufficiency, he even claims that the best approach to take to the less well-off is to reflect on one's own better fortune:<sup>174</sup> immunity from harm is the greatest good which can be reliably secured.

A sceptic about mainstream civic norms' influence on oligarchs' thought could argue that relevant oligarchs simply instrumentalized particular mainstream civic norms to justify to a wider audience predetermined, self-interested ends. However, the general limitations ascribed in this chapter's introduction to theories emphasizing self-interest alone, divorced from the important role of political cultures as widely respected, authoritative sources of orientation and legitimacy, certainly apply in this case. As in other cases, appeals to prominent basic norms were detrimental to these factionaries' narrow self-interest. They made possible the construction of unstable, temporary, extremist ideologies, which provided apparent legitimations and motivations for extremism and persecutions which destroyed the Thirty's long-term survival prospects, as Theramenes foresaw. These ideologies were certainly not an effective means of acquiring new converts or duping the vulnerable into behaving contrary to their interests. For example, the Thirty hardly appealed to principles drawn from the political culture of the democracy to court democratic support. Rather, they killed and exiled democrats.

This is not to deny that, like other factionaries considered in this chapter, some oligarchs probably sometimes straightforwardly instrumentalized some

<sup>170</sup> Taylor (2000), 129.

<sup>171</sup> Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983), 429–33.

<sup>172</sup> Cf. Farrar (1988), 233–5; Taylor (2007), 7–8.

<sup>173</sup> Farrar (1988), 240, 256–64; cf. Cairns (1993), 363–70 (Democritus as an advocate of something like conscience and personal responsibility).

<sup>174</sup> Democritus fr. 191 DK.

prominent Greek and Athenian civic values in order to win support or indulge hatreds and rivalries. However, such rhetoric could not have been persuasive unless the majority of the oligarchic audience was committed to the relevant norms.

It is also true that a broader range of oligarchs could be regarded as having applied mainstream civic norms in distinctive, contentious ways, or endorsed leading oligarchs' distinctive, contentious applications, in order to convince *themselves* of their incipient aspirations' legitimacy. However, on that view, relevant oligarchs would not have been straightforwardly 'instrumentalizing' mainstream norms as a means of pursuing pre-existing intentions. Rather, their engagement with those norms would have played a significant role in the complex process by which they arrived at resolutions to act in violent, revolutionary ways.

#### 4.3. Strict Reciprocity and Exclusionary *Stasis*

As well as appealing to principles of personal freedom and immunity, some later fifth-century Athenian oligarchs based their denial of the legitimacy of democrats' citizenship on more mundane appeals to central 'Dikaiopolitan' principles of strict reciprocity and personal desert. According to Xenophon, the oligarchs of 404–3 appealed to brutal negative reciprocity: they were taking revenge on democrats. Even Xenophon's Theramenes implicitly acknowledges at an early stage the legitimacy of retribution against those who have harmed reputable Athenians. His Theramenes later offers a more abstract defence of this position, arguing that it is 'just' that those who seek to remove the Thirty from power should suffer retribution, but implying that those who have committed no injustice should suffer no harm.<sup>175</sup>

Many Athenian oligarchs also appealed to precise applications of positive reciprocity: they argued that their financial and personal contributions to their polis entitled them to substantial rewards in power and resources.<sup>176</sup> The Old Oligarch begins his work with claims which imply that it is unjust that talented and wealthy Athenians receive no reciprocal benefits in return for their concrete contributions to the democracy's survival. He complains that, in the democracy, 'the vicious' (οἱ πονηροί) 'do better' (ἄμεινον πράττουσι) than 'the good' (οἱ χρηστοί). He at first ironically endorses this situation, on grounds of strict reciprocity: the Athenian masses row in the fleet, and it is therefore just (or, at least, 'seems just') that they should be eligible for political office and enjoy political freedoms. However, he then undercuts this ironic version of a democratic<sup>177</sup> argument: although the people supposedly sustain

<sup>175</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.12; 15; 37.

<sup>176</sup> Balot (2001), 213.

<sup>177</sup> Contesting the view that the Old Oligarch was in Section 1.2 parodying an established democratic argument, Ceccarelli (1993), esp. 444–51, 467–70, points out that there is very little

the polis, they in fact ensure that 'the good' undertake those important magistracies which truly bear on the 'safety' (σωτηρία) of the polis.<sup>178</sup> Concern with this kind of injustice recurs later. The Old Oligarch claims that Athenian democrats enjoy festivals at wealthy Athenians' expense, before accusing the democratic courts of disregarding concerns of justice.<sup>179</sup>

Similar 'Dikaiopolitan' arguments were reportedly advocated in practice by oligarchs in 411: political involvement should be restricted to those most able to serve the polis with money and their bodies.<sup>180</sup> An Athenian assembly subsequently endorsed this principle when it voted for the appointment of the Five Thousand, consisting of all who could provide their own weapons,<sup>181</sup> as a replacement for the Four Hundred. In 404–3 itself, Theramenes' moderate oligarchic programme included a reaffirmation of this doctrine: citizenship should be reserved for those who could serve the polis 'with horses and with shields'.<sup>182</sup> More radical oligarchs' support for the restriction of citizenship to the Three Thousand, a number not far removed from the Five Thousand of 411, was probably partly due to the application of similar principles. This is especially likely because the recent collapse of Athenian naval power neutralized the principal 'Dikaiopolitan' counter-argument, mentioned above: that less wealthy citizens made indispensable concrete civic contributions, worthy of recompense, by providing the bulk of Athens' military strength.

Oligarchic arguments from strict reciprocity, used in part justification of exclusions of citizens from citizenship through a restricted franchise, were another crucial stepping stone to justifying persecutions and expulsions. According to the 'Dikaiopolitan' logic explored in Chapter 3.3.4, exclusion and expulsion are legitimate means of preserving a strictly just civic contract, in which no citizen obtains more than he strictly deserves.

Oligarchs would have imbibed 'Dikaiopolitan' assumptions, central to the Classical Greek civic world's shared political culture, from a range of sources. The Athenian democracy's political culture was almost certainly one: as Davies points out, the arguments in terms of strict reciprocity deployed by Classical Athenian oligarchs belonged to a type common in impeccably democratic sources.<sup>183</sup> Earlier chapters have already discussed considerable

surviving evidence for fifth-century Athenian democrats claiming that democracy is morally and politically justified by the importance of the Athenian fleet. However, this may simply be a consequence of the shortage of surviving fifth-century democratic rhetoric. As Ceccarelli herself points out (pp. 464–6), Aristophanes in his comedies quite often parodies such rhetoric: consider *Acharnians*, ll. 162–3 (Dikaiopolis refers to the 'people responsible for the upper oars, the saviour of the polis', ὁ θρανίτης λεῶς ὁ σωσίπολις); cf. *Knights*, ll. 777–85.

<sup>178</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 1.1, 3.

<sup>179</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 1.13.

<sup>180</sup> Thucydides 8.65.3; [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 29.5.

<sup>181</sup> Thucydides 8.97.1; [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 33.1.

<sup>182</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.48.

<sup>183</sup> Davies (1977/8), 120. Compare Canfora (2004), 33–6.

evidence in Athenian democratic rhetoric for 'Dikaiopolitan' emphasis on strict reciprocity and desert, as grounds for awarding power and advantages to both groups and individuals.

Significantly for present purposes, such rhetoric may have become especially prominent in democratic political rhetoric around the time of the Sicilian expedition.<sup>184</sup> It is in this context that Thucydides attributes to the pro-Athenian Syracusan Athenagoras the blunt argument that burdens and risks undertaken by the many in a polis should be compensated with advantages, something not achieved under oligarchy.<sup>185</sup> In addition to Thucydides' text, Athenian political comedy attests 'Dikaiopolitan' desert norms' influence on democratic discourse in the second half of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>186</sup>

However, strict reciprocal principles are already detectable in earlier fifth-century Athenian political culture. Honorary decrees for foreigners from throughout the second half of the fifth century present honorands as entitled to honours on account of their services to the Athenians.<sup>187</sup> One unavoidable implication, among others, is that honours are direct, personally beneficial rewards for benefactors' services. In a pre-415 case concerning a citizen, the chorus of Aristophanes' *Acharnians* reports that Aristophanes himself claims to be deserving of many benefits (*πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄξιός*) in return for his good advice to the Athenian citizen-body.<sup>188</sup> These words lay claim to tangible, divisible benefits, not merely the opportunity to continue to benefit the people, in return for services rendered.

In some cases, relevant oligarchs' aims were probably shaped, not only by generic desert norms, partly transmitted to them through Athenian political culture, but also by particular Athenian democratic applications of them. Thucydides' Pericles' notion of meritocratic desert has a strongly intellectual slant: he associates social worth with political participation, an activity involving mental skill and application. He also emphasizes that the Athenian civic ethos which such participation preserves encourages enthusiastic engagement in cultural and intellectual activities.<sup>189</sup> The impeccably Periclean ideal of intellectual meritocracy probably led some educated Athenians to criticize democracy: as Momigliano suggests, it was characteristic of many later fifth-century Athenian anti-democrats, such as Socrates and his associates, that they considered themselves distinguished from the majority, not by superior breeding or wealth, but by superior intelligence and intellectual accomplishments.<sup>190</sup>

<sup>184</sup> Balot (2001), 159–69, discussing in particular Thucydides 6.16.1–4.

<sup>185</sup> Thucydides 6.39.2.

<sup>186</sup> Note the argument of the women's leader at Aristophanes *Lysistrata*, ll. 649–655, that her male addressees cannot object to her offering political advice, because she contributes men to the polis, whereas they fail even to pay *εἰσφοραί*.

<sup>187</sup> Veligianni-Terzi (1997), A1–46.

<sup>188</sup> Aristophanes *Acharnians*, ll. 633–5.

<sup>189</sup> Thucydides 2.40.1–2.

<sup>190</sup> Momigliano (1969b), 153.



Moreover, even Thucydides' Pericles himself at one point leaves the door open to exclusionary application of strict principles of desert, of the type attempted by many oligarchs. He suggests that, according to the same principles which dictate that those of existing good reputation should be honoured, less prominent citizens who are in a position to do some good to the polis are not hindered by an absence of authority or honour (*ἀξίωμα*). Tellingly, he makes no mention of the honour or political opportunities of those poorer citizens *not* equipped to benefit the polis.<sup>191</sup>

To sum up this argument concerning desert norms, the influence of counterbalancing 'Nakonian' norms, combined with that of poorer Athenians' conspicuous role in the navy for most of the fifth century, artificially constrained the intrinsic anti-egalitarian tendencies of principles of strict reciprocity, well-established in Athenian and wider Greek political culture. These anti-egalitarian tendencies, finally fully unleashed in 411 and 404–3, were partly due to the fact that strict principles of desert, under which desert is measured by material civic contribution, cannot give adequate weight to the influence of luck in determining what civic contributions individuals can make. This includes, in particular, the influence of genetic endowment and upbringing.<sup>192</sup> Nor can they take full account of the interdependency of individual citizens: even the apparent achievements of particular individuals are the result of a long chain.

Moreover, strict reciprocal principles' workings in practice allow talented or privileged individuals to accumulate resources and power, to an extent to which fellow citizens who assent to individual 'fair' exchanges would never consent. Accumulated power and resources then skew the playing field further, when it comes to subsequent distribution of rewards for material contributions.<sup>193</sup> Furthermore, power and resources accumulated through concrete contributions in one sphere of civic activity, such as moneymaking or culture, enable individuals to exercise disproportionate influence in other spheres, such as political decision-making, in which they have no special ability and have made no special contribution.<sup>194</sup>

In the fifth-century Athenian case, talented or privileged individuals were allowed, in a relatively unregulated economic system in a society which valued strict reciprocity, to exploit their talents and resources to accumulate money, honour, and influence. They in turn exploited that money, honour, and influence as the basis for wide-ranging power<sup>195</sup> and, eventually, as one justification for a claim to a monopoly of political prerogatives in Athens.

It is very probable that, in justifying the census requirement of 322–318, some Athenians repeated some of the central 'Dikaiopolitan' ideological

<sup>191</sup> Thucydides 2.37.1; cf. Loraux (1981), 188–91. <sup>192</sup> Cf. Rawls (1972), 103–4.

<sup>193</sup> Cf. Cohen (G. A.) (1995), 19–53. <sup>194</sup> Cf. Walzer (1983).

<sup>195</sup> Davies (1981).

moves of later fifth-century oligarchs. Some Athenians probably welcomed the restriction of citizenship to those with property worth more than 2000 drachmas partly on grounds of 'Dikaiopolitan' reciprocity: it was only those citizens with property over the census level who contributed to the city's finances, rather than being a burden on them; it was therefore only those citizens who were entitled to benefit from citizenship's privileges.<sup>196</sup> Indeed, as argued in Section 3.3, it would not have made political sense for Antipater to stipulate the introduction of a straightforward financial criterion for citizenship unless he thought such thinking current among likely sympathizers in Athens. The underlying idea that civic privileges are a reward for concrete civic contributions could also have been an argument for refusal of pity or public assistance to those affected by the census requirement. The new collapse of Athenian naval power at this point probably again gave this argument additional persuasive power.<sup>197</sup>

Such arguments would have been applications of the classic 'oligarchs' argument', formulated by Aristotle<sup>198</sup> in the same milieu as these anti-democratic Athenians. However, they would also have been applications of strict norms of personal desert central to fourth-century democratic rhetoric and ideology. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, arguments from strict reciprocity and *χάρης* were pervasive in fourth-century oratory.<sup>199</sup> Direct evidence for the continued influence of democratic 'Dikaiopolitan' norms on the 322–318 regime is its preservation in its honorific epigraphy of hortatory clauses expressing strictly reciprocal relationships, identical to parallel clauses in democratic honorific texts. Such clauses present civic honours as returned favours (*χαρίτες*), made in exchange for good services (*εὐεργετήματα*) to the polis.<sup>200</sup> The move from democratic to more oligarchic applications of fundamental 'Dikaiopolitan' principles was not necessarily great. Wealthier Athenians accustomed to bargaining with the *δημος* could easily have come to question what material benefits they received in return for their extensive financial and personal contributions, beyond protection from democratic persecution.<sup>201</sup>

Indeed, Wilson has argued that certain elite Athenians accustomed to asserting themselves as liturgists very easily adopted the role of political leaders under the regime of 322–318, confident, on the basis of their experiences under democracy, in their entitlement to rewards for their wealth and

<sup>196</sup> Compare Poddighe (2002), 106.

<sup>197</sup> Cf. Hackl (1987), 62; Dreyer (1999), 13.

<sup>198</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1280a25–31: oligarchs claim that a polis is like a business partnership, in which it is normal that those who contribute most capital receive most of the profits.

<sup>199</sup> Cf. Ober (1989), e.g. 231–3; Allen (2000), esp. 241; Wilson (2000), 172–8.

<sup>200</sup> e.g. Poddighe (2002), 'Epigrafi. Parte I' (pp. 141–69), no. 3 (*SEG* 26.83), ll. 5–8. Compare an only slightly earlier democratic example: *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 448, ll. 16–19 (in the first honorary decree, of 323/2, for the younger Euphron of Sikyon, now also *IG* II/III<sup>3</sup> 378).

<sup>201</sup> Cf. Christ (2006), 9–10, 13–14.

achievements. He points in particular to the elaborate choregic monuments set up by two choregic liturgists under the new regime. In his view, these men took to a new level a monumental practice common under the democracy, in order to display or even celebrate their new status.<sup>202</sup> This forms part of Wilson's wider argument that the equation between wealth or good use of wealth and good citizenship made in some democratic speeches<sup>203</sup> offered great scope for oligarchic adaptation.<sup>204</sup>

#### 4.4. Hellenistic Changes: Property, Contracts, Debt, and Oligarchic 'Dikaiopolitanism'

Although the two sets of 'Dikaiopolitan' justifications for large-scale disenfranchisement and expulsion, of 404–3 and 322–318, were largely parallel, the supporters of the 322–318 regime made an important change. As Johnstone has recently pointed out, they made the bold move of baldly tagging citizenship to monetary wealth. Later fifth-century oligarchs, by contrast, had kept the connection indirect, emphasizing capacity to make military contributions.<sup>205</sup> This represents an interesting transitional approach, a partial harbinger of the more narrowly financial type of single-minded 'Dikaiopolitan' insistence on legal and earned entitlements which appears to have become characteristic of wealthy citizens embroiled in civic disputes in the Hellenistic period. By that point, there is relatively little sign of the explicitly broad demands for deserved civic power, earned through varied contributions, characteristic of Classical oligarchs. In their place comes insistence on the inviolability of property rights and debt contracts.<sup>206</sup>

It must often have been such insistence which was the catalyst for the acute disputes and even civic unrest relating to debt attested in Hellenistic poleis,<sup>207</sup> sometimes resolved through the summoning of foreign judges.<sup>208</sup> In some cases, such disputes led to exilings: note, for example, the expulsions of apparently large numbers of citizens through debt-related *staseis* in poleis of central and northern Greece in the 180s, 170s, and 160s.<sup>209</sup> Those affected included exiles from Aetolian Hypata, eighty of whom, 'distinguished men',

<sup>202</sup> See Wilson (2000), 226–34.

<sup>203</sup> He cites Lysias 7.31 (compare Chapter 4.4 in this volume).

<sup>204</sup> Wilson (2000), 183. <sup>205</sup> Johnstone (2011), 100–2.

<sup>206</sup> Such arguments were often offered alongside claims to rule based on virtue, very familiar from Classical oligarchic rhetoric; see Sections 5 and 6 of this chapter.

<sup>207</sup> See, for example, Briscoe (1967); Champion (2007).

<sup>208</sup> For the argument that the summoning of foreign judges was usually a response to acute civic conflicts or the potential for them, see Crowther (1995); contrast Fabiani (2012), 158. For examples of explicit acknowledgement of prior unrest in Hellenistic honorary decrees for foreign judges, see Gray (2013d), 383, n. 39.

<sup>209</sup> Seibert (1979), 208–9; Fuks (1984), 43–4.

were massacred on their return to their city, supposedly under truce, in 174,<sup>210</sup> an event more consistent with deep-rooted socio-economic conflict than with superficial disputes within a civic elite.<sup>211</sup>

An interesting case-study is the politics of early second-century Iasos, marked by unrest as the city passed from Antigonid to Seleucid and then Roman control. Although Ma offers a revisionist argument that there was extensive civic consensus and collective action at this point in Iasian history,<sup>212</sup> there were very probably divergences of interest, and associated social and political divisions, between certain poorer and wealthier Iasians.<sup>213</sup> Relevant Iasian divisions and tensions must be attributed to a wide range of factors: for example, socio-economic inequality, the existence of rival claimants to interstate hegemony, and the destabilizing effects of war. However, it is very likely that underlying norms of citizenship interacted with those phenomena in destabilizing ways. In particular, relevant wealthier Iasians were very probably emboldened to insist single-mindedly on perceived entitlements by the harshly 'Dikaiopolitan' aspects of Iasian political culture, practice, and institutions, discussed in Chapter 4.2 and 4.3, especially by laws on debt strongly favourable to creditors.

Varied epigraphic evidence suggests the existence of a self-confident wealthy Iasian elite from the mid-third century onwards. Fabiani has recently argued that, from that point, citizens drawn from elite families appear to dominate the list of recorded proposers of assembly decrees, who were normally prytaneis.<sup>214</sup> Alongside this probable evidence for political self-assertion, the frequent Iasian recourse to foreign judges in the later third and early second centuries suggests that, in socio-economic life, members of the Iasian elite<sup>215</sup> frequently gave loans and strove to enforce interest payments and capital repayments, in ways which proved sufficiently controversial to make necessary the summoning of apparently impartial outsiders.<sup>216</sup>

Moreover, simultaneous 'Dikaiopolitan' assertion of sectional political and financial interests by relevant wealthy Iasians is probably evident from an

<sup>210</sup> Livy 41.25.3–4.

<sup>211</sup> Compare the Corinthian case-study in Section 5.3.2.

<sup>212</sup> Ma (2002a), 223–6.

<sup>213</sup> Hicks (1886), 61–2; Ma (2002a), no. 28, reveals the existence of civic disputes which needed a royal intervention to resolve them. Thériault (1996), 39–41, identifies disputes at Iasos at this point between 'democrats' and 'oligarchs'. For related general approaches to Hellenistic civic life: de Ste Croix (1981), e.g. 306–8; Fuks (1984), 40–51.

<sup>214</sup> Fabiani (2012), 127–48, 155–7.

<sup>215</sup> For the elite status of creditors in the poleis of Hellenistic Asia Minor, cf. Walser (2008), 179: even if early Hellenistic Ephesian creditors were farmers, they would probably nonetheless have belonged to the wealthiest landowners, e.g. the top 10 per cent.

<sup>216</sup> Fabiani (2012), 158–60, is sceptical about the view that frequent Iasian recourse to foreign judges represented a response to sustained socio-economic tensions bordering on *stasis*, but does see it as a sign of increasing elite power: foreign experts to some extent replaced local judges drawn from the general citizen population.

early second-century dedication to *Ῥμόνοια* and the People by the commissioners (*ἐπιμεληταί*) responsible for rebuilding the council house (*βουλευτήριον*) and magistrates' headquarters or 'registry office' (*ἀρχεῖον*) of Iasos.<sup>217</sup> This dedication probably dates either to c.196 or to shortly after 188.<sup>218</sup> The rebuilding of the *ἀρχεῖον*, which was probably the place for storing civic records,<sup>219</sup> including debt records, could well have represented an assertion of the inviolability of credit contracts: an advertisement of the power of a Iasian financial elite over less wealthy citizens.<sup>220</sup> Indeed, it is quite possible that the original destruction of the *ἀρχεῖον* was due to violent unrest by debtors.<sup>221</sup> Moreover, in Asia Minor in general, the *βουλευτήριον* was becoming, as a civic institution and building, symbolic in some contexts of the power of civic elites in the mid- and later Hellenistic period.<sup>222</sup> The coupling of the two buildings in the dedication could even have conjured up an ideal of responsible civic government by an elite of prudent property-owners, of the kind underpinning the Athenian 322–318 census requirement.

Relevant tensions in Iasos probably even contributed to causing exilings in this period: there were Iasian exiles in the Roman fleet in the Aegean in 190, pro-Roman and probably members of the self-confident Iasian elite identified above, who will be central to Section 5.3.1.<sup>223</sup> The precise date of these exiles' expulsion is uncertain. It is possible that the exiles were formally exiled or condemned to death<sup>224</sup> by Iasian civic courts, simultaneously or successively, during the period in which Iasos was faithful to the Seleucids. Alternatively, they may have 'voluntarily' fled Iasos during these years, to escape political persecution or dishonour.

Another possibility is that their exile was a more direct result of a specific royal intervention, such as Antiochos III's Seleucid reconquest of Iasos in

<sup>217</sup> *I.Iasos* 252.

<sup>218</sup> Thériault (1996), 41, regards both c.196 and post-188 as possible contexts. Crowther (1995), 117–18, places certain Iasian decrees for foreign judges (*SEG* 41.930, 932, 933) in the latter context, but favours c.196 for the dedication (p. 96). A possible consideration in favour of 188 is that another polis, Melanippion, could celebrate the post-Apameia settlement as a guarantee of local *Ῥμόνοια*: *SEG* 57.1663, ll. 2–8; Adak (2007).

<sup>219</sup> Compare the Athenian Metroon.

<sup>220</sup> Citizens receiving secured loans in Hellenistic Asia Minor were not necessarily particularly wealthy, even though they provided sureties in land: Walser (2008), 167–73.

<sup>221</sup> Crowther (1995), 96. Earthquake damage is the other possible explanation: Thériault (1996), 41–2.

<sup>222</sup> Müller (1995); Hamon (2005). Hamon (2005), 135–43, notes some resistance to this development in civic Asia Minor in the second and first centuries. Fabiani (2012), 121–2, discusses the transition in the role of the Iasian council, identifying the first strong evidence for an elite Iasian council with a census qualification, analogous to the Roman Senate, in the Imperial period. It is unclear when the transition occurred, but it was probably later than c.200 BC (Fabiani (2012), 119–20). The council could anyway have become relatively exclusive, or come to have symbolic potency as an alternative to the full assembly, prior to this development.

<sup>223</sup> Livy 37.17.1–7.

<sup>224</sup> In the latter case, the death sentence would have provoked their flight from Iasos.

c.197 or 196; the civic ‘reconciliation’ which he appears to have arranged soon after;<sup>225</sup> or the installation of the Seleucid garrison in Iasos, possibly as late as 190 itself.<sup>226</sup> Even if royal intervention or pressure was a significant factor, it is very probable that internal social and political divisions in Iasos made an important contribution to causing these exiles’ expulsion.<sup>227</sup> The decisions and behaviour of Seleucid agents would surely have been tailored to the internal Iasian political situation. The near contemporary case of the expulsion of pro-Attalid exiles from Thracian Ainos, when Philip V installed a garrison there in 187 after *stasis* between Antigonid and Attalid partisans,<sup>228</sup> is an important parallel for a royal intervention, leading to expulsion, which was a response to local antagonisms.

## 5. SINGLE-MINDED ‘NAKONIANISM’ AND EXCLUSIONARY STASIS

### 5.1. Introduction: Determinacy, Indeterminacy, and Exclusionary *Stasis*

The most common way in which citizens, under pressure of circumstances, reduced their political cultures’ complex strands to coherent, concrete, practical, often idealistic ideologies was, however, a different one: they insisted with ‘Nakonian’ certainty on particular, idiosyncratic interpretations of the true ‘Nakonian’ shape of their poleis. For reasons first sketched in Chapter 4, a feature of both widespread and local ‘Nakonian’ paradigms emphasized throughout this book helps to explain this tendency: their combination of strict determinacy of form with indeterminacy of content, crucial in other contexts for preserving civic peace. When external pressures demanded clarity, citizens had to make a contentious choice of precise, unambiguous content for ‘Nakonian’ ideals from the wide-ranging available repertoire. This often involved supplying their own content, shaped by their differing experiences, material interests, age,<sup>229</sup> and intellectual influences.

<sup>225</sup> Hicks (1886), 61–2, discussing what is now Ma (2002a), no. 28, ll. 1–9.

<sup>226</sup> Crowther (1995), 114; Ma (2002a), 247. Crowther argues that the exiles must have been expelled when the garrison was installed: Livy makes them claim to have been expelled through the power of the royal forces (*ui regiorum*). However, ‘the power of the royal forces’ could refer to the initial Seleucid intervention in Iasos or to informal pressure after it. In any case, it is not very reliable rhetoric: it was in the exiles’ interest in 190 to present themselves as victims of Seleucid imperialism, with no complaints against their fellow citizens.

<sup>227</sup> Cf. Thériault (1996), 41. <sup>228</sup> Polybius 22.6.7, 11.2–4; Seibert (1979), 200–1.

<sup>229</sup> For Hellenistic *stasis* between younger and older citizens, e.g. in Termessos and Gortyn, see Kennell (2013), 221–4.

Conceiving and presenting such contentious and often idiosyncratic content in the monopolistic, crusading way required by ‘Nakonian’ paradigms’ formal aspects, as a uniquely justified precise vision of civic virtue, traditions, and culture, was almost necessarily highly provocative. It was also highly exclusive: citizens had to conceive and present their concrete notion of ‘Nakonian’ unity as in need of protection from self-interested disruption and unorthodox thought, not least through the removal of dissenters and outsiders, including all those who advanced, supported, acted on, or symbolized other specific interpretations of indeterminate shared ideals.

## 5.2. Concrete ‘Nakonianism’ and Exclusionary Collapses of Athenian Civic Order

### 5.2.1. Introduction

This process is also clearly observable in the political disputes surrounding the large-scale expulsions of Athenian democrats in 404–3 and 322–318. In both cases, a period of diplomatic uncertainty and war led democrats to insist on strongly democratic interpretations of ‘Nakonian’ civic unity, which provoked equally provocative and exclusive oligarchic visions.<sup>230</sup>

### 5.2.2. Democratic ‘Nakonianism’

The trying circumstances of the Peloponnesian War probably provoked quite extreme democratic ‘Nakonian’ rhetoric, emphasizing the Athenian people’s internal cohesion, equality, and resistance to non-conformists. Although the main evidence for this development comes from Thucydides’ and Aristophanes’ hostile representations of post-Periclean Athenian orators’ demagogic rhetoric, those authors were probably simply exaggerating genuine developments in political language.

Stress on the immaculate unity and vigilance of the people, true upholders of Athenian traditions, encouraged stigmatization of actual or potential opponents as vicious anti-citizens. Indeed, it partly relied on the vilification

<sup>230</sup> Compare Taylor’s recent plausible interpretation of Thucydides’s analysis of the 411 oligarchic coup. In Taylor’s view, Thucydides makes Pericles provide in his speeches in Books I and II a model of patriotic citizenship: patriotic citizenship involves devising and advocating with conviction one’s own distinctive conception of Athens as an ideal polis, divorced from Attica’s material and geographical realities. According to Taylor, Thucydides then depicts the oligarchs of 411, and their opponents in the fleet in Samos, imitating this model: they each display devotion to their incompatible abstract ‘definition(s) and vision(s) of the city’ (Taylor (2010), quotation from 276). In this chapter, however, it is argued that competing visions of civic unity were not simply products of the inventiveness of certain Greeks, but reflections of fundamental moral ambiguities.

as ‘tyrants’, quasi-tyrants or conspirators of certain sections of the population.<sup>231</sup> In Thucydides’ portrayal, sharp criticism of wealthy or intellectual opponents was characteristic of post-Periclean Athenian orators: note, for example, Thucydides’ Cleon’s attack on the sophistic rhetorical tricks of those who wish to appear ‘wiser than the laws’.<sup>232</sup> Thucydides’ Cleon also makes distinctively prominent use of the language of conspiracy.<sup>233</sup> Thucydides gives the impression that such rhetoric helped to stoke fears of an oligarchic coup in Peloponnesian-War Athens.<sup>234</sup> In fact, it may well even have increased the likelihood of oligarchic agitation itself, because it created a dissident identity for the discontented to make their own, while leaving few alternative avenues for opposition. Moreover, demagogues’ stigmatization of opponents led to expulsions, including expulsions of future oligarchs, who were probably radicalized by the experience.<sup>235</sup>

Similarly, in the build-up to 322, democratic orators used particularly aggressive ‘Nakonian’ rhetoric to advocate specific visions of Athenian solidarity and stigmatize specified opponents.<sup>236</sup> Evidence includes the anti-tyranny law of 337/6, but also the rhetoric of, for example, Lycurgus’ *Against Leocrates* or Hyperides’ *Funeral Speech*. This tendency is known to have produced anti-democratic, or, at least, pro-Macedonian, exiles. The unleashing of democratic anti-Macedonian feeling on Alexander’s death led to the apparently voluntary flight of Pytheas and Kallimedon. Such exiles could remain politically active in exile; they may well have been further radicalized by it.<sup>237</sup>

### 5.2.3. Oligarchic ‘Nakonianism’

It might be thought, on the basis of Section 4, that underlying ‘Dikaiopolitan’ norms’ influence by itself explains oligarchic Athenians’ ideological justifications and motivations for leading, or contributing to, expulsions in both 404–3 and 322–318. However, that factor does not fully explain how and why relevant Athenians conceived and represented Athenian democrats as a vicious, greedy and disordered mob. This was, however, arguably the

<sup>231</sup> Morgan (2003b), pp. xxiv–xxv; Raaflaub (2003); Kallet (2003), 117; Ober (2003b), 215, 224; Mitchell (2006), esp. 183–6. Others think the Athenian democracy was notably tolerant of internal political dissent: Ober (1999), (2003a); Forsdyke (2005), esp. ch. 4.

<sup>232</sup> Thucydides 3.37.3–4.

<sup>233</sup> Sommerstein and Bayliss (2013), 122.

<sup>234</sup> Compare Rhodes (2000), 128, citing Thucydides 6.27.3, 28.2, 60.1.

<sup>235</sup> Cf. Osborne (2003), 264. On Critias’ exile: Whitehead (1982/3), 117 (cf. Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.15). Two other members of the Thirty, Aristoteles and Onomakles, had fled or been forced into exile in the relatively recent past, probably as a result of their involvement in the regime of the Four Hundred: Németh (2006), 97, 104–5. Another member of the Thirty, Sophokles, may have been identical with a Sophokles exiled by the δῆμος for corruption as general in 426/5 and 425/4 (Krentz (1982), 54; Rhodes (2000), 134; Németh (2006), 106).

<sup>236</sup> Cf. Brun (2000), 136–7.

<sup>237</sup> See Plutarch *Demosthenes* 27.2–5.



factor which tipped them from resentment and *anomie* to violent persecutions. This process is most comprehensible if dissident anti-democratic Athenians, including both disillusioned wealthy Athenians and other citizens alienated by the democracy, were also pursuing their own concrete, unambiguous applications of underlying 'Nakonian' norms, including the inflections of them central to Athenian political culture.<sup>238</sup>

Later fifth-century oligarchs commonly used monopolistic 'Nakonian' rhetoric about a unitary, overarching common good and substantive civic virtue. The Old Oligarch, for example, presents the elite citizens whom he considers best qualified to rule everywhere as men who are not simply good, but the 'best' (βέλτιστοι) in the Greek world. In his view, they qualify for this description, not by birth or status, but by rational, abstract criteria: they are virtuous and wise citizens who respect justice and the good and use political language appropriately,<sup>239</sup> upholding their entire poleis' interests.<sup>240</sup>

Similarly, radical oligarchs of 404–3 presented themselves as defenders of an ethical civic order, evoking abstract criteria of virtue, rather than merely high birth. For example, Xenophon's Theramenes comments, while criticizing more radical opponents, that the Thirty as a whole claim to be Athens' 'best men' (βέλτιστοι).<sup>241</sup> Another interesting piece of evidence is the report of a much later scholiast on Aeschines that Critias' supporters subsequently set up a funerary monument showing personified Oligarchia setting fire to Demokratia.<sup>242</sup> This report may well faithfully record a monument set up by contemporaries favourable to the Thirty,<sup>243</sup> maybe in the oligarchic enclave at Eleusis. At the very least, it would reflect an attempt to capture the Thirty's ideology and rhetoric by later ancient Greeks with access to very good sources for reconstructing them. Interestingly for present purposes, the monument reportedly bore an epigram describing it as a reminder simply of 'good men' (ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί). Along similar lines, the Thirty claimed to be promoting civic virtue and self-sacrifice: Lysias says that the Thirty claimed to wish to turn remaining citizens towards virtue (ἀρετή) and self-control (σωφροσύνη).<sup>244</sup>

The widespread Greek 'Nakonian' ideal of far-reaching civic virtue influenced later fifth-century oligarchs through a range of media, traces of each of which can be identified in their arguments. That ideal doubtless influenced them partly through the widespread Greek aristocratic tradition. In addition,

<sup>238</sup> This claim is mirrored in Furet's argument that the republicans of the French Revolution were guided by the preceding absolutist conception of an indivisible French state in their radically community-oriented rhetoric, including their stress on the primacy of 'public safety' (Furet (1981), e.g. 39; (1992), 77, 84, 103–4, 140).

<sup>239</sup> Bertrand (1989), esp. 38–41.

<sup>240</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 1.5, 7–9.

<sup>241</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.22. Cf. Critias at Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.25.

<sup>242</sup> *Scholia in Aeschinem* 82, on 1.39.

<sup>243</sup> Compare Bultrighini (1999), 316–19.

<sup>244</sup> Lysias 12.5; Ostwald (1986), 465. For language of σωφροσύνη as a hallmark of Greek oligarchic rhetoric in *stasis*, compare Thucydides 3.82.8.

radically oligarchic 'Nakonian' virtue rhetoric probably sometimes had philosophical roots. Indeed, as a thinker, Critias probably strove to endow his doctrine of σωφροσύνη with a more 'Nakonian' sense than the highly individualistic one discussed in Section 4.2.<sup>245</sup> According to Plato's *Charmides*, Critias was able to interpret his doctrine that σωφροσύνη is τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν as the doctrine that 'to do one's own things' is to perform those actions which are truly finely and beneficially done (τὰ καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα).<sup>246</sup> Other actions are merely ποιήσεις, not πράξεις. They are not truly the agent's own, because not 'appropriate' (οἰκεία) for him. What is appropriate for oneself is, as the 'Nakonian' paradigm requires, an objective matter, beyond personal choice. 'Doing one's own things', and thus σωφροσύνη, can therefore be redefined as 'doing good things' (ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράξις).<sup>247</sup>

The 'good' actions involved in this alternative form of σωφροσύνη, 'appropriate' (οἰκεία) for the agent concerned, are 'beneficial': ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα, not βλαβερὰ. Schmid thinks that Critias' καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα are beneficial only for the agent himself.<sup>248</sup> However, the combination of καλῶς with ὠφελίμως strongly implies that relevant actions are virtuous and public-spirited, like those of a good 'Nakonian'. The preceding claim that a true ἔργον always occurs 'with the fine' (μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ) carries a similar implication, as does Critias' subsequent clarification of his position: σωφροσύνη is a question of doing τὰ ἀγαθὰ, not τὰ κακά.

The Socrates of the dialogue certainly thinks that Critias is referring to activities which benefit others, as well as the agent himself. In order to show that Critias' definition is inadequate, because it does not require that the man exercising σωφροσύνη should have full knowledge of what he does, Socrates takes the example of a doctor, who benefits both himself and the people he cures, without necessarily knowing it. Socrates even picks up Critias' language of acting in a beneficial way (ὠφελίμως πράττειν) to describe the doctor's help to others.<sup>249</sup> Admittedly, Socrates could be twisting Critias' language, attempting to bring him around to a more Socratic position, but there is no clear marker of irony.

The historical Critias is known from other evidence to have taken the additional 'Nakonian' step of endorsing political institutions which encourage citizens to develop dispositions to perform the actions truly appropriate for them. The clearest indication is Critias' admiration for the Spartans' sympotic and military habits. Spartan moderate drinking practices encourage self-control (σωφροσύνη); their military beakers are unostentatiously practical.<sup>250</sup>

<sup>245</sup> On Critias' probable 'puritanical streak': Ostwald (1986), 465.

<sup>246</sup> Alternatively, in the light of the preceding discussion of whether a craftsman can be self-controlled and the reference to Hesiod *Works and Days*, l. 309, Critias could be referring here only to the making of fine things.

<sup>247</sup> Plato *Charmides* 163a1–e11.

<sup>248</sup> Schmid (1998), 34–5.

<sup>249</sup> Plato *Charmides* 164a1–c6.

<sup>250</sup> Critias frs. 6, ll. 15–22; 33–4 DK.

Moreover, in the *Charmides* itself, Critias' alternative interpretation of *σωφροσύνη* as τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν provides a stepping stone towards an extended discussion between Critias and Socrates of a further conception: *σωφροσύνη* as a form of knowledge.<sup>251</sup> One possibility canvassed is that *σωφροσύνη* is 'architectonic' knowledge of all other forms of knowledge and of itself. Applied to politics, such a notion of 'architectonic knowledge' could easily have led to a radically hierarchical form of 'Nakonian' thinking: virtuous, wise experts should exercise power over those with lower competences, which they themselves can understand, at least at an abstract level, organizing them into a well-ordered, productive polis. Such thinking too could easily have helped to shape the Thirty's ideology.<sup>252</sup>

The fact that Plato, generally hostile to Critias, here ascribed to Critias a notion of public-spirited, wise *σωφροσύνη* which is in the interests of its possessor, quite strongly reminiscent of those of the Platonic Socrates,<sup>253</sup> makes it probable that the report is accurate. Plato would have been unlikely to credit a man he was trying to discredit with doctrines close to his Socrates', unless it was undeniable that the historical Critias had advocated them. Plato's rhetorical purpose was probably to suggest that Critias did indeed, as commonly alleged, imbibe Socratic teaching, but that he did not understand its full complexities. On the contrary, he perverted Socratic notions of *σωφροσύνη* into self-serving, elitist doctrines.

Despite aristocratic and philosophical influences' importance, later fifth-century Athenian oligarchs were also exposed to 'Nakonian' ideals through the medium of the political culture of the Athenian democracy. In some cases, the role of this medium necessarily remains invisible. However, in other cases, oligarchs' assertions about civic virtue can be seen as concrete applications of vague 'Nakonian' tropes prominent in democratic rhetoric. *Σωφροσύνη* in the sense of virtuous self-restraint could be prized as a citizen attribute in democratic as well as aristocratic ideology,<sup>254</sup> even if it never developed into a pervasive 'all-purpose cardinal virtue' in the language of Athenian honorific

<sup>251</sup> See especially Plato *Charmides* 165b5–174c8.

<sup>252</sup> Schmid (1998), 129; Schofield (2006), 148–9.

<sup>253</sup> Cf. Socrates' definition of justice at *Republic* 433b3–5, 433e4–434c10.

<sup>254</sup> Cf. Loraux (1981), 109–10. For favourable mentions of citizen *σωφροσύνη* before democratic assembly and courts at different stages in the Classical period, see, for example, Thucydides 3.37.3 (Cleon: ignorance with *σωφροσύνη* is preferable to licentious cleverness); Lysias 26.5 (criticism of Euandros' lack of *ἡσυχιότης* and *σωφροσύνη* under the Thirty); Aeschines 3.168 (the man who is *δημοτικός* and *σώφρων* contrasted with the man who is *ὀλιγαρχικός* and *φαῦλος*). Cf. Peek GV 1564: a late fifth-century funerary epigram for an Athenian citizen, claiming that he honoured most of all *Σωφροσύνη* and *εὐπόλεμος Ἀρετή*; or fourth-century public honours for ephebes for showing *σωφροσύνη* or following their *σωφρονιστής* (IG II<sup>2</sup> 478, l. 10; 1156, ll. 28–9, with Whitehead (1993), 71).

inscriptions.<sup>255</sup> As for ἀρετή ('virtue') more generally, a term which certainly did acquire that status in Athenian honorific epigraphy, it is worth recalling that Thucydides' Pericles begins his Funeral Speech by describing the war dead straightforwardly as 'good men' (ἀνδρες ἀγαθοί), the same simple, uncompromising description used of oligarchs by oligarchic sympathizers on the reported monument to Oligarchia, in memory of Critias and others.

As shown in Chapter 4, Thucydides' Pericles' opening sets the tone for much of the subsequent speech, which is dominated by appeals to demanding ideals of often quite strongly militaristic virtue and unity. Contemporary fifth-century Athenian democratic interest in these ideals is confirmed by epigraphic evidence. A democratic public funerary epigram could praise a group of men who had died in war for glorifying their country (πατρίς) and leaving an immortal memory of ἀρετή.<sup>256</sup> As Loraux (1981) showed, the performative and political character of the Funeral Speech as an institution itself helped to construct and reinforce this notion of political community: the greatest achievement for a citizen is not to mark himself out from the majority, but to qualify for inclusion among the anonymous ranks of virtuous, self-sacrificing war dead.

These democratic ideals of political community were also closely echoed in late fifth-century oligarchs' claims to aspire to a pristine Athens of the virtuous, and in their means of advancing them. The Oligarchia monument reportedly set up by those mourning Critias even imitated the basic 'Nakonian' form of democratic funerary monuments. In the epigram, the dead honorands, even Critias himself, were not named. Rather, they were represented as a homogeneous group of 'good men', whose individuality was dissolved in ferocious, polemical commitment to a collective political cause.

As is clear from the examples above, the dominant overtones of the fifth-century Athenian democratic notion of citizen ἀρετή, unlike its more complex fourth-century successor, were military.<sup>257</sup> Admittedly, later fifth-century oligarchs probably put greater stress on other components of civic ἀρετή, but these were not absent from democratic rhetoric even in the fifth century: consider Thucydides' Pericles reflections on the civilian and cultural components of good citizenship.

Fifth-century democratic ideas about citizen virtue need not be regarded as survivals from, or adaptations of, alien aristocratic notions,<sup>258</sup> restored to their normal orientation by oligarchs. Such interpretations presuppose

<sup>255</sup> Whitehead (1993), 71. There were probably varied reasons for this. As Whitehead suggests (pp. 71–2), the term's possible associations with oligarchy, women, and obedience may have been significant factors; it could also appear old-fashioned (see Aristophanes *Clouds*, ll. 961–2).

<sup>256</sup> Peek GV 18. Similar emphasis on martial virtue and patriotism in other fifth-century public funerary epigrams: Peek GV 12–14; 16–17; 19–21.

<sup>257</sup> Cf. Loraux (1981), 109–13.

<sup>258</sup> Cf. Loraux (1981), 50, 183–205; Ober (1989), 289–92.

eighteenth- and nineteenth-century, rather than ancient, ideas about the distinction between democracy and aristocracy.<sup>259</sup> It is a prominent principle of some versions of modern Western liberal democratic thought that concern to recognize and encourage civic virtue can be significantly egalitarian, divisive, and exclusive. Democrats' priority should be to give equal weight to all law-abiding citizens' preferences, regardless of their moral or other standing. All values should be open to continuous democratic debate, and resulting adaptation.<sup>260</sup>

Such supposedly morally neutral notions of democracy and equality are not evident among ancient Greek ideas. Greek democrats showed a clear desire to eradicate distinctions between citizens based on birth or arbitrary status, but little anxiety about making distinctions between citizens based on abstract ethical criteria. Similarly, democrats showed few significant reservations, *pace* Plato's *Gorgias*, about using absolutist rhetoric about ethics and virtue, as the examples from Attic oratory considered so far in this book make clear.<sup>261</sup> As Berent argues, in the absence of a bureaucratic, punitive state apparatus, the imbuing of strong citizen virtue in all citizens was commonly regarded as a prerequisite for any meaningful civic life, even by democratic sympathizers.<sup>262</sup> For example, in Plato's *Protagoras*, Socrates and the pro-democratic Protagoras agree that universal political virtue (*ἀρετή*) and understanding are indispensable for civic life; they simply disagree concerning how they are acquired.<sup>263</sup>

For its part, the 322–318 regime placed similar stress on 'Nakonian' defence of civic virtue, using rhetoric again strongly reminiscent of that of the preceding democracy. Its members represented themselves as the legitimate embodiment of the Athenian people, competent to make collective ethical judgements concerning individuals' relationships with the *δῆμος*. They presented themselves as the sovereign *δῆμος* in their surviving decrees.<sup>264</sup> These included honorific decrees, often virtually indistinguishable from recent democratic honorific decrees,<sup>265</sup> praising naturalized foreigners for their *εὐνοία* towards the *δῆμος*<sup>266</sup> and, more rarely, for their *φιλοτιμία* towards the *δῆμος*.<sup>267</sup> Desire

<sup>259</sup> Cf. Connor (1994), 38.

<sup>260</sup> For liberal democratic scepticism about fixed standards of civic virtue, see, for example, Rawls (2001), 21–3.

<sup>261</sup> Consider, for example, Demosthenes 18.127–8 or Aeschines 1.137–40.

<sup>262</sup> Berent (1998).

<sup>263</sup> Cf. Schofield (2006), 126–30. Note, in particular, Plato *Protagoras* 323a2–3.

<sup>264</sup> Collected as Poddighe (2002), 'Epigrafi. Parte I', nos. 2–14 (pp. 147–69); cf. Oliver (2003), 42–3 (table).

<sup>265</sup> Compare *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 448 (first decree, 323/2), ll. 13–15 and 17–19, with Poddighe (2002), 'Epigrafi. Parte I', no. 3 (*SEG* 26.83), ll. 1–8 (heavily restored).

<sup>266</sup> Poddighe (2002), 'Epigrafi. Parte I', no. 12 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 399), ll. 10–12, cf. 7–8; compare the plausible restorations in no. 3 (*SEG* 26.83), ll. 2–4; no. 5 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 394), ll. 11–12; no. 6 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 395), ll. 1–2; no. 8 (*SEG* 37.82), ll. 1–2, 18–20.

<sup>267</sup> Poddighe (2002), 'Epigrafi. Parte I', no. 8, ll. 14–15; the word is also plausibly restored in no. 5, ll. 11–12. *Φιλοτιμία* in democratic decrees (first attested in the fourth century): Veligianni-Terzi (1997), 211–12.

to protect some disadvantaged Athenians' freedom as honourable Athenian citizens from, for example, captivity abroad, attested in the new regime's honorific rhetoric,<sup>268</sup> also chimes with familiar democratic concerns. The same can be said of the aspiration to reward virtuous exiles from allied cities, now in need.<sup>269</sup>

In addition to claiming to preserve the integrity of the Athenian δῆμος and its members' virtues, those in charge of the new regime also showed a concern to maintain immaculate public space, a scene of continued collective rituals. Demades proposed a decree requiring the *agoranomoi* and private citizens to preserve the beauty and cleanliness of the agora and streets in the Piraeus, especially those streets required for a procession for Zeus Soter and Dionysus.<sup>270</sup> A related 'Nakonian' approach, linked to concern for ethical purity and strong community, can also be detected in the policies of the subsequent non-democratic regime of 317–307, which clamped down on private intrusion on public space through lavish funerary and choregic display.<sup>271</sup> These examples of concern for discipline and control of self-interest chime with aspects of later fourth-century democratic discourse. For example, the later fourth-century democracy itself did not hold back from emphasizing 'Nakonian' virtues of militaristic patriotism and σωφροσύνη in the service of the δῆμος, especially in connection with war and ephebes.<sup>272</sup>

In 411, 404–3, and 322–318, another form of monopolistic 'Nakonian' justification for a reduced franchise involved an appeal to Athenian constitutional traditions. Certain oligarchs of 411 and 404–3 claimed to be upholding the 'ancestral constitution'.<sup>273</sup> As Németh has argued, there is even a case that the Thirty were indeed more faithful to traditional Athenian institutions, including democratic ones, than commonly supposed.<sup>274</sup>

<sup>268</sup> See Poddighe (2002), 'Epigrafi. Parte I', no. 12, ll. 15–19.

<sup>269</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 545 (321/0 or 320/19; for the date, see *SEG* 45.83); for democratic parallels, see Chapter 6.2.3.

<sup>270</sup> Poddighe (2002), 'Epigrafi. Parte I', no. 11 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 380).

<sup>271</sup> See Azoulay (2009), 317–19.

<sup>272</sup> Note, for example, Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 88, ll. 6–14; *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 478, l. 10, and 1156; compare Lycurgus *Against Leocrates*. On the question of use of space, compare Shear (2011), 186, arguing that the Thirty used space and monuments for political ends in a characteristically 'Athenian' way.

<sup>273</sup> For 411: [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 29.3, 31.1; Shear (2011), 50–1. For 404–3: Diodorus 14.3.3 claims that both 'those who wanted oligarchy' and 'the majority' claimed to be advocating the truly traditional Athenian constitution after the peace. By contrast, [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 34.3 implies that only the moderate oligarchs, not involved in factional clubs, advocated a return to the 'ancestral constitution' at this point, as required by the peace terms (such a condition is missing from most accounts of the peace: Rhodes (1981), 427). It is quite probable that this is a case where Pseudo-Aristotle restricted to his favoured 'moderate' party a type of principled argumentation which was more widespread, as Diodorus suggests. Indeed, Pseudo-Aristotle himself suggests that, after gaining power, the Thirty initially claimed to be running the ancestral constitution (35.2). Compare Shear (2011), ch. 6, esp. 168.

<sup>274</sup> Németh (2006), 13–19. Cf. Lewis (1994), 35, n. 47, on the Thirty's retention of the council; compare Shear (2011), 171–2.

Such 'Nakonian' emphasis on tradition was consistent with generic 'Nakonian' norms, especially with 'Nakonian' respect for the authority of collective civic traditions. Moreover, it was consistent with the particular application of that 'Nakonian' ideal in democratic ideology. Constitutional tradition had long served as a source of legitimacy for democratic measures, as in 462.<sup>275</sup> In the years between the two oligarchic coups, incumbent democrats stressed the authority of the 'ancestral laws', not least as a supposed means of restoring civic stability.<sup>276</sup> Indeed, the attempt of the Thirty to remove legal and constitutional ambiguities<sup>277</sup> can be seen as an application, not only of general democratic principles of political transparency and rationality, but also of the particular spirit of systematization and precision intrinsic to the democratic programme of revising and verifying the ancestral laws, begun in the wake of the 411 oligarchy.<sup>278</sup> Moreover, in 404–3 itself, democrats probably made their own claims that radical democracy was the true ancestral constitution of Athens.<sup>279</sup>

Similarly, in the fourth century, a vague notion of the Athenian 'ancestral constitution' probably long served as a rallying cry. Solon, adopted by the 322–318 oligarchs, who claimed to be running 'Solon's laws',<sup>280</sup> was ubiquitous in legal and constitutional rhetoric under democracy.<sup>281</sup> Especially in the build-up to 322, traditionalism had also been a hallmark of democratic civic life more broadly: consider Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates*, or his building programme.

#### 5.2.4. The Corollary of Concrete 'Nakonianism': Stigmatization of Opponents as Vicious Anti-Citizens

Relevant anti-democrats' monopolistic 'Nakonian' self-presentation demanded representation of their citizen opponents, who advocated, or acted on, rival specific notions of civic virtue and Athenian constitutional history, in a particular way: as non-virtuous, self-interested, and licentious opponents both of civic order and of Athenian traditions and interests, incapable of the sense of shame and self-control necessary for good citizenship. In the fifth century, the Old Oligarch stigmatized the poor everywhere as distinguished by 'lack of learning' (*ἀμαθία*), 'disorderliness' (*ἀταξία*), and 'vice' (*πονηρία*).<sup>282</sup> He probably had

<sup>275</sup> [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 25.2 (purported removal of later accretions).

<sup>276</sup> Ostwald (1986), 405–11; Dössel (2003), 69, 87–8; Shear (2011), ch. 3.

<sup>277</sup> [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 35.2; Shear (2011), 172–3.

<sup>278</sup> See Shear (2011), 174–5.

<sup>279</sup> Diodorus 14.3.3; Rhodes (1981), 428. Compare the response to the 411 oligarchy of the Athenian democrats on Samos: Thucydides 8.76.6.

<sup>280</sup> See Diodorus 18.18.5; cf. Habicht (1997), 44; Baynham (2003), 23; Rhodes (2005b), 285.

<sup>281</sup> On the looseness of the notion of the 'Athenian constitution' in the fourth century: Rhodes (2005b), 287–8; (2010), 75.

<sup>282</sup> Cf. [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 1.5, 7.

the Athenian people in mind above all: he subsequently implied they were barely distinguishable from slaves.<sup>283</sup>

In 404–3 itself, the radical oligarchs sent two probably radical members of the Thirty, Aischines and Aristoteles, to Lysander at the start of the purges, to ask for help in removing the ‘vicious’ (πονηροί) of Athens.<sup>284</sup> Lysias confirms that the Thirty claimed to be purifying the polis of the non-virtuous: it was necessary to make the polis ‘pure of unjust men’ (τῶν ἀδίκων καθαρὰν ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν).<sup>285</sup> Moreover, the text on the monument of Oligarchia setting fire to Demokratia, set up in honour of Critias and others, reportedly asserted: ‘here is a monument to good men, who restrained the accursed δῆμος from arrogant self-assertion (ὑβρις) for a short time’.<sup>286</sup>

As for 322–318, Plutarch claims that Phocion ensured that the ‘refined’ (ἀστεῖοι) and ‘graceful’ (χαρίεντες) citizens held office. Conversely, he ‘taught’ the ‘meddlers’ (πολυπράγμονες) and ‘revolutionaries’ (νεωτερισταί), barred from politics by the census requirement, to love their local habitats and farming (φιλοχωρεῖν καὶ ἀγαπᾶν γεωργοῦντας).<sup>287</sup> This can be compared with Phocion’s reported earlier unsuccessful use of ‘Nakonian’ invective, under full democracy early in Alexander’s reign, to discredit his opponents among leading politicians. He reportedly used examples of mythological heroes who sacrificed their own offspring for Athens to accuse opponents of cowardice and lack of patriotism in not agreeing to their own extradition to Alexander.<sup>288</sup>

There are reasons for accepting the gist of these reports of Phocion’s rhetoric. Like the rest of their accounts of this period of Athenian history, Plutarch and Diodorus probably derived their reports from late fourth-century Athenian sources hostile to democracy.<sup>289</sup> Such accounts probably preserved elements of the 322–318 regime’s rhetoric. This may well have been one such element. Even if not, the anti-democratic ideology which coloured those authors’ interpretations of recent events very probably resembled, given the proximity in time, that of supporters of the quite recent census requirement.

In both the fifth and the fourth century, such ethical and political representations of Athenian democrats provided apparent ideological justifications and motivations for large-scale purges, exclusions, and expulsions. This was because of the influence of the ‘Nakonian’ rationale for expulsion of citizens, shown in Chapter 3.3.3 to be prominent in Athens and the wider Greek world:

<sup>283</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 1.10.

<sup>284</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.13.

<sup>285</sup> Lysias 12.5. Compare Plato *Seventh Letter* 324d4–6: Plato initially thought that the Thirty would convert the Athenians from injustice to justice.

<sup>286</sup> *Scholia in Aeschinem* 82, on 1.39.

<sup>287</sup> Plutarch *Phocion* 29.5; Gehrke (1976), 102.

<sup>288</sup> Diodorus 17.15.2.

<sup>289</sup> These probably included Academic and Peripatetic eulogies of Phocion: Gehrke (1976), 194–8; Brun (2000), 27; Poddighe (2002), 177.



it is legitimate, or even necessary, to expel perceived threats to the persistence of a virtuous, integral civic community.

Anti-democratic Athenians' exclusionary virtue rhetoric was partly influenced by the rich tradition of Greek anti-democratic rhetoric, originating in the Archaic period with, for example, Theognis. However, relevant Athenians were probably predisposed to be favourable to such rhetoric by elements of the Athenian political culture familiar to them. Indeed, in some cases, their rhetoric comprised concrete applications of indeterminate tropes pervasive in democratic rhetoric. Balot shows that fifth-century oligarchs borrowed common criticisms of the greed of demagogues or the whole *δῆμος* which had been offered in the course of the non-revolutionary civic life of the later fifth-century democracy.<sup>290</sup> For example, a passage not far removed from oligarchic criticism of the supposed selfishness of Athenian democrats is the Thucydidean Pericles' criticism of members of the Athenian *δῆμος* for neglecting common safety (*σωτηρίᾳ*) at a time of collective need, distracted by private misfortunes.<sup>291</sup> Also similar is the ethical invective of later fifth-century political comedy, especially allegations of greed and profiteering through civic activities.<sup>292</sup>

Moreover, the excoriation of democratic *ὑβρις* on the reported memorial for Critias and others represented a strikingly inverted application of the prominent democratic belief<sup>293</sup> that *ὑβρις* is a severe anti-social vice. There was no necessary 'dissonance'<sup>294</sup> between the violence of the relief and the language of virtue and restraint in the inscription: oligarchs probably conceived violent treatment of the *δῆμος*, including expulsions, as a means necessary for restoring virtue to Athens.

The overlaps between later fifth-century democratic and oligarchic exclusionary rhetoric explain the fact that 'the polis' supposedly welcomed the Thirty's initial purges of sycophants and demagogues.<sup>295</sup> Indeed, Pseudo-Aristotle even suggests that the Thirty's identification of 'vicious' citizens worthy of removal initially coincided with more widespread assessments: they removed those whom Pseudo-Aristotle himself regarded as rascals (*κακοπράγμονες*) and vicious men (*πονηροί*), guilty of flattering the people contrary to what was best (*τὸ βέλτιστον*).<sup>296</sup> As subsequent events showed, those democratic Athenians who initially welcomed the Thirty's persecutions did not recognize this destructive potential of a concerted attempt at a

<sup>290</sup> Balot (2001), 192–201, 207.

<sup>291</sup> Thucydides 2.60.4.

<sup>292</sup> For such attacks on leading figures, compare Aristophanes *Knights* (e.g. ll. 247–54, 258–65) or *Acharnians* (e.g. ll. 593–622). Compare ridicule of sycophants: e.g. Aristophanes *Acharnians*, ll. 815–28, 904–958.

<sup>293</sup> Fisher (1992), ch. 3.

<sup>294</sup> Ober (2003b), 236.

<sup>295</sup> [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 35.3; cf. Diodorus 14.4.2 (the 'most decent' (*ἐπιεικέστατοι*) citizens approved up to this point). Compare Taylor (2002); (2010), 192–223 (on 411).

<sup>296</sup> Also [Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 35.3.

supposedly redemptive purge of the *πονηροί*, members of a shared but ill-defined category.

Furthermore, the overlaps between democratic and oligarchic exclusionary rhetoric probably account for Aristotle's claim that the faction of the oligarch Charikles attempted *demagogic* techniques for attracting support among other oligarchs.<sup>297</sup> These and similar divisions among the Thirty themselves, including the mutual accusations of vice and greed reported by Xenophon,<sup>298</sup> confirm the divisive and exclusionary force of concrete 'Nakonian' rhetoric and suspicion of non-conformist particularity: 'die Revolution fraß ihre eigenen Kinder'.<sup>299</sup>

For their part, supporters of the 322 census requirement could draw, not only on anti-democratic tropes,<sup>300</sup> but also on the rich seam of 'Nakonian' ethical invective in fourth-century oratory, partly discussed in Chapter 4.4. For example, both 'meddlesomeness' (*πολυπραγμοσύνη*)<sup>301</sup> and vague aspirations to 'change affairs' (*νεωτερίζειν*),<sup>302</sup> the qualities supposedly attributed by Phocion to the disenfranchised, had strong negative connotations in democratic oratory. Those charges evoked a leading democratic trope about the bad citizen: he disrupts ordered civic life because he holds the laws in contempt.<sup>303</sup> Similarly, in accusing anti-Macedonians of a lack of patriotic commitment and bravery, pro-Macedonians employed the characteristic language and forms of Athenian militaristic patriotism. Indeed, perhaps before the full census arrangements were in place, the new regime exercised one of the most striking exclusionary prerogatives of the Athenian *δῆμος*, most famously applied to Themistocles and soon after to Phocion himself:<sup>304</sup> the denial of burial in Attica to those exiled for treason, in this case leading anti-Macedonians.<sup>305</sup> Excoriation of disruptive cowardice and treachery echoes recent democratic rhetoric concerning the Macedonian question, including the exchanges between Demosthenes and Aeschines (see Chapter 4.4).

A more specific 'Nakonian' element of the discourse of the fourth-century democracy particularly ripe for anti-democratic application was one of the

<sup>297</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1305b25–6. Compare the leading oligarchs' reported fear that Theramenes would become 'people's leader' (*προστάτης τοῦ δήμου*) ([Aristotle] *Athenaion Politeia* 36.1).

<sup>298</sup> See Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.33, 43; Ungern-Sternberg (2000).

<sup>299</sup> Hostile contemporaries themselves compared the French revolutionary terror with the rule of the Thirty: see Nippel (2008), 189, 192–3.

<sup>300</sup> Cf. Green (2003), 4. <sup>301</sup> Lysias 1.15; 24.24; Aeschines 2.106.

<sup>302</sup> Aeschines 3.225.

<sup>303</sup> The stereotype of the disruptive citizen: Lysias 24.25 (the speaker distances himself from the stereotype); Aeschines 2.106. Criticism of alleged lack of respect for the laws: Cleon at Thucydides 3.37.3–4; [Demosthenes] 50.1, 66. Cf. Christ (2006), chs. 2 and 4: the 'bad citizen' as the citizen who avoids legally enforceable military and financial obligations.

<sup>304</sup> Thucydides 1.138.6; Plutarch *Phocion* 37.3; Diodorus 18.67.5–6.

<sup>305</sup> Plutarch *Vitae decem oratorum* 849c1–8; Williams (1989), 25; Habicht (1997), 45; Brun (2000), 118.

checks on popular self-assertion, crucial to the balance of democratic civic life, discussed in Chapter 4.2: the hierarchical 'Nakonian' view, probably prominent since the 350s, that the people's militaristic appetites should be tempered by elite leaders and institutions more given to financial and diplomatic prudence, especially elected financial officials and the Areopagos.<sup>306</sup> As mentioned in Section 4.2, Aeschines had even recently counted on pleasing a democratic jury by vilifying over-enthusiastic political participation, the tendency to speak on every topic in the hope of financial gain.<sup>307</sup>

Anti-democratic Athenians' rhetoric of exclusion also comprised concrete applications of the vague democratic ideal of Athenian ethnic-cultural purity: a concern with the purity, not of individual blood-lines, but of the Athenian ethnic-civic community as a whole.<sup>308</sup> Bertrand suggests that the Old Oligarch's criticism of the corruption of the purity of Attic culture and language through contact with visiting and resident foreigners<sup>309</sup> recalls the demagogic, exclusionary 'Nakonian' conception of Athenian citizenship underlying Pericles' Citizenship Law of 451/0.<sup>310</sup> In describing the Athenian poor as ignorant and base, and physically indistinguishable from (barbarian) slaves,<sup>311</sup> the Old Oligarch assimilated them to external, impure threats to Athenian ethnic, cultural, and linguistic uniformity. Moreover, as Parker notes, the ideal of the 'purity' of the Athenian citizen-body, in need of protection from illegitimate outsiders,<sup>312</sup> was influential on both democratic restrictions on eligibility for citizenship and the Thirty's more exclusive similar moves.<sup>313</sup>

In the case of the 322–318 regime, Plutarch's descriptions of the first assemblies of the restored democracy suggest that its members engaged in similar vilification of the disenfranchised as ethnic outsiders. The first, which deprived Phocion of the generalship, was an 'indisciplined assembly made up of all sorts' (*ἐκκλησία παμμυγῆς καὶ ἄτακτος*), including exiles, foreigners, and *ἄτιμοι*.<sup>314</sup> According to Plutarch, the subsequent assembly which condemned Phocion to death included foreigners, slaves, and disenfranchised Athenians; a request for 'foreigners and slaves' to withdraw was refused.<sup>315</sup> These descriptions of the revived democratic assembly were contentious: as mentioned in

<sup>306</sup> For a recent statement of the case that fourth-century orators' interest in expert leadership fed into later fourth-century anti-democratic thinking, see Allen (2010), 137–8; compare Hackl (1987).

<sup>307</sup> Aeschines 3.220.

<sup>308</sup> On the democratic version of this ideal, compare Wilson (2000), 80–1; Lape (2010), ch. 2.

<sup>309</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 2.8.

<sup>310</sup> Bertrand (1989), 41. That law was to be upheld, after forced concessions to inclusivity in the later Peloponnesian War, immediately after the democratic restoration (Athenaeus Book XIII, 577bc; Lape (2010), 21–3).

<sup>311</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 1.10.

<sup>312</sup> Compare Davies (1977/8), 111–14.

<sup>313</sup> Parker (1983), 262–3.

<sup>314</sup> Plutarch *Phocion* 33.2.

<sup>315</sup> Plutarch *Phocion* 34.3, 5–6.

Section 3.3, the succeeding regime claimed, by contrast, that ‘the δῆμος has returned’.<sup>316</sup>

This probable tendency of the 322–318 regime can be seen as an extreme case of a practice common in the fourth-century courts: stigmatization of an opponent as unqualified for citizenship on legal or ethnic grounds.<sup>317</sup> Peace could be maintained in the fourth-century democracy for as long as citizens tolerated pragmatic loosening of the boundaries of legitimate Athenian civic membership, for harmony’s sake. There was probably even some fragment of truth underlying Plato’s accusation that, in the democracy, even those formally sentenced to death and exile remain at large in the city.<sup>318</sup> Moreover, as mentioned in the conclusion to Chapter 4, some scholars have seen a widespread pragmatic tendency for residents of fourth-century Athens to ignore status distinctions, including formally rigid distinctions between citizens and outsiders, in the interests of stability and prosperity.<sup>319</sup> However, when circumstances demanded clarity about membership of the citizen-body, acute conflict could result.<sup>320</sup>

There is a revealing precedent for the events of 322–318 from an earlier, less desperate moment in Athenian relations with Macedon. In the early 340s, military insecurity was thought to make necessary scrutiny of civic membership to prevent or reverse dangerous infiltration of the citizen-body, through the comprehensive citizen registration (διαβήφισις) in all demes conducted in 346/5.<sup>321</sup> At this point, as shown by the evidence of Demosthenes 57, considered in Chapter 4.4, citizens’ attempts to identify indisputable ethnic insiders and outsiders led to controversial, partisan accusations of illegitimacy: the Euxitheos of that speech was condemned for foreign origins.<sup>322</sup>

By way of conclusion to this discussion of unstable ‘Nakonian’ politics in Classical Athens, it is worth reflecting that the Euxitheos dispute also illustrates broader features of later fourth-century Athenian civic life, of which events of 322–318 can themselves be regarded almost as characteristic episodes. It attests the high-stakes, inflammatory character of the ‘Nakonian’ politics of precise, *ad hominem* praise and honorific grants, which invited attempts to erase false attributions of civic virtue and to expunge inadequate citizens. As discussed in Chapter 4.4, before challenging his citizenship itself, Euxitheos’ opponents had challenged his pretensions to virtue by chiselling out an honorary decree in his honour.<sup>323</sup> This can be seen as a smaller-scale,

<sup>316</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 448, ll. 62–4.

<sup>317</sup> See Brun (2000), 49; Lape (2010), 71–94.

<sup>318</sup> Plato *Republic* 558a4–8.

<sup>319</sup> See Cohen (2000); Vlassopoulos (2007b). Compare Connor (1994), 35–8; Scafuro (1994b).

<sup>320</sup> On the devastating exclusivity of Athenian ethnic ideology even in peacetime: Loraux (1993), 205–8, 234–6; cf. Hunter (2000), 25; Sissa (2009); Lape (2010), 82–94, ch. 3.

<sup>321</sup> See Hunter (2000), 20–1.

<sup>322</sup> Compare Lape (2010), 203–16.

<sup>323</sup> Demosthenes 57.64; Liddel (2007), 162.

local parallel for Aeschines' attempt to challenge Demosthenes' crown.<sup>324</sup> Lycurgus even explicitly commended the practice of destroying the honours of those considered lacking in civic virtue: he praised the fifth-century Athenians for melting down the bronze statue of the traitor Hipparchos, son of Charmos, using the metal to make a stele on which the names of all traitors were inscribed.<sup>325</sup> Democrats again symbolically overturned honours towards the end of the fourth century, defiling statues of Demetrius of Phaleron after his regime's overthrow in 307.<sup>326</sup>

Significantly, the 322–318 regime engaged in this very practice. It took down the inscription of an honorary decree for Euphron of Sikyon of 323/2 for his services to Athenian interests, which was in turn reinscribed by the subsequent restored democracy.<sup>327</sup> The new regime thus called into question a previous public, monopolistic attribution of civic virtue, which was inextricably bound up with contested questions about recent Athenian and Greek history.<sup>328</sup>

Menander concisely represented aspects of the 'passionate'<sup>329</sup> tone of contemporary Athenian politics, with its unstable and polarized concrete 'Nakonian' discourses about civic virtue, ethnicity, history, and legitimacy, in his *Sikyonioi*, set in the closing years of the fourth century. In one scene, a democrat and an oligarch exchange insults: they each baldly accuse the other of being 'vicious' (*πονηρός*). The oligarchic man accuses the democratic man of rejecting decision-making in a small council in favour of decision-making in a full citizen assembly, given to emotion and 'wailing'. He thus offers something resembling an argument to support his accusation of 'vicious' character, but one which denies all legitimacy and rationality to democratic decision-making, precluding a conciliatory reply. The democrat does not even offer an argument to defend democratic institutions' ethical superiority, but simply vilifies his opponent.<sup>330</sup> These tensions endured at least into the early third century: note, for example, the polarized language about democracy and entirely illegitimate 'oligarchy' in the Athenian honorary decree for Kallias of Sphettos (see Chapter 6.4.2.1).

<sup>324</sup> Compare also Demosthenes 22; also 20.146–7, for reported contestation of honours in the 370s.

<sup>325</sup> Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 117–19.

<sup>326</sup> See Azoulay (2009).

<sup>327</sup> See *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 448, esp. ll. 60–2. Compare destructions of inscribed honorary decrees for foreign benefactors of the democracy by the Thirty: see Shear (2011), 175–7.

<sup>328</sup> For this case as evidence for tensions between different interpretations of civic history, compare Luraghi (2010), 256.

<sup>329</sup> Compare Bayliss (2011), 97.

<sup>330</sup> Menander *Sikyonioi*, ll. 150–68, with Lape (2004), 220. Compare the polarized ethical language and insults of the subsequent deme assembly, ll. 257–66.

### 5.3. Explosive ‘Nakonian’ Specificity outside Athens: ‘Ομόνοια, Tyranny, and Exile

#### 5.3.1. Rival Visions of ‘Ομόνοια in Hellenistic Iasos

Early Hellenistic Athens was not the only Hellenistic polis riven by exclusionary *stasis* when different groups advocated with ‘Nakonian’ intensity their own notions of ‘Nakonian’ civic unity. As argued in Section 4.4, Iasos’ turbulent politics in the early second century probably contributed to causing exilings. It was argued there that ‘Dikaioopolitan’ norms were probably at work beneath the surface, alongside many other factors. However, the evidence for the polarized ideologies of the pro-Roman Iasian exiles of 190, serving in the Roman fleet, and their incumbent opponents more directly indicates underlying ‘Nakonian’ norms’ contribution to insoluble conflict.

It is revealing to juxtapose the epigraphy of the pro-Seleucid Iasian regime of the 190s with Livy’s account of the rhetoric of their opponents, these exiles. The surviving part of the honorary decree for Antiochos passed by the incumbent citizens of Iasos in c.196 mentions Antiochos’ orchestration of a civic reconciliation:

... γέγ[ρα-]

[φε] πλεονάκις τῷ δήμῳ περὶ τούτων, ἀκόλουθα πράσσω  
τῇ διὰ πατέρων ὑπαρχούσῃ αὐτῷ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας  
εὐεργεσίαι, ὃ τε θεὸς ὁ ἀρχηγέτης τοῦ γένους τῷ  
βασιλέων συνεγμεμαρτύρηκεν τῷ βασιλεῖ παρακα-  
λῶν μεθ’ ὁμονοίας πολιτεύεσθαι, ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἔχων  
ταύτην τὴν αἴρεσιν πολὺ τι μᾶλλον μεθ’ ὁμονοίας πολι-  
τεύμενος τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ παρειληφώς παρὰ τοῦ  
βασιλέως ταῦτα διατηρεῖ· ἵνα δὲ φανερόν γένηται τῷ τε  
βασιλεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ἣν ἔχει διάληψιν ὁ δῆμος  
πρώτομ μὲν ὑπὲρ βασιλέως μεγάλου Ἀντιόχου καὶ  
βασιλίσσης Λαοδίκης καὶ τῶν τέκνων αὐτῶν. . . .<sup>331</sup>

He has written multiple times to the people about these things, doing things consistent with the beneficence towards the Greeks which he has inherited from his ancestors. The god, the origin of the family of the kings, has testified in support of the king, calling on us to conduct civic life in concord. The people, who, having this attitude, conducting their civic life much more in concord, have received the greatest goods from the king, preserve these; so that it may become clear to the king and to all others what opinion the people holds first concerning the Great King Antiochos and Queen Laodike and their children. . . .

<sup>331</sup> Ma (2002a), no. 28.

According to this presentation, the Iasians came to interact politically much more in accordance with *ὁμόνοια* after receiving advice and benefactions from Antiochos. They also developed a single, positive opinion, as a *δῆμος*, of Antiochos and his royal house.

Conversely, the Iasian exiles claimed in 190 that all Iasians were unanimous in support of *their* policy, opposition to 'royal servitude'. In that year, the Roman naval commander L. Aemilius Regillus approached Iasos, held by a Seleucid garrison. After his forces had pillaged Iasian territory, he appealed to the leading citizens and magistrates of Iasos to surrender. They responded that it was not in their power. Regillus then prepared to attack Iasos. As a result, the Iasian exiles in his army appealed to the Rhodians, the principal allies in Regillus' fleet, to prevent Regillus from destroying a neighbouring city:<sup>332</sup>

*ii frequentes Rhodios orare institerunt, ne urbem et uicinam sibi et cognatam innoxiam perire sinerent; sibi exilii nullam aliam causam esse quam fidem erga Romanos; eadem ui regiorum, qua ipsi pulsi sint, teneri eos, qui in urbe maneant; omnium Iasensium unam mentem esse, ut seruitutem regiam effugerent.*<sup>333</sup>

The thronging exiles began to beseech the Rhodians not to allow an innocent city, neighbouring and related to their own, to be destroyed; there was no other cause of their own exile than good faith towards the Romans; those who remained in the city were detained by the same power of the royal forces by which they themselves had been expelled; all the Iasians had one mind, in commitment to the purpose of escaping from royal servitude.

Livy's report that the exiles claimed that the Iasians had *una mens* in support of their view was quite probably a translation of a report by Polybius, in the account on which Livy drew, that the exiles claimed that all Iasians were united in *ὁμόνοια*. Polybius could have invented the rhetoric of the Iasian exiles. However, it is more plausible that Polybius offered a detailed account based on oral or written eyewitness reports, in which he captured their precise terminology. This view is strongly supported by the prominence of the term *ὁμόνοια* in contemporary Iasian epigraphy. Indeed, some of these exiles may well have been among those who put up the dedication to *Ὁμόνοια* and the People on completion of the registry office and council house (see pp. 236–7).

It is, therefore, probable that both the incumbent and the exiled citizens were under the spell of the pervasive Hellenistic civic ideal, 'à la fois indispensable et inaccessible',<sup>334</sup> of civic *ὁμόνοια*. As a result, both groups represented their own interests and contentious interpretations of the uncertain political situation in Iasos as consistent with an imaginary impregnable Iasian

<sup>332</sup> Moved by this appeal, the Rhodians, together with Eumenes of Pergamon, persuaded Regillus not to attack (Livy 37.17.7).

<sup>333</sup> Livy 37.17.5–6.

<sup>334</sup> Thériault (1996), 13.

consensus. This was at least a partial parallel to the political situation which Dössel has reconstructed as underlying the third-century oath of *ὁμόνοια* from Chersonesos Taurica, discussed in Chapter 3.3.4. Dössel argues very plausibly that the repeated references to vigilance and resistance against dissidents, and to lost territories, suggests that this oath was itself a factional oath: the incumbent democrats obliged citizens in the city to swear an oath of *ὁμόνοια*, and staunch virtuous commitment to the common good, in opposition to a breakaway faction.<sup>335</sup>

It could be argued that the Iasians involved were self-consciously manipulating available rhetoric at different points. In c.196, the incumbent Iasians needed to sustain a complex, mutually beneficial relationship with Antiochos and promote internal cohesion among those in the city, by presenting Antiochos as a defender of civic order.<sup>336</sup> Similarly, in 190, the exiles needed to persuade the Rhodians to intervene to save their city, and thus ensure that they had an intact city to which to return, by claiming that there was unanimity between themselves and their erstwhile opponents in the city.

Nevertheless, in addition to the theoretical considerations emphasized earlier in this chapter, there is a strong empirical reason for thinking that the exiles, at least, were not simply manipulating available rhetoric for predetermined, self-interested ends. The exiles' obvious power-political interest in 190 was to urge the Romans to attack their city and to remove the Seleucid garrison and domestic Seleucid sympathizers, before installing them as the new incumbent faction. That they in fact pursued a far more moderate course,<sup>337</sup> calling for the city itself and all Iasians to be spared, is a strong reason for thinking that they sincerely believed the Iasian citizen-body to be united in support of one policy. Admittedly, the exiles would also have had an interest in avoiding the building costs which would arise from a sack, but, for determined seekers of material advantage and power, that would probably not have outweighed the prospect of factional ascendancy.

A possible objection to the view that this is a case of rival, incompatible visions of Iasian *ὁμόνοια* is that the two conceptions might accurately reflect two contrasting situations, in c.196 and 190 respectively: the Iasians may have been united among themselves as Seleucid allies, until the establishment of the attested Seleucid garrison provoked unanimous anti-Seleucid sentiment. Individual leading citizens of a polis of Hellenistic Asia Minor could engage in diplomatic relations with different hegemonic powers in turn, depending on their cities' predicaments. Moreover, their polis could simultaneously display

<sup>335</sup> Dössel (2003), 187–90, discussing *IOSPE* I<sup>2</sup> 401, l. 5, alongside ll. 30–3, 36–40. Kalimtzis (2000), e.g. 96–9, thinks Aristotle captured the general phenomenon of partisan *ὁμόνοια*.

<sup>336</sup> Cf. Ma (2002a), esp. 214–28.

<sup>337</sup> Cf. Seibert (1979), 197–8.



inscriptions demonstrating successive privileged relationships with those different hegemonic powers.<sup>338</sup>

In the Iasian case, however, it is hard to believe that all wealthy Iasians embraced the Seleucid alliance even in c.196, considering the later view of at least some Iasians that Seleucid rule over Iasos was a despotism. Moreover, there were probably disgruntled Antigonid partisans in Iasos, as in Kyme or Miletus.<sup>339</sup> Conversely, it is hard to believe that all pro-Seleucid Iasians, including all the beneficiaries of Seleucid benefactions, had become disaffected by 190. Admittedly, Regillus did try to persuade the *principes* and magistrates to surrender the city. Their response that they were powerless to act might suggest resentment of Seleucid occupation by some inside the city, but it was also a cautious one. Arguably, with a Roman army so close, they could have surrendered the city, despite the Seleucid garrison. In any case, these were the *principes* and magistrates, probably approached informally by the Romans. The poorer citizens inside the city were probably far less equivocal towards the Seleucid–Roman dilemma.<sup>340</sup>

In addition to attesting the common influence of the abstract ideal of *δμόνοια* on both incumbent and exiled Iasians, their parallel rhetoric also reveals shared formal conceptions of *δμόνοια*. First, it indicates the influence on both groups of the ideal of *δμόνοια* in commitment to collective freedom from slavery. The incumbent Iasians claimed that Antiochos had saved them from slavery (*δουλεία*) and established *δμόνοια*; the exiles claimed that Antiochos was subjecting them to ‘royal slavery’ (*servitus regia*), from which all Iasians were resolved in *δμόνοια* to escape.<sup>341</sup> Although they both used the stirring, dogmatic rhetorical trope, the two sides offered diametrically opposed specific applications of it to Iasos’ current uncertain predicament.

Second, the two groups’ parallel rhetoric reveals the influence on both of the ideal of *δμόνοια* among Iasian citizens in commitment to certain myths and historical traditions. Once again, under pressure, the two sides applied this indeterminate shared ideal in incompatible ways. They each presented Iasian relations with their favoured external hegemon as pre-eminently strong and long-lasting, because underpinned by religious and historical or mythological bonds.

The incumbent Iasians presented Iasian relations with Antiochos as anything but purely prudential. Antiochos was, together with Laodike, a consistent,

<sup>338</sup> Ma (2002a), nos. 31, II, ll. 4–8 (part of letter B) (196–193) and 45, ll. 3–5 (late 190) (Herakleia-under-Latmos), with analysis on pp. 246–7. Compare Ma (2002a), no. 47 (Amyzon, after 188).

<sup>339</sup> Ma (2002a), 226.

<sup>340</sup> Note the evidence for Queen Laodike’s generous benefactions to the more vulnerable or unwell citizens of Iasos (*εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενούντας*): Ma (2002a), no. 26A, ll. 11–25; Crowther (1995), 119–20.

<sup>341</sup> Ma (2002a), 247; compare his no. 26B (Col. I), ll. 15–18, with Livy 37.17.6.

enthusiastic benefactor of Iasos, which was in keeping with his family's ancestral tradition of euergetism towards all the Greeks. Moreover, Antiochos' proposal for civic reconciliation in Iasos had been supported by Apollo of Claros, the 'founder' (ἀρχηγέτης) of Antiochos' line (γένος).<sup>342</sup> The incumbent Iasians also fully integrated the cult of Antiochos and Laodike into communal civic life.<sup>343</sup>

Conversely, the Iasian exiles claimed to base their own policy on equally strong historical and mythological considerations, with contradictory practical implications: they based their appeal to the Rhodians on Iasian mythological kinship with the Rhodians and their own past *fides* towards the Romans. The appeal to mythological kinship with the Rhodians recalls the rhetoric of the diplomatic exchanges between Rhodes and Iasos in the period before the Seleucid reconquest, when these exiles had probably played a leading role in Iasian politics.<sup>344</sup>

Ma comments that cities' adaptation (or 'manipulation') of collective civic memory, in relations with Antiochos, 'ensure(d) the uniformity of remembrance and impose(d) consensus'.<sup>345</sup> This example does, however, reveal a different possible consequence of collective attempts to base civic politics on shared conceptions of Iasian history, values, and identity which were necessarily multifaceted and flexible, but supposedly monolithic.

### 5.3.2. *Concrete 'Nakonian' Visions as Provocations: Corinth, Phigaleia, Delos*

The rival, incompatible embeddings of preferred foreign policies in monopolistic conceptions of collective freedom, Iasian history, and Greek culture evident in Iasian political rhetoric of the 190s probably helped to bring about the original exile or flight of the Iasian exiles in the Roman fleet. Two relevant processes, familiar from the Phliasian and Athenian examples, are discussed in this and the next sub-section.

For one thing, monopolistic insistence on a particular, controversial 'Nakonian' stance by the future exiles could have provoked opposition, and even exclusionary violence, in their opponents. There was a particular risk of this when, as at Iasos, 'Nakonian' visions of civic unity and external allegiance were bound up with claims to religious legitimacy and even with ritual performances: the characteristic 'Nakonian' enmeshing of the political and religious aspects of civic life could be a source of unrest and exilings, as well as unity.

<sup>342</sup> Ma (2002a), no. 26B, esp. B (Col. I), ll. 9–11; no. 28, esp. ll. 4–6.

<sup>343</sup> Ma (2002a), no. 26B (Col. II), ll. 17–44; no. 27.

<sup>344</sup> Meadows (1996), 252–4 (revised text of *I.Iasos* 150, a text dating to 220–214), ll. 4–5, 39–40; *I.Iasos* 76 (probably dating to 202–197: Crowther (1995), 111), ll. 13–14. For the similarity with the exiles' later rhetoric: Meadows (1996), 263; Ma (2002a), 247.

<sup>345</sup> Ma (2002a), 226.

This was particularly evident in the *stasis*-ridden fourth-century Peloponnese, beyond Phlius.

Early fourth-century Corinth is a revealing case-study. In 395, some influential Corinthians who had received Persian support, and probably money, secured Corinth's participation in the anti-Spartan coalition in what was to become the Corinthian War. The Oxyrhynchus historian describes them as wanting to 'change affairs' (μεταστήσαι τὰ πρά[γμ]ατα),<sup>346</sup> which suggests revolutionary leanings even at this stage. By 392, however, as a result of setbacks in three years of warfare, including damage to Corinthian territory, Corinthian proponents of peace with Sparta were influential. Xenophon describes this group as οἱ πλείστοι καὶ βέλτιστοι. The former adjective indicates that they were numerous, although subsequent events suggest that it was an exaggeration to present them as the majority; the latter indicates that they were educated members of the Corinthian elite.

In Xenophon's account, those 'most responsible for the war' became alarmed by the prospect of peace with Sparta. As a result, they made a dramatic intervention, which illustrates the main topic of this sub-section, the entanglement of civic religious life with political strife: they launched an attack on those supporting peace, in the course of a civic festival. Although many were massacred, others succeeded in fleeing into exile.<sup>347</sup> Xenophon suggests that some of the resulting exiles then returned to Corinth, in response to their families' pleas and a guarantee of safety from their opponents.<sup>348</sup> However, there were around 150 Corinthian exiles in the Spartan-led army which attacked Corinth soon afterwards, with internal collusion.<sup>349</sup> This suggests that a significant proportion of those who fled the massacre stayed in exile,<sup>350</sup> or returned to exile.

In order to determine the precise significance of the attack on the festival, and its relevance to the argument here, it is necessary to reconstruct the two sides' political orientations. Some modern scholars follow Xenophon's account closely in interpreting the massacre and expulsion of 392 as an opportunistic strike against fellow wealthy Corinthians by oligarchs who were disillusioned with Sparta, principally for personal reasons, but had no democratic aspirations.<sup>351</sup> The rival interpretation, most prominently advocated by Kagan, is that the massacre and expulsion constituted a democratic revolution. This latter view is more convincing. The extreme violence of the coup is more compatible with the expression of widespread popular resentment of elite privilege, based on ideological conviction, than with internal elite

<sup>346</sup> *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 7.3.

<sup>347</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.4.1–5; Diodorus 14.86.1.

<sup>348</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.4.5.

<sup>349</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.4.9.

<sup>350</sup> Seibert (1979), 107.

<sup>351</sup> Grote (1888), vol. VII, 494–5; Perlman (1964), 69–70; Ruschenbusch (1978), 30, 35; Salmon (1984), 355–7.

squabbling.<sup>352</sup> Moreover, it is democrats, rather than oligarchs,<sup>353</sup> who would have arranged the subsequent close collaboration between Corinth and democratic Argos, involving some form of constitutional merger.<sup>354</sup> Allowing Argives, or at least those who registered, a vote in the Corinthian assembly, by *ἰσοπολιτεία*,<sup>355</sup> would have ensured a pro-war majority in the Corinthian assembly,<sup>356</sup> but also a democratic majority in relation to other political, social, and military questions, something surely intolerable for oligarchs.

A section<sup>357</sup> of Xenophon's own presentation also contains hints that the revolution was democratic,<sup>358</sup> even if some of the early supporters of the Corinthian War had been opportunist, disgruntled members of the elite. Xenophon's vilification of the victors suggests that they were offensive to him for reasons other than disloyalty to Sparta. He describes Corinth's new leaders ruling like tyrants. Moreover, referring to the merger with Argos, he claims that native Corinthians were less powerful than 'metics' in the new regime, a claim reminiscent of other Greek anti-democratic rhetoric.<sup>359</sup> Conversely, Xenophon presents those defeated in the revolution, who subsequently plotted against the incumbent regime, in polemically 'Nakonian' terms, as champions of aristocratic standards against democratic indiscipline: patriots who wished to free their city and, crucially, instil in it 'good order' (*εὐνομία*), a key anti-democratic slogan.<sup>360</sup> Significantly, comparable political and ideological tensions probably surfaced at Corinth in c.370, when Timophanes seized power with popular backing, only for his more aristocratically inclined brother Timoleon to orchestrate his controversial assassination.<sup>361</sup>

It is now possible to consider the possible relevance of this episode, interpreted as a clash between democrats and oligarchs, to this sub-section's concern with provocative 'Nakonian' rituals. It may well be very significant that the festival at which the 392 massacre was perpetrated was sacred to Eukleia, probably conceived as a cult title of Artemis.<sup>362</sup> It was thus partly a celebration of the abstract quality of *εὐκλεία* ('Good Reputation'). *Εὐκλεία* was a value with a very wide range of possible meanings and implications. Like many Greek ethical and social concepts, it could have a very bland, generic meaning, but it was also amenable to varied specific applications. *Εὐκλεία*

<sup>352</sup> Kagan (1962), 453; Lintott (1982), 224.

<sup>353</sup> Kagan (1962), 448–9.

<sup>354</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.4.6. Different modern views of the relationship between Corinth and Argos: Griffith (1950), 242–52; Kagan (1962), 453; Tuplin (1982); Salmon (1984), 357–62; Whitby (1984).

<sup>355</sup> Compare Chapter 2, n. 73.

<sup>356</sup> Salmon (1984), 359, 361.

<sup>357</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.4.6.

<sup>358</sup> The 'democratic' interpretation is here independent of the disputed reading of Diodorus 14.86.1 (see Kagan (1962), 449; Salmon (1984), 355–7).

<sup>359</sup> Cf. [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 1.12.

<sup>360</sup> Gehrke (1985), 85, with n. 21. For *εὐνομία* as a polemically anti-democratic value: [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 1.8–9.

<sup>361</sup> Plutarch *Timoleon* 4.4–5.2.

<sup>362</sup> Cf. Plutarch *Aristides* 20.7–8; Braund (1980), 184.

could be praised<sup>363</sup> and worshipped<sup>364</sup> in democratic cities. However, it could also in some contexts be given a strong aristocratic ring, by consequence of its connotations of heroic military prowess,<sup>365</sup> of a quasi-Homeric<sup>366</sup> or Spartan<sup>367</sup> type, and of good breeding.<sup>368</sup> In the fifth century, in praising aristocratic Aigina, Bacchylides had once presented ἀρετή, εὐκλεία 'loving of garlands' and 'self-controlled' εὐνομία ('good order') as at the helm of the Aiginetan polis.<sup>369</sup>

It is likely that the latter, more aristocratic tinge was quite prominent in the fourth century. Significantly, the term εὐκλεία was not a stock part of Athenian democratic ethical rhetoric: it does not feature in the corpora of Lysias, Demosthenes, and Aeschines, except in the Demosthenic *Funeral Speech*.<sup>370</sup> By contrast, the more aristocratic and pro-Spartan Xenophon himself used the word quite liberally.<sup>371</sup> It is quite probable that εὐκλεία was given a similar aristocratic shade by pro-Spartan Corinthians in the 390s. Indeed, Bacchylides' association of εὐκλεία with εὐνομία could well have been paralleled in their ideology: as mentioned above, Xenophon suggests that members of the faction attacked at the Εὐκλεία festival were subsequently advocates of εὐνομία.<sup>372</sup>

In addition to a particular, contentious interpretation of the ideal of εὐκλεία, the principle of Spartan-style age-hierarchy was probably embedded in the structure of the festival. The 'older' citizens were the main victims of the massacre, for they were more prominent in the agora than the younger citizens, who stayed out of trouble in the Kraneion, presumably in the gymnasium there.<sup>373</sup> Xenophon suggests this was because one of the younger citizens, Pausimelos, suspected a plot. However, it probably also reflects the festival's structure. The older citizens were its directors, permanently established in the central civic space, the agora. Meanwhile, the younger citizens trained in their appropriate civic space, the gymnasium, in preparation for an entrance to the main civic stage choreographed by their seniors.

<sup>363</sup> e.g. Pericles at Thucydides 2.44.4.

<sup>364</sup> e.g. Pausanias 1.14.5 (reference to a temple of Eukleia in Athens).

<sup>365</sup> Xenophon *Anabasis* 7.6.32.

<sup>366</sup> Cf. Sophocles *Ajax*, l. 465.

<sup>367</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.1.17.

<sup>368</sup> Cf. Plutarch *Aristides* 20.8: brides and bridegrooms in Boeotia and Lokris customarily make initial sacrifices to Artemis Eukleia.

<sup>369</sup> Bacchylides *Ode* 13, ll. 175–89. Cairns (2010), 321–3, argues that Bacchylides keeps his praise uncontroversially generic here, but also suggests that Aiginetan oligarchs, at least, would have perceived an endorsement of Aigina's existing constitution. Compare the priesthood of Εὐκλεία and Εὐνομία in another aristocratic polis, Roman Athens (e.g. *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 3738, ll. 2–3).

<sup>370</sup> [Demosthenes] *Funeral Speech* 32–3. It is used once with approbation by Lycurgus (*Against Leocrates* 82).

<sup>371</sup> See, for example, Xenophon *Lakedaimonion Politeia* 9.2; *Agésilas* 1.36; *Hipparchicus* 1.19; *Cynegeticus* 1.14, 13.12; *Cyropaedia* 8.2.22.

<sup>372</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.4.6.

<sup>373</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.4.4; for the gymnasium there, see Diogenes Laertius 6.77.

It is possible that the Corinthian festival of *Εὐκλεία* had long had this particular tinge. If so, it could have helped to inculcate support for the established, oligarchic order and a sense of communal belonging among Corinthians, not least by helping to dissipate tensions resulting from socio-economic inequalities. Alternatively, the festival's structure and symbolism could have previously been usually more elastic; it could have been only in the tense 390s that certain Corinthians insisted on a particular, aristocratic interpretation.

Xenophon himself presents the revolutionaries' decision to attack during the festival as purely opportunistic: there would be more people in the agora to slaughter.<sup>374</sup> Aeneas Tacticus was certainly concerned about cities' vulnerability to attack during festivals, when defences were lax.<sup>375</sup> However, this kind of explanation offers no help in explaining how the perpetrators acquired the degree of conviction required to motivate a massacre and large-scale expulsion. As a result, the symbolism of the *Εὐκλεία* festival makes another interpretation attractive, highly relevant to this sub-section's concerns: the massacre should also be interpreted as an attack on the specific, contentious conception of Corinthian civic community and virtues embodied in it.<sup>376</sup>

The incumbent oligarchs' promotion of a specific, aristocratic interpretation of Corinth's 'Nakonian' unity had thus probably alienated a substantial section of the citizen population. This was probably not least because of the oligarchs' characteristically 'Nakonian' use of the festival itself to promote that interpretation. Celebration of particular notions of *εὐκλεία* and associated ideals through institutionalized collective ritual represented an attempt to establish them as unquestionable civic values: values beyond political disagreement and debate, central to shared pride and worthy of universal worship and appreciation.<sup>377</sup> Partly because of this effect of the festival itself, there was no peaceful way for alienated citizens to express their discontent within prevailing 'Corinthian' culture. The inflammatory entanglement of questions of political legitimacy in religious organization is also evident from the resulting exiles' most notable act. In 390, with Agesilaos' help, they organized their own version of the Isthmian sacrifice to Poseidon and Isthmian games, in competition with the official Argive-Corinthian celebration.<sup>378</sup>

Slightly later events in Phigaleia represent a mirror image of this Corinthian episode, with democrats as the incumbents. In c.375, pro-Spartan Phigaleians

<sup>374</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.4.2, endorsed by Cartledge (1987), 256.

<sup>375</sup> Aeneas Tacticus 17. Compare examples in Thucydides 1.126; 3.3.3; 7.73.2; Polybius 8.37.

<sup>376</sup> On political violence during festivals, times of heightened emotional intensity: Chaniotis (2006), 211–12.

<sup>377</sup> On Greek civic rituals' role in defining and promoting fundamental civic values, see, for example, Sourvinou-Inwood (1990); Chaniotis (1995); Parker (2005).

<sup>378</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.5.2; Seibert (1979), 109.

were expelled from their city, almost certainly in a democratic coup.<sup>379</sup> They found refuge in the Arcadian polis of Heraea or, more likely, on the nearby Heraion mountain.<sup>380</sup> Some time later, the exiles attacked their home polis while the Dionysia were 'by chance' in progress. After perpetrating a massacre of democrats, they fled again, to Sparta.<sup>381</sup>

It is implausible that the exiles were not aware of the timing of the Phigaleian Dionysia. Indeed, the Corinthian parallel casts doubt on Diodorus' emphasis on coincidence. Like the Corinthian democrats of 392, these Phigaleian oligarchic exiles probably calculated that a festival was a good practical opportunity for an effective and highly visible attack on their home polis. In addition, the exiles were probably motivated to attack the Dionysia as, in its democratic form, a usurpation of shared, supposedly non-partisan civic space and ritual by political, ethical, and cultural values inimical to their own. The embedding of a vision of civic order in the festival would have been a particularly provocative, monopolistic move if Dionysus was the 'principal deity of the city'.<sup>382</sup> Moreover, the festival would have been a particular outrage to oligarchs if it resembled the Classical Athenian democratic Greater Dionysia in its celebration, through drama and ritual, of democratic solidarity, virtues, and debate and of the supersession of hierarchy.<sup>383</sup>

The Phigaleian exiles' attack might well fit into a pattern of attacks on 'Nakonian' embodiments of democratic ideology in public ritual and space: compare the mutilation of the Herms and profanation of the Mysteries in Athens in 415;<sup>384</sup> or the reported decision of an early Hellenistic non-democratic regime in Erythrai to remove the sword from a statue of an earlier tyrannicide, thinking that its whole stance (*στάσις*) was directed against themselves.<sup>385</sup> Also partly comparable is the intervention of those Delians who dragged and beat the Amphictyons administering the Delian sanctuary on behalf of democratic Athens in the 370s, for which the Amphictyons fined them and sentenced them to perpetual exile.<sup>386</sup> Athenian democratic dominance of Delos must have been particularly clearly, and provocatively, symbolized in the Athenian Amphictyons' presence and activities. Indeed, through them, the Athenians provocatively sought to give the solemnity of religious legitimacy to contingent political circumstances. An extreme, violent course,

<sup>379</sup> Gehrke (1985), 127. <sup>380</sup> Stylianou (1998), 333–4.

<sup>381</sup> Diodorus 15.40.2; see also Hornblower (1991–2008), vol. III, 16.

<sup>382</sup> Hansen and Nielsen (2004), 528.

<sup>383</sup> On the Athenian model: Goldhill (1987); Seaford (1994), chs. 7 and 10. For a Hellenistic parallel for partisan democratic ritual and revelry, see Posidonius F253 Edelstein–Kidd (early first-century BC Athens).

<sup>384</sup> Cf. Osborne (1985); Murray (1990b).

<sup>385</sup> *I.Erythrai* 503, ll. 2–6; see also Ober (2003b), 227–8. For discussion of possible precise dates for this anti-democratic move and democrats' subsequent restoration of the statue, see Teegarden (2014), 159–64.

<sup>386</sup> Rhodes–Osborne *GHI* 28, B(a), ll. 24–30.

such as the forcible ejection and beating of the Amphyctyons, would have been one of the only possible forms of dissent.

5.3.3. 'Nakonian' Visions as Direct Motivations for  
Exclusionary Interventions: Syracuse, Sikyon,  
and Tendentious Charges of Tyranny

The other reason why rival 'Nakonian' visions could have provoked expulsions from Iasos in the 190s is that those visions themselves demanded vilification of opponents, in a pattern familiar from the Athenian cases. They made it necessary to construe opponents as supporters of treacherous or subversive policies, alienated from a united civic community and thus unworthy of citizenship.

There is a precedent for this phenomenon in Iasian history, dating to a time of disputes concerning an earlier external claimant to hegemony. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the fourth-century partisans of Mausollos of Caria succeeded in having a decree passed by council and people condemning Mausollos' opponents to exile and confiscation of property. The decree represents the exiles as men who have 'plotted against Mausollos and against the polis of the Iasians'. It thus identifies the interests of the Iasian polis, presented as an undivided collectivity, with a particular, clearly controversial external allegiance.<sup>387</sup>

The close interlinking of concrete 'Nakonian' visions and stigmatization of opponents as vicious anti-citizens, worthy of expulsion, is widely attested in the extra-Athenian Greek world. Some Hellenistic one-man rulers of poleis probably used 'Nakonian' language about civic unity and purity to justify expulsions of opponents. Diodorus and Plutarch capture this in some of their portrayals of monarchical rhetoric. Diodorus represents Agathokles of Syracuse justifying large-scale purges of opponents in 317, achieved through street violence, as a way of making the polis 'pure of those attempting to establish autocratic regimes' (*καθαράν τῶν δυναστεύειν ἐπιχειρούντων*) and returning 'pure autonomy' (*τὴν αὐτονομίαν ἐίλικρινῇ*) to the people.<sup>388</sup> Plutarch represents Cleomenes III of Sparta giving a similar explanation for his expulsion of eighty leading citizens, in connection with his land reforms: he claimed to have 'put out of the way (*ἐκποδῶν*) those who were resistant to the salvation of Sparta (*τοὺς ἐνισταμένους τῇ σωτηρίᾳ τῆς Λακεδαιμόνος*)'.<sup>389</sup> Even if they themselves were engaging in cynical instrumentalization, one-man rulers who used such rhetoric would always have been reaching out to an audience more attached to 'Nakonian' ideals.

The spectacle of Agathokles, himself widely vilified as a tyrant, accusing opponents of aiming at despotic rule encapsulates a broader phenomenon.

<sup>387</sup> *I.Iasos* 1, ll. 2–3.

<sup>388</sup> Diodorus 19.9.1.

<sup>389</sup> Plutarch *Agis and Cleomenes* 31.10–11.



When citizens vilified powerful opponents as outsiders from 'Nakonian' civic community, a particularly prominent charge was that of aspirations to illegitimate power or even tyranny. In a time of tension, such accusations could, in line with the discussion earlier, complement and reinforce concrete 'Nakonian' visions of civic integrity. However, they could also serve as a useful substitute when such positive visions were difficult to formulate or promote.<sup>390</sup> Indeed, presentation of a particular citizen as a bestial<sup>391</sup> tyrant could obviate difficult questions about the precise nature of the common good or civic virtue.<sup>392</sup> The result was that a large proportion of citizens could, at least, rally around shared opprobrium for a consensually acknowledged violator of civilized standards. Relevant accusations often led to exilings, of the accused or their accusers.

This phenomenon was particularly common in the tense circumstances of the aftermath of *stasis* violence. In the sequence of later fourth-century documents from Eresos on Lesbos relating to former 'tyrants', it is claimed that the two 'tyrants' tried in 332 after losing power, Eurysilaos and Agonippos, had excluded the citizen-body from the city in its entirety (*πανδαμί*).<sup>393</sup> It is implausible that these men managed to exclude the whole citizen-body from the city. More likely, some male citizens remained in the city, either under duress or as willing supporters.

The documents' probable simplification of historical reality can be seen as an attempt, begun at the time of the trials themselves and reaffirmed through these documents' monumental publication towards the end of the fourth century,<sup>394</sup> to make the large-scale exclusion of democratic Eresians a symbol of civic solidarity, not divisions. The claim that all the citizens were excluded implied that the civic body had remained united as one body, a collective victim of the autocratic vices of lone tyrants.<sup>395</sup> This style of commemoration demanded the removal of the 'tyrants' and their descendants. Eurysilaos and Agonippos themselves were sentenced to death. Other recent Eresian 'tyrants' and their descendants incurred exile, subsequently reaffirmed.<sup>396</sup> These documents contain incidental indications that the Eresian political situation was more complex than they themselves suggest. Not only did a handful of Eresians vote against the consensus, for the acquittal of Eurysilaos and Agonippos, but some of the earlier tyrants' descendants willingly agreed to submit to trial in 324, which suggests that they thought they had a case to make, even

<sup>390</sup> Cf. Loraux (2001), esp. 152–3; Ober (2003b), 225, 235.

<sup>391</sup> Cf. Diodorus 19.1.8 (Agathokles' *ῥμιότης*).

<sup>392</sup> Cf. Villard (2008), esp. 81–3, 776 (on Medieval Italian city-states).

<sup>393</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 83,  $\beta$  side, ll. 1–3 and  $\gamma$  front, ll. 7–8. For a new edition, rearranging the fragments, see Ellis-Evans (2012), 204–10.

<sup>394</sup> See Ellis-Evans (2012), 199.

<sup>395</sup> Compare Ellis-Evans (2012), 199–201, with other bibliography.

<sup>396</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 83,  $\gamma$  back, ll. 14–15;  $\gamma$  side, ll. 25–8, and back, ll. 26–8.

though eventually unsuccessful.<sup>397</sup> This example thus confirms that 'Nakonian' specificity about recent civic history, as opposed to safer concentration on the mythical or indefinite past, could be highly divisive.

Even outside the context of the restoration of civic order after unrest, such simplistic, exclusionary divisions of poleis into virtuous visionaries and unscrupulous despots were a common citizen response to tension and uncertainty. However, while this formal 'Nakonian' framework was commonly influential on whole citizen-bodies, there was rarely consensus about the identification of the two groups in particular cases.<sup>398</sup> This is especially clear in the exile-laden politics of fourth- and third-century Sikyon in the Peloponnese.

The first fourth-century 'tyrant' of Sikyon was the elder Euphron. Xenophon portrays Euphron as a selfish opportunist and turncoat, 'clearly a tyrant'. This view of him was almost certainly shared by contemporary Sikyonians: returned exiles from his regime travelled to Thebes to assassinate him when he had himself been expelled from power.<sup>399</sup> Euphron probably did show some of the stereotypical tyrannical features ascribed to him by Xenophon: employment of mercenaries,<sup>400</sup> exploitation of civic funds, imposition of arbitrary exile, and other unconstitutional methods.<sup>401</sup> However, as Lewis emphasizes, there are hints in Xenophon's account that his accusations of tyrannical behaviour were at least partly ideological inventions, aimed at discrediting a populist leader, developed by aristocratic Sikyonians and Xenophon himself.<sup>402</sup> Euphron's first step in power was to establish democracy, based on 'equal and alike' civic rights. Moreover, the new democratic *δημος* elected him general.<sup>403</sup> Even when he returned after his own first expulsion, by the Arcadian general Aineias of Stymphalos, he regained control of the town of Sikyon 'with the *δημος*', as well as his mercenaries. Moreover, after his death, the people granted Euphron burial in the agora and honours as city 'founder'.<sup>404</sup> This reveals that his popular image was that of a distinctly civic figure, rather than a transgressive tyrant: he was deemed worthy of burial in the principal egalitarian civic space, the agora.

Sikyonian history after the elder Euphron was also sometimes dominated by similar exile-laden political conflict sustained by tendentious tyranny

<sup>397</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 83, γ front, ll. 30–40. Cf. Ellis-Evans (2012, 197; Teegarden (2014), 133.

<sup>398</sup> Compare Lewis (2004), 73, on the importance of 'political standpoint'; cf. Rhodes and Osborne (2003), 377. For the general prominence of ideological accusations of tyranny in ancient Greek politics, compare: Berve (1953), 42; (1967), 302, 383, 508; Lanza (1977), esp. 30–2, 191–2; Morgan (2003b), p. xi; Osborne (2003), 251; Lewis (2006b), 5. Some fourth-century examples: Aeschines 3.89, 92, with Berve (1967), 303, and Hansen and Nielsen (2004), 649; Trundle (2006), 70; Polyaeus 6.49, with Lewis (2004), 72–3.

<sup>399</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.1.44–6; 3.1–12.

<sup>400</sup> Trundle (2006), 69–70.

<sup>401</sup> Mossé (1969), 128; Osborne (2003), 254.

<sup>402</sup> Lewis (2004), 71–4.

<sup>403</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.1.45.

<sup>404</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.3.4; 12; Berve (1967), 305–6; Lewis (2004), 71; Rhodes (2005a), 219.

accusations. For example, Plutarch, probably partly following the contemporary Sikyonian Aratus' *Memoirs*, presents the early and mid-third-century pro-Antigonid political leaders of Sikyon as vicious, unstable tyrants, responsible for exilings.<sup>405</sup> Nevertheless, the 'tyrant' Abantidas, at least, ruled for an extended period (264–252), suggesting that he enjoyed prolonged domestic support.<sup>406</sup> Abantidas also advertised his interest in philosophy in a way more consonant with a civic than a monarchical lifestyle: the philosophical disputation at which he was assassinated, of a type he was reportedly accustomed to attend, took place in the agora, not in a domestic quasi-court setting.<sup>407</sup>

An inverse case, in which a non-democratic political leader was probably stigmatized as a tyrant by opponents, is that of Aratus himself. The evidence for this is Plutarch's account of how Aratus, after growing up in exile in Argos, mobilized Sikyonian exiles to regain control of Sikyon, from the 'tyrant' Nikokles, in 251. Plutarch's account begins with complimentary details. Aratus first consulted his fellow exile Aristomachos and the Megalopolitan 'philosophical and practical man' Ekdelos, a student of the Academic philosopher Arcesilaus. In a source closer to the time of these events, Polybius praises this Ekdelos (or Ekdemos) as an exile from tyranny in Megalopolis who studied philosophy and became a campaigner against tyranny, overthrowing Aristodemos' tyranny in Megalopolis, as well as helping Aratus.<sup>408</sup> This presentation by Polybius of earlier politics in his home city provides further, more direct evidence for a Hellenistic Peloponnesian tendency to divide the politically active into virtuous, enlightened citizens and vicious tyrants or tyrant lovers.

According to Plutarch, after consulting these elite intellectual supporters, Aratus then appealed to the Sikyonian exiles in assembly. Those who felt 'shame' at not taking part agreed to participate in the attack on Sikyon, which other exiles presented as too 'bold'. The exiled Sikyonian engineer (*μηχανοποιός*) Euphranor built scaling ladders for the attack, while unspecified men, presumably exiles, must have been responsible for the preparation of weapons which Plutarch mentions.<sup>409</sup> As a whole, this exile coalition corresponds in its three parts to the ideal city of Plato's *Republic*: philosophers; 'bold', shame-conscious fighters; and craftsmen.

This complimentary part of Plutarch's account may well derive from Aratus' self-presentation in his *Memoirs*, in which he could have claimed philosophical legitimation for his political decisions, resembling Abantidas in eagerness to demonstrate an association with philosophy. A positive, abstract 'Nakonian' image of Aratus' political achievements certainly had

<sup>405</sup> Plutarch *Aratus* 2.1–3.

<sup>406</sup> Cf. Berve (1967), 394.

<sup>407</sup> Plutarch *Aratus* 3.4. Berve (1967), 396, points out that Antigonal kings must have taken into account local conditions and civic divisions in imposing tyrants on Sikyon.

<sup>408</sup> Polybius 10.22.2–3. See also Plutarch *Philopoemen* 1.3–5; Pausanias 8.49.2.

<sup>409</sup> Plutarch *Aratus* 5–6.1.

some contemporary supporters. According to Plutarch, the restored exiles put up a bronze statue to him, with an epigram praising him for widely famed achievements and for virtue and justice; he had brought 'equality in the citizen-body and divine good government' to Sikyon (δᾶμον ἴσον θείαν τ' ὥπασας εὐνομίαν).<sup>410</sup>

However, such 'Nakonian' representation of Aratus could well have provoked a hostile reaction in others. After its complimentary opening, Plutarch's account of the exile movement adds damning details: in addition to the coalition described above, Aratus armed his slaves and recruited soldier-brigands.<sup>411</sup> Significantly, these are activities characteristic in Plato's *Republic* of the tyrant, who hires fighters and arms slaves (newly freed from their owners) to ensure his own security.<sup>412</sup> These details are probably best attributed to a hostile third-century source, such as the historian Phylarchus, who wished to puncture Aratus' pretensions to be a virtuous philosopher-ruler by exposing him as himself a tyrant, according to Plato's own definition.

#### 5.4. Explanations for Divergent 'Nakonian' Visions

In many cases, in Athens and beyond, it was often not merely contingent that, when citizens had to choose concrete, unambiguous content for 'Nakonian' ideals, they seized on sharply contrasting interpretations, vilifying one another as outsiders from true civic community. This was often also an explicable result of prominent 'Nakonian' paradigms' workings and nature.

One relevant factor is that citizens had often developed their specific or idiosyncratic interpretations of 'Nakonian' civic virtue, on which they single-mindedly insisted during exclusionary *stasis*, by contrasting themselves or their favoured political leaders with visible opponents within their city. For example, in later fifth-century Athens, disillusioned Athenians' specific interpretations of civic virtue relied on contrasts with their democratic opponents' habits: truly virtuous Athenians were those who did not dress like slaves, participate in unruly collective revelry, or hang on popular orators' words.<sup>413</sup> As a result, promoting those specific interpretations with unequivocal 'Nakonian' vigour required anti-democratic Athenians to stigmatize those contrasting citizens, necessarily very prominent in their own consciousness, as vicious anti-citizens.

The reverse process would be popular stigmatization of otherwise ideologically useful elite individuals when tensions demanded ideological clarity.

<sup>410</sup> Plutarch *Aratus* 14.4.

<sup>411</sup> Plutarch *Aratus* 6.2.

<sup>412</sup> Plato *Republic* 567d9–568a2.

<sup>413</sup> For criticism of democrats as foils to the virtuous, sober man, or citizen, see, for example, [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 1.10, 13; Plato *Republic* 557a2–562a3.

Modern theorists have identified a relevant tendency of Greek cities to expel in crises actual and metaphorical scapegoats, including Socrates. According to this analysis, these were men who were held up in crises as perfect anti-citizens, but had in fact been nourished and given prominence by the relevant polis itself. Indeed, these were the men by reference to whom conformist citizens had developed and reinforced notions of civic order and civic rationality.<sup>414</sup> Although it is difficult to substantiate this analysis with precise evidence for the processes involved, there is at least good evidence, already presented in this chapter, for democratic poleis turning against previously integral and influential citizens. In an extreme case, certain citizens could come to advocate before a popular assembly exacting standards of civic commitment of which they themselves turned out to fall short. The Argive ‘demagogues’ who incited the Argive people to a massacre of wealthy Argives by clubbing in 370/69 quickly found themselves the next victims of the collective fervour to expunge inadequate citizens which they had provoked.<sup>415</sup>

The other crucial reason why the sharply polarized character of ‘Nakonian’ factionalism was often not merely contingent was that the indeterminate content of the shared ‘Nakonian’ ideals of a polis’ political culture often incorporated sharply contrasting visions of civic order. For example, as emphasized already in this chapter, indeterminate ‘Nakonian’ ideals often straddled (different types of) democratic and oligarchic, egalitarian and hierarchical models of order. When concrete constitutional choices had to be made, previously united citizens could fracture into devoted partisans of different constitutional arrangements. That this well-attested Classical phenomenon endured into the Hellenistic period is strongly suggested by the *stasis* scenarios envisaged by laws against overthrow of democracy from, for example, Hellenistic Ilion and Kyme,<sup>416</sup> not to mention the Iasian internal politics discussed in Section 5.3.1.

This phenomenon can also be illustrated by reference to a central ambiguity of Hellenistic civic values: the ambiguity about whether the good polis should adopt an attitude of free-spirited defiance of kings and other external claimants to hegemony, or rather of cultivated subservience to them. Skilful alternation between the two attitudes was necessary to survival as a political community.<sup>417</sup> This involved careful rhetorical triangulation, of the kind familiar from Chapter 4, between assertion of autonomy and eulogy of its external protectors.<sup>418</sup>

<sup>414</sup> See Derrida (1981), 133–4 (part of ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, pp. 63–171); compare Leonard (2005a), 205–7.

<sup>415</sup> Diodorus 15.57.3–58.4; Gehrke (1985), 31–3.

<sup>416</sup> In general, see Teegarden (2014).

<sup>417</sup> Cf. Ma (2002a); (2008a); also Champion (2004), on the ‘politics of cultural indeterminacy’ observed and applied by Polybius in his approach to the Roman conquerors, presented as virtuous and barbarous at once.

<sup>418</sup> Consider Ma (2002a), no. 28 itself.

Accordingly, citizens of Hellenistic poleis had to entertain ambivalent, or even conflicting, attitudes about specific claimants to hegemony. Acute divisions arose when, with tensions leaving no further room for ambiguity, citizens had to endorse with 'Nakonian' conviction one of the two horns of the freedom-dependency dilemma, as well as adopting concrete positions concerning the different external claimants to power over them.

This is evident in the contrasting attitudes to civic freedom, tradition, Seleucids, and Romans in 190s Iasos, analysed in Section 5.3.1 above. Polybius relates a revealing story<sup>419</sup> concerning unrest in Selge in 218, catalyzed by the presence of the rebel Seleucid general Achaïos. According to Polybius, the leading citizen Logbasis schemed to hand the city over to Achaïos' forces. When the citizens in assembly discovered this, some moved to defend the city, but the majority rushed to Logbasis' house, where they killed Logbasis, his sons, and the others present.<sup>420</sup> This story, which must have sounded plausible to Polybius' contemporary readers, evokes the kinds of extreme behaviour and violence which could be unleashed when a Hellenistic polis was faced with an unavoidable concrete choice about foreign policy. Logbasis used subterfuge to pursue his own policy of accommodation with superior forces. The majority of citizens responded with direct, collective action aimed at extirpating a perceived traitor to the city's traditional freedom.

Significantly, Polybius himself praises the Selgians' actions in terms which indicate the kinds of monopolistic, uncompromising 'Nakonian' rhetoric, involving concrete application of ideals of civic patriotism and tradition, which situations such as these could provoke, even in an outside observer. In Polybius' assessment, the Selgians overcame the threat of Logbasis' impiety (*ἀσεβεια*), using their own valour (*εὐτολμία*) to preserve their city in a way which disgraced neither their freedom nor their kinship with the Spartans. Interestingly, at the same time as using such emphatic language himself, Polybius even suggests that the Selgians were themselves aware of the inflammatory character of concrete, uncompromising decisions about their city's political and diplomatic orientation. Despite their success in fighting off Achaïos' forces, they decided to seek a compromise truce with Achaïos, fearful, not only of a siege, but also of potential *staseis* within their own citizen-body.<sup>421</sup>

Relevant disputes concerning freedom, dependency, and foreign allegiance could lead to the flight of exiles, as evident from Iasian politics of the 190s themselves.<sup>422</sup> In a related case of exclusionary *stasis* concerning relations with

<sup>419</sup> Compare also the analysis of Polybius' interpretation of second-century Achaian and Aetolian politics in Gray (2013b).

<sup>420</sup> Polybius 5.76.1–5. <sup>421</sup> Polybius 5.76.6–11.

<sup>422</sup> Rhodes was another polis affected by relevant types of exile: some partisans of Perseus fled Rhodes on the Romans' arrival in 168 (Livy 45.10.14).

the Romans, this time in a federal state, rival pro- and anti-Roman Boeotians orchestrated their own rival versions of the Boeotian federal assembly in 173, showing the adeptness at running and adapting political institutions encouraged by norms of civic voluntarism. Members of both factions were successively forced into exile during the conflict.<sup>423</sup>

Plutarch tells a story about responses to Roman power in Hellenistic Boeotia slightly later, concerning the young Damon of Chaironeia, which reveals some of the tensions underlying this earlier Boeotian *stasis*, but also crystallizes many of the processes analysed in the previous paragraphs. Indeed, this story's interest for Plutarch and his sources and readers was probably partly due to the way in which it addressed uncertainties and paradoxes of the post-Classical polis.<sup>424</sup>

According to Plutarch, Damon orchestrated the assassination of a Roman commander who had erotic designs on him and was treating the city with contempt, before fleeing into local exile with his young supporters. In Plutarch's account, Damon's act of resistance struck at the heart of the Chaironeians' ambivalence about civic autonomy and Roman power. Indeed, according to Plutarch, it forced them into successive, contradictory concretely 'Nakonian' resolutions of the dilemmas involved. First, the civic council condemned Damon to death *in absentia*, formalizing his exile. Subsequently, however, the Chaironeians induced him back to the city. On his return, they first appointed him gymnasiarch, symbolic cultural leader of the polis. Soon afterwards, however, 'they' slaughtered him while he was anointing himself in the gymnasium.<sup>425</sup>

## 6. GREEK SYNTHESSES OF 'NAKONIAN' AND 'DIKAIOPOLITAN' IMPERATIVES: *STASIS* IDEOLOGIES AS THE INVERSE OF EUDAIMONISM

### 6.1. Introduction

The most important reason why the sharply polarized interpretations of 'Nakonian' civic order characteristic of exclusionary *stasis* were usually not contingent, but rather explicable results of civic political cultures, is, however, another one, already evident from the opening Phliasian case-study. It is that

<sup>423</sup> Livy 42.43.7–9, where Livy presents one assembly as far more legitimate than the other; see also Seibert (1979), 210.

<sup>424</sup> For the continuation of a related type of *stasis* under the Principate, see Thornton (1999), 509–16 (discussing Cyzicus under Augustus and Tiberius).

<sup>425</sup> Plutarch *Cimon* 1.2–7; Ma (1994).

'Dikaiopolitan' perceptions of justice and entitlement often structured factionaries' concrete 'Nakonian' visions.

Periods of tension and uncertainty demanded straightforward political programmes which were internally consistent as well as concrete. As a result, citizens often sought to integrate neatly into precise, coherent ideological schemes the 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' considerations, imperatives, and impulses jointly central to their political consciousness.

Eudaimonist ideas<sup>426</sup> could serve this purpose: citizens could reconceive their 'Dikaiopolitan' narrow personal welfare and security<sup>427</sup> as inextricably tied to the upholding of 'Nakonian' communal success and values. Plato's Socrates' arguments show clearly how eudaimonism could appear to harmonize notably materialistic 'Dikaiopolitan' norms with strongly 'Nakonian' norms. The *Republic's* Socrates makes a curious attempt to quantify the just king's happiness as 729 times greater than that of the tyrant,<sup>428</sup> combining high-minded virtue ethics with a straightforwardly quantified conception of personal happiness.

Rather than embracing eudaimonist approaches, citizens who became embroiled in *stasis* sometimes performed inverse types of reconciliation. Thucydides very concisely captures the essence of this opposite type of synthesis in his version of the exiled Alcibiades' speech at Sparta in 415: 'I do not bear patriotic loyalty in so far as I am being wronged, but in so far as I lived securely as a citizen' (τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην). Alcibiades goes on to make clear that he does not even recognize the current city of Athens as his homeland: he wishes to 'recover' his homeland with Spartan help.<sup>429</sup> He thus redefines 'Nakonian' patriotism, and even the Athenian polis, in such a way that its legitimate demands cannot stand in the way of his strict 'Dikaiopolitan' entitlements, to 'just' treatment and personal security or even immunity.

## 6.2. Oligarchic Cases

### 6.2.1. Resolution of Subjective 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' Impulses

Oligarchs attempted different versions of the type of synthesis under consideration here. For one thing, oligarchs could develop single rhetorical poses and ideological schemes which appeared faithful to 'Nakonian' ideals, but did not

<sup>426</sup> Namely, ideas belonging to the common Greek line of thought which makes possession of virtue necessary for personal well-being, first discussed in Section 6 of the Introduction.

<sup>427</sup> For a connection between strong virtue, education, and personal security, see Plato *Gorgias* 510a6–521b1.

<sup>428</sup> Plato *Republic* 587d12–e4.

<sup>429</sup> Thucydides 6.92.4.



substantially inhibit the fulfilment of their separate 'Dikaiopolitan' desires as individual, disparate citizens, propertied and ambitious. For example, Critias' slogan that *σωφροσύνη* is 'doing one's own things' was usefully ambiguous, as shown in Sections 4.2 and 5.2.3 above, between a cry for unrestricted personal freedom and a robust 'Nakonian' appeal for fine, public-spirited action.

For another thing, oligarchs could inflect their crystallizations of open-ended 'Nakonian' ideals with the resentments, idiosyncratic political value-judgements, and concrete perceptions of entitlement which they shared as members of a collective interest group. Indeed, many of the specific, provocative oligarchic 'Nakonian' visions considered in Section 5 earlier were coloured with collective 'Dikaiopolitan' perceptions of legitimate freedom and earned entitlement, of the kind studied in Section 4.

In one clear case, the Old Oligarch assimilates wealthy material contributors to poleis, such as himself, whom he considers entitled to political power as a just reward for their services, to the ethically 'best' men (*οἱ βέλτιστοι*). Similarly, in the context of 404–3 itself, Xenophon's Theramenes couches even his insistence that the Thirty should follow principles of strict reciprocity, harming only those who have harmed them, in 'Nakonian' ethical terms: the oligarchs should spare those who have served the democracy, but not been burdensome to the 'virtuous and good'.<sup>430</sup> Significantly, there are signs that an Athenian oligarch could entertain doubts about the legitimacy of the egoism and antagonism of bald 'Dikaiopolitan' claims, which this type of rhetoric could have assuaged. As analysed in Section 4.3, it is only with irony and understatement that the Old Oligarch insinuates that wealthy Athenians are entitled to just rewards for their contributions to the polis' survival.

In the Hellenistic period, in accordance with the developments studied in Section 4.3, the corresponding tendency was for wealthier citizens to embed in their specific 'Nakonian' visions claims to property rights, creditors' rights, and associated civic power. This is vividly reflected in the decision of the second-century Iasians responsible for rebuilding the registry office, probably the home of debt records, to dedicate the new building pointedly to 'Ομόνοια and the People. Their approach is closely echoed in the later second-century long Colophonian honorary decree for the citizen Menippos, roughly contemporary with the decree for Polemaios, first discussed in the Introduction. Menippos was praised for having preserved 'common *ὁμόνοια*' among all citizens and the existing property of each (*τὴν τε κοινὴν τοῖς πολίταις πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμόνοϊαν καὶ τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἐκάστωι κτήσεις*),<sup>431</sup> as if true unity was inextricably bound up with the existing distribution of property rights. The emphasis on unity suggests that these comments relate to a period of acute socio-economic crisis, or even near *stasis*, in Colophon, perhaps in

<sup>430</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.15.

<sup>431</sup> SEG 39.1244, col. II, ll. 19–21.

the context of the uprising of the anti-Roman Attalid rebel Aristonikos (133–129 BC).<sup>432</sup>

A related approach is evident in a second-century honorary decree from Paros, not deriving from a context of overt *stasis*. In that text, the *agoranomos* Killos is praised for having used the law to ensure that wage earners were not idle, and that their employers paid their wages ‘without a legal suit’ (ἀνευ δίκης).<sup>433</sup> The reference to the possibility of an acrimonious trial is probably best interpreted as a rhetorical device, inserted by a wage-paying decree author, to cast employers’ mere fulfilment of wage contracts as self-sacrificing concern for civic harmony: they *voluntarily* paid wages, rather than making necessary destabilizing litigation. Indeed, this claim recalls the rhetoric commonly used to praise the resolution of disputes by arbitration, rather than strict enforcement of law, during visits by foreign judges to Hellenistic poleis. In endorsing the ideology evident at Iasos, Colophon, and Paros, wealthy Hellenistic citizens fused, rather than holding in balance, the competing instincts for ‘Dikaiopolitan’ insistence on legal entitlements and for harmonious, friendly *δμόνοια* simultaneously tolerated or encouraged in many such decrees for foreign judges (see Chapter 4.2).

These Hellenistic approaches to money and civic virtue are paralleled in Polybius’ text. When Polybius identifies the root cause of second-century *stasis* in Kios in Bithynia as ‘lack of counsel’ (ἀβουλία) and ‘bad government’ (κακοπολιτεία), he makes clear the centrality of defence of private property rights to his ostensibly ‘Nakonian’ emphasis on civic prudence and order: the Kianoι favoured the ‘worst’ politicians over their opponents in order to ‘divide up one another’s property’ (ἵνα διαιρῶνται τὰς ἀλλήλων οὐσίας).<sup>434</sup>

Such hybrid ideological positions provided precisely the kind of mindset required to invest oligarchs with the ideological conviction to perpetrate purges and expulsions: by removing opponents, they would be both claiming their strict reciprocal or legal due and protecting the safety of a core of virtuous citizens. Indeed, those positions fed into uncompromising, exclusionary vilification, of the kind considered in Sections 5.2.4 and 5.3.3, of those who opposed, or stood to lose from, the implementation of oligarchs’ entitlement claims. Examples of such vilification themselves bear the marks of attempts to reconcile divisive insistence on such demands with a sense of patriotic civic solidarity.

For example, the Old Oligarch stigmatizes the Athenian people for skewing Athenian institutions and political life in their own interests: they have successfully made the political system entrench their advantage. Indeed, they seek to perform only those offices which bring wages or other rewards. Their conduct reveals a lack of self-control, patience, and education, which renders

<sup>432</sup> Robert and Robert (1989), 93.

<sup>433</sup> IG XII 5 129, ll. 14–20.

<sup>434</sup> Polybius 15.21.3–5.

them unfit for political decision-making.<sup>435</sup> Such vilification of the strategic intelligence and manipulations of the people serves to cast the Old Oligarch's own equally partisan speech-act as a disinterested cry for the restoration of political probity.

Along similar lines in the Hellenistic period, as Eckstein shows, Polybius presents popular calls for anti-Roman policies or remissions of debts in Greeks states as signs of moral degeneration or political madness or disease.<sup>436</sup> For example, the Boeotian Opheltas, who devised populist economic measures in the 190s, was contriving the destruction of all. Moreover, those Boeotians who favoured the anti-Roman cause at this point were 'sick in their souls' (*καχεκτοῦντες ταῖς ψυχαῖς*).<sup>437</sup> Accusations of demagogic challenges to property rights and civic order, amply attested in the second century BC, can partly be seen as attempts by competitive factions to appeal to Roman conservatism,<sup>438</sup> but they also drew on the long traditions of *stasis* rhetoric and vilification discussed in this chapter.

A potentially particularly interesting epigraphic parallel is offered by the Colophonian decree for Polemaios himself. In that decree, resident citizens mentioned a *Δούλων Πόλις* adjacent to Colophonian territory.<sup>439</sup> It is a convincing hypothesis, helpful in explaining the involvement of the Roman Senate in the issue, that this settlement was occupied by residents of Colophon who had joined Aristonikos' revolt, subsequently received Roman recognition as an ally, and then plundered Colophonian territory.<sup>440</sup> This group may well have included Colophonian citizen debtors, who had joined the revolt to avoid impoverishment.<sup>441</sup> Indeed, the incumbent citizens are more likely to have

<sup>435</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia*, esp. 1.1–7; compare Euripides *Suppliant Women*, ll. 34/35.2.26; Yunis (1996), 42, 46–7.

<sup>436</sup> Eckstein (1995), 133–5. <sup>437</sup> See Polybius 20.6.4, 7.4.

<sup>438</sup> See Champion (2007), esp. 262–5, discussing a rich set of examples from Polybius and epigraphy. Champion acknowledges (pp. 260–1) that such rhetoric was certainly not first invented at this point as a means of courting Roman support.

<sup>439</sup> SEG 39.1243, col. II, ll. 33–51: raiding of 'the land belonging to us at *Δούλων Πόλις*'.

<sup>440</sup> Rigsby (2005), 112–15, arguing against the interpretations of Robert and Robert (1989), 37–8; Buraselis (2000); Ferrary (1991), 558, with n. 3, and 559, with n. 5, 559; Mileta (1998), 55–6.

<sup>441</sup> Cf. Dubois (2006), 7–8. Strabo claims that Aristonikos attracted at Heliopolitai, not only slaves, but also poor inhabitants of inland Anatolia (Strabo 14.1.38; contrast Diodorus 34/35.2.26). It is probable that he also attracted residents or even citizens of coastal poleis (cf. Mossé (1969), 199). The citizens of Pergamon certainly feared the defection of residents (*I.Pergamon* I 249, ll. 26–30; cf. Chapter 3.2). The Romans did once grant freedom and secure possession of territory to a dissident group in Spain composed entirely of slaves, in contravention of important aspects of Roman ideology (*ILLRP*<sup>2</sup> 514, presented as a parallel in Rigsby (2005)). In this case, however, the involvement of free dissidents, with experience of citizenship, would help to explain the formation of an apparently well-organized and effective dissident community: there is very little evidence for Greek slaves establishing their own institutions, let alone their own polis, even with foreign or monarchical help. The formation of a new community by poorer Colophonians who had seceded, or been expelled, from their home city would have had at

described as ‘the polis of slaves’ a group including free dissidents, rather than a community of men who were all, at least in their eyes, slaves. To call a group of rebel slaves a ‘polis’ would have been to assign them a status of which they could not normally dream. By contrast, to call a community including free men a ‘city of slaves’ would have been purely and strongly derogatory.<sup>442</sup>

The styling of the settlement as a Δούλων Πόλις would have represented an effective means, amid the hardship and uncertainty provoked by Aristonikos’ revolt, for Colophonian creditors to reconcile provocative perceptions of political and financial entitlement with a sense of ‘common *ὁμόνοια*’ and obligation towards fellow residents of Colophon. If the settlement was the antithesis of an ideal community of free, virtuous citizens, dissident residents of Colophon settled there lay beyond the scope of obligations of civic charity.<sup>443</sup> In particular, if the settlers included rebel, indebted Colophonian citizens, the representation of the settlement as a Δούλων Πόλις would have provided a means for creditors to reconcile their perceptions of entitlement to debt repayments with their ‘Nakonian’ sense of responsibility for needy Colophonian citizens: citizens who rebelled against debt obligations were non-rational, non-virtuous anti-citizens, verging on slaves. For incumbent citizens who consciously or unconsciously styled themselves as quasi-Aristotelian citizens,<sup>444</sup> the choice of the name Δούλων Πόλις was highly appropriate: a Δούλων Πόλις was Aristotle’s own notion of an absurd, dystopian anti-polis.<sup>445</sup>

Relevant reconciliations of the competing practical entailments of rival underlying ‘Nakonian’ and ‘Dikaiopolitan’ norms were less demanding than eudaimonist ones: they required less abstraction from immediate circumstances and little revision of already well-formed convictions. The resulting ideological schemes and fictions were, in the first instance, resolutions of particular citizens’ subjective conflicts of motivation and orientation. They must have helped to dispel both internal doubts and outward appearance of

least one precedent: the formation of a new community at Notion by anti-Persian Colophonians in the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides 3.34.1–2).

<sup>442</sup> For the stigmatizing of poor or democratic political opponents as ‘slaves’, or similar to slaves, by the wealthy, compare the Athenian rhetoric considered in Section 5.2.4 earlier, esp. [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 1.10; probably also Herodotus 6.83 (on Argos after 494).

<sup>443</sup> See Thomas (1971), 561, 564–5; Briggs (1996), 29–50, 139–41, for discussion of parallel explanations of early modern European witchcraft accusations.

<sup>444</sup> Certain parts of the decree for Polemaios, presumably written by one of his supporters among the Colophonian elite, have a distinctive quasi-Aristotelian form, whether or not there was any direct influence: an explicit role is given to both virtue and external goods in the good life of both Polemaios himself and of the city as a whole (SEG 39.1243, col. I, ll. 11–16; col. V, ll. 7–11), which recalls Aristotle’s view that *εὐδαιμονία* requires both virtue and external goods (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1101a14–16; note in particular the similarity with the wording of SEG 39.1243, col. V, ll. 10–11); and the language about Polemaios’ civic education is reminiscent of Aristotelian thinking (see Gray (2013a), 252–3).

<sup>445</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1280a32–4. Cf. Dubois (2006), 8–9; (2007), 440–2.

hypocrisy. Nevertheless, relevant ideological schemes and fictions also superficially reconciled the objective conflict of values at the heart of Greek civic political culture, appearing to offer precisely the concrete, coherent resolution of political problems, valid for all, sorely needed in times of tension.

### 6.2.2. *Resolution of Objective Contradictions between 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' Norms*

For one thing, such visions gave an egoistic cast to the notion of virtue itself. The Anonymus Iamblichi, writing in the later fifth century, criticizes a particularly crude way of doing this: individuals should not give particular weight to 'self-seeking' or 'advantage' (πλεονεξία), nor 'think that the power concerned with self-seeking is virtue' (τὸ κράτος τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ πλεονεξίᾳ ἡγεῖσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι).<sup>446</sup> Plato seeks to capture a similar tendency in oligarchic rhetoric in his portrayal of Callicles in the *Gorgias*: Plato's Socrates shows that Callicles relies on an indeterminate notion of 'the better men', which blurs the distinction between those who are strongest and most talented and those who are wisest about civic affairs and bravest.<sup>447</sup> The Anonymus Iamblichi's counter to such views is along eudaimonist lines: the only true form of power and excellence is that which involves scrupulous respect for law and justice. He thus pursues the opposite, more demanding type of synthesis: the task, not of rethinking ἀρετή as πλεονεξία, but of rethinking πλεονεξία as ἀρετή.

More subtle ways of achieving a similar egoistic recasting of virtue assimilated the state of being virtuous and enlightened, in a way commendable by 'Nakonian' standards, very closely to the tendency or ability to acquire, preserve, and harness personal wealth, like a good 'Dikaiopolitan'. For example, in his representation of the debate about the fate of Plataea in 427, Thucydides makes the strongly oligarchic<sup>448</sup> Thebans claim that the Plataeans who invited the Thebans into their city in 431, the men pre-eminent in birth and wealth, were the Plataeans who had most at stake in the matter.<sup>449</sup> The implication is that the fact that they had the most to lose from collective civic failure entitled them to political power, but also made them particularly anxious to ensure common Plataean welfare.<sup>450</sup>

A related ideological move is evident in the Colophonian decrees for Polemaios and Menippos. Those decrees present wealth as a prerequisite for admirable civic virtue. For example, the start of the decree for Polemaios presents his acquisition of civic virtue as a result of his extensive education at

<sup>446</sup> Anonymus Iamblichi 6.1 DK.

<sup>447</sup> See Yunis (1996), 142, discussing Plato *Gorgias* 488b8–491d3.

<sup>448</sup> Compare Hornblower (1991–2008), vol. I, 460.

<sup>449</sup> Thucydides 3.65.2–3.

<sup>450</sup> Note that Thucydides attributes a similar argument to an ostensibly democratic speaker, Nicias, at 6.9.2 (discussed in Chapter 4.2).

Colophon and Rhodes,<sup>451</sup> an expensive undertaking beyond the reach of the less affluent. Moreover, it regularly cites examples of Polemaios' civic virtue which involve lavish use of private resources, to fund, for example, hospitality and embassies.<sup>452</sup>

Polemaios is also praised for releasing many from their debts. The beneficiaries then left formal testimonies of their gratitude (*χάρης*), making very clear in the public archives the remission's 'humanity' (*φιλανθρωπία*).<sup>453</sup> This is quite far removed from the rhetoric about debt remissions in another later Hellenistic decree, passed by the Otokondeis of Mylasa, which praises a certain Iatrokles for giving loans and releasing struggling debtors from their contracts, 'thinking that justice is more beneficial than injustice'.<sup>454</sup> That claim represents a very strong assertion of 'Nakonian' values and repudiation of 'Dikaioopolitan' ones: it would have been not only ungenerous, but also *unjust*, for Iatrokles to insist on debt repayments in difficult circumstances. This Mylasan decree strikes the same 'Nakonian' note as the Prienian decree which praises Moschion for donating money to his city in a crisis, 'treating his property as common to all citizens' (see Chapter 4.2). According to that claim, Moschion did not behave as if making a special sacrifice of legitimate private goods, but as if recognizing the true scope of the communal.

In the decree for Polemaios, by contrast, the remission of debts is presented as an act of particular generosity and humanity, worthy of special notice in the public archives. This approach laid claim to much greater normality and legitimacy for the profitable credit-giving practices in which Polemaios engaged, and the inegalitarian distribution of civic power which they reflected and underwrote. Anyone who questioned the compatibility of profitable elite credit-giving practices with 'Nakonian' public-spiritedness would be faced with apparent formal proofs of Polemaios' particular virtue in relation to credit and debt. This approach, like the association of 'common *ὁμόνοια*' with existing property rights in the decree for Menippos, chimes with the spirit of a more theoretical second-century version of this type of redefinition of 'Nakonian' virtue, attempted by the Stoic Hecato of Rhodes. According to him (see Chapter 1.4.4), the common good of a city is best served if its citizens each concentrate on the prosperity of their private family estates, within customary and legal constraints.<sup>455</sup>

Such oligarchic visions also sought to establish a converse, apparently intrinsic connection between poverty and lack of civic virtue. A key part of the Old Oligarch's attack on the poor is that their poverty itself makes them

<sup>451</sup> SEG 39.1243, col. I, ll. 1–28.

<sup>452</sup> e.g. SEG 39.1243, col. I, ll. 11–16; col. II, ll. 5–11; col. III, ll. 11–13, 47–58; col. IV, ll. 20–3, 47–50.

<sup>453</sup> Cf. SEG 39.1243, col. III, ll. 38–47.

<sup>454</sup> *I. Mylasa* 109, ll. 7–10.

<sup>455</sup> Cicero *De Officiis* 3.63.

vicious and self-interested,<sup>456</sup> disqualifying them from political office. In a similar way, Xenophon's Theramenes claims that the poor individuals whom he thinks can legitimately be excluded from the Athenian citizen-body would 'sell their city for a drachma'. He thus distorts poorer Athenians' financial needs, the reason for their inferior material civic contributions, into supposed evidence for lack of patriotism, an implicit justification for the following, fundamentally 'Dikaiopolitan' proposal to restrict the citizen-body to those, such as Theramenes himself, able to help the city with horses and shields.<sup>457</sup> Consequences of poverty and lack of political opportunity were thus made into justifications for their continuation.

In a related way, the specific nature of Plato's Critias' ostensibly 'Nakonian' interpretation of the doctrine that *σωφροσύνη* is 'doing one's own things', namely 'fine' things, analysed in Section 5.2.3, put *σωφροσύνη* beyond the reach of poorer Athenians, precisely because of their poverty. Oligarchs probably associated the 'fine' activities characteristic of *σωφροσύνη* principally with those serving no immediate material end and bringing no personal profit, clearly *πράξεις*, not mere *ποιήσεις*.<sup>458</sup> Poorer Athenians, who did not already enjoy comparable financial and social advantages, could not aspire to the required abstinence from demeaning profitable work and self-interested political agitation. Moreover, most poorer Athenians had not received the education required to appreciate and undertake those intellectual and cultural pursuits, including the pursuit of abstract, synoptic knowledge, which were paradigms of true *πράξεις*. A consideration strongly supporting this interpretation of the ideological force of these arguments is that the Platonic Critias presents with incredulity the suggestion that Hesiod could have thought that working as a cobbler or other manual labourer carries no stigma.<sup>459</sup>

The evidence for oligarchic thinking along these lines reveals a paradox concerning the common Greek 'Nakonian' high evaluation of considered, virtuous action, contrasted with instrumental action,<sup>460</sup> a probable reaction against the encouragement of more strategic action by the 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm. Although shared by ancient democrats<sup>461</sup> and championed by some modern critics of individualistic capitalism,<sup>462</sup> this high evaluation of non-instrumental action could easily itself be used to stigmatize those who

<sup>456</sup> See [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia*, esp. 1.5; Ceccarelli (1993), 448–9, compares the tendency in some Attic oratory to associate poverty with injustice.

<sup>457</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.48; Ungern-Sternberg (2000), 153.

<sup>458</sup> Compare Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1140b11–13, in the context of 1140a1–b21.

<sup>459</sup> Plato *Charmides* 163b5–8. Justification of the denial of political rights to manual workers on similar grounds: Aristotle *Politics*, e.g. 1278a15–21.

<sup>460</sup> Consider Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, e.g. 1140b6–7; compare Aristotle *Politics* 1254a5–8. See also Holmes (2005), 11.

<sup>461</sup> Cf. Thucydides 2.40.5 (Pericles); 3.42.5–6 (Diodotos).

<sup>462</sup> e.g. Arendt (1958), esp. Part V.

performed necessary roles, satisfying shared purely material needs, or who relied on wages to meet their own material needs. By its lights, pay for work, let alone political office, appeared mercenary.<sup>463</sup>

The other main reason why relevant oligarchic visions appeared to resolve the objective contradiction between 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' requirements was that they made insistence on tangible reciprocal rewards for supposed virtuous action and habits appear consistent with 'Nakonian' principles of harmony, self-sacrifice, sharing, and equality. In general, as Saxonhouse argues in relation to Aristotle's ideas about justice, 'proportional justice', or the satisfaction of desert claims, 'must depend on the diversity of skills, of values, of claims'.<sup>464</sup> Oligarchic visions of civic community concealed the conflictual nature of certain desert claims, by circumscribing and reorienting the notion of civic community in such a way that static, 'Nakonian' civic harmony could enclose within itself certain types of dynamic political self-seeking.

Because wealthy contributors to the polis were conceptualized as having an exclusive claim to virtue, their promotion of their own interests and perceived deserts ceased to represent an antagonistic challenge to the interests of other unequivocally legitimate citizens. Indeed, within the redefined civic community, the interest and entitlement claims of all legitimate citizens were entirely aligned with one another: citizens constituted a consensual unity, with no need for impartial civic institutions to adjudicate disputes and assign conflicting deserts. Even equality was seemingly protected: those who qualified as virtuous did not receive widely unequal shares of available power and resources.

Oligarchic visions of these types arguably made any form of partisan, sectional self-promotion by the wealthy indistinguishable from display of solidarity. The Old Oligarch candidly claims that even virtuous rulers' rule would be in the interests of 'those like them' (*τοῖς ὁμοίοις αὐτοῖς*).<sup>465</sup> From his perspective, therefore, sectional self-seeking and 'helping of friends' by one particular civic faction, that of the 'virtuous', and removal of their opponents, comes to coincide with the preservation of a static, homogeneous civic community of 'equal and alike' fellow citizens.

Similarly, in the scheme set out by Plato's Critias, the self-controlled man of *σωφροσύνη* shows his public-spiritedness, integrity, and respect for civic order precisely by behaving as a restrained, self-sufficient, untouchable individual, interested in 'knowing himself' and gaining synoptic knowledge. Such a man is able to elevate himself high above the demands of trade, manual work, or civic bargaining. He achieves a community of interest and outlook with fellow

<sup>463</sup> Note the stigmatization of wage labour, even in democratic contexts: e.g. Isocrates 14.48; cf. Finley (1981), 105–7.

<sup>464</sup> Saxonhouse (1992), 209 (compare 204–205).

<sup>465</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia*, esp. 1.6.



citizens, but only with those fellow citizens who have the resources and educational background required to adopt a similar approach to life and citizenship. Through appeal to *σωφροσύνη*, therefore, the self-reliance and self-insulation of the 'Dikaiopolitan' citizen could be carefully embedded in a wider quasi-'Nakonian' vision of political quiescence and of a meeting of minds between legitimate citizens.<sup>466</sup>

Moreover, some oligarchic visions of civic community pegged the satisfaction of particular interests and entitlement claims to the apparent upholding, not only of communal harmony, but also of 'Nakonian' ethical standards themselves, especially barriers between the virtuous and the vicious. The Old Oligarch's approach, for example, makes any self-assertion or insistence on earned entitlements, mirroring his own, by those outside elite circles appear absurd or amoral: it begins to appear highly questionable that 'the poor and the people' should 'have more than the virtuous and wealthy' (*πλέον ἔχειν τῶν γενναίων καὶ τῶν πλουσίων*), or than the 'hoplites and virtuous and good' (*οἱ ὀπλῖται καὶ οἱ γενναῖοι καὶ οἱ χρηστοί*).<sup>467</sup>

Oligarchic visions of this type seemingly reconciled the more 'Dikaiopolitan' and more 'Nakonian' interpretations of the common notion that power and resources should be distributed according to worth (*κατ' ἀξίαν*). Thucydides captures this phenomenon in his representation of the oligarchic Thebans of 427. They claim that the Plataean oligarchs who invited the Thebans into their city in 431 wanted to ensure that 'the worse men among you would not become even worse' (*τούς τε ὑμῶν χείρους μηκέτι μᾶλλον γενέσθαι*),<sup>468</sup> revealing an exclusionary concern with the Plataean civic community's ethical qualities. However, they then add that those oligarchs also wanted to ensure that 'the better men receive their deserts' (*τούς τε ἀμείνους τὰ ἀξία ἔχειν*), a fairly bald statement of the principle that virtuous citizens deserve personal benefits in recognition of their virtue. This sudden eruption of an explicit expression of a 'Dikaiopolitan' perception of entitlement to *τὰ ἀξία* is then swiftly followed by further heavily 'Nakonian' language about ethical improvement: the oligarchic Plataeans wanted to act as 'moderators' (*σωφρονισταί*) of the Plataeans' attitudes.<sup>469</sup>

<sup>466</sup> For a related interpretation of some ideas of Plato and Aristotle: Adorno and Horkheimer (1972), 22. This type of harmonisation has had a wide-ranging influence on subsequent European opposition to full democracy; compare, for example, Nippel (2008), 108 (on civil-war England and 1848 Germany).

<sup>467</sup> [Xenophon] *Athenaion Politeia* 1.2. Compare Ceccarelli (1993), 448, discussing 1.2: the Old Oligarch locates democratic claims to just entitlements in the domain of opinion (*δόξα*), and thus reserves 'pour lui-même et pour sa classe la vérité absolue, l'*ἀρετή*'.

<sup>468</sup> Note the reservations about this text and translation at Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover (1945–1981), vol. II, 351.

<sup>469</sup> Thucydides 3.65.3.

Along similar lines, the Persian characters Chrysantas and Cyrus argue in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* that those who contribute more in practice to the army's success should receive proportionately greater rewards (see Chapter 1.4.2). Xenophon makes them closely associate the proportional distribution of tangible rewards with the defence of distinctions between good and bad citizens and the promotion of virtue. At one point, Chrysantas states that nothing could be 'more unequal' than for the bad man and the good man to be 'deemed of equal worth' (τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦσθαι),<sup>470</sup> usefully blurring the distinction between material rewards and moral recognition. Controversial entitlement claims are thus hitched to an apparently less partisan insistence on preserving moral standards against relativistic laxity and free-riders.

Whereas Xenophon probably himself sympathized with such elisions, Plato implicitly criticized them. The Callicles of the *Gorgias*, responding to Socrates' questioning about the nature of the 'better men', at certain points simply tacks the 'Dikaiopolitan' claim that the better men should 'have more' than their fellow citizens onto the more 'Nakonian' claim that their wisdom about civic affairs and bravery make them best qualified to rule. At these points, as in the arguments of Xenophon's Cyrus, a demand for material rewards is subsumed within an argument about good rule and civic order.<sup>471</sup> Socrates' attempts to guide Callicles towards a more public-spirited position thus succeed only in making him express his partisan entitlement claims with the provocative moral absolutism of 'Nakonian' rhetoric.

The Colophonian decrees again offer a Hellenistic parallel. Those decrees present as a key to the promotion of civic solidarity and far-reaching civic virtue the provision of generous reciprocal rewards and honours in return for benefactors' services.<sup>472</sup> A reader of the decree for Polemaios could easily have inferred that his honours, though extremely beneficial for him personally as sources of pleasure, power, and prestige, were principally a crucial means of maintaining the ethical barriers between virtuous, rational citizens and vicious, irrational 'slaves'. Similarly, when that decree comments that relieved debtors registered their χάρις towards Polemaios, the picture of straightforward 'Dikaiopolitan' reciprocity, of the politically useful formal recommendations as quid pro quo, is quickly counterbalanced. The debtors were, in fact, helping to reinforce demanding standards of civic and humane virtue, by putting Polemaios' humanity on record.

As apparent objective reconciliations of Greek values, the oligarchic visions analysed here had greater appeal, not only than more abstract eudaimonist ones, but also than a further possible type of harmonizing vision: a vision of a stable, united, harmonious polis in which each citizen is content with his

<sup>470</sup> Xenophon *Cyropaedia* 2.2.18; compare 23–7.

<sup>471</sup> See Plato *Gorgias* 490a6–8; 491c6–d3.

<sup>472</sup> See, for example, SEG 39.1243, col. V, ll. 18–25, 38–43.

station and with his earned entitlements, and with the general distribution of goods and burdens, like the contented citizens of Cicero's inegalitarian *Republic*.<sup>473</sup> Such a vision would not have given any place to the kind of antagonistic self-seeking and self-protection intrinsic to 'Dikaiopolitan' politics. Moreover, the kind of civic unity which it offered had nothing of the visceral fellow-feeling and collective striving for demanding goals intrinsic to the 'Nakonian' paradigm.

### 6.3. Democratic Cases

When forced to unify the swirling imperatives of their political cultures into coherent schemes, democrats sometimes developed stable syntheses. For example, the public epigram for the Athenians who died at Potidaea in 432 used the verb ἀλλάσσομαι, a word associated with commercial exchange,<sup>474</sup> to describe how the dead men had 'exchanged' their lives (φσυχὰς δ' ἀντίρρο[π]α θέντες) for ἀρετή, posthumous glory, and brought glory to their fatherland:<sup>475</sup> the ideals of the 'market polis' and the patriotic military-political community were welded together. However, democrats more commonly achieved synthesis by provocatively embedding conventional, material perceptions of 'Dikaiopolitan' entitlement in concrete, exclusive 'Nakonian' visions.

For example, the aggressively democratic visions of Athenian civic harmony considered in Section 5.2.1 were strongly shaped by the less wealthy majority's subjective political preferences, instincts towards self-protection, and contentious perceptions of desert. The joins between synthesized contrasting imperatives are occasionally visible in our evidence. For the fifth century, they are most visible in the indirect evidence of criticism and satire by hostile authors. In Thucydides' Sicilian debate, for example, as Ober shows, Alcibiades argues for intervention in a partisan way which apparently reconciles cooperative and agonistic imperatives, 'justice and expediency':<sup>476</sup> in pursuing their individual and collective material interest in conquest, the Athenians will also be bringing justice to their Sicilian allies and preserving civic unity between young and old.<sup>477</sup> Thucydides thus represents Alcibiades redefining the democratic common good in terms of 'Dikaiopolitan' entitlements and freedoms before he goes into exile, foreshadowing his more straightforward, anti-democratic pegging of τὸ φιλόπολι to his perceptions of personal just entitlement in his speech in exile in Sparta. Aristophanes also satirizes democratic figures claiming absolute ethical value and public-spiritedness for

<sup>473</sup> See, for example, Cicero *De Re Publica* 1.69.

<sup>474</sup> e.g. Plato *Laws* 915e1. <sup>475</sup> Peek GV 20, ll. 11–12.

<sup>476</sup> Compare, for example, Cleon at Thucydides 3.40.4.

<sup>477</sup> Thucydides 6.17–18, with Ober (1999), 114, 116–17.

interventions aimed at fulfilling democratic desires or requiring democratic services.<sup>478</sup>

There is more direct evidence in the aggressive democratic rhetoric of the fourth-century democracy, in the build-up to 322. In his *Against Leocrates*, for example, Lycurgus sometimes blurs the distinction between appealing to the immediate, contingent self-interest of the majority of the jury, like a good 'Dikaiopolitan' orator, and upholding civic unity and absolute values. He sometimes uses 'Nakonian' rhetoric of unity with a partisan twist, referring to the *δῆμος* in a way which is ambiguous between its narrower and broader senses. For example, he opens by appealing to the gods to allow him to be a good prosecutor of Leocrates, for the sake of the *δῆμος* and of the polis, as if those two things must coincide. He also later tells the jury that, if they acquit Leocrates, they will give anyone licence to injure the *δῆμος* and 'yourselves'.<sup>479</sup> This latter claim presupposes that members of the jury, 'you', are entitled to reflect about how to protect and promote their own particular interests through civic institutions, including the court itself, like good 'Dikaiopolitans'.

Lycurgus also sometimes infuses 'Nakonian' appeal to fixed, demanding civic values with 'Dikaiopolitan' considerations of utility. In his opening, he claims that the stigmatization of those who bring public prosecutions as interfering is 'neither just nor beneficial for the polis', as if there must be substantial overlap between those things. Moreover, he later merges human and divine interests, appealing to the jurors to punish Leocrates 'on behalf of yourselves and the gods'.<sup>480</sup> In general, Lycurgus' ways of speaking appear, at least for democratic sympathizers, to make any tension between short-term self-interest, pan-Athenian solidarity, and abstract, timeless justice disappear.

The discussion of tyranny accusations in Section 5.3.3 above attests similar processes beyond Athens. The fourth-century Sikyonian democrats acted out a similar synthesis of rival norms when they provocatively buried their controversial champion, Euphron, in the agora, ritually celebrating him as a city 'founder'. These democrats can be seen to be inspired in this self-confident assertion of their interests by the competitive, regulatory conception of political interaction implicit in Euphron's promise to the people of Sikyon, when he first seized power, that the Sikyonian constitution would now be 'on equal and alike terms' (*ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις*).<sup>481</sup> According to this conception, citizens should not themselves be 'alike', but should interact and bargain

<sup>478</sup> Consider the personified Demos at Aristophanes *Knights*, ll. 777–87: the offer of a cushion to soothe the body which fought at Salamis, implicitly a reward or recompense for that military service, is 'truly noble and people-loving' (*ἀληθῶς γενναῖον καὶ φιλόδημον*). Compare Aristophanes *Knights*, ll. 871–4, using the kind of grandiose language characteristic of an honorary decree to make the elision. See also Yunis (1996), 54, discussing ll. 1207–13.

<sup>479</sup> Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 2, 145.

<sup>480</sup> Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 3, 146.

<sup>481</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.1.45.

with one another, as groups or individuals, on equal terms, within the bounds of constraints which are 'the same' for all, poor as well as wealthy.

Nevertheless, the people of Sikyon here embedded their contentious bargaining position in 'Nakonian' gestures which appeared to invest it with absolute, unquestionable legitimacy, seemingly elevating their partisan champion into a statesmanlike city 'founder' above the political fray. This appropriation of shared civic space, myth, and means of approbation was sufficiently provocative to their opponents to make Xenophon comment, in a way which captures the ideological process under discussion here, that this was an example of how the majority defines as 'good men' its own benefactors (οἱ πλείστοι ὀρίζονται τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἐαυτῶν ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι).<sup>482</sup>

A close comparison can be drawn with the behaviour of the restored early Hellenistic democrats in Erythrai who ordered the repair of the statue of the tyrannicide Philitos, deprived of its sword by a recent anti-democratic regime. The decision clause of the first decree begins with the claim that the decree is being passed 'so that the people of Erythrai may clearly show much concern and always remember its benefactors, both alive and dead' (ὅπως ἂν ὁ δῆμος φαίνηται πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενος καὶ μνημονεύων ἀεὶ τῶν εὐεργετῶν καὶ ζώντων καὶ τετελευτηκότων).<sup>483</sup> The Erythraian δῆμος thus expressed a strictly reciprocal sense of obligation and gratitude specifically towards those who had done favours to it, called εὐεργέται, as in Xenophon's description of the Sikyonians. This was combined with a strictly reciprocal desire to create incentives for further similar pro-democratic favours, including decisive, dangerous action against anti-democrats.<sup>484</sup> The δῆμος also freely admitted that these sentiments had a partisan edge, by stating that the recent anti-democratic regime had attacked the statue.

The Erythraian democrats thus explicitly represented themselves behaving partly in the manner characteristic of the stereotypical δῆμος of Xenophon's Sikyon or Plato's Athens: as a group aware of its partisan interests and the way to achieve them through 'Dikaiopolitan' exercise of collective political freedom and exchange of χάρις. Simultaneously, however, they also, like Xenophon's Sikyonian democrats, provocatively embedded their 'Dikaiopolitan' lobbying and requital of favours in a type of 'Nakonian' rhetoric which ostensibly soared above considerations of self-interest, bargaining, and debts: the expression of regulations about supposedly consensual, unifying public art and ritual, symbolizing timeless, pristine civic freedom and shared anti-tyrannical commitment.

<sup>482</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.3.12. Xenophon himself was not immune from engaging in this type of rhetoric, from a mirroring aristocratic standpoint: consider how he attempts to lift the partisan, contentious figure of Agesilaos above the political fray, by claiming that he behaved like a 'father' to his Spartan opponents (Xenophon *Agesilaos* 7.3).

<sup>483</sup> *I.Erythrai* 503, ll. 6–9.

<sup>484</sup> Compare Teegarden (2014), 151–3.

In conclusion, the result of assimilation of the *δημος* qua interest group with the *δημος* qua civic community was a conception of the *δημος* as an integral, indivisible, but restricted community. This conception created an ideological perspective from which dynamic, antagonistic self-assertion by the poorer majority, the full, free exercise of its 'Dikaiopolitan' bargaining power, ceased to be a challenge to static 'Nakonian' unity, and became instead an assertion of it. From this perspective, any individuals whose behaviour or ideas were at variance with the particular view of civic interests and values advocated, such as Lycurgus' Leocrates or anti-democratic Sikyonians, became almost automatically civic traitors, candidates for exile.

## 7. CONCLUSION

The different phenomena considered in this chapter reveal in further detail the dominant pattern in civic political cultures discussed in Chapters 1–4: competing 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' norms, which each had crucial practical indeterminacies, exerted parallel influence. The evidence from different regions considered in this chapter also shows with particular clarity that this enduring basic pattern could take very different forms.

In Classical and early Hellenistic Athens, for example, the most prominent 'Dikaiopolitan' principles were principles of personal political freedom and strict meritocracy, involving tangible rewards for tangible contributions. Conversely, the most prominent 'Nakonian' paradigm treated the Athenian citizen-body as a solidaristic, autochthonous community of virtuous citizens, faithful to constitutional traditions. The principal 'Dikaiopolitan' features of early fourth-century Peloponnesian civic political cultures were norms requiring unqualified respect for property rights and Spartan-influenced notions of honour, courage, and revenge; the principal accompanying radical 'Nakonian' norms concerned religion, warfare, and commensality. In second-century Asia Minor, 'Dikaiopolitan' norms found expression in favourable attitudes to civic bargaining, strict legal justice, and the protection of financial contracts. Conversely, 'Nakonian' norms found expression above all in the ideals of euergetism and *ὁμόνοια*.

This chapter has also demonstrated that mainstream ideas of citizenship could be important factors among the varied causes of exclusionary *stasis*, as a result of the varied, complex processes considered in turn in Sections 4–6. There were once again significant regional variations: for example, *staseis* in the Peloponnese frequently involved massacres.<sup>485</sup> This feature might have

<sup>485</sup> For the early fourth century, compare the cases from Corinth, Phigaleia, and Argos discussed above. For the Hellenistic period: Diodorus 19.66.6 (Dyme); Polybius 4.16.11–21.12 (Kynaitha); Plutarch *Aratus* 49.3–5 (Messene).

been due either to Spartan exemplary barbarity or to the unleashing of suppressed hatred as a result of the lifting of the Spartan yoke in the early fourth century. However, underlying social processes, and forms of political thinking, were similar in different regions.

For one thing, this chapter has shown that the absence of strong, mainstream, middling proto-Kantian norms, enshrining pluralism and unconditional respect for fellow citizens as ends in themselves, helped to enable exclusionary *stasis*. For example, in Classical Athens, democrats never conceived equality in the unconditional way which would have been necessary to make it a strong barrier against radical, exclusionary, oligarchic arguments:<sup>486</sup> they never identified the citizen's claim to equal status as an inalienable, unconditional civil right.<sup>487</sup> Rather, equality had to be justified through arguments susceptible to oligarchic adaptation.

First, political equality could be justified in 'Dikaiopolitan' terms. It could be justified as a prudential means of maximizing Athens's military strength and individual citizens' well-being,<sup>488</sup> an argument which collapsed after the Sicilian expedition.<sup>489</sup> Indeed, this argument probably lost its force in the changed circumstances even in the minds of poorer Athenians, whom Thucydides and Pseudo-Aristotle represent showing meagre resistance to the proposals for a prudential shift to oligarchy in 411.<sup>490</sup>

Another 'Dikaiopolitan' defence of equality relied on 'Dikaiopolitan' appeal to the personal worth (*ἀξία*) of the free-born and associated entitlement.<sup>491</sup> One of the arguments of Thucydides' Alcibiades shows how such democratic rhetoric about conditional equality could be used to support anti-egalitarian ideas: citizens do not share in the misfortunes of leading figures, so they have no claim to share in their good fortune; they should 'lay claim to the same things' only if they 'give out equal things'.<sup>492</sup> It was a small step to actual oligarchic applications of notions of equality. Indeed, the fact that intellectual supporters of oligarchy had to stress the notion of 'geometrical equality',<sup>493</sup> shows, not only that it was necessary for them to frame their objections to democracy partly in the terms of the prevailing political culture, but also that they found a relatively seamless way of doing so. The fact that *ισότης* was indeterminate between 'equality', 'fairness', and 'proportionality' meant that anti-democrats had no difficulty in adopting it.

<sup>486</sup> Contrast Ober (1989), 93–4; Bultrighini (1999), 65–6.

<sup>487</sup> Compare Ober (1996), 101, on the absence of any 'foundational standard' in Athenian democratic discourse.

<sup>488</sup> Consider Herodotus 5.78.

<sup>489</sup> Osborne (2003), 256–8.

<sup>490</sup> Taylor (2002); (2010), 192–223.

<sup>491</sup> Consider Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1131a25–9.

<sup>492</sup> Thucydides 6.16.4; Ober (1999), 110.

<sup>493</sup> Compare Section 4.3; also Plato *Laws* 756e9–758a2.

Second, political equality between citizens could be justified in ‘Nakonian’ terms, as a corollary of civic fraternity. This style of argument for equality was satirized by Plato: Athenians are equal by nature because they are brothers, born of one mother, the Athenian soil.<sup>494</sup> This approach made the citizen’s entitlement to equal political status conditional in another way: conditional on membership of an imaginary autochthonous community. This argument from community and common origins bore strong affinities to the exclusionary oligarchic arguments considered in Section 5.2.4 earlier. Indeed, oligarchs’ exclusionary decisions and practices arguably represented quite a modest intensification and adaptation of an exclusionary social system dedicated to the maintenance of equality and useful homogeneity<sup>495</sup> within a narrow civic group, partly through the practical and symbolic exclusion of foreigners and the unfree.

The contribution of ‘Dikaiopolitan’ and ‘Nakonian’ norms to Greek exclusionary *stasis* in general can be summarized in slightly different terms by reference to a recent trend in scholarship on the later Classical and post-Classical polis. Recent studies have emphasized that, despite the frequent façade of permanence and unity, later Classical and post-Classical poleis saw significant political conflict. As Azoulay has put it, the ‘marmoreal’ polis of ritual studied by anthropologists must be studied alongside the polis of conflict and change studied by political historians.<sup>496</sup> This chapter adds to this approach the argument that the coexistence in Greek political cultures themselves of these two approaches to politics was itself an important cause of political conflict. This was not least because, as emphasized in earlier chapters, the ongoing dialectic at the level of ideas, and the mirroring practical need for counterbalancing norms, caused the two approaches to reinforce each other, adding to each other’s radicalism.

Exclusionary *stasis* could arise when, under the pressure of tension or uncertainty, citizens insisted on precise, radically conflictual ‘Dikaiopolitan’ demands to earned or financial entitlement, mindless of ‘Nakonian’ considerations of marmoreal solidarity and virtue. Tellingly, for example, *φιλοτιμία* (‘love of honour’), often prized by ‘Dikaiopolitans’, could be used to refer to *stasis* itself.<sup>497</sup> Conversely, similar pressures could also provoke exclusionary *stasis* when citizens insisted single-mindedly on ‘Nakonian’ unity and purity, seeking to give a precise shape to a vision of extreme civic harmony and virtue.

Indeed, such marmoreal ‘Nakonian’ rhetoric made necessary vilification of political opponents and otherwise useful *frères-ennemis*, advocates or

<sup>494</sup> Plato *Menexenus* 238e1–239b1.

<sup>495</sup> See Osborne (2010), ch. 2.

<sup>496</sup> Azoulay (2009), 340; compare Hamon (2009), 366–8; van Nijf and Alston (2011b), 17; Martzavou and Papazarkadas (2013b), 9. For this approach put this into practice: Ma (2013), chs. 4–6.

<sup>497</sup> See, for example, Plutarch *Aratus* 2.1.



followers of rival specific interpretations of shared values, as anti-citizens, eligible for legitimate, polis-preserving expulsion: as uneducated, purely self-interested, or vicious citizens or, at the extremes, as 'slaves' or 'tyrants'. Paradoxically, at the same time as dividing poleis in this way, 'Nakonian' rhetoric consolidated factions: those with overlapping contentious conceptions of cultural and ethical civic unity cohered into close-knit factions. Indeed, poleis usually splintered into two, rather than more, factions, partly because each faction was united in vilification of members of the other as threats to civic order and cultural integrity.<sup>498</sup> In such cases, *stasis* was very clearly a reciprocal process, which required that each side should play its role.

The analysis of the potentially divisive effects of radical 'Nakonian' norms advocated in this chapter echoes the argument advocated by some modern historians that the idealization of substantial political virtue and political unanimity contributed to political violence by, and internal divisions among, participants in the French<sup>499</sup> and Russian Revolutions.<sup>500</sup> It is also consistent with the arguments of modern theoretical advocates of forms of liberal and social democracy that far-reaching ethical and cultural consensus within a political community is unrealizable. If stability and non-violence are considered very important, political institutions should protect pluralism and free debate between mutually respectful citizens.<sup>501</sup> More substantial shared institutions and value often, as Marxist critics would agree, entrench partisan interests, often class ones. Moreover, the predominant process suggested above by which 'Nakonian' norms led to political instability mirrors a process identified by modern post-structuralist theorists as common in political communities which assign priority to the elimination of difference: inevitable differences concerning the interpretation of necessarily ambiguous and polyvalent political and cultural values lead the political community to implode, because members seek to destroy one another, as representatives of deviant, non-conformist political and cultural positions.<sup>502</sup>

A previous application of such modern analyses to ancient political ideas is S. T. Holmes' controversial argument that attempts to apply the Classical ideal of integral civic community to complex, structurally differentiated modern societies have frequently led to totalitarian oppression of individuals and civil society. Holmes suggests that Classical poleis were immune to these dangers, because they were sufficiently homogeneous to bear the constraints of strongly 'Nakonian' ideals and institutions.<sup>503</sup> The argument of this chapter, by contrast, is that the problems of 'Nakonian' politics are not confined to modern societies.

<sup>498</sup> Cf. Loraux (2005), 130.

<sup>499</sup> Furet (1992), pp. x, 77, 103–4; Schama (1989), 184, 292, 297.

<sup>500</sup> Priestland (2007), e.g. 15–16, 38, 41, 49.

<sup>501</sup> See, for example, Habermas (1996); Rawls (2000), 8–9; (2001), 21–3; cf. Williams (2005), 33–7.

<sup>502</sup> See Derrida (1994), 176–9, 247–52.

<sup>503</sup> Holmes (2005), 1, 12–15.

Many Greek poleis had sufficiently complex, varied societies, and sufficiently ambiguous and contradictory political ideals, to make the pursuit of concrete 'Nakonian' unity often devastatingly divisive and exclusive.

Importantly, those marginalized or expelled in pursuit of 'Nakonian' clarity were often individuals who had been licensed by 'Dikaiopolitan' norms to engage in political self-assertion. This tension was captured in some surviving popular stories from the post-Classical polis, such as those about Damon of Chaironeia or the 'exiled' and 'recalled' honorific statue of the highly successful Thasian athlete Theagenes.<sup>504</sup> The insoluble dilemma was whether bold, Alcibiades-like individuals were worthy of lavish honours or exile.

A crucial related process emphasized in this chapter was that citizens sometimes confused and fused the types of political action and rhetoric appropriate to 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' politics: they couched demands appropriate to 'Dikaiopolitan' competition and bargaining in the language of the defence of marmoreal civic harmony. One way of achieving this was the eudaimonist method of insisting that personal interests and communal welfare and virtue necessarily coincide. However, the more common form of fusion was the embedding of bargaining positions in absolutist, marmoreal 'Nakonian' rhetoric. Such ideologies contributed significantly to the formation of tight-knit, irreconcilable factions intent on the expulsion of opponents, each in itself a distorted image of perfect civic harmony. This chapter has thus shown that two characteristic Greek civic phenomena of the fourth century and Hellenistic period, eudaimonism and exclusionary *stasis*, were intrinsically connected.

This account of the contribution to exclusionary *stasis* of the combination of 'Dikaiopolitan' and 'Nakonian' norms is broadly consistent with some modern analyses of political unrest. Some modern historians have interpreted the exclusionary violence and internal divisions of the French Revolution partly as consequences of simultaneous idealization both of a formally conceived 'General Will' and of notions of personal liberty and desert: revolutionary citizens supplied partisan, contentious opinions and entitlement claims as the flesh on a shared skeletal notion of a unitary, unanimous French state.<sup>505</sup> According to Furet, for example, Robespierre was unable, under the pressures of the revolutionary situation, to master the necessary 'political art' of 'playing a double keyboard': speaking the language of Machiavellian interest-oriented bargaining simultaneously with the utopian language of

<sup>504</sup> Pausanias 6.11.2–9, with Azoulay (2009), e.g. 325–6; (2012).

<sup>505</sup> Cf. Hegel *Philosophy of Right* 258; Furet (1981), 48–61, and (1992), 87; Kluge and Negt (1981), 76–7; Schama (1989), 162, 354, 359. Compare Constant's claim that the French revolutionaries (con)fused ancient and modern notions of political liberty (cf. Constant (1988; originally 1819), 309). Compare also the arguments of Esposito (2010), especially 1–3, 52–3 (on Rousseau), that ideals of community have been infiltrated in the modern period by ideals of immunity.

indivisible popular sovereignty, as smoothly achieved by Mirabeau. Instead, he embedded his particular, idiosyncratic perspective in a single, exclusionary vision of revolutionary solidarity.<sup>506</sup>

In a related way, theorists of the Frankfurt School partly explained the rise of Fascism in twentieth-century Europe as a result of the fusion by political elites of two prominent features of early twentieth-century European political cultures: the newly dominant ideal of instrumental, egoistic reason and the reaction it provoked, the reaffirmation of ideals of 'nature' and community. According to this view, political elites 'refunctionalized' notions of virtue and community to serve their instrumental ends as a partisan group, as well as to further the broader 'rationalization' of society.<sup>507</sup>

Those who advocate such interpretations of the French Revolution and Fascism tend to imply that the explosive coexistence of radical ideals of virtue, self-sacrifice, community, and a common will, on the one hand, and radical ideals of personal freedom, entitlement, and desert, on the other, is a distinctively modern development. As argued in this chapter, the two rival sets of ideas were also simultaneously influential, with sometimes explosive consequences, in many Greek poleis.

<sup>506</sup> Furet (1981), 59; cf. 49–50.

<sup>507</sup> For an account of this approach: Habermas (1984), 368–70. Cf. Horkheimer (1947); Arendt (1967), ch. 10.



## Citizens in Exile as a Lens for Interpreting Civic Political Cultures

### 1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter turns to the lives in exile of the displaced, including many displaced through the types of civic trial and *stasis* considered in Chapters 3–5. The main existing comprehensive interpretation of the political identities of displaced citizens is an argument suggested by Balogh<sup>1</sup> and developed in McKechnie (1989).<sup>2</sup> According to this view, displaced Greeks increasingly tended, from the fourth century onwards, to sever links with home cities and even to abandon the ideal of polis citizenship, in order to adopt more individualistic, market-oriented lifestyles. This chapter considers the abundant surviving evidence for the reverse phenomenon: displaced Greeks who did not accept alienation from the polis world imposed by others, but used their behaviour, rhetoric, and interaction with others to assert their continued claim to a civic identity and citizen prestige.

In addition to exiles of this type expelled by a court or through *stasis*, this chapter considers similar groups and individuals rendered refugees by interstate war. These different types of exiles are treated together because, as will become clear in this chapter, the choices open to relevant displaced citizens were very similar, regardless of the causes of their expulsion. Some remarks are, however, made about the differences between the different groups' responses to exile. The focus is on groups of exiles, from one polis or from many, but some consideration is also given to more isolated exiles.

This chapter contributes to the book's project by examining the range of political assumptions and ideals cast into relief by the political behaviour and identities of exiles who clung to a predominantly civic identity, and the

<sup>1</sup> Balogh (1943), 35–6.

<sup>2</sup> More recently, see Trundle (2006). On the importance of 'wandering Greeks', including exiles and refugees, in the Archaic and Classical Greek world, see also now Garland (2014), which appeared after this book was substantially complete.

contributions of those assumptions and ideals to political unity and division. Relying on the method familiar from the Introduction and earlier chapters, the discussion presupposes that aspects of basic conceptions of the good man and the good society are at least implicit in political action and rhetoric. This is especially true of the action and rhetoric of citizens thrust into the extraordinary situation of exile, whose dangers and opportunities almost obliged citizens to make fundamental decisions about their political identity and behaviour. In addition, exile also provided opportunities for relevant exiles to engage in fundamental political experimentation, something which also brought to the surface basic political assumptions. The reconstructed assumptions and ideas and their effects are interpreted as evidence for the workings of the political cultures of the poleis to which relevant exiles had been, or were, exposed: both home poleis and, in many cases, host poleis. The evidence for exiles' identities and ideas has not been much exploited in this way in existing scholarship. For example, the question is little discussed in the central modern work on exiles' actual political behaviour, Seibert (1979), a very rich survey of evidence for exiles from the Archaic period to the Roman conquest.<sup>3</sup>

This chapter relies, to a greater extent than earlier chapters, on the method of interpreting political actions, as opposed to explicit rhetoric, as evidence for underlying political assumptions and attitudes. Frequently, the chapter extrapolates from exiles' attested political decisions and actions to reconstruct underlying basic political ideas. As a result, the constraints on that kind of interpretation identified in the Introduction, and restated in the introduction to Chapter 5, take on added importance.

## 2. PROBLEMS WITH THE EVIDENCE: UTOPIAN AND DYSTOPIAN PRESENTATIONS OF DISPLACED CITIZENS IN POLEIS' PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND IN LITERARY WORKS

### 2.1. Introduction

A major problem in identifying and studying groups of exiles who clung to the polis ideal is the nature of the evidence for such groups.<sup>4</sup> There survive only a few epigraphic texts and monuments which were clearly set up on exile groups' initiative. Many more surviving inscriptions, ostensibly passed by associations or whole poleis, may well have been produced by exile groups,

<sup>3</sup> Compare Lewis (1981).

<sup>4</sup> The situation is different for individual exiles: see the conclusion to this chapter.

in a way invisible to us: as this chapter makes clear, exile groups of different types strove to preserve the appearance of citizen dignity and to imitate the forms of settled poleis and associations.

Since inscriptions of that type are impossible to identify, the most significant evidence for exile groups consists of ancient representations produced by others: in particular, representations of exile groups in the public discourse of expelling poleis or of host poleis; in civic texts commemorating periods of collective exile; and in historical, rhetorical, and philosophical works. All such accounts were shaped, or distorted, by significant ideological and rhetorical factors. This section offers a brief survey of relevant factors, by analysing these different types of representation of exiles. This survey<sup>5</sup> is a necessary preparatory exercise for the attempt to reconstruct exile groups' actual behaviour and identities in subsequent sections, but it also itself yields important evidence for civic political cultures, including some significant tendencies not evident in earlier chapters.

## 2.2. The Representation of Displaced Citizens in the Public Discourse of Their Home Poleis

'Nakonian' civic norms determined most settled citizens' representations of all exiled compatriots, both individuals and groups. Settled citizens commonly perceived or represented their exiled compatriots as uncivilized, worthless,<sup>6</sup> unreliable,<sup>7</sup> and violent.<sup>8</sup> This image of exiles could be expressed through a legal fiction: exiles or fugitives could be made equivalent to foreign military 'enemies' (πολέμιοι) in certain circumstances.<sup>9</sup> Nabis, third- and second-century tyrant of Sparta, is said even to have treated Spartan exiles as prey to be hunted: his agents rented houses next to the houses of exiles, sometimes boring through the walls.<sup>10</sup> This kind of behaviour probably became proverbially associated with tyrants or despotic individuals: Posidonius reports that Athenion, the Peripatetic tyrant of Athens in the First Mithridatic War, sent hoplites out into the Athenian countryside to hunt down (θηρεύοντας) any exiles who had returned within civic borders or any citizens fleeing the city.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See also Gray (2013b), 324–6.

<sup>6</sup> Consider Demosthenes 33.11–12.

<sup>7</sup> Note the Athenian message to the Persians at Herodotus 5.96.2.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. McKechnie (1989), ch. 2, esp. 20–1. Compare Aristotle *Politics* 1253a1–7, or the implied suspicions in *I. Sinope* 1, ll. 18–20: in a mid-fourth-century treaty between Sinope and the ruling family of Herakleia Pontika, the two sides agreed to allow exiles from each city to continue living in the other city, 'provided that they commit no injustice'. Note also the discussion of SEG 39.1243, col. II, ll. 33–51, in Chapter 5.6.2.1.

<sup>9</sup> Hatzopoulos *Macedonian Institutions* II, no. 40 (Amphipolis, 357 BC), ll. 7–10; cf. Vanderpoe (2007), text, pp. 123, 125 (Sagalassos, c.333–200), ll. 9–15.

<sup>10</sup> Polybius 13.6.6–9.

<sup>11</sup> Posidonius F253 Edelstein-Kidd.

Moreover, Plutarch was later to claim that Archias, the commander of the soldiers sent by Antipater to capture Athenian exiles in 322, was known as the 'exile-hunter' (*φυγαδοθήρας*).<sup>12</sup>

Settled citizens could also represent exiled compatriots as antitheses of the good civic benefactor or citizen. For example, by giving the Macedonian benefactor Timotheos the choice of any house among those confiscated from exiles to own, the later fourth-century Eretrians symbolically contrasted those exiles with an individual worthy of civic recognition.<sup>13</sup> Recently discovered financial documents from early fourth-century Argos also give publicity to the confiscation of property from dissidents whose poleis were incorporated into the Argive state: they record the depositing in civic treasuries of income arising from confiscations of property.<sup>14</sup> This too served a symbolic function: the demonstration of collective power over dissidents' private resources.<sup>15</sup> It was not only an exile's property which could be dramatically and symbolically subjected to popular power. As first mentioned in Chapter 5, Azoulay shows that the Athenians threw into the sea, mutilated, and sold honorific statues of Demetrios of Phaleron on his overthrow and flight.<sup>16</sup>

Settled citizens could even present exiled compatriots as devoid of the basic marks of civilization. This is clear from Demosthenes' presentation of the behaviour of Xenophron, son of one of the Thirty Tyrants, Phaidimos (or Phaidrias),<sup>17</sup> settled in exile in Pella, during the Athenian embassy of 346 which negotiated the Peace of Philokrates. Demosthenes presents Xenophron as having behaved in either a non-Greek or a non-civic way. According to Demosthenes, Xenophron arranged for a captive Olynthian woman to attend a symposium at his house, attended by Aeschines. The implication is that he admitted the slave-girl either qua free woman, betraying his corruption by the sympotic practices of the barbarian North, or qua slave-girl, in spite of the fact that the cause of her captivity, Philip II's capture of Olynthos, was an outrage to civic autonomy.<sup>18</sup> In the case of this hostile representation of an exile, it is possible to imaginatively reconstruct the motivations and perspective of the stereotyped actor: Xenophron may have wished to recreate in exile Athenian aristocratic sympotic culture, heavily stigmatized in Athens since 403, a project which gained legitimacy through the presence of visiting Athenian envoys.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Plutarch *Demosthenes* 28.3.

<sup>13</sup> *IG XII 9* 196 (probably dating to 319/8), esp. ll. 2–4, 23–5; cf. Knoepfler, *Décrets érétréens*, no. 7, esp. the discussion on pp. 180–4.

<sup>14</sup> See Kritzas (2006), 428, on money from confiscations at Kleonai dedicated to Hera.

<sup>15</sup> For another possible parallel, see Thonemann (2011), 247–8 (sales of land in Prienian territory to new private owners in the 290s, after the overthrow of Hieron's regime).

<sup>16</sup> See Azoulay (2009), esp. 323–4.

<sup>17</sup> MacDowell (2000), 287, citing Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.3.2.

<sup>18</sup> Demosthenes 19.196–8, with Murray (1996), 15–16.

<sup>19</sup> Contrast MacDowell (2000), 287: Xenophron was trying to gain favour with the Athenian envoys, with a view to a return to Athens.



### 2.3. Representations of Exiles in the Public Discourse of Host Poleis

Representations of groups of exiles in the public discourse of poleis which granted them refuge<sup>20</sup> all show the influence of distorting factors. Such representations occur in three principal media. First, they feature in public documents granting aid or asylum, or reporting the past granting of aid or asylum, to exiles and refugees. The largest group of such texts consists of late fifth- and fourth-century Athenian collective grants of a range of civic privileges to groups of exiles.<sup>21</sup> Principal functions of these texts were to present the exiles concerned as models for imitation by pro-Athenian partisans in other important cities; to offer incentives to those partisans to risk their citizenship for Athenian interests; and to advertise Athenian benevolence, respect for the rule of law, and requital of favours. As a result, the texts represent the exiles concerned in a highly schematic way: as 'friends' (φίλοι) of the Athenians or as 'good men' (ἀνδρες ἀγαθοί),<sup>22</sup> and sometimes as victims of unlawful expulsion.<sup>23</sup>

A similar early Hellenistic document from Ephesus is comparable in this respect: it represents the Prienian exiles given assistance as devoted promoters of Ephesian interests.<sup>24</sup> However, two other surviving Hellenistic texts of this type represent the displaced Greeks involved in a different, equally ideological way, as meek recipients of humanitarian aid. Both Aristonidas of Stratonikeia and Polemaios of Colophon were honoured in the second century, by the Chrysaoric κοινόν and the polis of Colophon respectively, for humanitarian aid to refugees, involving hospitality and donations.<sup>25</sup> Polemaios was even explicitly praised for humane treatment of these refugees: he dealt with them in a 'civic' (πολεμικῶς) and 'humane' (ἀνθρωπίνως) way.<sup>26</sup>

The emphasis on humanitarian aid in these two texts partly reflects the fact that the recipients of aid were war refugees rather than political exiles, but it

<sup>20</sup> On Archaic and Classical asylum: Lonis (1993).

<sup>21</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 2 (403/2 BC), for Samian democratic refugees; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 33 (c.385), for Thasian exiles, who are compared with Mantineian exiles; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 37, with addenda (pp. 656–7) (after 383), for exiles possibly from Apollonia (Wilhelm, cited in the addenda), Thebes (Seibert (1979), 113) or the whole of Boeotia (Walbank (1982), 268, with n. 19); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 109 (363/2), for Astykrates and fellow Delphian exiles; *IG* II/III<sup>3</sup> 316 (338/7), for Akarnanian exiles; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 545 (321/0 or 320/19), for Thessalian exiles. Compare decrees for exiles of unknown origin: *IG* II/III<sup>3</sup> 404 (345–320); 502 and 503 (both mid-fourth century).

<sup>22</sup> For a similar retrospective presentation of a pro-Athenian individual's triumphant return from exile, to liberate willing compatriots, compare *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 448 (in the second decree, of 318/7), ll. 45–7.

<sup>23</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 109, ll. 15–21; 545, ll. 6–8.

<sup>24</sup> *I.Ephesos* 2001 (301/0–298/7), esp. ll. 6–7.

<sup>25</sup> *SEG* 53.1229, ll. 11–14, reading ἀποσκευ[ασμένων τινῶν] in l. 12 (compare Şahin (2003); *SEG* 39.1243, col. III, ll. 25–35. The former text may refer only to Aristonidas storing property, but the absence of space for an object of ἀποσκευ[ασμένων] and the use of masculine pronouns as objects of ὑπεδέξατο suggests that it was people to whom he gave space 'in his fields' and 'in the polis'. The participle ἀποσκευ[ασμένων] would then be used absolutely, to refer to those who had 'packed up and left' (for Stratonikeia); compare *OGIS* 229, ll. 56–8.

<sup>26</sup> *SEG* 39.1243, col. III, ll. 29–30.

probably also indicates a distinctively Hellenistic, political type of humanitarianism. Since this claim, central to this chapter's argument, might be thought to downplay unreasonably the role of humanitarianism in Classical approaches to the displaced, it is worth explaining it in detail. Humanitarian ideals, especially the widespread expectation of generosity towards suppliants, had long been central to Greek culture: they are already prominent in Homer. However, they were not as prominent in political contexts in the Classical period as they became in the Hellenistic period.<sup>27</sup>

In Classical Athens, it was possible for Isocrates to represent aid to refugees as one of Athens' distinguishing characteristics. However, he stresses that the beneficiaries were virtuous and deserving of help: whereas the Spartans mistreated even benefactors of the Greeks and their own kinsmen, the fifth-century Athenians gave new homes to the displaced Messenians and Plataeans.<sup>28</sup>

Rather than unconditional, humane aid to adult male citizens, it was mainly unconditional, humane aid to persecuted or displaced women and children which was celebrated and encouraged in Classical Athenian political discourse, including political theatre. For example, one of the most prominent relevant myths, that of Athenian aid to the children of Heracles, clearly involved help to persecuted children who were undeniably incapable of defending themselves singlehandedly.<sup>29</sup> Even aid to these children might need to be justified by considerations other than unconditional humanity. In Euripides' version in his *Children of Heracles*, for example, characters refer to kinship, Athens' status as a free land, respect for the gods, justice and self-interest as reasons why the Athenians should help these refugees.<sup>30</sup>

Similarly, in Euripides' *Suppliant Women*, it is a group of women, the Argive mothers of the warriors who have died in battle at Thebes and been denied burial, who are the main applicants for, and beneficiaries of, Athenian aid.<sup>31</sup> However, Euripides does not there give strong reasons for thinking that it was axiomatic among the Athenian audience that even women such as these should be helped for humanitarian reasons. Theseus initially refuses the request to intervene to achieve the burial of the dead, on the grounds that King Adrastus of Argos acted recklessly, and in defiance of advice, in invading Thebes. Notably, it is eventually a woman, Theseus' mother Aethra, who

<sup>27</sup> See Gray (2013c), citing much earlier bibliography.

<sup>28</sup> Isocrates 12.94; Forsdyke (2005), 232, 234–9; Garland (2014), 125–8. Compare Euripides *Children of Heracles*, ll. 329–32, where justice and help for friends are emphasized as grounds for characteristically Athenian help to those without means. On the close links between pity and desert in Classical Greek ethics more generally, see Konstan (2001), esp. 37–43.

<sup>29</sup> Their status as children is immediately evident from Iolaos' opening speech in Euripides' *Children of Heracles*: see ll. 10, 26, 48.

<sup>30</sup> See, for example, Euripides *Children of Heracles*, ll. 34–7 (kinship between the sons of Theseus and the Heraclidae); ll. 61–2 (a free polis such as Athens should protect refugees); ll. 236–52 (Demophon's speech justifying his decision to help the refugees).

<sup>31</sup> But see the discussion in Section 3.3.3 below of the role of King Adrastus of Argos.

responds to the appeal, showing pity.<sup>32</sup> However, even she does not attempt to convince her son to intervene on grounds of unconditional humanity: she makes more hard-headed arguments about honouring the gods, helping victims of injustice, curbing violent men who overturn Greek customs, and avoiding charges of cowardice. Theseus then responds enthusiastically to this last point, stating that he is a 'punisher of the wicked' and cannot be seen to be avoiding effort.<sup>33</sup> Even the imaginary, partly idealized early Athens of tragedy is, therefore, in important respects quite distant from the public celebration of unconditional humane aid even to male citizen refugees in the Hellenistic public documents mentioned above.

The second medium in which resident exiles and groups of exiles were represented in the public discourse of a host city was fourth-century Athenian forensic oratory. The significant distorting influence was that speakers manipulated their presentations of exiles with whom they were themselves associated, or whom they otherwise needed to present favourably, in the hope of better persuading the jury. They did so by presenting the exiles in question as unthreatening, or positively favourable, to the Athenian civic community and to Athenian democracy: as docile and moderate, committed to 'quietness' (*ἡσυχία*);<sup>34</sup> as devoted Athenian allies who had given up their possessions and families for Athens;<sup>35</sup> as deserving recipients of substantial rewards for loyalty to Athens, useful advertisements of Athenian gratitude and incentives to others;<sup>36</sup> or as members of organized, democratically run<sup>37</sup> quasi-civic communities of exiles from one home polis, safely imitative of, and subordinate to, the Athenian civic community itself.<sup>38</sup>

The third relevant medium is Athenian polemical texts partly intended to convince Athenians of the necessity of helping the displaced. Isocrates' *Plataicus*, for example, is probably best interpreted as a pamphlet written by Isocrates to promote a number of causes, including more humane treatment of Plataean and other refugees at Athens: Isocrates makes his Plataean speaker lament the misfortunes and helplessness of the Plataeans in exile,<sup>39</sup> inviting sympathy for them.<sup>40</sup> In doing so, Isocrates was implicitly advocating the application of humanitarian values to political decision-making about the displaced, using the ostensible voice of an actual refugee addressing a formal political meeting. He thus anticipated a trend which, as suggested above, became much more pronounced in the Hellenistic period.

<sup>32</sup> See especially Euripides *Suppliant Women*, l. 292.

<sup>33</sup> See Euripides *Suppliant Women*, ll. 297–342.

<sup>34</sup> Demosthenes 19.80.

<sup>35</sup> [Demosthenes] 59.103–4.

<sup>36</sup> Demosthenes 20.52–63.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Aeschines 2.142.

<sup>38</sup> e.g. Lysias 23.6–8, discussed in Section 5.4.2.

<sup>39</sup> Isocrates 14.46–50.

<sup>40</sup> Compare the discussion of Menander's apparent agitation on behalf of some exiles in his *Halieis*, discussed in Section 3.3.1.

## 2.4. Commemoration of the Political Activities and Identities of Exiles after Their Return Home

Another rich source for exile groups' organization and identities is public commemoration of collective displacement, produced after exiles' return home. Many returnees publicly commemorated their own collective displacement, but civic exile traditions were also constructed, or adapted, by subsequent generations. Such traditions were established and preserved through a wide range of media: honorary decrees for benefactors who had given assistance during a period of collective exile;<sup>41</sup> honorary decrees for restored exiles themselves;<sup>42</sup> internal civic legal documents;<sup>43</sup> criteria for holding civic magistracies;<sup>44</sup> plays for the civic stage;<sup>45</sup> civic political and legal oratory;<sup>46</sup> the rhetoric of submissions to an interstate arbitration, subsequently recorded and displayed epigraphically;<sup>47</sup> works of local history;<sup>48</sup> oral traditions;<sup>49</sup> and the organization of civic festivals.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *IG* XII 6 1 17–40 (cf. 42–3) (Samos, after 322); Ampolo (2001), Entella text A2, ll. 9–13, and A3, ll. 8–14 (see also *SEG* 30.1123 and 35.999) (Entella, probably mid-third century); *IPArk* 18 (decree of Elateia, c.189; see also now Mackil (2013), T43 (pp. 472–5)); *I.Oropos* 307 (text—151/0; events described—earlier in the 150s, c.156; see also Mackil (2013), T46 (pp. 480–1)). The evidence that the Oropians in the last example were exiled from their city is that the decree praises the leading Achaian Hieron for having made it possible for them to have returned home (*κατεληλ[υ]θέναι*, ll. 24–5), with their children and wives.

<sup>42</sup> e.g. *CID* 4.118 (decree of Delphic Amphictyony, c.120–115).

<sup>43</sup> Rhodes–Osborne, *GHI* 83, β side, ll. 1–3 and γ front, ll. 7–8 (Eresos, later fourth century).

<sup>44</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1300a16–19: in fifth-century Megara (probably in 424), eligibility for office was restricted to those who had participated in the recent anti-democratic exile movement.

<sup>45</sup> See the interpretations of Menander's *Sikyonioi* and the Greek source for Plautus' *Rudens* mentioned in n. 56 of this chapter.

<sup>46</sup> e.g. Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 68–71; Demosthenes 18.204–5; Lysias 24.25, 31.9.

<sup>47</sup> Magnetto (2008), text (pp. 34–45) (new edition of *I.Priene* 37, a record of the second-century Rhodian arbitration between the Samians and Prienians concerning the Karion), ll. 87–105, a narrative of the exile of a group of anti-tyrannical Prienians in the Karion fort during the tyranny of Hieron (probably 301/0–298/7 BC). On the date and the exiles' conduct: Magnetto (2008), 113–18. The narrative occurs in the Prienians' first submission before the Rhodian arbitrators (Magnetto (2008), 65). Since this arbitration dates to the early second century (probably 197–191: Magnetto (2008), 75–7), the Prienian representatives were referring to events a whole century earlier. For reference in diplomacy to a more recent experience of collective exile, compare the Megalopolitans at Livy 32.22.10.

<sup>48</sup> e.g. Memnon *FGrH* 434, lone fragment, 4.1, 3; 7.3–4: Memnon, a citizen of Herakleia Pontika under the Romans, recorded the patriotism of early Hellenistic Herakleian anti-tyrannical exiles in his narrative history. In doing so, he probably used the historical works of Nymphis of Herakleia, an early Hellenistic historian (*FGrH* 432) who was a leader of the exile group (11.3) (cf. F. Jacoby, *FGrH* IIIb, 259, 273). It was thus probably Nymphis who first crystallized collective memories of the exiles' behaviour into a written account, incorporating his own recollections. For another late Hellenistic recording of a civic tradition about collective flight, compare Higbie (2003), text, pp. 18–49, col. D, ll. 2–59, an account of the flight of Lindians to local strongholds in 480.

<sup>49</sup> For example, Pausanias probably relied partly on oral traditions for his descriptions of local legends about exile (especially his account of Messenian exile traditions in Book IV).

<sup>50</sup> Pausanias 9.3.5: the interval between each Great Daedala festival in Boeotia supposedly corresponded to the length of time the festival lapsed because of the Plataeans' collective exile.

Such traditions were necessarily heavily shaped by rhetorical and ideological factors.<sup>51</sup> Distorted representations of displaced groups of citizens are best attested in later fifth- and fourth-century Athenian democratic discourse. Large groups of Athenians displaced in 480,<sup>52</sup> 411,<sup>53</sup> 404–3,<sup>54</sup> 322–318<sup>55</sup> and possibly also 317–307<sup>56</sup> were each idealized as instantiations of a recurring patriotic, egalitarian *δημος*-in-exile, fiercely united in ideas and emotions,<sup>57</sup> capable of preserving pristine democratic standards ruptured at home and heroically forcing a return to Athens.<sup>58</sup> In these Athenian cases, and in other Greek cases considered later, invented or adapted traditions about collective exile were particularly effective paradigms of ‘Nakonian’ civic order: citizens could imagine the civic community-in-exile as a sublimated, ideal version of the normal civic community, in which all members had voluntarily dedicated themselves to collective well-being. This was partly because, in a period of collective exile, the civic community was displaced from the normal physical environment of its polis, in which an inequalitarian structure of property relations was embedded. As a result, a period of collective exile was one in

Cf. *I.Priene* 11, the establishment of a festival to celebrate restored freedom at Priene after the successful return of anti-tyrannical exiles in 297 (cf. Magnetto (2008), text (pp. 34–45), ll. 87–105); see Crowther (1996), 211–13, 220.

<sup>51</sup> For an example of the plasticity of poleis’ traditions about their own history, especially with regard to moments of defeat or crisis, see Pretzler (2005).

<sup>52</sup> Herodotus 8.79–80, 143–4; 9.3–6; Plutarch *Themistocles* 10–17; Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 68–71, 122; Demosthenes 18.204–5; cf. Hirzel (1909), 263–4; Rosivach (1987), 240–1; Allen (2000), 142–5.

<sup>53</sup> Thucydides 8.75–7. Cf. Hornblower (2004b), 253–4; Forsdyke (2005), 183, 189–90; Hornblower (1991–2008), vol. III, 977–81; Garland (2014), 68.

<sup>54</sup> e.g. Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 4; Plato *Apology* 20e8–21a2; Lysias 25 and 31, esp. 31.9; Demosthenes 20.48; Aeschines 3.181, 187, 208. Cf. Thomas (1989), 132–8; Wolpert (2002), part II; Forsdyke (2005), 262–3. The sixth-century exiles from the Pisistratids were often assimilated to these exiles through similar language: Andocides 1.106, 2.26; Thomas (1989), 139–41, 252–4; Forsdyke (2005), 129, 267.

<sup>55</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 448, ll. 62–4.

<sup>56</sup> There are possible allusions to later fourth-century collective democratic exile, in 322–318 or 317–307, in New Comedy. Lape (2004), 216–17, 234, 237–9, 241, identifies relevant symbolism in Menander’s *Sikyonioi*. Furthermore, Daemones, the main character in Plautus’ *Rudens*, based on a lost late fourth-century Athenian play by Diphilus, is living in exile (ll. 35, 77) in Cyrene, because he has lost his property (ll. 33–8). A plausible interpretation is that Diphilus represented Daemones as having lost his property, fallen below the property census of 322 or 317, and fled into exile on losing his citizenship (contrast Marx (1928), 63–4, on ll. 35–8; Leigh (2010), 112–13). In that case, Daemones’ discovery of his long-lost daughter in Cyrene and her marriage to a fellow Athenian expatriate there could have been symbolic of solidarity among Athenian democrats in exile in 322–318 or 317–307.

<sup>57</sup> Note especially the praise for parallel stoning of a traitor and his wife by the Athenian men and women on Salamis at Demosthenes 18.204–5.

<sup>58</sup> Taylor (2010), 241–65, suggests that Thucydides wished to criticize the quasi-exiles in the Athenian fleet on Samos in 411 for partisanship and lack of attachment to Athenian territory. There is, however, little explicit sign of scepticism in Thucydides’ text. In any case, Athenian democrats themselves probably had a far less equivocal view of this instantiation of the *δημος*-in-exile.

which the citizen-body could be conceived as having transcended conventional socio-economic divisions.

Probably interconnected traditions resembling the Athenian ones were developed in poleis of the eastern Aegean in the early Hellenistic period. Early Hellenistic Eresians (compare Chapter 5.5.3.3) and Prienians constructed parallel traditions: in one case all citizens, and in the other a large number, had been exiled during tyrannical regimes.<sup>59</sup> The nearby Samians contemporaneously constructed a similar tradition regarding their collective exile from a different type of oppressive usurper of civic power: the Athenian cleruchy on their island (365–322).

Probably partly in order to counter fissiparous tendencies in the restored polis,<sup>60</sup> the returned Samians represented their former selves as having formed a cohesive *δημος*-in-exile even when dispersed around the Mediterranean,<sup>61</sup> by presenting ‘the *δημος* when it was in exile’ as the collective recipient of aid from the honorands of post-return honorary decrees.<sup>62</sup> The establishment of such honorary decrees in the Samian Heraion was itself an ostentatiously collective form of commemoration. It contrasts, for example, with an earlier reported commemoration of exile and return in the Heraion through a strongly personal dedication, by Pythagoras’ son Arimnestos.<sup>63</sup> The ‘Nakonian’ character of both the content and means of Samian post-322 commemoration of the period of exile may well conceal a reality of divisions and local variations within the recent Samian exile diaspora.<sup>64</sup>

There is a significant contrast between the Athenian and Samian cases: whereas the Athenians constructed the various versions of the Athenian *δημος*-in-exile as heroic and largely self-sufficient, the Samians represented their *δημος*-in-exile as heavily dependent on external aid. This feature of the Samian presentation was characteristic of many Hellenistic civic traditions about collective exile. Such representations can be partly explained by the fact that shared memory of appreciative dependence on a powerful foreign benefactor while in exile could provide a basis for a small polis to construct more durable relations with that benefactor after return.

However, it was probably also another reflection of the broader shift towards politicised humanitarianism in Hellenistic approaches to the ethics of exile. Some Hellenistic civic traditions about collective exile represent exiles

<sup>59</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 83,  $\beta$  side, ll. 1–3 and  $\gamma$  front, ll. 7–8; Magnetto (2008), text (pp. 34–45), ll. 87–102 (exiles from the tyrant Hieron took control of a civic garrison).

<sup>60</sup> Cf. this chapter’s n. 72.

<sup>61</sup> Shipley (1987), 161–4.

<sup>62</sup> *IG XII 6* 1 17–40 (cf. 42–3).

<sup>63</sup> Duris *FGrH* 76, F23. It may be significant that it was Duris who mentioned Arimnestos’ dedication: Duris’ family was associated with a far less egalitarian conception of the Samians-in-exile of 365–322 (cf. this chapter’s n. 72).

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Section 4.1. On the possible wider significance of social memory of collective exile for the civic life of Hellenistic Samos: Fabricius (1999), 156–8; contrast Ma (2004a), 207–8.

from the city concerned as helpless, meek recipients of humanitarian aid.<sup>65</sup> The suppliant identity was becoming a patriotic civic identity, cherished and given publicity by citizens in official public rhetoric and documents. The most extreme case is that of the third-century Entellinoi, who presented themselves in exile as dependent wanderers: they thanked the citizens of Enna for granting them asylum when ‘we went into exile from our own city and were wandering (ἐπλανώμεθα)’.<sup>66</sup> It was one thing to represent one’s own polis as an actual or potential generous supporter of meek refugees, like Euripides, Isocrates, or the drafters of decrees of the Chrysaoric κοινόν and Colophon considered in the previous section. It was quite another, requiring a far more robust commitment to the value and dignity of the figure of the helpless refugee, for citizens to positively advertise, as the Entellinoi did in this case, the fact that they themselves had been helpless and dependent as a wandering polis.

A sign that there was a transition to politicized humanitarianism concerning exiles in this period is that one relevant public civic text fused humanitarian with more traditional rhetoric. According to a plausible restoration, the Elateians in c.189 thanked the Stymphalians, their kin according to myth, for having shown ‘energetic exercise of humanity appropriate to their kinship’ (ἐκτενεί[αν φιλα]νθρωπίας τᾷ σ[υγγενεῖαι καθ]ακούσαν) in making grants to them when they were expelled en masse from their own polis.<sup>67</sup> They thus probably alluded both to new universalist humanitarian grounds for public aid to refugees and more traditional, particularist grounds of kinship, at the same time as blending a traditional notion of public virtue as striving (ἐκτένεια) with a less conventional conception of it as compassionate, philanthropic concern.

Exile groups presented as dependent refugees had not necessarily been so meek in reality. There is an interesting contrast between the Oropian epigraphic portrayal of displaced leading Oropians of c.156 as relatively helpless refugees dependent on the charity and diplomatic interventions of an influential Achaian<sup>68</sup> and Pausanias’ story that at approximately the same time ‘the

<sup>65</sup> Livy 32.22.10 (reported Megalopolitan claims about Antigonus Doson having ‘restored to their fatherland’ Megalopolitan refugees of 223); *IPArk* 18 (decree of Elateia, c.189), esp. ll. 2–5; *I. Oropos* 307 (Oropos, 151/0), ll. 4–25. Compare the way the later third-century citizens of Amyzon praised an external powerful individual, the Seleucid official Menestratos of Phokaia, for summoning dispersed Amyzonians back to Amyzon for a *synoikismos*: *LAmyzon* 15, ll. 14–17. Robert and Robert (1983), 189–91, discuss this example, with many parallels for civic refoundations involving recall of exiles.

<sup>66</sup> Ampolo (2001), Entella text A2, ll. 9–13, and A3, ll. 8–14, with discussion on pp. xii–xiv. Mackil (2004), 503–4, argues that the Entellinoi benefited in exile from a pre-existing network of mutual support including Entella, Enna, and Egesta.

<sup>67</sup> *IPArk* 18, l. 2.

<sup>68</sup> *I.Oropos* 307, ll. 4–25; for these Oropians as exiles, see this chapter’s n. 41.

Oropians', possibly the same exiles,<sup>69</sup> attempted to bribe a Spartan general of the Achaian League to persuade the League to intervene militarily on their behalf.<sup>70</sup> If the two groups were identical, this is a very striking illustration of the scope for civic traditions to downplay, as well as exaggerate, exile groups' political autonomy. Even if not, Pausanias' story at the very least shows that there would have been significant scope for the displaced Oropians attested in the inscription to take the initiative in negotiations with leading Achaians, something of which the inscription, perhaps through deliberate choice, gives no hint.

Another factor which makes such civic traditions difficult to use as evidence for exile groups' actual political behaviour and identities is that, like other civic legends and collective representations considered in Chapters 1–5 of this book, such traditions were open to contestation. They could oscillate in their meaning and interpretation or fissure into idiosyncratic or partisan versions.<sup>71</sup> In particular, there could be disagreement about where the responsibility for the achievements of an exile movement lay: with the masses or their leaders.<sup>72</sup> Necessarily indeterminate exile traditions also evolved across time, in accordance with changing political circumstances. For example, fourth-century Athenians forged a purported decree of the βουλὴ on Salamis of 480–79, authorizing the stoning of Lykidas, who had proposed capitulation to the Persians.<sup>73</sup> The forging of this decree may reflect, not only the tenacity of the mass displacement of 480–79 as an Athenian paradigm of collective patriotism, but also fourth-century unease, in a period when the 'sovereignty of law' had established itself,<sup>74</sup> at the spontaneous, unregulated violence against Lykidas.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Compare Petrakos (1997), 218. This identification depends on interpreting Pausanias' *καταφεύγοντες ἐπὶ Ἀχαιοῦς* (7.11.7) literally, as a reference to flight. For discussion of the different possible interpretations, see Mackil (2013), 481.

<sup>70</sup> Pausanias 7.11.7–12.1; Seibert (1979), 217–18.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Clarke (2008), 315, on the fissiparous and contested character of many local Greek civic traditions.

<sup>72</sup> Concerning the Athenian exiles of 404–3: contrast the emphasis on elite leadership in Isocrates 8.123 and (for example) Demosthenes 58.67 (cf. Thomas (1989), 132–8; Forsdyke (2005), 262) with the dominant Athenian tradition about the solidaristic, egalitarian δῆμος-in-exile of 404–3. Concerning the Samian exiles of 365–322: contrast Pausanias 6.13.5 (as emended and restored by Barron (1962), 190–1, developing a suggestion of Schwartz in *RE* V, col. 1853), which offers the more hierarchical version that the leading Samian Kaios 'led the δῆμος back to their homes', with the image of a homogeneous, egalitarian δῆμος-in-exile in the post-return honorary decrees set up in the Samian Heraion (see page 302 above). Pausanias' claim probably derived from Kaios' own monument at Olympia, one strand in Samian oral tradition, or the work of Kaios' son Duris (Shipley (1987), 179).

<sup>73</sup> Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 122; Habicht (1961), 21–2; Flower and Marincola (2002), 108.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Ostwald (1986).

<sup>75</sup> Habicht (1961), 22, 31. Rosivach (1987), 239, argues that the idea that a decree had been passed developed as a legitimating device very soon after 479.



## 2.5. Historiographical and Philosophical Representations of Exiles

Literary conventions and polemics strongly shaped portrayals of exiles by historical and philosophical authors in this period. There was a consistent tendency for such authors to represent exiles and exile groups as political and ethical paradigms, often at the expense of historical accuracy. An author could treat a group of displaced citizens as a kind of political laboratory, in which the strains and opportunities of exile revealed the strengths and weaknesses of different forms of political organization. This approach to exile communities encouraged rhetorical manipulation of facts, in order to make the results of the quasi-laboratory analysis cohere with the author's political outlook. The most extensive example is Xenophon's paradigmatic presentation of the wandering Greek mercenaries of his *Anabasis*, mercenaries who become 'refugees', in the sense of wanderers with no imminent prospects of settled residence or long-term employment, perilously and apparently hopelessly stranded far away from home, after the death of Cyrus.<sup>76</sup>

As recent studies demonstrate, Xenophon manipulates his narrative to enhance the rhetorical force of his moralizing account of the experience and political behaviour of the refugees.<sup>77</sup> The result is a sweeping, tendentious portrayal of the construction and dissolution of political community. The refugees retain close-knit 'Nakonian' organization until they reach the Black Sea, but are then consumed by various forms of *stasis*. At first, the displaced army is a utopian paradigm of quasi-Spartan militaristic, hierarchical civic *δμόνοια*, in which the voluntary heroic striving of each serves the common good.<sup>78</sup> As soon as appeals to enlightened individual self-interest come to dominate political debate,<sup>79</sup> the army fragments.<sup>80</sup> The account thus offers good evidence for the exile Xenophon's own preference for 'Nakonian' ideals over 'Dikaiopolitan' ones, but only very problematic evidence for the political tendencies of a whole group of refugee mercenaries.

Other authors offered more monolithic utopian or dystopian presentations of displaced individuals and groups. Such presentations were probably inspired by the belief that exile was a state of exception, flux, and disorientation, in the context of whose pressures and opportunities individuals and groups could take on extreme forms of character and political organization. These extreme forms of character and organization could be taken to reveal with

<sup>76</sup> For an analysis of the influence of literary considerations on another portrayal of an exile group by Xenophon, see Schmitzer (1998).

<sup>77</sup> Lane Fox (2004b), 42–4; Rood (2004), 210.

<sup>78</sup> Consider Xenophon *Anabasis* 3.2.31. <sup>79</sup> Xenophon *Anabasis* 5.1.5–13; 5.7.26–9.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Nussbaum (1967), e.g. 157–8; Roy (1967), 312; Dillery (1995), 64–95; Ma (2004b). For another literary construction of an exile group veering between utopian and dystopian tendencies, compare Plutarch *Aratus* 5–6.2, as analysed in this book, Chapter 5.5.3.3.

exceptional clarity fundamental, and sometimes suppressed or unfulfilled, tendencies of the individuals and groups concerned, or could be offered as real-life paradigms of otherwise abstract ideals or nightmare visions.

Monolithically utopian presentations of exile communities are attested in historical works. As I have argued elsewhere, Polybius represents the Megalopolitan refugees of 223, in the passage first discussed in the opening to the Introduction, as a notably 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm of the importance of showing respect for formalized 'good faith' (πίστις), even at the expense of cherished aspects of 'Nakonian' civic identity.<sup>81</sup> He probably did so partly as a result of the influence of Roman ethics on him during his exile, an experience which clearly made possible for him, at least, fundamental reflection about political bonds. He probably also did so in reaction against the dominant tendency of Greek historians, attested already in Herodotus, to represent exile groups as 'Nakonian' paradigms of civic unity.<sup>82</sup>

At least one philosopher published paradigmatic accounts of exiles' lives: the fourth-century philosopher Aristippus of Cyrene is reported to have written a work entitled *Φυγάδες*, presumably containing accounts of the lives of famous exiles who had displayed in exile the kind of anti-conventional virtue he prized.<sup>83</sup> Some Hellenistic Stoics may also have taken an ethical interest in the lives of exiles who endured exile's hardships through virtue and wisdom, guaranteeing their own true happiness.<sup>84</sup> Laudatory anecdotes about the asceticism, imperviousness, and cosmopolitanism in exile of the Cynic founders Diogenes of Sinope and Crates of Thebes, eventually recorded by Diogenes Laertius,<sup>85</sup> could well also have been in circulation in the Hellenistic period.

An example of the construction of a community of the displaced as monolithically dystopian is the tradition, recorded by Theopompus, that Philip II founded a city in Thrace in which he settled criminals, sycophants, perjurers, and other people accused of 'viciousness': Poneropolis.<sup>86</sup> In the richest source of such representations, Isocrates' speeches, the *πλανώμενοι* or 'wandering masses', usually presented as an amorphous group, are a running symbol of the social instability and ethical decay which Isocrates perceived in the fourth-century Greek world: victims and causes of social and political upheaval, but also potential raw material for political and military

<sup>81</sup> For another monolithically paradigmatic representation of an exile group by a Hellenistic historian, see Diodorus 14.78.6.

<sup>82</sup> For these arguments and the evidence, see Gray (2013b), esp. 328–44.

<sup>83</sup> Diogenes Laertius 2.85.

<sup>84</sup> For a later Stoic's admiring description of a virtuous Roman exile, see Seneca *De Consolatione ad Helviam* 9.4–6; Rawson (1985), 285–6.

<sup>85</sup> e.g. Diogenes Laertius 6.49, 63, 93; Branham (2007).

<sup>86</sup> Theopompus *FGrH* 115, F110. 'Poneropolis' was probably a disparaging name for the new foundation of Philippopolis in Thrace: Hansen and Nielsen (2004), 894. Compare the tradition that Alexander settled the island off Caria called 'Kinaiopolis' with disgraceful people (Pliny *Natural History* 5.36.134: *probris ibi relictis a rege Alexandro*).

transformation.<sup>87</sup> Dystopian representations of exile groups also featured in Hellenistic historiography.<sup>88</sup>

By way of conclusion to this sub-section, it is noteworthy that strong support for the view that the authors concerned were often self-consciously participating in an ongoing political debate and observing enduring literary conventions comes from one particular recurring motif in literary portrayals of exile groups: the motif of a group of exiles or refugees stoning, attempting to stone, or 'almost stoning' an internal or external opponent. This motif featured in accounts of displaced Greeks' behaviour by Herodotus,<sup>89</sup> Thucydides,<sup>90</sup> Xenophon,<sup>91</sup> Demosthenes,<sup>92</sup> Lycurgus,<sup>93</sup> Phylarchus,<sup>94</sup> Polybius<sup>95</sup> and Diodorus.<sup>96</sup> The stoning motif itself encapsulates the ambiguity of the stereotypical literary 'polis-in-exile': it was both utopian and dystopian. On the one hand, stoning was an enactment of the 'Nakonian' ideal. It was the ultimate form of coordinated<sup>97</sup> collective action to uphold common interests and shared ethical standards, by excluding a wrongdoer or vicious individual from the community.<sup>98</sup> On the other hand, stoning could be a violent, impulsive symptom of collective disorientation and disillusionment with conventional political methods.<sup>99</sup>

## 2.6. Conclusion

The third-person portrayals of exile groups considered in this section supplement the picture of civic political cultures developed in previous chapters. In particular, they provide initial evidence for the increasing political application of humanitarian ideas to exile problems in the Hellenistic period. However, the problems in using such portrayals as evidence for exile groups' actual

<sup>87</sup> e.g. Isocrates 4.167–8 (cf. 115–16); 5.96, 120–3; *Letter* 9.8–10. Compare Fuks (1984), 52–79, esp. 60–6; McKechnie (1989), ch. 2, esp. 24–7. The accuracy of this portrayal with regard to the case-study of exiles from Lesbos is questioned in Brun (1988).

<sup>88</sup> Livy 38.33 (probably based on Polybius; see Gray (2013b), 345–53). Compare Quintus Curtius 7.5.29, probably based on Cleitarchus (Hammond (1998)): the Branchidai of Miletus, long exiled in Asia, had become *degeneres* in their language through contact with non-Greeks, despite preserving Milesian *mores*.

<sup>89</sup> Herodotus 9.5. <sup>90</sup> Thucydides 8.75.1.

<sup>91</sup> Xenophon *Anabasis* 5.7.19–23; 6.6.7. <sup>92</sup> Demosthenes 18.204–5.

<sup>93</sup> Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 71, 122; cf. Hirzel (1909), 263–4; Rosivach (1987), 240–1.

<sup>94</sup> Phylarchus' account is reported in Polybius 2.61.5.

<sup>95</sup> Polybius 2.61.5. <sup>96</sup> Diodorus 19.71.5 (probably based on Timaeus).

<sup>97</sup> Hirzel (1909), 226–32, emphasizes that Greek stonings were often tightly structured and rule-governed: many cases cannot be classified as unregulated mob violence.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. Hirzel (1909), esp. 238–9, 244–6, 253–8, 261–2, 264–5; cf. Wilhelm (1911), 177–8; Forsdyke (2012), ch. 5. Demosthenes and Lycurgus, in particular, unambiguously present the resort to stoning by the Athenian refugees of 480–79 as a heroic, patriotic move.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Hirzel (1909), 263; Rosivach (1987), 236, 243–4.

political behaviour and identities are obvious. Indeed, the details in such portrayals which would be most revealing for the project of this chapter, those concerning exiles' political language and ethical values, are the most subject to distorting influences.

Nevertheless, an attempt is made in subsequent sections to reconstruct many exile groups' actual political behaviour and identities. The reconstruction is achieved partly by assuming that the more mechanical details of portrayals of exile groups, concerning exiles' institutions and formal relations with outsiders, were less susceptible to tendentious distortion. Falsifying such clear-cut, verifiable details would often have exposed those responsible to immediate refutation. Considerable information about exiles' political assumptions can be inferred from such formalized political behaviour by exile groups. However, recovering exiles' political identities also requires imaginative reconstruction of the broader perspectives of the exiles stereotyped in the portrayals considered here.

### 3. EXILES' 'LIMINAL' QUASI-CIVIC IDENTITIES AND BEHAVIOUR

#### 3.1. Introduction

The following sections examine in turn the varied forms of quasi-civic exilic identity and activism which can be reconstructed for exiles in this period. They argue that the variety of attested forms of identity and activism reflects the influence of diverse, competing underlying norms of citizenship, but also exiles' exercise of wide-ranging individual and collective agency. Also examined are arguments among the displaced and their supporters about the correct political stance to adopt in exile, which are used as further evidence for varied, contrasting underlying ideas of citizenship. This section itself addresses what might be called 'liminal' quasi-civic exilic identities and behaviour: the identities and behaviour of displaced citizens who found a temporary place of refuge and adopted unequivocally provisional adaptations of home civic identities and practices, treating exile as an exceptional interlude. Even within this category, there was a wide variety of possible lifestyles and forms of self-understanding.

#### 3.2. Varieties of Liminal Exilic Habitat

There were two main habitats for a liminal exile. Some achieved temporary asylum in another polis: a provisional and interstitial place of refuge. Such

provisional asylum is granted, for example, in the surviving fourth-century Athenian decrees which award privileges to displaced citizens valid 'until they return home'.<sup>100</sup> For their livelihood, the wealthiest such liminal exiles probably relied on mobile property and capital; on property and capital already stored elsewhere before their exile;<sup>101</sup> on landholdings and income-generating loans outside their home poleis; and on their social and economic connections outside their home poleis. Less affluent exiles probably engaged in a craft or trade or even undertook casual wage labour, although Isocrates presented this as a desperate predicament for a liminal exile.<sup>102</sup> The majority of exiles living provisionally in a host community probably relied strongly on the generosity of their hosts: public grants and permissions (including grants of *ἐγκτησις*)<sup>103</sup> or tax exemptions; and hospitality and loans from private citizens. Public assistance was probably sometimes conditional on exiles undertaking military service on behalf of the host polis.<sup>104</sup>

The second, more obviously liminal habitat open to exiles consisted of pieces of marginal or disputed territory, often consisting of rugged and inhospitable borderlands (*ἐσχατιαί*).<sup>105</sup> Relevant areas included rural areas or dependent settlements within the rural territory (*χώρα*) of a single polis which were not subject to strong centralized control by a polis, such as isolated parts of a polis' territory or the mainland territories (*peraeae*) of island poleis;<sup>106</sup> contentious or unpopulated areas along civic frontiers;<sup>107</sup> and

<sup>100</sup> IG II/III<sup>3</sup> 302, ll. 32–3; 316, ll. 24–5; 404, ll. 9–11; 452, ll. 36–7; IG II<sup>2</sup> 545, ll. 11–12.

<sup>101</sup> Note that the probable Olynthian refugee Herakleodoros had apparently deposited money with a Thasian citizen, presumably before his exile (SEG 19.595, as analysed in Mack (2015), ch. 2).

<sup>102</sup> Isocrates 14.48. Isocrates also refers there to the necessity for exiles to take out loans.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 77, ll. 24–6 (heavily restored); SEG 55.564bis, ll. 7–8 (partly restored).

<sup>104</sup> Compare Spartan policy: in the years after the Battle of Leuctra, the Spartans deployed both young Tegeate exiles and Boeotian exiles in Peloponnesian garrisons (Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.5.24; Diodorus 15.64.2). The exile groups honoured by the fourth-century Athenians (cf. Section 2.3) were presumably also required to fight for the Athenians.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Robert (1970), 602; also Robert (1960), 304–6, discussing Alcaeus fr. 130 Lobel-Page, ll. 16–26; Robert and Robert (1989), 37; cf. Chaniotis (2008), 109, 116–17. On Greek perceptions of the nature of *ἐσχατιαί*: Vidal-Naquet (1986), 109. Compare Robert and Robert (1976), 213–14, on the seizure of mountain or hilltop strongholds by exile groups.

<sup>106</sup> On *peraeae* as exile habitats, see Brun (1988), 258–9; Constantakopoulou (2007), 250–1.

<sup>107</sup> Even if polis frontiers were often linear and well-defined, to a much greater extent than Robert recognized (Rousset (1995); (1999), 50–1), ungarded, wild stretches of land could still exist along them (cf. Rousset himself, (1995), 118–19; (1999), 52). On the continued ferocity of border disputes between poleis in the Hellenistic period: Ma (2000), 341–3; 350–1. Note the frequency of interstate arbitrations of civic border disputes in the Hellenistic period: Ager (1996); Magnetto (2008). A region of this kind which served as an important base for exiles (different Samian exile groups in Anaia and the Prienians in the Karion; see Table 6.1 for details) was the contested area around the delta of the River Maeander, disputed between Priene, Ephesus, and Samos (on the disputed character of this area, see, for example, Thonemann (2011), 246–7, discussing *I.Priene* 3). That area can also be compared with some regions of the Peloponnese: Thyrea, disputed between Sparta and Argos, which was also a base for exiles (Thucydides 2.27.2;

small, remote poleis of which a larger power took control.<sup>108</sup> Such areas were commonly power vacuums, in which it was possible for displaced citizens to settle and craft their own quasi-civic institutions and identities, relatively unmolested. Displaced groups sometimes did so with the support of a hegemonic power, itself unable to control independently the marginal territory they inhabited. There was considerable scope in such places for exiles to take care of their own subsistence, through hunting or agriculture, even if external donations usually remained welcome.<sup>109</sup>

### 3.3. The Varieties of Quasi-Civic Political Behaviour and Identity of Liminal Exiles

#### 3.3.1. *Citizens-in-Exile: Voluntarism and Political Activism*

This and the following two sub-sections reconstruct the range of liminal quasi-civic identities adopted by exiles, especially exile groups, within the constraints of the habitats discussed in the previous sub-section, and identify underlying ideas of citizenship. The most common tendency was for liminal exiles to behave as ‘citizens-in-exile’: to create provisional imitations of standard, civilized home civic institutions, or to perform imitations of home civic practices, usually in rivalry with an incumbent regime in their home polis.<sup>110</sup>

This phenomenon is reliably attested. There is some direct epigraphic evidence for it. Furthermore, most literary evidence for it is likely to preserve a kernel of truth: it would not have been straightforward for literary authors to invent basic factual details about institutions and diplomacy, easily falsifiable by their contemporary readers. The varied evidence for the phenomenon is presented in Table 6.1, which presents the fourth-century and Hellenistic evidence.<sup>111</sup> Table 6.1 gives an immediate impression of the frequency of ‘poleis-in-exile’, which could be democratic, oligarchic, or monarchical: they were a stock part of the fourth-century and Hellenistic diplomatic world.

for the comparison of the Maeander delta and Thyrea in this respect, see also Thonemann (2011), 28–9; or Skiritis, disputed between Sparta and Megalopolis in the Hellenistic period (see Mackil (2013), T45 (pp. 477–80), with commentary), which was probably a base for Hellenistic Achaian exiles (see Table 6.1). For an early fifth-century example, see Herodotus 5.34.3 (Naxian exiles on Naxos).

<sup>108</sup> The fifth-century Athenians and Spartans sometimes settled exile groups in poleis with free space: for example, the Athenians settled ‘Messenian’ exiles in Naupaktos in 456/5 (Thucydides 1.103.3) and Plataean exiles in Skione in 421 (Thucydides 5.32.1); the Spartans settled Megarian exiles in Plataea for a year in 427 (Thucydides 3.68.3).

<sup>109</sup> For example, Anaia in the Samian *peraea*, occupied by fifth- and probably also fourth-century Samian exiles (cf. this chapter’s nn. 129, 135, 140, and 283), incorporated coveted fertile land (cf. *IG XII 6 1 11*, ll. 5–20; Akdeniz (2006)).

<sup>110</sup> Cf. Seibert (1979), 312–14; Gehrke (1985), 224–9.

<sup>111</sup> Some parallels with the fifth century and earlier are drawn in footnotes.

**Table 6.1.** Forms of civilized quasi-civic organization and behaviour adopted by liminal exiles in the fourth century and Hellenistic period.

| Type of civilized quasi-civic <sup>112</sup> organization or behaviour adopted by liminal exiles          | Secure and very probable cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Probable and possible cases |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>Internal political, military, financial and social organization and activities of poleis-in-exile:</b> |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                             |
| Assemblies                                                                                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 411: the Athenian fleet on Samos held an emergency assembly, after receiving news of the Four Hundred's seizure of power in Athens.<sup>113</sup> This 'army assembly'<sup>114</sup> assumed one of the principal functions of the Athenian sovereign assembly: the election of new generals.</li> <li>• 403: Thrasyboulos addressed his army of Athenian exiles in the Piraeus,<sup>115</sup> in what was probably conceived as an assembly-in-exile, representing the Athenian sovereign assembly, abolished by the Thirty.</li> <li>• 379: Plutarch claims that Pelopidas made speeches before the mass (<i>πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος</i>) of fellow Theban exiles in Athens, calling for a counter-coup attempt.<sup>116</sup></li> <li>• 343: Boeotian exiles in Athens held an assembly to elect advocates to speak on Aeschines' behalf.<sup>117</sup></li> <li>• 223: the citizens of Megalopolis, displaced</li> </ul> |                             |

(continued)

<sup>112</sup> Some cases of quasi-federal organization are included.<sup>113</sup> Thucydides 8.76.1–2. <sup>114</sup> Hornblower (2004b), 253–4.<sup>115</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.4.12–17. <sup>116</sup> Plutarch *Pelopidas* 7.1.<sup>117</sup> Aeschines 2.142. For the possibility of exiles resident in Athens supplying evidence to the Athenian courts, cf. Hyperides 3, cols. 15–16 (the speaker calls on the testimony of Troizenian exiles).

Table 6.1. Continued

| Type of civilized quasi-civic organization or behaviour adopted by liminal exiles | Secure and very probable cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Probable and possible cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Decrees and collective decisions                                                  | <p>en masse to Messene, gathered in an assembly in which they heard and rejected Cleomenes' offer, delivered through envoys, of a return to their city in exchange for alliance.<sup>118</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 379: Plutarch uses the language of polis decision-making to refer to decisions of the Theban exiles in Athens (τὰ δεδογμένα; ἔδοξε τοῖς φυγάσι).<sup>119</sup></li> <li>• 220–217: 'exiles from Achaia' based in Skiros (Skiritis) made a collective decision to crown an Aetolian benefactor, as is clear from the third-person plural verb [ἐσ]τεφάνωσαν in the resulting inscription.<sup>122</sup> They thus performed one of the characteristic activities of a Hellenistic polis or federal body: the collective honouring of a benefactor.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• c.338: Hyperides' reference to an honorary decree for the Athenians passed by 'the Troizenians' on account of which (δι' οὗ) the Athenians granted citizenship to some Troizenian exiles<sup>120</sup> could be a reference to an honorary decree passed by the Troizenian exiles themselves.<sup>121</sup></li> <li>• Late Hellenistic period: ὁ δῆμος ὁ ἐν Αἴνῳ, responsible or partly responsible for an epitaph for the Maroneian Hedeia Dionysiou, may well have been a democratic group of Maroneian exiles based in Ainos, claiming legitimacy as the δῆμος of Maroneia.<sup>123</sup></li> </ul> |

<sup>118</sup> Polybius 2.61.4–12 (criticizing Phylarchus' account of the same events); Plutarch *Agis and Cleomenes* 45.7–8; Plutarch *Philopoemen* 5.3–5.

<sup>119</sup> Plutarch *Pelopidas* 7.1–8.1. <sup>120</sup> Hyperides 3, col. 16.

<sup>121</sup> Habicht (1961), 16, with n. 1, argues that it was a (presumably forged) Troizenian decree of 480 granting asylum to Athenian refugees. It is true that the speaker mentions the events of 480 shortly before appealing to this decree. However, it is quite possible that the Troizenian decree in question was a decree passed by the current Troizenian exiles, praising the Athenians and requesting help; such a decree could itself have mentioned the events of 480.

<sup>122</sup> *FD* III 4.239, l. 2.

<sup>123</sup> *SEG* 34.709, l. 4. If the group was merely a normal group of expatriates, they would probably have styled themselves as οἱ Μαρωνεῖται οἱ ἐν Αἴνῳ κατοικοῦντες; Moretti (1984), 261–3. The problem arises that the monument itself was located within the territory of Maroneia. It is, however, possible that the exiles were nearing reconciliation with the incumbent regime (Moretti (1984), 263) or that they brought the monument with them, or copied it, when they returned home. For quasi-civic activity by an earlier group of Maroneian exiles, note the embassies of Maroneian exiles to the Senate in 186/5 and 184: Polybius 22.6.2, 11.2; Livy 39.24.9; Seibert (1979), 200–2.



Magistrates<sup>124</sup>

- 403: the Athenian exiles in the Piraeus appointed a board of men to arrange the arming of members of their faction, with the aid of donated money.<sup>125</sup>
- 394–390: Siphnian oligarchic exiles based in the western Aegean appointed a magistrate with full powers (*ἄρχων αὐτοκράτωρ*), who appointed a secretary (*γραμματεὺς*) and steward (*ταμίης*) of funds.<sup>129</sup>
- Later fourth century: the members of the Sicilian resistance movement against Agathokles, which included Syracusan exiles and other Sicilians, appointed (*ἀπεδείξαν*) Deinokrates, one of the exiles, as their *στρατηγός*.<sup>130</sup> Deinokrates could be called ‘*στρατηγός* of the exiles’ in relation to events of 306.<sup>131</sup>
- 195: Agesipolis, a Spartan king exiled in boyhood, was, in Livy’s words, the ‘leader’ (*princeps*) of the Spartan exiles who joined the Roman campaign against the tyrant Nabis.<sup>132</sup> Agesipolis was
- c.220–217: the Achaian exiles based in Skiros (cf. above, middle column) styled themselves as ‘Kleopatros and the exiles’ (*[Κλεό]πατρος καὶ οἱ φυγάδες*) and ‘Kleopatros and the exiles from Achaia’ (*[Κλεό]πατρος καὶ οἱ φυγάδες οἱ ἐξ Ἀχαιῶν*). Given that the Achaian League itself had only one *στρατηγός* by this date,<sup>126</sup> the exiles could have regarded Kleopatros, probably a rebel former Achaian garrison commander,<sup>127</sup> as a shadow Achaian federal *στρατηγός*, a rival to the incumbent.<sup>128</sup>

(continued)

<sup>124</sup> Aeneas Tacticus 10.16–17, identifies a general threat to incumbent fourth-century civic governments from exile rulers (*φυγάδες δυναστεύοντες*), with followers.

<sup>125</sup> Lysias 31.16; Adak (2003b), 305. <sup>126</sup> Polybius 2.43.2.

<sup>127</sup> Cf. Plutarch *Aratus* 40.5–7: a Kleopatros was garrison commander of the Acrocorinth when it suddenly fell to the Aetolians in 224, possibly as a result of internal collusion.

<sup>128</sup> However, the formulation ‘Kleopatros and the exiles’ is more reminiscent of the epigraphic styling of kings and tyrants than that of civic or federal magistrates (cf. Section 3.3.2).

<sup>129</sup> Isocrates 19.38. In a fifth-century parallel, the eponymous magistrate Batis on a coin-type which Barron attributes to the Samian exiles in Anaia in the Peloponnesian War (for this view, see n. 135 of this chapter) could have been a magistrate of the exile community. Alternatively, however, he could also have been a Persian overseer of the exile community appointed by the satrap Pissouthnes (Barron (1966), 92).

<sup>130</sup> Diodorus 20.31.1–2.

<sup>131</sup> Diodorus 20.79.2.

<sup>132</sup> Livy 34.26.12–14.

Table 6.1. Continued

| Type of civilized quasi-civic organization or behaviour adopted by liminal exiles | Secure and very probable cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Probable and possible cases                                                                                                                                                                               |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| An <i>epidosis</i> (organized collection of donations)                            | effectively a 'king-in-exile', exercising one of the main functions of a Spartan king, generalship.<br>403: the Athenian exiles in the Piraeus probably organized a form of <i>epidosis</i> , supervised by special magistrates, through which exiles and sympathizers were invited to donate money and weapons to their resistance movement. <sup>133</sup> |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Hiring of mercenaries                                                             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c.346/5: Eleian exiles engaged Phokian mercenaries to fight against Elis itself.<sup>134</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Issuing of coins                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Possible mid-fourth-century case: an attested issue of coins of Naulochon could have been issued by a dissident Prienian community there.<sup>135</sup></li> </ul> |
| Town planning                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c.404–386: exiles from Klazomenai could well have been responsible for</li> </ul>                                                                                  |

<sup>133</sup> Adak (2003b), interpreting Lysias 31.15–16. Philon claimed that he had offered to donate money or arms to the exiles, like others unable to fight themselves. Lysias called as supposedly authoritative witnesses to disprove Philon's claim those who had been appointed to arm the democrats with the aid of donations. Adak (2003b), 305, plausibly argues that these men could have given authoritative testimony on this point only if they had administered a systematic *epidosis*, making a list of donors.

<sup>134</sup> Diodorus 16.63.4.

<sup>135</sup> Charneux (1966), 207; for possible dissidents at Naulochon, compare this chapter's n. 157. There is a much more probable fifth-century case: the Samians in Anaia in the Peloponnesian War may have issued their own coins. Barron attributed two silver coin-types (of 'c.430 BC or a little later' and shortly before 412 respectively), both lacking an ethnic, to the exiles in Anaia, because he considered them to date after the Athenian Standards' Decree, which prohibited the incumbent Samian regime from issuing silver coins. The earlier coin even has the legend *A*, possibly standing for Anaia (Barron (1966), 92–3, cf. 85–7). The later of the two coin-types dates to the period after the Standards' Decree, even if the Standards' Decree dates to the later date now often favoured (Kallet (2001), 205–26; Rhodes (2008), 503; Papazarkadas (2008), 72). The earlier coin type may date to the period before the Standards' Decree, but the *A* legend still makes it attractive to associate it with the exiles in Anaia.

Phase I in the construction of the fourth-century houses, laid out on an egalitarian grid-plan, in the area opposite Klazomenai identified by Özbay as Chyton, the base of exiles from Klazomenai before 386.<sup>136</sup>

**Internal cultural organization and activities of poleis-in-exile:**

Administration of a festival

- 390: a rival version of the Isthmian Games was administered by Corinthian exiles (cf. Chapter 5.5.3.2).<sup>137</sup>

Quasi-civic commensality

- 381: the *συσσίτια* of oligarchic Phliasian exiles (cf. Chapter 5.2.3).<sup>138</sup>

**Participation of poleis-in-exile in interstate affairs:**

Sending of embassies<sup>139</sup>

- 403/2: embassy by exiled Samian democrats to Sparta.<sup>140</sup>
- 301/0–298/7: the Prienian exiles from Hieron's regime, based in the Karion, sent decrees to the Rhodians, presumably through envoys.<sup>141</sup> Contemporary Prienian exiles based in 'the Charax', quite probably identical with the exiles in the Karion, sent an embassy to the Ephesians.<sup>142</sup>

(continued)

<sup>136</sup> Özbay (2004), 136–40, relying on Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 18, ll. 7–13; contrast Cook (1953–4), 155–7.

<sup>137</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.5.2; Seibert (1979), 109; Salmon (1984), 357–62.

<sup>138</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.3.17.

<sup>139</sup> Aeneas Tacticus, 10.6, refers to the possibility of fourth-century exiles sending representatives or letters to home citizens. These can be viewed as quasi-diplomatic.

<sup>140</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 2 §ii, ll. 45–8. Compare Thucydides 3.32.2: an embassy from Samian oligarchic exiles in Anaia to the Spartan navarch Alkidas in 427.

<sup>141</sup> Magonetto (2008), text (pp. 34–45), ll. 95–8, 101–2.

<sup>142</sup> *I.Ephesos* 2001, ll. 3–5. The identification of the two groups of exiles is plausible because the Ephesians could have used their own distinctive name ('the Charax') for the Karion, in

Table 6.1. Continued

| Type of civilized quasi-civic organization or behaviour adopted by liminal exiles | Secure and very probable cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | Probable and possible cases                                                                                                                                                                              |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Period after 197: multiple embassies to the Roman Senate from Greek exile groups, including groups from Thyrreion (Akarnania), Pherai, Sparta, Ainos, Maroneia, Kaunos, Stratonikeia, Delos, and Epiros.<sup>143</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Quasi-diplomatic representations to the authorities of host poleis                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fourth-century Athens: appeals by resident exiles to council and assembly for privileges.<sup>144</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 314: Syracusan exiles from Agathokles' regime urged leading citizens of Akragas to help them, possibly through formal representations.<sup>145</sup></li> </ul> |
| Reception of envoys                                                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 301/0–298/7: the Prienian exiles in the Karion received decrees, presumably through envoys, from the incumbent regime in Priene and from 'several poleis', including the Rhodians.<sup>146</sup> The decree of the Ephesians for the contemporary 'Prienians in the Charax' may well have been among these decrees.<sup>147</sup></li> </ul> |                                                                                                                                                                                                          |

keeping with the well-attested phenomenon of poleis advocating rival toponymies, especially for disputed areas. On this view, the references in the Ephesian decree to the Charax exiles actually or potentially 'saving' and 'preserving' the fort (*I.Ephesos* 2001, ll. 2–7) could be interpreted as references to the exiles saving and protecting some Ephesian territory. Alternatively, they could be interpreted as references to the exiles saving and guarding some free Prienian territory (i.e. the Karion) from the tyrant, something also in the Ephesians' interests. Admittedly, however, the case for identifying the two groups cannot be conclusively proved (Magnetto (2008), 116–17).

<sup>143</sup> Seibert (1979), 190–1, 197, 199–208, 215–18.

<sup>144</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 109, ll. 8–9 (a reference to claims made to the council by Astykrates and fellow Delphian exiles); *IG* II/III<sup>3</sup> 316 (338/7), ll. 6–7 (the Athenians respond to requests by two leading Akarnanians); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 545, ll. 4–8 (a possible reference to representations by Thessalian exiles to the Athenian people).

<sup>145</sup> Diodorus 19.70.1–2. The verb Diodorus uses of their approach to the leading citizens (*παρακαλεῖν*) is commonly used in epigraphy of formal diplomatic approaches: e.g. *I.Amyzon* 16, ll. 4–7; Meadows (1996), 252–4 (revised text of *I.Iasos* 150), ll. 42–3, 74–6.

<sup>146</sup> Magnetto (2008), text (pp. 34–45), ll. 91–5, 99–101.

<sup>147</sup> *I.Ephesos* 2001: the two groups of exiles were probably identical (cf. n. 142 above).

|                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 223: the Megalopolitan refugees in Messene (cf. above, this column) received envoys from Cleomenes III;<sup>148</sup> the envoys were reportedly leading Megalopolitans who had been taken prisoner by Cleomenes.<sup>149</sup></li> <li>• Late Hellenistic period: the citizens of Chaironeia sent envoys and decrees to their dissident young citizen Damon to persuade him to return to the city.<sup>150</sup></li> </ul> |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| Formation of a bilateral treaty          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shortly before 317: the Carthaginians collaborated militarily with Syracusan oligarchic exiles, possibly in a formal alliance.<sup>151</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                              |
| Participation in a multilateral alliance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 378/7: the ‘δημος of the Zacynthians in the Nellos’, probably a pro-Athenian Zacynthian exile group, was registered among the members of the Second Athenian Confederacy.<sup>152</sup></li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 370s: a group which had fought with Chabrias, and which granted one of the wreaths to him recorded on his monument in the Athenian agora of 375 (ο[ι.....c.32.....Σι]κυωνίων),<sup>153</sup> may have consisted of pro-Athenian Sikyonian</li> </ul> |

(continued)

<sup>148</sup> Polybius 2.61.4.

<sup>149</sup> Plutarch *Agis and Cleomenes* 45.2–7.

<sup>150</sup> Plutarch *Cimon* 1.7.

<sup>151</sup> Diodorus 19.4.3 (the verb used is *συμμαχεῖν*).

<sup>152</sup> Rhodes–Osborne, *GHI* 22, ll. 131–4; Seibert (1979), 117; Gehrke (1985), 198. There are close parallels from the fifth century. Exile and refugee groups as possible participants in the Delian League in the later 450s: Meritt, Wade-Gery’ and McGregor (1939–1953), vol. III, 252–3; Meiggs (1979), 112; Thonemann (2011), 284–5 (on the ‘Milesians in Leros’). The ‘Spartan War Fund’ inscription of 432–425 (in favour of this date range: Meiggs in Meiggs and Lewis (1969), 183–4; Smarczyk (1999), 60–3; Loomis (1992), 69–76) or of the early Ionian War (in favour of this date: Bleckmann (1993), 300–4; Piérart (1995), 267–70; contrast Smarczyk (1999), 56–8); the Aiginetan contributors (Loomis (1992), pl. 17, front ll. 3–4) must also have been exiles, since their home polis was not in existence between 431 and 405 (Piérart (1995), 259–60); if the contributions date to the early Ionian War, the Melian contributors (Loomis (1992), pl. 17, side, ll. 8–14, 20–5) would also be exiles, since their home polis was not in existence between 416 and 405 (Bleckmann (1993), 298; Piérart (1995), 260–1; Seaman (1997), 396–8).

<sup>153</sup> *SEG* 19.204, seventh crown, ll. 1–2.

Table 6.1. Continued

| Type of civilized quasi-civic organization or behaviour adopted by liminal exiles                                                          | Secure and very probable cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Probable and possible cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | <p>exiles;<sup>154</sup> if so, they may have been members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, like the 'Zacynthians in the Nello's'.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 362/1: Phliasian exiles based on the Trikaranon may have been signatories of the Common Peace mentioned in the 'letter to the satraps' inscribed at Argos (cf. Chapter 5.2.1).<sup>155</sup></li> </ul> |
| Establishment of monuments at sites of interstate prominence                                                                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• c.220–217: the 'exiles from Achaia' based in Skiros (cf. above, this column and the right-hand column) erected, and presumably paid for, a statue of their Aetolian benefactor Simos at Delphi.<sup>156</sup></li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 375: it is possible (cf. above, this column) that Sikyonian exiles granted to the Athenian general Chabrias one of the honorific wreaths recorded on his monument in the Athenian agora.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                               |
| Receipt of a grant of territory or privileges from a superior power, in accordance with interstate conventions concerning grants to poleis | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• c.289: in a fragmentary section of a treaty between Demetrios Poliorketes and the Aetolian League, exiles from Herakleia-by-Oita</li> </ul>                                                                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• c.334: the group based in Naulochon included in a grant by Alexander of freedom and autonomy and of the right to own land and houses 'in the</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                           |

<sup>154</sup> Sikyonians who had fought for Chabrias would have to have been pro-Athenians. Since there is no clear indication that Sikyon deviated from an oligarchic, pro-Spartan policy before Euphron seized power in the aftermath of Leuktra, such Sikyonians could well have been exiles. This would be consistent with Wilhelm's hypothesis that the Athenians intervened in a failed Sikyonian uprising of the 370s (Wilhelm (1947), 192, citing Diodorus 15.40.4). The restoration of the group's name could be ο[ι.....τῶν φυγάδων τῶν Σικωνίων]. Such a group of exile warriors would represent a more coherent corporate group for making such a dedication than the group suggested by Burnett and Edmonson: a one-off group of Athenian soldiers who captured a Sikyonian ship (ο[ι στρατιώται οἱ ἐλόντες τὴν τριήρη τὴν τῶν Σικωνίων]) (Burnett and Edmonson (1961), 86–7).

<sup>155</sup> Wilhelm (1984), 101–2, restoring [οἱ ἐκ Τρικαρὰ]νον φυγ[άδες] in l. 1 of what is now Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 42.

<sup>156</sup> *FD* III 4.239. For exile dedications and monuments at Delphi (*FD* III 4.1; *SEG* 32.550) and Olympia (*IvO* 259; Meiggs-Lewis *GHI* 74) in the fifth century, erected by self-styled Messenian exiles: Courby (1927), 297, 301–2; Luraghi (2002), 60; (2008), 191–4.

were granted, or had recognized, the right to take advantage of (*καρπεύειν*) some property (its nature is not preserved) and possibly also to spend their time (*διατρίβειν*) wherever they chose, in terms very similar to those used immediately afterwards probably to grant rights to, or recognize rights of, another group, quite possibly citizens of a settled polis (e.g. Oianthea).<sup>158</sup>

- c.220–217: the Achaian exiles from Skiros (cf. above, this and the right-hand column) claimed that the Aetolian Simos had restored (*ἀπέδωκε*) Skiros to them.<sup>159</sup> Their choice of the verb *ἀποδιδόναι* implied the contentious claim that Simos had restored to them what was rightfully their own territory;

polis' may have been a dissident group of Prienians based in Naulochon.<sup>157</sup>

(continued)

<sup>157</sup> Rhodes–Osborne, *GHI* 86B, ll. 2–7. The group is described as τῶν ἐν Ναυλόχῳ κ[ατοικούν]των ὅσοι μὲν εἰσι [...7...]; the last word is probably to be restored as [Πριηνεῖ]ς. Evidence for unrest, leading to exilings, in the eastern Aegean at this date: Rhodes–Osborne, *GHI* 83–5. The recording of the grant in early Hellenistic Priene would be explicable if the 'Prienians in Naulochon' subsequently returned to their city, overthrowing the incumbent regime: a civic tradition could then have developed, similar to those considered in Section 2.4 above, which made the 'Prienians in Naulochon' into heroic resistance fighters (like the later Prienians in the Karion). If there was a Prienian dissident community in Naulochon at this date, it could have sent the *θεαροδόκος*, said to be from Naulochon, recorded in an Argive list of 330 from which a Prienian *θεαροδόκος* is conspicuously absent (*SEG* 23.189, col. II, l. 10). In a possible parallel within this list, Notion is included (col. II, l. 7), but there is no mention of Colophon. Moreover, the entry immediately before the entry for Naulochon is an entry for Pygela, a marginal settlement disputed between Samos, Ephesos, and Priene (Charneux (1966), 198–206) and therefore another possible stronghold for dissidents. As mentioned earlier in the Table, an issue of coins by Naulochon, commonly dated to the mid-fourth century (Charneux (1966), 207), could also conceivably have been issued by such a dissident Prienian community. For an alternative interpretation of the relevant part of Rhodes–Osborne, *GHI* 86B, see Thonemann (2011), 242–3, and (2013) (restoring ὅσοι μὲν εἰσι[ν] Ἑλληνεῖς). Thonemann's view requires that, in a departure from normal Greek diplomatic practice and language, individuals benefited as individual Greeks, rather than as members of a corporate group, from Alexander's grant of freedom and autonomy.

<sup>158</sup> *SEG* 48.588, ll. 26–32 (part restored); Lefèvre (1998), 126–7.

<sup>159</sup> *FD* III 4.239, l. 3.

Table 6.1. Continued

| Type of civilized quasi-civic organization or behaviour adopted by liminal exiles          | Secure and very probable cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Probable and possible cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                            | this claim in turn presupposed that they were the legitimate representatives of the Achaian League. <sup>160</sup>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| <b>Tenure by individual citizens-in-exile of formal positions in interstate diplomacy:</b> |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Exiles appointed, or serving, as <i>πρόξενοι</i> while in exile <sup>161</sup>             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• If a text ordering the inscription of a grant of proxyeny to [<i>Ἀριστ...</i> c.4..<i>ωι Σίμωνος Βοιωτίωι</i>, later described in the accusative as <i>Ἀριστ[.....c.12.....]</i> <i>έα</i>,<sup>162</sup> dates, as is probable, to the archonship of Eukleides (403/2),<sup>163</sup> it would probably represent a grant of proxyeny to a Plataean refugee during the Plataeans' first exile (427–386): the only plausible Boeotian city ethnic to restore in the accusative is [<i>Πλαται</i>]<i>έα</i>.<sup>164</sup> This man could have been a resident Plataean in Athens who refused Athenian citizenship; or</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• c.394: the sons of a Ialysian father, styled as Ialysians, received a grant of proxyeny and benefactor-status (<i>εὐεργεσία</i>), after the Thirty had destroyed the stele granting those privileges to their father. The retention of the Ialysian ethnic may suggest that they were Ialysian exiles from the synoecism of Rhodes in 412/11, who retained Ialysian civic identity in exile despite the disappearance of their home polis.<sup>165</sup></li><li>• Mid- and late fourth century: three Messenians honoured with proxyeny by the Delphians in 340/39,</li></ul> |

<sup>160</sup> For the significance of the verb *ἀποδιδόναι*, as opposed to (*δωρεῖαν*) *διδόναι*: [Demos-thenes] 7.6, cf. 28, 35; Amandry (1940–1), 74.

<sup>161</sup> Cf. Marek (1984), 355; Mackil (2008), 176–7.

<sup>162</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2, a, ll. 2, 9–10. Walbank offers a controversial new text of this decree in Walbank (1982), reprinted in *SEG* 32.38.

<sup>163</sup> View of D. M. Lewis cited in *SEG* 32.38; Tracy (2003), 353. Contrast Walbank (1982), who favours 382/1, even though this is very late for the naming of the secretary with his demotic in the prescript, on grounds criticized in Fossey (1985). Even if Walbank is right to read a *nu* at the beginning of l. 8, which would have to be the final letter of *ἡρχεν*, leaving eight characters for the archon name, the possible eight-letter-archon years (417/6 (probably too early for the cutter), 408/7 and 398/7: Walbank (1982), 261–3) all fall during the Plataeans' exile.

<sup>164</sup> Fossey (1985), 39–40.

<sup>165</sup> Funke (1983), 173–4, discussing *SEG* 28.48.



he could have been settled elsewhere (for example, he could have been a member of the Plataean exile community at Skione,<sup>166</sup> expelled from Skione by Lysander at the end of the Peloponnesian War).<sup>168</sup>

323/2 and 323/2<sup>167</sup> were not described as citizens or inhabitants of a polis or civic sub-division within Messenia. If this indicates that they were not members of the new Messenian state, founded in 369 supposedly as a refuge for dispersed Messenians who had lacked a homeland since the Archaic period, they were presumably self-styled 'Messenians' who had been born and remained in liminal 'exile' abroad.<sup>169</sup>

- Late fifth- and early fourth-century Athens: Ekphantos of Thasos was probably awarded proxeny, *εὐεργεσία* and exemptions (*ἀτέλεια*) in recognition of his assistance in one of Thrasyboulos' conquests of Thasos (407 or 389).<sup>171</sup> The grant may well have been made to him after he was forced into exile from Thasos.<sup>172</sup> In any case, he exercised the intermediary function of a *πρόξενος* while in exile: he was given joint responsibility for drawing up the list of Thasian exiles in Athens eligible for *ἀτέλεια* under a collective Athenian grant of c.385.<sup>173</sup>
- Second century: the polis of Akraiphia in Boeotia granted proxeny to a citizen of Haliartos, whose name is lost.<sup>170</sup> Before 171, such a proxeny grant would probably have been otiose: both Akraiphia and Haliartos were members of the Boeotian League. After 171, this man would have to have been an exile: Haliartos was destroyed by the Romans in 171.<sup>174</sup>
- Second century: a man styled as *Μινωήτης* who was granted proxeny by the Tenians, in a decree with lettering of the second century, was quite

(continued)

<sup>166</sup> Thucydides 5.32.1.

<sup>167</sup> *FD* III 4.4, 7 and 8. For dating: Sanchez (2011), 519.

<sup>168</sup> Parts of Xenophon's text (*Hellenica* 2.2.3, 9) imply, taken together, that Lysander restored Skione to its original inhabitants at this point.

<sup>169</sup> Contrast *FD* III 4.5 (322/1), for a 'Messenian from Thouria'; *FD* III 4.6 (321/20), for a 'Messenian from Ithoma'.

<sup>170</sup> Perdrizet (1899), no. 4 (p. 95), ll. 1–4.

<sup>171</sup> Demosthenes 20.58–62. Demosthenes mentions other Athenian sympathizers' potential aspirations to the 'same gifts' as those earlier granted to Archebios of Byzantion and Ekphantos of Thasos, having earlier said that Archebios was awarded *προξενία*, *εὐεργεσία*, and *ἀτέλεια*.

<sup>172</sup> Gerolymatos (1987), 47.

<sup>173</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 33, ll. 8–9.

<sup>174</sup> Ma (2005), 173, 175.

Table 6.1. Continued

| Type of civilized quasi-civic organization or behaviour adopted by liminal exiles | Secure and very probable cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Probable and possible cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Early fourth century: Athenian grant of proxeny, as well as <i>εὐεργεσία</i> and <i>ἀπέλεια</i>, to two Byzantine exiles, Archebios and Heraklides.<sup>176</sup></li> <li>• 360s: the Boeotian League granted proxeny to a certain Timeas, son of Cheirikrates, styled <i>Λάκων</i>.<sup>180</sup> Since the Boeotian League was at war with Sparta, it is very probable that Timeas was an exiled Spartiate or Laconian.<sup>181</sup></li> <li>• 324/3: the Delphians granted proxeny to a Theban, who must have been a refugee expelled on the destruction of his home city in 335.<sup>182</sup></li> <li>• Later fourth century: an Olynthian <i>πρόξενος</i> of Thasos gave a benefaction of a tower, exedra, and statue, probably after the destruction of his own city in 348.<sup>183</sup></li> </ul> | <p>possibly an exile; Minoa was under Samian control from the late third century until sometime in the second.<sup>175</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hellenistic Crete: a Kydonian decree grants land to named <i>πρόξενοι</i> from Knossos, Tyliisos, Aptara, Delphi, and Arkas, for as long as they are ‘useful’ (<i>ἐπιτάδειοι</i>).<sup>177</sup> These individuals have been interpreted as exiled pre-existing <i>πρόξενοι</i> of Kydonia or as pro-Kydonian exiles granted proxeny while in exile.<sup>178</sup> This hypothesis may be correct, but it is equally plausible that these individuals were mercenary soldiers granted land in Kydonia.<sup>179</sup></li> </ul> |
| Exiles serving as magistrates at a Panhellenic sanctuary                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Final years of the third century: representatives</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |

<sup>175</sup> Reger (1992), 381, n. 89, discussing *IG* XII 5 821.

<sup>177</sup> *IC* II x 1 (probably later third century).

<sup>178</sup> L. Robert in *BE* 1959, 350, endorsed by Seibert (1979), 529, n. 1464.

<sup>179</sup> Marek (1984), 318–19. <sup>180</sup> *SEG* 55.564bis.

<sup>176</sup> Demosthenes 20.60.

<sup>181</sup> Mackil (2008), 171–85.

<sup>182</sup> *FD* III 1.356, with Marek (1984), 219. I thank Will Mack for this example.

<sup>183</sup> *SEG* 19.595; see Mack (2015), ch. 2.

of Phthiotic Thebes served as magistrates (*ἱερομνήμονες*) within the Aetolian contingent of *ἱερομνήμονες* in the Delphic Amphictyony.<sup>184</sup> Since the Phthiotic Thebans were probably in exile throughout the period 217-197, while their home polis was occupied by Antigonid colonists (under the new name of Philippi), it is very probable that these *ἱερομνήμονες* were members of a pro-Aetolian Phthiotic Theban polis-in-exile.<sup>185</sup>

**Other quasi-citizen behaviour by individual citizens-in-exile:**

Participation by an individual exile in an embassy sent by his home polis

- 324: the exiled Demosthenes mingled with Athenian envoys and addressed the Arcadian assembly.<sup>186</sup>

Participation in Panhellenic games

- Mid-fourth century: the Samian exile Kaios won a victory in the boys' boxing contest at Olympia during the period of the Samians' collective exile (365-322).<sup>187</sup>

Financial contributions to a Panhellenic sanctuary

- 336: Endexios, an exile from the Phokian polis of Phanoteus/Panopeus, was recorded as having made a financial contribution to the sanctuary at Delphi, apparently in a personal capacity.<sup>188</sup> He thus advertised his piety,

(continued)

<sup>184</sup> CID 4.97, l. 6; CID 4.99, l. 4.

<sup>185</sup> Walsh (1993), 41, 43-5.

<sup>186</sup> Plutarch *Demosthenes* 27.3-5.

<sup>187</sup> Pausanias 6.13.5.

<sup>188</sup> CID 2.24, col. II, ll. 13-16. Cf. Hansen and Nielsen (2004), 424.

Table 6.1. Continued

| Type of civilized quasi-civic organization or behaviour adopted by liminal exiles | Secure and very probable cases                                                                                                                         | Probable and possible cases                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                   | wealth, and respect for the principal sanctuary of his home region, all attributes of a respectable citizen, retained despite his exile.               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| Holding of symposia                                                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 346: the symposium of the exiled Athenian Xenophon in Pella (cf. Section 2.2 above).<sup>189</sup></li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• c.404–386: the houses in the area opposite Klazomenai identified by Özbay as Chyton (cf. above, this column) contain evidence of symposia dating to their early fourth-century phase (Özbay's Phase I): an <i>andron</i> and decorated pottery.<sup>190</sup></li> <li>• 301/0–298/7: the excavators of the Karion fort propose that the Prienian exiles based there used Hellenistic drinking vessels and other pottery discovered there.<sup>191</sup></li> </ul> |

Exiled factions organizing themselves as 'poleis-in-exile' predominate in the evidence and the table. However, it was also possible for whole exiled populations of destroyed or captured cities to constitute themselves as 'poleis-in-exile': note, for example, the Megalopolitan refugees of 223. Evidence for the recognition of exile groups by established powers is included in the table. Existing quasi-civic organization was usually a prerequisite for such recognition; and such recognition usually made possible new forms of quasi-civic behaviour.

The examples collected in the table demonstrate the frequency among liminal exiles of the aspiration to create, or, more commonly, recreate, civilized, often autonomous civic institutions and practices in exile. They also reveal the self-confidence and versatility with which some liminal exiles put

<sup>189</sup> Demosthenes 19.196–8.

<sup>190</sup> Özbay (2004), 137, 139.

<sup>191</sup> Kleiner, Hommel, and Müller Wiener (1967), 96, 158–60. However, it is difficult to exclude the possibility that these items were used by regular soldiers from Priene manning the Karion fort at some point in the Hellenistic period.

this aspiration into practice. A consequence is that, in accordance with the more general pattern discussed in Section 2.1, there may well be more poleis-in-exile and citizens-in-exile in surviving evidence than can be identified as such: such groups and individuals had a particular interest in concealing or denying their loss of citizenship or residence in their home polis. Robert, for example, plausibly argues that a certain Apollonothemis of Prokonnesos whose epitaph at Athens made no reference to exile status was quite probably the former pro-Athenian factional leader in Prokonnesos, responsible for a known coin issue: he could have died in Athenian exile after being forced out of Prokonnesos when it was absorbed into Cyzicus in c.362.<sup>192</sup>

It was usually the case that 'liminal' exile reinforced already strongly established identities and relationships. Nevertheless, in exceptional cases, it could help to generate new political identities and institutions. The fifth-century emigrants from the Peloponnese styling themselves as the 'Messenians in Naupaktos' were probably engaged in developing a coherent Messenian political, cultural, and ethnic identity, with the necessary institutional underpinnings.<sup>193</sup>

Some liminal exile groups formed poleis-in-exile even in the unpromising context of the *ἐσχατιαί*: fifth- and fourth-century Samian exiles based in Anaia, early third-century Prienian exiles based in the Karion,<sup>194</sup> and third-century 'exiles from Achaia' in Skiros<sup>195</sup> all feature in the table and its footnotes. In these cases, liminal exile groups used their political behaviour, self-presentation, and interaction to construct their marginal geographical bases as political centres, home to quasi-civic communities with some claim to autonomy and well-defined identities. They thus bestowed political significance on the isolated, inhospitable habitats which were often the only places in which they could achieve basic security and subsistence. This process resembles one recently analysed by Ma: the denial of marginality by small poleis commonly perceived as marginal.<sup>196</sup>

<sup>192</sup> Robert (1967), 15–22. For a possible parallel for pro-Athenians in the northern Aegean who had served as mint-magistrates in their home city being forced into exile around this time, see *IG II/III*<sup>3</sup> 302 (honours for Abderites, 346/5), with Lambert (2007), 102, n. 13.

<sup>193</sup> On this group, see Luraghi (2008), 188–94. The members of this group were liminal exiles, despite their secure residence in a new city: they presented themselves solely as 'Messenians' and participated in military campaigns against their Peloponnesian opponents (cf. Luraghi (2008), 193–4, and (2009), 112). The best attested aspect of this group's self-presentation is their striving to present themselves as perpetuating 'Messenian' religious life: see Pausanias 4.33.2 (whose veracity is questioned in Luraghi (2008), 176–7); Zunino (1997), 66. They probably at least preserved as an 'anthem of independence' (West (2002), 110) or even commissioned (D'Alessio (2009), 144–5) the Delian *prosodion* for the Messenians attributed to Eumelus (Pausanias 4.4.1; 33.2).

<sup>194</sup> The Ephesian decree responding to an embassy from Prienians in 'the Charax', probably identical with these exiles (cf. this chapter's n. 142), refers to them as 'the citizens from Priene in the Charax' (*I.Ephesos* 2001, ll. 1, 6), explicitly recognizing them as 'citizens-in-exile'.

<sup>195</sup> On the topography of Skiritis: Pikoulas (1987).

<sup>196</sup> Ma (2008b).

The table also attests the inverse process in the case of liminal exiles and exile groups settled in far less marginal locations, the urban centres of host poleis. Such exiles could easily have been subsumed into their new milieu. However, some individuals and groups mentioned in the table avoided this outcome by presenting themselves as entirely separate from their hosts, or even marginal within their new milieu. Individual residents could receive proxeny grants from their host poleis: public recognition of their alterity, as well as of their legitimacy as representatives of their home poleis. Moreover, some whole resident exile groups constituted themselves as provisional poleis-in-exile, entirely distinct from their host poleis. In some cases, they even communicated in a quasi-diplomatic way with their host poleis, as if they were settled elsewhere.<sup>197</sup> Representing themselves as provisional, marginal poleis-in-exile was an effective way for such groups to encourage benefactions from their hosts, including both immediate material assistance and more long-term political help.

The frequency of these two symmetrical processes indicates that liminal exiles could exercise considerable agency in structuring their own political institutions and identities in exile, in response to their particular circumstances and needs. However, as suggested above, they revealed in doing so the influence of certain pervasive basic norms of citizenship, necessary points of orientation and guides to conduct in the unfamiliar circumstances of exile. In particular, their consistent facility and boldness in exercising a high degree of political initiative, and claiming legitimacy for their own inventions, is best explained if norms of civic voluntarism exerted a strong, wide-ranging influence.<sup>198</sup> Importantly, in the light of the constraints on the interpretation of political action imposed in this book, such norms of civic voluntarism are explicitly formulated in many contemporary texts from other contexts, explored earlier in this book.

Similarly, the common tendency of citizens-in-exile to form close-knit, exclusive and conservative poleis-in-exile is best explained as a consequence of the widespread influence, as prompts and guides to conduct, of underlying norms of particularist civic patriotism, belonging to the 'Nakonian' strain in civic political cultures, of the kind strongly attested in other evidence analysed in this book. The predominantly political and diplomatic, and occasionally cultural, collective activities of such poleis-in-exile reflect the specific nature of the strand of 'Nakonian' civic patriotism influential on them: a strand making civilized, autonomous political and diplomatic institutions and practices the central core of civic identity, sometimes alongside some cultural institutions and practices.

The behaviour of some liminal citizens-in-exile also provides further evidence for a feature of 'Nakonian' paradigms emphasized in Chapters 3–5: particularist civic patriotisms demanded ethical and cultural unity, but were

<sup>197</sup> Cf. Table 6.1.

<sup>198</sup> Cf. Chapter 3.3.3 and Chapter 5.2.3.

based on shared reference points whose meanings were equivocal and contentious. This is clear from the way in which some citizens-in-exile advocated, and acted on, their own construals of indeterminate shared civic values, often claiming monopolistic legitimacy for their own interpretations.<sup>199</sup>

For example, it was probably while in exile in the 390s<sup>200</sup> that the Spartan king Pausanias<sup>201</sup> and probably also Thibron, a former Spartan commander in Asia Minor,<sup>202</sup> wrote works on the constitution of Lycurgus. Strabo adduces Pausanias' work on Lycurgus' laws as evidence for his argument that Lycurgus was the true original Spartan lawgiver, stating that Pausanias wrote the work *κατὰ τῶν Λυ[κούρ]γου νόμων ὄντος τῆς ἐκβαλοῦσ[ι]ς οἰκίας* ('against the laws of Lycurgus, since he was from the royal house responsible for the expulsion').<sup>203</sup> Some have argued that the work must have been 'about', not 'against', Lycurgus' laws,<sup>204</sup> but it is hard to explain on that view why Pausanias wrote *κατὰ τῶν Λυ[κούρ]γου νόμων*. If Pausanias did attack Lycurgus' laws, he rejected a central pillar of Spartan patriotism. He presumably offered his own alternative interpretation of the true ancestral Spartan constitution<sup>205</sup> or of the best possible Spartan constitution by ethical and philosophical criteria. It was probably partly the experience of exile itself which concentrated Pausanias', and also Thibron's, mind on questions of political theory, and their connections with history.

The corollary of promotion of idiosyncratic interpretations of civic patriotism by citizens-in-exile was a version of a phenomenon emphasized in Chapter 5: vilification of members of the incumbent regime in the home

<sup>199</sup> An example already considered in detail in Chapter 5.5.3.1 is the reported rhetoric of the Asian exiles in Regulus' fleet in 190 (Livy 37.17.5–6).

<sup>200</sup> Seibert (1979), 103, 104. <sup>201</sup> Strabo 8.5.5.

<sup>202</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 1333b16–21; cf. David (2007), 299–300. It was in exile that Thibron would most likely have had the leisure and political motivation to write a historical-political pamphlet.

<sup>203</sup> The text of Radt (2002–2007), vol. II, 478.

<sup>204</sup> Cf. Meyer (1892), 233–5; Hodkinson (1996), 92–3. Meyer, writing without the evidence of the Vatican palimpsest P, which confirms that the preposition used was *κατά*, argued that Pausanias' work was 'about' (*περί*) the laws of Lycurgus. In support of the view that the work must have been 'about', not 'against', the laws of Lycurgus, Meyer denied that Pausanias, a former Spartan king, could have written a work criticizing the laws of Lycurgus (cf. David (1979), 98). It is, however, quite possible that Pausanias claimed a rival basis for Spartan law. Indeed, exile could have turned him against the prevailing constitution in Sparta (Ducat (2006), 44). Meyer also suggests that Ephorus, Strabo's source, would not have offered a pamphlet written against the laws of Lycurgus as evidence that Lycurgus was the true original Spartan lawgiver (cf. David (1979), 97–8). However, it is quite possible that Ephorus, or Strabo himself, intended to make a paradoxical argument: even the anti-Lycurgan Pausanias effectively acknowledged Lycurgus' responsibility for the laws of Sparta, by writing a work criticizing his laws. In that case, the participial phrase *ὄντος τῆς ἐκβαλοῦσ[ι]ς οἰκίας* has a clear (causal) meaning within the sentence (compare Ducat (2006), 42–4).

<sup>205</sup> For example, an interpretation of the initial settlement made by the Heraclidae on their return from exile as the true ancestral Spartan constitution.

polis as men devoid of ethical and political virtue and legitimacy.<sup>206</sup> For example, the early fourth-century speaker of Isocrates' *Aigineticus* presents himself and his fellow Siphnian exiles as virtuous, distinguished Siphnian citizens, in contrast to their incumbent opponents, who were reliant on brute force for their power.<sup>207</sup> Exiles could even deny polis status to incumbent regimes. Demosthenes was probably reflecting the perspective of the Rhodian democratic exiles in whose support he spoke in 351<sup>208</sup> when he dismissively referred to the incumbent regime in Rhodes as 'the Rhodians now in (the city)' (οἱ νῦν ὄντες ἐν αὐτῇ Ῥόδιοι), shortly before referring to the democratic faction as 'the Rhodian people' (ὁ Ῥοδίων δῆμος).<sup>209</sup>

Similar exile rhetoric is echoed in the later Hellenistic decree of the Delphic Amphictyony, praising some Delphian citizens who had suffered exile after pointing out some financial irregularities, which was discussed at the start of the Introduction to this book. The decree denies all ethical legitimacy to these citizens' opponents: they had been exposed committing 'injustices (ἀδικήματα) to the sanctuary', and subsequently plotted the exile of these men, who had themselves preserved civic virtue in exile.<sup>210</sup>

Some exiles even presented incumbent citizens as vicious tyrants. Fourth-century exiles from Herakleia may well have been a principal source for the portrayal of Dionysius of Herakleia, the ruler responsible for their exile, which Menander reportedly included 'on their behalf' (ὕπέρ τινων φυνάδων ἐξ Ἡρακλείας) in his lost *Halieis*. Menander portrayed Dionysius as a tyrant and a glutton lacking all self-control, the inverse of a self-disciplined, patriotic, anti-tyrannical exile: 'he indulged himself, in such a way that he would not indulge himself for long' (ἐτρύφησεν, ὥστε μὴ πολὺν τρυφᾶν χρόνον).<sup>211</sup> The Prienian exiles who arrived at the Karion fort in c.300 put into action a belief that the incumbent regime in Priene, led by Hieron, was a tyranny lacking all legitimacy: they summarily put to death all the members of the civic garrison there, which had 'chosen the side of the tyrant'.<sup>212</sup> The fact that this garrison

<sup>206</sup> For the fifth century, compare Alcibiades at Thucydides 6.92.2–4; Taylor (2010), 190–2.

<sup>207</sup> Contrast sections 36 and 19 of Isocrates 19.

<sup>208</sup> *Scholia in Demosthenem* 15, section 1; Gehrke (1985), 139.

<sup>209</sup> Demosthenes 15.14–15.

<sup>210</sup> CID 4.118, ll. 1–7, which can probably be brought into connection with CID 4.119; see also Lefèvre's commentary in CID IV, pp. 287–8, and Sanchez (2001), 172.

<sup>211</sup> Athenaeus Book XII, 549c; Menander fr. 25 Kassel-Austin. For a possible second-century parallel: Cartledge and Spawforth (1989), 72, discussing Polybius 13.7. For other possible evidence of Menander's sympathy for exiles, note his invention of a virtuous, modest Samian girl, who could stand partly for the many unfortunate displaced Samians of the fourth century, in his *Samia*.

<sup>212</sup> A less extreme way for liminal exiles to put into action a belief in the illegitimacy of an incumbent regime was to urge other states to attack their home polis. See, for example, Heraclides Lembus *On Constitutions* 35, concerning Theogenes, a fourth-century Samian exile.



had freely sided with the ‘tyrant’ suggests that, as in examples considered in Chapter 5, the actual political situation in Priene was less clear-cut.

### 3.3.2. Mobilized Anti-Citizens

An alternative political course for liminal exiles committed to their home poleis was the deliberate and pointed suspension of normal civic habits during the period of exile. This is presented as an appropriate response to exile by the unnamed speaker of Isocrates’ *Aigineticus*, a member of the Siphnian oligarchic exile movement mentioned in Table 6.1, who lived as a metic in Aigina after the failure of that movement.<sup>213</sup> The speaker is now claiming the estate of his friend and fellow exile Thrasylochos. He claims that, while he was nursing Thrasylochos in his final illness, the two men spent no day without tears, since they were constantly lamenting their hardships, exile, and loneliness.<sup>214</sup>

The speaker reinforces this self-presentation through his portrayal of his opponent in the suit, a half-sister of Thrasylochos who was the rival claimant to Thrasylochos’ estate. This woman was a daughter of Thrasylochos’ father, the Siphnian seer Thrasylos, and an anonymous mother<sup>215</sup> who was probably from a city other than Siphnos.<sup>216</sup> She was therefore a partial member of the Siphnian diaspora, even though it is unclear if she had ever lived on Siphnos herself.<sup>217</sup> As presented by the speaker, she shared none of the anguish and asceticism of the truly Siphnian members of the diaspora. She failed to join the Siphnians in Troizen who travelled to Aigina for Thrasylochos’ funeral; and she sacrificed and participated in a festival when news arrived that Thrasylochos’ brother Sopolis, another exile, had died fighting (presumably as a mercenary)<sup>218</sup> in Lycia.<sup>219</sup> Admittedly, an important function of these stories is to show that she was anything but a devoted half-sister. There is, however, an undertone of criticism of her supposed lack of embeddedness, not only in Thrasylochos’ particular family, but also in the wider Siphnian exile community, within whose bounds it would be proper to keep Thrasylochos’ fortune. The speaker’s words create a rhetorical contrast between the good liminal exiles, himself and Thrasylochos, depicted as having treated forced separation from their home polis as a period of crisis and torment, and this woman, portrayed as a relatively rootless outsider, without a clear-cut civic affiliation.

<sup>213</sup> Isocrates 19.12.

<sup>214</sup> Isocrates 19.24–7. Cf. Mathieu and Brémond (1928–1962), vol. I, 99, n. 2, and 100, n. 2; McKechnie (1989), 18–21.

<sup>215</sup> Isocrates 19.6.

<sup>216</sup> Her mother’s city may have been Troizen, since that is where she is now living, but Mathieu and Brémond (1928–1962), vol. I, 91, think that it was an island polis other than Siphnos.

<sup>217</sup> The speaker claims at Isocrates 19.7 that her father had abandoned her in childhood, together with her mother, to return to Siphnos.

<sup>218</sup> Mathieu and Brémond (1928–1962), vol. I, 103, n. 3.

<sup>219</sup> Isocrates 19.31, 40.

Conceived as a state of emergency or an exceptional state, exile could be considered to demand uncompromising mobilization in the struggle to secure a favourable return to the home polis, waged, if necessary, by unconventional, anti-civic, devious, or desperate means. This expectation is crystallized in the claim of Thucydides' Alcibiades, in exile in Sparta, that the good citizen should attempt to regain his citizenship by any means possible, through desire (ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν).<sup>220</sup> This could be reflected in exile groups' political organization. For example, some liminal exiles appointed emergency autocratic magistrates. The appointment by the members of the early fourth-century Siphnian oligarchic exile movement of an ἄρχων αὐτοκράτωρ<sup>221</sup> was presented in Table 6.1 as an example of imitation of civilized civic organization. However, it can also be seen as a conscious repudiation of republican political organization by the Siphnian exiles in favour of temporary autocracy, for the sake of unity and efficiency.<sup>222</sup> In a similar way, the 'exiles from Achaia' in Skiros in the period 220–217 could have considered their leader Kleopatros an emergency autocratic leader, even though the Achaian League itself had only one general by this point (cf. Table 6.1). Indeed, the styling of Kleopatros and the exiles as 'Kleopatros and the exiles from Achaia' on the statue base arguably recalls more the epigraphic nomenclature of a Hellenistic king or tyrant and his acolytes than that of a corporate civic or federal group.

Furthermore, some exile groups used unorthodox or brutal guerrilla strategies and methods, partly resembling those identified by Vidal-Naquet<sup>223</sup> as characteristic of one possible Greek stereotype of the ephebe or 'young man' (νέος). Actual ephebes and νέοι of the later Classical and Hellenistic periods were often presented, and presented themselves, as highly disciplined and obedient.<sup>224</sup> However, an alternative stereotype survived of the ephebe or νέος as a liminal young man confined to rugged border regions<sup>225</sup> and focused on hunting and trickery, part citizen-in-waiting and part the antithesis of the socialised adult citizen.<sup>226</sup>

A story told by Plutarch, analysed by Ma, crystallizes the relevant type of identity and behaviour, and its relevance for both the ephebe or νέος and the

<sup>220</sup> Thucydides 6.92.4. Note also reports that some Greeks referred with scorn to exiles who lived in comfort in exile, rather than embracing hardship: Plutarch *Aratus* 6.4–5; Livy 39.36.15. Possibly compare Xenophon's own description at *Hellenica* 7.4.16 of Eleian Pylos, base of Eleian exiles, as a χωρίον καλόν.

<sup>221</sup> Isocrates 19.38.

<sup>222</sup> Compare the reasoning of the wandering mercenaries at Xenophon *Anabasis* 6.1.18: a single commander can act more secretly and decisively.

<sup>223</sup> Vidal-Naquet (1986). Compare Plutarch *Lycurgus* 28, on the Spartan *krypteia*.

<sup>224</sup> See, for example, Kennell (2013).

<sup>225</sup> For the Greek association of rugged border regions with liminal groups and identities, compare Øistein Endsjø (2000).

<sup>226</sup> Compare Ma (1994); (2008b).

exile. It also demonstrates its usefulness for Greeks exploring their political consciousness. This is Plutarch's report of the behaviour of the young Damon of Chaironeia, himself of the age of an ephebe or νέος, first discussed in Chapter 5.5.4. According to Plutarch, Damon fled into exile in the countryside with young associates, after assassinating a Roman commander. From their exilic hideout the young Chaironeians harried their home city in brutally transgressive, anti-civic ways: they slaughtered magistrates dining together; and they plundered Chaironeian territory.<sup>227</sup>

Plutarch reports a similar story involving similar behaviour by a more conventional, grown-up exile,<sup>228</sup> which also reveals the possible shape of an anti-citizen exilic identity and its usefulness for Greeks' reflection on the ambiguities of their political culture. According to him, in c.370, Timoleon of Corinth chose roving exile, wandering in the most desolate regions (πλανώμενος ἐν τοῖς ἐρημοτάτοις τῶν ἀγρῶν), after committing an act delicately poised, like those of one type of stereotypical ephebe or νέος, on the border between patriotism and barbaric lawlessness: the procuring of the assassination of his brother, the Corinthian 'tyrant' Timophanes. This was an act of simultaneous tyrannicide and fratricide, perceived by some as 'hatred of vice and greatness of spirit' (μισοπονηρία καὶ μεγαλοψυχία) and by others as 'impiety' (ἀσέβεια).<sup>229</sup>

Less obviously symbolic and embroidered accounts attest the use of similar political and military methods by both young exiles<sup>230</sup> and adult exiles, especially Peloponnesian ones. Relevant methods used by adult exiles included assassination of incumbent political leaders.<sup>231</sup> They also included secretive, unrestrained attacks on exiles' home poleis: a surreptitious invasion,<sup>232</sup> opportunistic harrying and raiding,<sup>233</sup> and even a massacre of home citizens.<sup>234</sup>

<sup>227</sup> Plutarch *Cimon* 1.2–7; Ma (1994).

<sup>228</sup> In a fifth-century example of relevant behaviour by adult refugees, the monosandalism of the Plataean refugees fleeing into exile in 427 (Thucydides 3.22.2) was partly a reversion to the 'rites of adolescence' (Vidal-Naquet (1986), 64, 69–70; Hornblower (1991–2008), vol. I, 406–7; Ma (1994), 74) or, at least, an evocation of one stereotype of behaviour by an ephebe or νέος. This adoption of one characteristic activity of the stereotypical ephebe or νέος could have permitted the Plataean refugees to make sense of, and to justify to themselves and to others, their flight from their besieged home city, as a new, ingenious method of resistance, not a dishonest, cowardly means of escape. For an Archaic precedent for self-presentation by an exile in terms recalling the stereotypical ephebe or νέος, compare Alcaeus' presentation of himself living as an exile in the ἐσχατιαί, μοῖραν ἔχων ἀγροῦωτίκαν (fr. 130 Lobel–Page, ll. 16–26).

<sup>229</sup> Plutarch *Timoleon* 4.5–5.4.

<sup>230</sup> Note the reported raiding of home territory by dissident youths in Diodorus 18.47.2 (Pisidian Termessos in 319) and Polybius 4.53.9, 4.55.6 (mid-third-century Gortyn).

<sup>231</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.3.5; 4.3. Compare Nabis' fear of assassination by Argive exiles at Livy 32.39.9.

<sup>232</sup> Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.4.1–12; Plutarch *Pelopidas* 7–13.

<sup>233</sup> Thucydides 4.75.1; Diodorus 13.65.4; Xenophon *Hellenica* 7.2.5–9.

<sup>234</sup> Diodorus 15.40.2; cf. Chapter 5.5.3.2. Compare the violence in Dyme after it was garrisoned by Cassander, which was perpetrated partly by a quasi-exilic breakaway faction which walled itself off (Diodorus 19.66.4–6).

The Prienian exiles from Hieron's regime in Priene provide an interesting case-study of actual anti-citizen exilic behaviour, not least because the implications of a subsequent report of their behaviour and identity is confirmed by an inscription contemporary with their exile. The exiles in the Karion behaved partly as civilized citizens-in-exile through their diplomatic interactions with states (cf. Table 6.1), but they also acted as anti-citizens. The Prienians' deposition to the early second-century Rhodian arbitration concerning the Karion stated, as mentioned in Section 3.3.1, that the exiles killed the incumbent garrison on arriving in the Karion:<sup>235</sup> they acted in accordance with the norms of *stasis*, inversions of the civilized norms of regular war (*πόλεμος*), under which it is only foreign enemies whom the good citizen kills.<sup>236</sup> The verb (*διαφθείρω*) used to describe the killing implies ruthlessness.<sup>237</sup> According to the Prienians' Samian adversaries in the arbitration, the exiles went on to ravage (*κατατρέχειν* and *κακοποιεῖν*) the territory of the incumbent tyrannical regime in Priene.<sup>238</sup>

The comparable contemporary evidence comes from the preamble to the Ephesian decree granting aid to the contemporary Prienian exiles in 'the Charax', probably identical with those in the Karion.<sup>239</sup> That preamble reports that the exiles requested arms and said that they 'would save the Charax, if they could', but would otherwise request assistance from the Ephesians.<sup>240</sup> This rhetoric implies readiness for desperate and uncompromising bravery, as well as unwillingness to receive military reinforcements unless absolutely necessary. Moreover, in the decision-clause of the Ephesian decree, whose content the exiles may have been able to influence, through their envoys, the Ephesians represented the exiles as devoted solely to the military struggle for the Charax. If the restorations proposed for the decision-clause are accurate, the Ephesians claimed to be making the grant to the exiles 'because they guard the fort, bringing all assiduousness (*[ἐκτέ]νεια*) to bear, and say and do things consistent with our pre-existing friendship'.<sup>241</sup> The Ephesians thus probably praised the Prienian exiles for 'assiduousness' (*[ἐκτέ]νεια*), using the word in isolation, without reference to other abstract virtues, in a departure from the common pattern in honorary decrees. This praise was accompanied by acknowledgement of their other speech and action consistent with their friendship with the Ephesians, but not by any

<sup>235</sup> Magonetto (2008), text (pp. 34–45), ll. 88–90.

<sup>236</sup> For the inverse relationship and its dissolution during the Peloponnesian War: Price (2001); Loraux (2005), 53.

<sup>237</sup> The verb is used in Hellenistic epigraphy and historiography principally to refer to destruction of physical objects. It could also refer to savage killing (e.g. Polybius 1.39.11, the mauling of Roman soldiers by Carthaginian elephants; or 13.6.8–9, the killing of defenceless Spartan exiles by Nabis' agents) or deceitful killing (Diodorus 4.45.2: poisoning).

<sup>238</sup> Magonetto (2008), text (pp. 34–45), l. 145.

<sup>239</sup> Cf. n. 142 of this chapter.

<sup>240</sup> *I.Ephesos* 2001, ll. 3–5.

<sup>241</sup> *I.Ephesos* 2001, ll. 6–7.

reference to mainstream or civilian civic qualities such as ἀρετή, εὐνοια or even προθυμία.<sup>242</sup> Given that the decree granted urgently needed arms to the exiles, an additional underlying implication of praise for their ἐκτένεια was that they had previously fought hard for the fort with inadequate or make-shift weapons.<sup>243</sup>

Most of the examples of anti-citizen mobilization considered in this chapter involve members of *stasis* factions cast into exile. However, it was also possible for a group of refugees from a single polis to adopt this kind of identity: note, in particular, Thucydides' representation of the final Plataean refugees fleeing Plataea in 427.<sup>244</sup>

The behaviour by exiles surveyed in this sub-section is best explained by distinctive features of civic political cultures, sufficiently powerful to give relevant exiles the idea of behaving in the ways discussed here, as well as the confidence to do so in practice. First, the relevant exiles must have been influenced by a particular strand of 'Nakonian' patriotism: one marked by special types of particularism and militarism. Particularist belief in the necessary and unique role of a single polis as the basis of a citizen's social and political identity<sup>245</sup> partly explains some exiles' resort to all available methods to recover their home city. Similarly, habituation into militaristic norms helps to explain some exiles' constant mobilization in pursuit of their perception of the best interests of their home city.<sup>246</sup>

Second, the exilic behaviour and identities considered in this sub-section lend support to Vidal-Naquet's structuralist argument, challenged and refined by Ma,<sup>247</sup> that something like the figure of the 'Black Hunter', the problematic, liminal young citizen-in-waiting without civic self-restraint, was integral to Greek civic consciousness.<sup>248</sup> That model of conduct was promising for exiles. Behaving and presenting themselves as self-consciously unlike settled citizens, even while hoping for a return, offered exiles a means of coming to terms with their loss of citizenship, an alternative to the denial of marginality considered in the previous sub-section.<sup>249</sup> Paradoxically, it was also a means by which to prove their continued civic virtue and familiarity with civic political culture, and its

<sup>242</sup> Contrast the praise for Ainetos, general of Demetrios Poliorketes, in the same decree, ll. 12–15.

<sup>243</sup> Cf. Vidal-Naquet (1986), 70, on the Plataean refugees of 427 using the 'equipment of the rites of adolescence'.

<sup>244</sup> See this chapter's n. 228 for a discussion of Thucydides treatment of these refugees.

<sup>245</sup> Cf. Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 100 (quoting Euripides), 107 (quoting Tyrtaeus). Compare Andocides 1.5: a citizen's indissoluble link to his home city makes residence there preferable even to prosperous exile elsewhere.

<sup>246</sup> For the view that military practices and organization and 'military culture' persisted as defining features of many Hellenistic poleis: Ma (2000); (2004a).

<sup>247</sup> Ma (1994); (2008b). <sup>248</sup> Vidal-Naquet (1986), esp. 106–28.

<sup>249</sup> Cf. Vidal-Naquet (1986), 70.

structural oppositions. Indeed, relevant exiles were showing their sensitivity to the fact that civic ideals made different demands in different contexts.

This interpretation might be considered not to meet fully either of the criteria for deriving political assumptions from evidence for political action followed in this book (see p. 19). However, it can be argued that it does meet the second of those constraints. Not only does this interpretation represent the best candidate for the ideological assumptions which imbued relevant exiles with the right type of conviction to engage in the attested types of transgression, but it is also possible to point to a more explicit reflection on this complex approach to exile in the work of a Greek intellectual. Isocrates captures well in his *Archidamus* the possible joint influence of anti-citizen norms and militaristic norms on exilic identity. That speech ostensibly represents an appeal by the Spartan King Archidamus to his fellow Spartans not to be downhearted at the recent loss of Messene, but to continue to fight for their polis like traditional Spartans. In one passage, Isocrates makes Archidamus argue that the Spartans have nothing to fear: if really pressed, they could become a wandering city of warriors, devoted to war alone. Archidamus even claims that the Spartans would then become in reality that of which their settled polis is only an imitation: a military camp. This wandering militaristic paradigm will, however, also be an anti-polis in important respects: there will be no leisure for anything but war; wives and children will have been sent away; and there will be no constitution (*πολιτεία*).<sup>250</sup> There is no explicit reference to the young or age-classes at this point, but the picture would surely often have called to mind the Spartan *krypteia*. Indeed, this passage was probably intended to be a satire on Spartan customs in general:<sup>251</sup> the Spartans have so blurred the boundaries between citizenship and brute violence, and between civilization and barbarism, that they are left in the paradoxical position that the true realization of their polis ideal would in fact be a wandering band of ruthless raiders.<sup>252</sup>

### 3.3.3. 'Refugee' Identity and Politicized Humanitarian Norms

The final main variety of liminal quasi-civic exilic identity was that of the peaceable, dependent refugee, lacking all, or almost all, political autonomy, but nonetheless recognizably a citizen of a particular polis. There is particularly strong evidence for the importance of this identity among exiles from the second century onwards. From that point, even some cohesive groups of

<sup>250</sup> Isocrates 6.72–81.

<sup>251</sup> Contrast the views of Mossé (1953) and Azoulay (2006a).

<sup>252</sup> Isocrates in the *Panathenaicus* explicitly reports that he himself compared the Spartan polis with a band of warriors, in the way it achieves internal concord by means of external rapacity, in a debate with a pro-Spartan (12.225–6; note that 231–4 retreat from this position).

male exiles from a single polis, who would have been able to organize themselves into a 'polis-in-exile' or 'anti-polis', are known to have behaved as collective groups of refugees, presenting themselves as entirely dependent on external aid.

As discussed in Section 2.3, second-century honorary decrees passed by the Chrysaoric *κοινόν* and Colophon for local benefactors, Aristonidas of Stratonikeia and Polemaios of Colophon respectively, represent those benefactors giving hospitality and donations to refugees. In these presentations, the refugees necessarily emerge as passive recipients of aid. As suggested in Section 2.3 earlier, the drafters of these two honorary decrees could well have distorted their representations of the honorands' conduct, in an attempt to appeal to newly prominent politicized humanitarian expectations concerning exile behaviour. However, they would have struggled to smuggle purely invented benefactions past the honorands' opponents in the assembly.

Consequently, it is very probable that relevant refugees in second-century Asia Minor were content to receive philanthropic assistance from these wealthy benefactors in their host cities, rather than agitating politically or militarily for a return home. The mixed origins of the later second-century refugees in Colophon, beneficiaries of private charitable donations from Polemaios of Colophon and of public appeals for aid to them,<sup>253</sup> would have limited their ability to agitate politically as a cohesive group. However, this is not true of the other group: early second-century refugees from Alabanda based in Stratonikeia, a cohesive group from a single polis, could have behaved in a way more familiar from the previous two sub-sections. Instead, they took up residence 'in the fields' of Aristonidas of Stratonikeia, presumably in a type of private refugee camp,<sup>254</sup> and in the city, relying on his patronage for their survival and welfare.<sup>255</sup>

As discussed in Section 2.4, the other principal representations of groups of displaced citizens as helpless recipients of aid occur in honorary decrees of the citizens of Entella, Elateia, and Oropos for benefactors during the recent large-scale exile of home citizens.<sup>256</sup> Each case involved a large group of refugees from a single polis, including men as well as women.<sup>257</sup> As discussed in Section 2.4, these representations of displaced citizens were also subject to significant distorting influences: the aspiration of the returned Entellinoi, Elateians, and Oropians to present their behaviour in exile as that of well-behaved, blameless<sup>258</sup> refugees, not destructive vagrants or political schemers;

<sup>253</sup> SEG 39.1243, col. III, ll. 25–35.

<sup>254</sup> Note that the Elateian refugees at Stymphalos reportedly also received a part or parts of Stymphalian land to occupy (*IPArk* 18, l. 6).

<sup>255</sup> SEG 53.1229, ll. 11–14; Şahin (2003) (see this chapter's n. 25 for a justification of this interpretation of these lines).

<sup>256</sup> Ampolo (2001), Entella text A2, ll. 9–13; *IPArk* 18; *I.Oropos* 307, ll. 4–25.

<sup>257</sup> This is explicitly drawn out at 35.999, ll. 11–12. <sup>258</sup> Cf. *IPArk* 18, ll. 13–15.

and those returned citizens' desire to accentuate the importance of the assistance rendered to them in exile by the honorands.

However, even if the representations were tendentious constructions, details which are probably trustworthy are the specific references in two of the texts to diplomatic interventions before the second-century Achaian League by the respective honorands on behalf of the displaced group concerned. The Stymphalians are said to have succeeded in convincing the Achaian League to send envoys to M'. Acilius Glabrio, then in Phokis, to petition for the Elateian refugees' return home, and later to have secured from the Achaian League permission for the returning Elateians to take grain with them; exporting grain from the Peloponnese would otherwise have been contrary to an emergency League ban. For his part, the leading Achaian Hieron of Aigeira is said to have spoken on behalf of displaced leading Oropians at an Achaian federal meeting (*σύνοδος*) in Corinth and another (a *σύγκλητος*) at Argos, advocating intervention to defend Oropos against Athenian mistreatment.<sup>259</sup> To make entirely fanciful claims about such specific, falsifiable details of recent diplomatic history could have exposed the cities involved to ridicule.

In these cases, therefore, the refugees concerned probably did not undertake their own diplomatic activities in imitation of a settled polis, but surrendered their diplomatic autonomy to foreign patrons.<sup>260</sup> In doing so, they, like the refugees in Colophon and Stratonikeia discussed above, complied with the requirements of, but also helped to construct and reinforce, a 'citizen refugee' identity, which stood in stark contrast to the 'citizen-in-exile' and 'anti-citizen' identities dominant among displaced citizens in earlier periods. This identity represented the incorporation of the long-established figure of the suppliant within acceptable, patriotic civic roles. All displaced Oropians present at Argos were even reportedly taken into the private hearth of Hieron's Argive residence,<sup>261</sup> an image which recalls the probable 'refugee camp' for the displaced citizens of Alabanda at Stratonikeia. These points about these exiles' identities stand even if, behind the scenes, these displaced citizens were not so meek: for example, if the Oropians tried to bribe an Achaian federal general.<sup>262</sup> Even in that case, the Oropians would still have given the impression that they were docile, disenfranchised refugees, and victims of circumstances, by allowing Hieron to represent them in the accompanying official diplomatic negotiations.

This shift in diplomatic habits was not all-embracing in the mid- to late Hellenistic period. As shown in Section 3.3.1, other exiles and refugees of the

<sup>259</sup> *IPArk* 18, ll. 9–13, 15–18; *I.Oropos* 307, ll. 6–22.

<sup>260</sup> Compare the behaviour of the Iasian exiles in fleet in 190 (Livy 37.17.4–6), who successfully appealed to the Rhodians to act as intermediaries with Regulus.

<sup>261</sup> *I.Oropos* 307, ll. 14–17; Mackil (2013), 481. Note the same expression is also used of the reception of refugees at *IPArk* 18, l. 3.

<sup>262</sup> Cf. Section 2.4.



second and first centuries did act as citizens-in-exile in diplomatic contexts.<sup>263</sup> The 'refugee' diplomatic behaviour of some groups was probably, therefore, partly due to particular circumstances in each case. Each group may have deliberately chosen reliance on a foreign patron, as a more effective means of achieving its diplomatic ends. Alternatively, each group may have been constrained to rely on diplomatic representation by foreign benefactors, as a result of the force of Roman and Achaian regulatory norms discouraging Greek-style civic voluntarism<sup>264</sup> and oligarchic-style norms effectively restricting political speech to those in possession of land and a city. Moreover, newly prominent politicized humanitarian norms concerning exile may have been particularly influential in these three groups' home or host cities.

Other displaced citizens who displayed signs of the identity of the helpless refugee engaged directly in political and diplomatic communication, but did so using rhetoric dependent on the pathos of their circumstances. Polybius attributes this kind of rhetoric to the envoys from a group of Spartan exiles who appeared before the Roman Senate in 180.<sup>265</sup> According to Polybius, these exiles spoke only briefly, describing their situation and appealing for 'common pity' (*κοινὸς ἔλεος*).<sup>266</sup> It is striking that Polybius could imagine even Spartan exiles presenting themselves as helpless victims in need of assistance, in a public (indeed, a Roman) context.<sup>267</sup> In most of the cases considered in this sub-section, it was a group of refugees from a destroyed or captured polis which behaved as a helpless 'polis of refugees'. It is, therefore, notable that Polybius here presents a political faction from a divided polis adopting a 'refugee' identity.

Admittedly, the politicized 'refugee' identity, like political application of the humanitarian ideal of unconditional aid to refugees (see Section 2.3), was certainly not entirely new. In the Classical period, some displaced citizens' wives and children behaved, and were treated, as entirely dependent refugees. For example, it was thought that the Athenian male citizens had in 480 evacuated their women and children to Troizen to protect them from the

<sup>263</sup> For example, in sending embassies to the Roman Senate.

<sup>264</sup> Roman respect for the rule of law: consider, for example, Cicero *De Re Publica*, esp. 1.39–40. For Roman scepticism about Greek voluntarism, note Livy's hostility to an improvised Boeotian assembly at Livy 42.43.7–9. Achaian proceduralism: Polybius 2.37.7–39.12.

<sup>265</sup> For the context: Seibert (1979), 199–208.

<sup>266</sup> Polybius 24.10.2. At least in another Hellenistic historian, Diodorus, the pathetic condition of exiles and refugees is a topos: Diodorus 4.57.2–4; 13.89.3–4; 19.53.2–54.2. Polybius himself refers (4.54.5) to the citizens of Cretan Lappa giving asylum en masse to the citizens of Lyttos, rendered refugees after the destruction of their city, 'with humanity' (*φιλανθρωπῶως*) in the third century.

<sup>267</sup> Contrast the toughness of the exiled Spartan Drakontios in Xenophon *Anabasis* 4.8.25–6, analysed by Ma (2004b), 332–3: a paradigm of a good Classical Spartan approach to exile (cf. Isocrates 6.72–81). For a cynical appeal to humanitarian values by a second-century exile, compare Livy 35.34.6–12 (concerning Eurylochos of Demetrias and his supporters).

Persian advance, themselves staying behind in Athens and Salamis to defend their ancestral territory.<sup>268</sup> Similarly, in Classical Athenian drama and rhetoric, as discussed in Section 2.3, humane generosity to helpless wandering women and children was often celebrated. In that context, however, even a female character can disrupt gender expectations<sup>269</sup> by arguing that it is inappropriate to maintain the helpless pose of a suppliant if it is possible to show courage.<sup>270</sup>

Although it was principally an identity for women and children in the Classical period, Classical male citizens themselves sometimes showed signs of 'refugee' identity. However, those signs were usually submerged beneath more dominant forms of behaviour and self-presentation. In his *On the Return* of 410, for example, Andocides appealed for the Athenians' pity.<sup>271</sup> However, he did not present himself as a helpless victim, with no political autonomy or room for manoeuvre: he claimed entitlement to the Athenians' gratitude for turning informer in 415 and argued that he had energetically promoted Athenian interests while in exile.<sup>272</sup> Similar tempering of 'refugee' tendencies is evident in some political action by exiles in the Classical period: the Samian refugees of 403/2 accepted the collaboration of Athenian envoys in making a joint embassy to Sparta,<sup>273</sup> but presumably undertook their part of the embassy as a quasi-autonomous group.

It is true that a male victim of misfortune in an Attic tragedy could adopt a more unequivocally helpless pose in order to attract support, without giving up his pretensions to a political role. In Euripides' *Suppliant Women*, King Adrastus of Argos presents himself as a helpless suppliant, appealing for Theseus' charity on behalf of his city. However, he also appears to show an awareness that that kind of appeal may not sit easily with his status as a male, king, and active politician. He attempts to hitch his claims to pity to the more uncontroversial ones of the suppliant Argive women accompanying him, discussed in Section 2.3.<sup>274</sup> In a parallel case, Heracles' elderly kinsman Iolaos presents himself in Euripides' *Children of Heracles* as a suppliant in need of charity from more powerful figures. However, he too hitches his claims to the more uncontroversial ones of the children of Heracles, whom he is protecting.<sup>275</sup> Moreover, the characters who look favourably on his appeals do not treat him as a normal male citizen: for example, the chorus emphasize his age.<sup>276</sup>

<sup>268</sup> See Plutarch *Themistocles* 10.5. <sup>269</sup> Mendelsohn (2002), 89–104.

<sup>270</sup> Euripides *Children of Heracles*, ll. 500–519. <sup>271</sup> Andocides 2.6–9.

<sup>272</sup> Andocides 2.9–23. <sup>273</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 2 §ii, ll. 45–8.

<sup>274</sup> See Euripides *Suppliant Women*, ll. 113–14, 128, 168–9.

<sup>275</sup> See Euripides *Children of Heracles*, ll. 10–11, 26, 69–72, 226–7, 445–50.

<sup>276</sup> See Euripides *Children of Heracles*, ll. 75, 127–9. Note that Iolaos himself subsequently shifts (ll. 688–9, 796) to a more appropriately male identity: Mendelsohn (2002), 104–12.

In the mid- and late Hellenistic period, by contrast, the identity of the peaceable, helpless refugee became one which was sometimes an acceptable, or even praiseworthy, principal exilic identity even for male members of civic communities. Moreover, it became effective for liminal exiles to lay claim to host poleis' assistance, both with immediate subsistence and with broader political objectives, by presenting themselves as human beings, or Greeks, in need. The 'refugee' identity thus came to rival that of the quasi-autonomous citizen-in-exile as a means of obtaining external assistance.

The behaviour and self-presentation of such exiles not only reflected, but also stimulated the rise to prominence of politicized humanitarian values in civic political cultures more generally in the mid- and late Hellenistic period. Values already overt and influential in literature, as evident from the discussion of Isocrates' *Plataicus* in Section 2.3,<sup>277</sup> came to be notably influential in practical politics in certain contexts.<sup>278</sup> This development was probably partly due to some Hellenistic intellectuals' emphasis on 'humanity' (*φιλανθρωπία*), and application of it to politics. It was probably also partly due to widespread Greek weariness with ongoing war and unrest, themselves partly results of more demanding, particularistic notions of citizenship.<sup>279</sup> This is, moreover, one of the few places in which something like a proto-Kantian concern with something like unconditional respect for individuals as ends in themselves impinged significantly on mainstream political discourse.

### 3.4. Conclusion

As argued in detail in the conclusions to the individual sub-sections above, liminal exiles' identities and behaviour are best explained by the wide-ranging influence of underlying norms of civic voluntarism and the sometimes simultaneous influence of three distinct specific versions of the 'Nakonian' paradigm: a civilized institutional one, a militaristic one and, from the mid-Hellenistic period onwards, a politicized humanitarian one. They thus reveal the variety of 'Nakonian' norms within the civic political cultures which shaped those liminal exiles' political consciousness.

The variety in the political cultures influential on them meant that liminal exiles could exercise individual agency in choosing and adapting an identity which they expected to further their interests, or which enabled them to come to terms with their new social position. Citizens-in-exile and 'refugee'

<sup>277</sup> Compare also the humanitarian implications of much earlier poetry, including important Classical Attic tragedies and comedies.

<sup>278</sup> Compare Kiechle (1958).

<sup>279</sup> See Gray (2013c).

exiles living in host poleis adopted two distinct identities suitable for attracting the patronage and support of their host polis. For their part, citizens-in-exile and anti-citizen exiles living in marginal areas developed two different identities which enabled them to lend structure and dignity to their hand-to-mouth subsistence lifestyles, but also to pursue their political and military interests.

Significantly, liminal exile groups did not usually adopt forms of organization and rhetoric closer to the 'Dikaiopolitan' ideal. This was probably because the desperate circumstances of liminal exile made complete unity and solidarity a prerequisite of survival, let alone political success. Moreover, liminal exiles rarely had the same need for the bargaining inherent in 'Dikaiopolitan' politics: all members shared a common end, their return to their home polis, for which they were prepared to make large personal sacrifices.

Action and interaction by liminal exiles guided by underlying civic voluntarist and 'Nakonian' norms could lead to open conflicts between exiles from the same polis. Plutarch reports a story told by the third-century historian Phylarchus about conflict in the Arcadian assembly in 323, in the early stages of the Lamian War, between two Athenian exiles: the pro-Macedonian Athenian exile Demeas, who had come to argue that the Greeks should remain faithful to Antipater, and the anti-Macedonian Athenian exile Demosthenes, who had come to encourage a widespread Greek revolt. According to Plutarch, the two men exchanged invective. They also offered contrasting views of the incumbent regime in Athens: Demeas claimed that a visit from an Athenian embassy was a sign of disease; Demosthenes replied that it represented hope of salvation.<sup>280</sup> The two exiles' reported behaviour and rhetoric was all consistent with both civic voluntarist and formal 'Nakonian' norms. They each spoke in a formal political assembly, despite being exiles. Moreover, they each used vivid metaphors of sickness and health to express monopolistic claims about the ethical qualities of the incumbent regime in Athens.<sup>281</sup>

Although, in this case, voluntarist and 'Nakonian' civic norms contributed to antagonistic interaction between liminal exiles, in a phenomenon similar to those considered in Chapter 5, most of the evidence considered in this section suggests that the dominant tendency was quite different. In general, action and communication guided by these norms ensured the political cohesion and autonomy of liminal exile groups, enabling them to maintain community, dignity, and authority in often desperate circumstances.

<sup>280</sup> Plutarch *Demosthenes* 27.2–5.

<sup>281</sup> For factions within a diaspora of exiles from a single polis, compare the splintering of early second-century Spartan exiles: Seibert (1979), 199–200, 203–4.

#### 4. THE CHOICE BETWEEN LIMINAL AND 'EMIGRANT' QUASI-CIVIC BEHAVIOUR AND IDENTITIES IN EXILE

##### 4.1. Rival Choices within Exile Communities

The adoption of a liminal quasi-civic exilic identity, and of liminal quasi-civic exilic practices, was far from a universal response to exile among exiles who remained committed to the polis ideal. Many pursued the quite different course of settling in a new place of residence, with the intention of remaining for a long period or even permanently. In their new habitats, they engaged in civic or quasi-civic political and cultural practices which were, or which they presented as, durable and self-contained, rather than provisional and purely derivative. This course of action in exile can be classified as characteristic of an 'emigrant' civic or quasi-civic exilic identity.

Those who chose an 'emigrant' civic or quasi-civic lifestyle or identity could actively repudiate ongoing struggle or liminality, in favour of building a permanent, self-contained new lifestyle in exile. There is a hint of the different possible choices, and their moral and political potency, in the responses of the Hellenistic Cretan cities of Knossos and Gortyn to a request by Magnesia-on-the-Maeander that they should look favourably on emigrants from their cities, not necessarily originally exiles or refugees, who had settled in Miletus. In symmetrical clauses first noted in Chapter 3, Table 3.1, each city categorically stated that those who had simply lived as metics in Miletus could continue to be citizens of their home, Cretan city, whereas those who had adopted citizenship of Miletus would be denied return, lose their property in their home city and be treated like men who had participated in a campaign against their homeland.<sup>282</sup> The latter group thus became *de facto* exiles from their home cities at this point. There may well have been particular tensions between Miletus and these cities which motivated this harsh language, but there is a clear underlying suspicion of the emigrant who adopts a durable lifestyle and status in a new city, rather than clinging solely to his original civic identity. The strongly particularist 'Nakonian' approach suggested in Section 3.4 above as an important motivation for exiles' 'liminal' behaviour and identities was thus thriving in early second-century Crete, in a markedly anti-cosmopolitan form.

Some broad communities of definite exiles were similarly divided into liminal and 'emigrant' members. In the period 365–322, for example, some

<sup>282</sup> *IC I* viii 9, ll. 22–32; *IV* 176, ll. 29–38 (probably both dating to the first third of the second century).

Samian exiles probably remained in, or returned to, the Samian *peraea*, agitating for a swift return home. Those who launched a premature attempt to return to Samos in 323 from Anaia, with the help of ships provided by Naosinikos of Sestos in the 'war against the cleruchs', may well have been based in Anaia beforehand.<sup>283</sup> By contrast, the bulk of Samian exiles were dispersed throughout the Greek world; some had probably migrated as far as Sicily.<sup>284</sup> The 'emigrant' choices of members of this latter group are evident from the fact that they attempted to return only when a royal order of 322 made doing so straightforward. They are also evident from the political, social, and economic relationships which members of this group almost certainly formed in exile: the wide range of diplomatic and economic relationships with wealthy or important foreigners attested in the post-return Samian honorary decrees for benefactors during the exile.<sup>285</sup> These were durable, beneficial relationships with non-Samians formed in exile, whose function was not, or not solely, to enable the exiles' swift return home.

In this and other cases, disagreements within a community of exiles and their sympathizers regarding the relative validity of liminal and 'emigrant' behaviour in exile may have become explicit. Plutarch, for example, gives reports of Pelopidas (in 379/8) and Aratus (in 251) having to persuade Theban and Sikyonian exiles respectively to undertake military campaigns to recover their home cities. Pelopidas tells the Theban exiles to take dangerous action instead of remaining dependent on Athenian demagogues; Aratus faces the resistance of cautious Sikyonian exiles.<sup>286</sup> Admittedly, Plutarch may have shaped and distorted these accounts in order to make them conform with a running motif in which the subject of a *Life* heroically defies the timidity or complacency of fellow exiles at a decisive moment.<sup>287</sup> However, his accounts nonetheless demonstrate divergent choices open to exile communities. Two Sicilian examples illustrate the ideas of citizenship at stake.

<sup>283</sup> *IG XII 6 1 42*, ll. 1–24, and 43, ll. 9–14, with Badian (1976). Anaia could have been merely the base from which Samian exiles, who had earlier lived elsewhere, launched their unsuccessful attempt to return to Samos. However, they could well have been based in Anaia for a longer period beforehand, treating it either as a guerrilla base or as a type of refugee camp. The fact that they returned to Samos with their offspring (*IG XII 6 1 42*, ll. 5–6) supports the latter view: it is unlikely that they would have brought their children with them to a mere launch-pad (cf. Habicht (1957), 167).

<sup>284</sup> Shipley (1987), 161–4.

<sup>285</sup> *IG XII 6 1 17–40*.

<sup>286</sup> Plutarch *Pelopidas* 7.1–3; *Aratus* 5.2.

<sup>287</sup> In addition to the two accounts cited, note Plutarch *Dion* 22.4–7 (most Sicilian exiles do not join Dion's expedition, through cowardice); *Agis and Cleomenes* 45.7–8; *Philopoemen* 5.3–5 (Philopoemen curbs the expelled Megalopolitans' willingness to accept Cleomenes' offer of alliance, which would allow them to return home).

## 4.2. Criticism of Liminality and the Suspension of Civilization

### 4.2.1. *The Seventh Letter Attributed to Plato: the Superiority of Philosophical Exile over Ongoing Struggle*

Dion of Syracuse convinced Plato to come to Syracuse in the early 360s to reform the young tyrant Dionysius II. Shortly afterwards, Dionysius expelled Dion from Syracuse. Dion lived in exile in mainland Greece for some years. Meanwhile, Plato paid two further visits to Syracuse, in the hope of turning Dionysius to philosophy. When Dionysius eventually terminated the income sent to Dion in exile from his estates and sold them for his own profit, Dion retaliated: in defiance of Plato's advice, he assembled an army of mercenaries and supporters, with which he conquered Syracuse, establishing himself as tyrant in 357. His period of rule was turbulent. In 354, he was assassinated by supposed supporters. The *Seventh Letter* attributed to Plato is at least ostensibly an attempt by Plato to convince Dion's supporters to prefer moderation to retaliation<sup>288</sup> in the aftermath of Dion's death.

The Plato of the *Seventh Letter* generally emphasizes Dion's philosophical and ethical qualities.<sup>289</sup> For this reason, Bradley Lewis suggests that the Plato of the *Letter* exempts Dion's revolution in Syracuse from his strictures against the use of force for political ends.<sup>290</sup> However, the Plato of the *Letter* does explicitly criticize Dion for his contribution to Sicilian unrest through his rivalry with Dionysius. He also intimates regret that Dionysius was not sufficiently accommodating to make it possible for Plato himself to restrain Dion. A particular aspect of Dion's revolution in Syracuse criticized by the Plato of the *Letter* is Dion's choice of associates: they were associates so duplicitous that they later joined in Dion's assassination.<sup>291</sup>

Significantly, Dion first developed friendships with at least two of these unreliable associates while in exile: Kallippos and his brother, the two Athenians who allegedly became Dion's lead assassins. The Plato of the *Letter* contrasts Plato's own relationship with Dion with that of the two brothers. Plato himself developed a friendship with Dion through sharing of 'the learning appropriate to a free man' (ἐλευθέρα παιδεία). By contrast, the two brothers were 'friends who had not become so through philosophy' (οὐκ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας γεγονότε φίλω): their friendship with Dion was based only on shared revelry and cult activity and purely prudential political collaboration.<sup>292</sup>

<sup>288</sup> Plato *Seventh Letter* 336c2–337e2.

<sup>289</sup> e.g. Plato *Seventh Letter* 327a1–e2; 351a1–c6.

<sup>290</sup> Bradley Lewis (2000), 34; note especially Plato *Seventh Letter* 331a5–d5.

<sup>291</sup> Plato *Seventh Letter* 350d5–351a1, 351c1–e.

<sup>292</sup> Plato *Seventh Letter* 333d7–334c2; cf. Plutarch *Dion* 54.1.

An implication of the *Letter* is thus that Dion could eventually have ruled Syracuse more securely if he had developed stable, philosophically grounded friendships, or relied exclusively on such friendships, while in exile, rather than recruiting casual friends to conquer Syracuse.<sup>293</sup> In other words, Dion should have rejected the opportunity to undertake a campaign characteristic of a mobilized, liminal exile, in favour of developing strong friendships rooted in philosophy as an ‘emigrant’ exile.<sup>294</sup>

Significantly, the Plato of the *Seventh Letter* has already raised the possibility of Dion benefiting from philosophical interaction in exile. In justifying his acceptance of Dion’s initial invitation to Syracuse, the Plato of the *Letter* suggests that, if he had not accepted, Dion could have come to him, an exile, to deliver an unanswerable rebuke:

“ὦ Πλάτων, ἤκω σοι φυγὰς οὐχ ὀπλιτῶν δεόμενος οὐδὲ ἱππέων ἐνδεὴς γενόμενος τοῦ ἀμύνασθαι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, ἀλλὰ λόγων καὶ πειθοῦς, ἣ σὲ μάλιστα ἠπιστάμην ἐγὼ δυνάμενον ἀνθρώπους νέους ἐπὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια προτρέποντα εἰς φιλίαν τε καὶ ἑταιρίαν ἀλλήλοις καθιστάναι ἐκάστοτε· ὦν ἐνδεία κατὰ τὸ σὸν μέρος νῦν ἐγὼ καταλιπὼν Συρακούσας ἐνθάδε πάρεμι.”<sup>295</sup>

‘O Plato, I have come to you as an exile, not because I lack hoplites, or because I was short of cavalry to defend myself against my enemies, but because I lacked arguments and persuasion, through which I knew that you, most of all, were able, urging young men towards good and just things, to establish friendship and comradeship between them all. Lacking these things because of your role, now I am here, having left Syracuse . . .’

This speech makes this hypothetical Dion appear an ideal exile, fully aware of the importance and power of philosophy. His principal point is that the lack of Plato’s philosophical arguments and persuasive power were reasons for his exile.<sup>296</sup> Moreover, the reader is led to infer from his presence in Athens and words that he has come to Plato in exile to learn the very arguments whose lack has caused his expulsion from Syracuse.

The author of the *Seventh Letter* probably hoped that the reader would note a contrast between the attitudes in exile of the hypothetical and actual Dion. The didactic point of this passage and the description of unreliable friends, interpreted together in the light of this contrast, is that Dion should have undertaken transformative, collaborative study of political philosophy and methods.<sup>297</sup> The suggestion that a virtuous man should protect and cultivate

<sup>293</sup> Cf. Bluck (1947), 100; Bradley Lewis (2000), 30.

<sup>294</sup> Compare Plutarch’s account of Plato’s aspirations for Dion at Plutarch *Dion* 17.3. The crucial role of firm, virtue-oriented friendships in stable political structures is a theme of the *Seventh Letter*: cf. 332cd.

<sup>295</sup> Plato *Seventh Letter* 328d4–e2.

<sup>296</sup> Cf. Morrow (1962), 211; contrast Knab (2006), 88.

<sup>297</sup> For a modern parallel: Marx and Engels, *The Great Men of the Exile*, esp. the conclusion to ch., 4. Cf. Lattek (2006), 93, 107.



his virtue through prolonged exile, making no concessions to political pragmatism, coheres with an argument advanced by the Athenian speaker of Plato's *Laws*: the virtuous man should avoid all influences which threaten his own virtue, including, in the final instance, his polis, if it proves necessary for the whole citizen-body to be uprooted, to avoid rule by the worse citizens, or for him to flee into exile, to avoid an inferior regime harming his character.<sup>298</sup>

Plato's attitude here was echoed in some Athenian democratic attitudes about commendable behaviour under degenerate regimes, and good types of exile. One of Lysias' speakers claims credit for having preferred to experience dangerous exile with fellow citizens in 404–3, rather than enjoy secure citizenship under the oligarchy.<sup>299</sup>

In the third century, the Athenian people praised Demochares of Leuconoe for remaining in exile, rather than collaborating with any non-democratic regime at Athens.<sup>300</sup> Similarly, they praised Kallias of Sphettos for not having endured the new regime<sup>301</sup> and 'having given up his own property to be given as a donation in the oligarchy' (τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ἐ[αυτοῦ] προέμενος δόσιν δοθῆναι ἐν τεῖ ὀλιγαρχίαι), in order to avoid doing anything contrary to the laws and 'democracy from all Athenians'.<sup>302</sup> The best explanation of these lines is that they praise Kallias for having somehow given up his property in order to remain pure of any involvement with the oligarchy. He may have abstained from litigation to defend his property, or even actively given up his property as a means of avoiding qualifying for Athenian citizenship, or office, under some form of property census in force during the 'oligarchic' years 294–287.<sup>303</sup> The Athenians thus praised these leading citizens for preferring the purity of non-involvement<sup>304</sup> and semi-voluntary exile to any attempt to influence a degenerate regime from within.<sup>305</sup> Discussion of exile in even these apparently bland and quite consensual third-century honorary decrees thus allowed provocative political positions and ideological fault lines, including those between more hierarchical and more egalitarian visions of the good polis, to come to the surface.

<sup>298</sup> Plato *Laws* 770c7–e6; compare the interpretation of R. G. Bury in his Loeb edition of 1926, though his emendations are probably unnecessary to support it. Contrast England (1921), vol. I, 601–2, and Bobonich (2002), 398.

<sup>299</sup> Lysias 24.25; cf. 31.9.

<sup>300</sup> Plutarch *Vitae decem oratorum* 851f2–11; cf. Shear (1978), 54–5, n. 154; 63.

<sup>301</sup> See Knoepfler (2002), 188–9. <sup>302</sup> SEG 28.60, ll. 79–3.

<sup>303</sup> See the discussion in Gauthier (1982), 223–5; contrast Shear (1978), 49. For Athenian democrats' view that these were years of 'oligarchy', see Habicht (1997), 90–1.

<sup>304</sup> Kallias was, however, involved in the military manoeuvres which led to the 'liberation' of 287; SEG 28.60, ll. 10–32; Shear (1978), 14–21; Gauthier (1982), 222.

<sup>305</sup> Compare the inverse attitude attributed by Hecato (quoted in Seneca *De Beneficiis* 6.37.1) to the Athenian general Kallistratos, exiled from Athens in 361: having been exiled from his faction-ridden and licentious country, he expressed a positive wish not to return.

The *Seventh Letter* was clearly written with polemical purposes: to defend Plato's behaviour in Sicily, to justify his general aloofness from politics and to differentiate his philosophy from Pythagoreanism. These apologetic thrusts of the *Letter* are easiest to explain if the *Letter* was written, if not by Plato himself,<sup>306</sup> then by a contemporary or immediate successor of Plato in the Academy.<sup>307</sup> If it was written by Plato himself or a near contemporary, the implied argument of the *Seventh Letter* about good exilic behaviour would be directly relevant to reconstructing debates about the politics of exile within a community of exiles and their sympathizers. However, the possibility cannot be excluded that the *Letter* was written as a piece of fictional epistolography in the Hellenistic period.<sup>308</sup> Even in that case, the argument identified here would still reveal a complex Hellenistic perspective on good and bad exilic behaviour.

#### 4.2.2. *Diodorus, Deinokrates, and Timaeus: Political Corruption and Civilization in Exile*

A passage of Diodorus provides probable evidence for a partly parallel case of criticism of liminal identity and political behaviour, this time involving criticism of a group of exiles by a fellow exile. In the early years of his rule in Syracuse from 317, Agathokles drove many Syracusans into exile. These exiles initially fought alongside the Carthaginians, but in 309 constituted themselves as an independent army, appointing Deinokrates their general. Deinokrates subsequently attracted further supporters from the Greek poleis of Sicily by declaring himself 'champion' (*προστάτης*) of 'common freedom'. By 306, Deinokrates and his supporters had achieved such military success over Agathokles that he offered terms of surrender, including the restoration of republican rule in Syracuse.<sup>309</sup> Diodorus reports the outcome of this proposal:

ταύτας δ' ἀσυντελέστους συνέβη γενέσθαι τῇ μὲν Ἀγαθοκλέους προαιρέσει κυρωθείσας, διὰ δὲ τὴν Δεινοκράτους πλεονεξίαν μὴ προσδεχθείσας. οὗτος γὰρ μοναρχίας ὣν ἐπιθυμητῆς τῆς μὲν ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις δημοκρατίας ἀλλότριος ἦν, τῇ δὲ ἡγεμονίᾳ τῇ τότε οὔσῃ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐαρεστεῖτο· ἀφηγέιτο γὰρ πεζῶν μὲν πλείονων ἢ δισμυρίων, ἱππέων δὲ τρισχιλίων, πόλεων δὲ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, ὥστε αὐτὸν μὲν καλεῖσθαι τῶν φυγάδων στρατηγόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ βασιλικὴν ἔχειν ὑπεροχὴν, τῆς ἐξουσίας οὔσης περὶ αὐτὸν αὐτοκράτορος. εἰ κατέλθοι δ' εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας, πάντως ἀναγκαῖον ἂν ἦν ιδιώτην ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἕνα τῶν πολλῶν ἀριθμῆσθαι, τῆς αὐτονομίας ἀγαπώσης τὴν ἰσότητα, ἐν τε ταῖς χειροτονίαις ὑπὸ τοῦ τυχόντος δημαγωγοῦ παρενημερεῖσθαι, τοῦ πλήθους ἀντικειμένου ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἀγόντων παρρησίαν. διόπερ Ἀγαθοκλῆς μὲν δικαίως

<sup>306</sup> For arguments for Platonic authorship, note, for example, Solmsen (1969); Knab (2006), esp. 6, 50. For the opposite view, note, for example, Schofield (2006), 16–18.

<sup>307</sup> Huffman (2005), 42; cf. Edelstein (1966), 59–61, 67–8.

<sup>308</sup> A possibility raised, but rejected, in Solmsen (1969), 34.

<sup>309</sup> Diodorus 20.77.3.

ἀν λέγοιτο λελοιπέναι τὴν τῆς τυραννίδος τάξιν, Δεινοκράτης δ' αἴτιος εἶναι νομίζοιτο τῶν ὕστερον τῷ δυνάστῃ κατορθωθέντων.<sup>310</sup>

These [agreements] ended up not being fulfilled, after being ratified through Agathokles' decision, but not accepted due to Deinokrates' desire for more. For he, desiring monarchy, was hostile to the democracy [*sc.* the proposal for democracy] in Syracuse, and was well pleased with the leadership role which he then held. For he had command of more than 20,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and many great poleis, such that he was called the 'general of the exiles', but in truth had royal supremacy, since he enjoyed autocratic power. If he were to return to Syracuse, in all respects it would have been necessary for him to be a private citizen and to be counted as one of the many, since autonomy loves equality, and to be outdone in elections by any chance demagogue, since the people tend to be hostile to the supremacy of men who exercise free speech. Therefore Agathokles could justly be said to have abandoned the station of tyrant, and Deinokrates could be thought responsible for the subsequent successes of the tyrant.

Diodorus' source for these events is controversial. Regarding Diodorus' sources for his account of Agathokles' reign as a whole, the most plausible view is that Diodorus intermingled material from Duris' favourable<sup>311</sup> biography of Agathokles<sup>312</sup> and Timaeus' hostile<sup>313</sup> account.<sup>314</sup> It is true that Diodorus accused Timaeus of fabricating his account of Agathokles' rule,<sup>315</sup> but he still clearly drew on details of Timaeus' account.<sup>316</sup>

As for Diodorus 20.79 itself, at least the factual details, if not the interpretation, were probably derived by Diodorus from an earlier account. It might be thought that Diodorus derived them from a pro-Agathokles source, on the grounds that the story transfers all blame for prolonging the civil war to Deinokrates, exonerating Agathokles.<sup>317</sup> However, the story is not very flattering to Agathokles: it exposes his weakness, showing that his subsequent status was not achieved through his own agency. It can thus be more plausibly attributed to an embittered anti-Agathokles dissident who resented Deinokrates for perceived betrayal of the liberation movement.

<sup>310</sup> Diodorus 20.79.1–3. <sup>311</sup> Kebric (1977), 76; contrast Brown (1958), 90.

<sup>312</sup> Echoes of fragments of Duris: Diodorus 20.41.3 (compare *FGrH* 76, F17); Diodorus 20.104.3 (compare *FGrH* 76, F18); cf. Kebric (1977), 72; Consolo Langher (1998), 70–3.

<sup>313</sup> Timaeus was exiled by Agathokles and therefore virulently opposed to him: Diodorus 21.17.1.

<sup>314</sup> Bervé (1953), 20; Meister (1967), 134–6; Gattinoni (1997), 146–7.

<sup>315</sup> Diodorus 21.17.1–3.

<sup>316</sup> Explicit references to Timaeus' testimony: Diodorus 20.79.5; 20.89.5; cf. Consolo Langher (1998), 90, n. 89. The argument of Consolo Langher (1998), esp. 90, 93–4, that Timaeus cannot have been one of Diodorus' sources is not incontrovertible. Even if based on Timaeus' account, Trogus' account of Agathokles' reign (summarized in Justin 22.1–23.2) did not necessarily reflect all elements of Timaeus' account. Moreover, Timaeus himself, in exile in Athens, would probably have relied for information about Sicilian affairs on the very local oligarchs whom Consolo Langher presents as alternative sources for Duris (Gattinoni (1997), 146–7).

<sup>317</sup> Consolo Langher (1998), 38; Consolo Langher (2000), 253.

This conclusion is reinforced by the more general anti-monarchical stance reflected in the story. Diodorus connects Deinokrates' monarchical aspirations with his 'desire for more' or even 'greed' (*πλεονεξία*) and 'desire' (*ἐπιθυμία*), a link which may have been in his original source. Moreover, again possibly following his original source, Diodorus presents Deinokrates' assumption of de facto autocratic powers within the exile movement as a hypocritical transgression of the movement's republican principles.<sup>318</sup> Deinokrates was called 'general of the exiles', but in fact wielded autocratic power.<sup>319</sup> Diodorus then makes an uncharacteristically bold apparent endorsement of equality, which seems to reinforce the republican thrust of the story: autonomy loves equality. Admittedly, Diodorus then undermines this impression by making disparaging remarks about egalitarian government. He claims that Deinokrates feared that, if he returned to Syracuse, he could lose power to 'any chance demagogue'. However, this claim could be explained by the influence on Diodorus of anti-democratic attitudes circulating in the first century BC, with Roman encouragement, which led him to qualify the thrust of his original source.

The most plausible candidate for an anti-Agathokles, anti-monarchical original author is Timaeus.<sup>320</sup> If Timaeus was the original author, his reporting of this story reflected a dispute between exiles about political behaviour in exile, relevant to this section. Himself an exile from Agathokles' regime, Timaeus chose to spend 'fifty consecutive years' in Athens as a self-confessed quietist, unfamiliar with war,<sup>321</sup> in preference to active involvement in Sicilian exile politics.<sup>322</sup> Timaeus thus had an interest in discrediting the resistance movement as ineffectual or counter-productive. He could have achieved this by suggesting that its leader, Deinokrates, had been corrupted by the autocratic power granted to him within the movement, as a necessary expedient in war, into a quasi-tyrannical opponent of democracy in Syracuse. Significantly, other supposed individual military champions of Sicilian liberty portrayed in accounts by Diodorus and Plutarch probably based on Timaeus also reveal tyrannical tendencies.<sup>323</sup> By portraying Deinokrates as a quasi-tyrant, Timaeus could have shown that the massed mobilized exiles in his army had fallen victim again to the duplicity of an autocrat. He could have claimed or implied that he himself, by contrast, had preserved and promoted the culture

<sup>318</sup> Tillyard (1908), 192; Seibert (1979), 268–9.

<sup>319</sup> Compare Diodorus 19.1.1–3 for the dangers posed to republican regimes by those of special talent and ambition.

<sup>320</sup> Schubert (1887), 188; Meister (1967), 161; Pearson (1987), 252–3.

<sup>321</sup> Polybius 12.25h.

<sup>322</sup> Compare other beneficiaries of Athenian asylum who appear to have established new lives in Athens, rather than engaging in perpetual struggle (e.g. the Corinthian exiles at Demosthenes 20.52–5).

<sup>323</sup> Diodorus 19.71.1–5 (Akrotatos); Plutarch *Pyrrhus* 23.5–6 (Pyrrhus). Cf. Pearson (1987), 206, on Timaeus' probable view of Dion.

and 'cultural liberty'<sup>324</sup> of Tauromenion, Syracuse, and other Sicilian poleis by writing history in exile, a course immune to the risks inherent in single-minded mobilization.

If the *Seventh Letter* was written by Plato or by a contemporary or near contemporary, Timaeus could have been influenced by the attitude towards good exilic behaviour implied in the *Seventh Letter*. Even if there was no direct influence, there was probably a general attitude among intellectuals in Athens in the late fourth and third centuries that Sicilian exiles should study theoretical political questions and pursue cultural interests rather than forming purely prudential alliances in pursuit of return at all costs: certain political and cultural values had to be preserved and reinforced, even at the expense of a delayed return.

### 4.3. Conclusion

The different attitudes and disagreements considered here concerning the relative merits of liminal and 'emigrant' choices in exile cast considerable light on the divergent or ambiguous ideas of citizenship influential on those involved. Those who preferred or advocated 'emigrant' choices in exile rejected some of the particularistic civic expectations acted on by their liminal counterparts. They rejected particularism about place, since they were favourable to quasi-civic activities in new habitats. They also rejected strict particularism about social relationships: they were favourable to life-shaping social and political relationships with individuals outside the imaginary descent-group of fellow citizens. In the case of the *Seventh Letter*, the author also rejected the principles of brutal negative reciprocity acted on by Dion. He claimed that Dion should have resisted seeking revenge on Dionysius, in favour of learning the means to achieve civic reconciliation grounded in virtue.

The author of the *Seventh Letter* and probably also Timaeus advocated particular 'Nakonian' visions of the good polis, as guides to behaviour in exile. The Plato of the *Letter* and probably also Timaeus rejected the view that a good civic community has a limited *τέλος*: collective military achievement, collective political autonomy, and the maximization of the honour of individual citizens. The author of the *Seventh Letter* implied that the good civic community has a quite different *τέλος*: citizens' mutual achievement of abstract civic virtue and civic friendship. Timaeus, for his part, probably implied that cultural and constitutional continuity should be central to the *τέλος* of a civic community. In any case, he himself spent his exile in Athens preserving

<sup>324</sup> Momigliano (1977), 43–6.

and interpreting Western Greek cultural traditions, declining to join the front line of the exile struggle.

## 5. EXILES' 'EMIGRANT' CIVIC OR QUASI-CIVIC IDENTITIES AND BEHAVIOUR

### 5.1. Introduction

As shown in the previous section, the 'emigrant' exilic identity was a prominent alternative to liminal exilic identities. In some cases, exiles adopted 'emigrant' exilic identities and forms of organization because of the nature of their circumstances: for example, because they were too isolated from fellow exiles from their home polis to mobilize themselves politically, or there was no credible hope of forcing a return to their home polis. However, as clear from the previous section, exiles often had a choice whether to behave as liminal or 'emigrant' exiles. Dion could have stayed in Athens to learn more philosophy, and Timaeus could have joined the Sicilian exiles' struggle in Sicily.

Like the liminal quasi-civic exilic lifestyle and identity, the 'emigrant' civic or quasi-civic exilic lifestyle and identity was not monolithic. Displaced citizens and groups adopted a wide range of 'emigrant' civic and quasi-civic lifestyles and identities. This section examines this wide range, and its sources in civic political cultures.

### 5.2. New City Foundations by Exiles: Sources of Political Consciousness

There were two obvious means by which displaced citizens could preserve or develop an 'emigrant' civic lifestyle or identity in this period: by founding a new city or by gaining citizenship in a host city. Through both of these possible methods, displaced citizens could hope to become again citizen landowners. In this period, however, neither of these methods of preserving civic identity and status was straightforward in practice.

The prospects for a group of exiles to found a new city were already small in the fifth century, after the Persian Wars. If it was Eretrian exiles of the 470s who founded the new polis of Dikaia in Chalkidike, discussed in Chapter 1.3,<sup>325</sup> then those exiles defied the prevailing trend. Their foundation would represent a late, perhaps final example of the Archaic phenomenon of

<sup>325</sup> For this argument: Knoepfler in *BE* 2008, 263.

groups of enterprising Greek exiles founding or co-founding new poleis.<sup>326</sup> In general, by this point, such ventures were hindered by the lack of easily accessible, unoccupied territory. The best that exiles could usually hope for was to be granted occupation of an existing polis by a major power, in which they could found a new civic community.<sup>327</sup> Indeed, coherent groups of exiles are not known to have founded new cities even in the next major wave of Greek expansion, at the start of the Hellenistic period.

Displaced Greeks who founded a durable new civic community could be very conservative. For example, the descendants of the Tirynthians who settled in Halieis in Akte after their own polis was conquered by the Argives in c.460<sup>328</sup> continued to style themselves as ‘Tirynthians’ on their fourth-century coins. Moreover, on one such coin they included with that ethnic an image of the club of Heracles, patron god of Tiryns.<sup>329</sup> They thus laid claim to the continued patronage of Tirynthian Heracles, probably in conscious opposition to the Argives, who not only incorporated Tirynthian territory into their own polis, but probably also subsumed Tirynthian Heracles into their own civic organization and cults.<sup>330</sup>

Nevertheless, some exile groups which founded new civic communities revealed revolutionary, utopian aspirations. As discussed in Chapter 1.3, Dikaia’s original settlers’ choice of the name Dikaia was probably a conscious ideological move.<sup>331</sup> If the settlers were exiles, the choice of name could well have implied criticism of the home regime in Eretria, responsible for their exile. Such an ideological move would have echoed an Archaic example: sixth-century Samian exiles from the Samian tyrant Polykrates gave the name Dikaiaarcheia to their new foundation, or refoundation, in Italy, the future Puteoli.<sup>332</sup> It can also be considered alongside the foundation and development of utopian Pythagorean politico-religious communities in South Italy in the sixth and fifth centuries, in which Pythagoras was probably not the only exile from the Aegean to be prominent.<sup>333</sup> At Dikaia, as in the South Italian

<sup>326</sup> For the Archaic South Italian cases: Cerchiai, Jannelli, and Longo (2004), 17.

<sup>327</sup> Tyrants or established poleis of Classical Sicily commonly granted to groups of exiles vacant poleis or land for a new polis: Diodorus 13.89.3–4 (with McKechnie (1989), 36; Demand (1990), 98); Diodorus 14.78.5–6; Diodorus 14.87.1–3 (with McKechnie (1989), 37; Demand (1990), 102). Diodorus even makes a dubious report of a fourth-century original city foundation by exiles, on their own initiative: Diodorus 16.7.1 (on Tauromenion; cf. Cerchiai, Jannelli, and Longo (2004), 162, 166; Bennett (1977)), convincingly questioned in Hansen and Nielsen (2004), 231. As mentioned in n. 108, the fifth-century Athenians and Spartans settled exile groups in polis territories with free space in mainland Greece. However, these settlements were probably usually more akin to ‘liminal’ exile strongholds than to long-term ‘emigrant’ exilic city foundations.

<sup>328</sup> Hansen and Nielsen (2004), 608–9. <sup>329</sup> Head (1911), 443.

<sup>330</sup> Kritzas (1992), 237; SEG 41.282. For Greeks preserving cults and religious identities after displacement, compare Parker (2009), 186–7.

<sup>331</sup> Cf. BE 2008, 263. <sup>332</sup> Mitchell (1975), 87; Shipley (1987), 91.

<sup>333</sup> Cf. Burkert (1972), 119–20; Rawson (1985), 31, 94. A possible fourth-century parallel for exiles exhibiting utopian tendencies concerns the later fourth-century foundation of

cases, exiles appear to have taken full advantage of a rare opportunity for systematic political experimentation, putting into practice utopian ideas. In these examples, those involved could have set up merely liminal, provisional quasi-civic institutions, but chose instead to establish durable, innovative 'emigrant' communities.

### 5.3. Integration into a Host Polis: Naturalization and Civic Identities

Few 'emigrant' exiles are known to have gained naturalization in a host city and assimilated to its civic practices. This was mainly because most exiles were simply unable to gain naturalization in a host city: most poleis' exclusivity made them reluctant to grant citizenship to exiles, except in times of crisis or special need.<sup>334</sup> Indeed, it is only in the evidence for poleis on the fringes of the Greek world, in whose own foundation myths exiles often featured, that any sustained willingness to naturalize asylum-seeking exiles can be identified.

Ouranopolis in Thrace, whose reported *οἰκιστής* was Antipater's son Alexarchos (Strabo Book 7a.1.35; Athenaeus Book III, 98de). This new polis had a utopian name (cf. Thomas (1968), 259) and probably also a utopian new language (Athenaeus Book III, 98ef; Dubois (2006), 4–5). McKechnie plausibly suggests that its inhabitants were the disenfranchised Athenians of 322 reportedly granted a city in Thrace by Antipater (McKechnie (1989), 55–6).

<sup>334</sup> On the exclusivity of Classical Athenian citizenship: Davies (1977/8), 106–7. Exceptional Athenian war-time collective naturalizations of exile groups: grants to Plataeans in 427 ([Demosthenes] 59.104–106) and to Troizenian exiles in 338 (Hyperides 3, col. 16). Athenian naturalizations of especially useful or talented exiles and refugees:

- 1) Naturalization (or confirmation of the prior naturalization of) exiled monarchs or tyrants: Osborne, *Naturalization* D14, also T59 (probably subsequently rescinded) and 60 (subsequently rescinded) (possibly also T66; cf. Lambert (2007), 107, n. 45).
- 2) Naturalizations of exiled leading citizens of poleis: Osborne, *Naturalization* D11, 17, and 23 (with Osborne's comments in vol. II, 92), and 22; T61 (subsequently rescinded).
- 3) Naturalization of a skilled individual who was probably an exile: the naturalization of the seer Sthorys of Thasos (Osborne, *Naturalization* D8, with vol. II, 46). Compare the case of the sculptor Sthennis of Olynthos: Sthennis may well have already been a refugee from the destruction of Olynthos when he was almost certainly granted Athenian citizenship (Osborne, *Naturalization* T62). This was almost certainly a special grant to Sthennis; the majority of Olynthian refugees in Athens probably received only *ἰσοτέλεια* (Harpocration, s.v. *ἰσοτελής καὶ ἰσοτέλεια*, citing Theophrastus, followed by Osborne, *Naturalization*, vol. III, 125–6; contrast Suda s.v. *Κάρανος*, followed by Cohen (2000), 66, n. 112).

The pattern in other mainstream Greek poleis in the Classical and Hellenistic periods was probably not very different. Teles *On Exile*, pp. 27–9 Hense, hints at widespread hostility to immigrants within contemporary (third-century) poleis; cf. Mendels (1979). Naturalization of resident exiles was certainly not the rule in the Hellenistic Peloponnese: the Hellenistic Stymphalians did not naturalize even their supposed kin, the Elateians, but only 'considered them (*νομί[ξ]αντες*) their fellow . . .' (probably 'citizens') (*IPArk* 18, ll. 5–6). Note, however, Polybius 32.7.3: Delians expelled from their island by the Athenians in 167 were naturalized as Achaeans.



Numerous cases are known from Sicily<sup>335</sup> and northern and western Asia Minor.<sup>336</sup>

However, the reluctance of 'emigrant' exiles to embrace a new civic identity was also due to the fact that even those exiles who did gain naturalization in a host polis seldom made their new citizenship central to their self-presentation: such exiles tended to retain their original civic identity.<sup>337</sup> The most prominent exception is an exile naturalized in a polis on the fringes of the Greek world, who embraced his new civic identity. In a dedication at Olympia in c.450, the *stasis*-exile Ergoteles of Knossos announced that he had won immortal renown for Himera, his new polis, through his athletic victories. He combined this with a claim to membership of, and superiority over, a supra-civic Greek cultural community: he boasted that he had defeated 'Greeks' in Panhellenic games.<sup>338</sup> However, even Ergoteles did not relinquish his civic identity as a Knossian. Pindar explicitly referred to him, in a eulogistic poem probably reflecting his wishes, as a victim of Knossian *stasis*,<sup>339</sup> at the same time as emphasizing through language and imagery his integration into Himera.<sup>340</sup>

It was probably only special characteristics of host poleis which enabled and encouraged naturalized exiles to embrace their new civic identities. In Ergoteles' case, for example, the cosmopolitan traditions and foundation myths of Himera,<sup>341</sup> and its superior prestige compared with Knossos,<sup>342</sup> were probably

<sup>335</sup> Naturalizations of exiles by Sicilian tyrants: the *stasis*-exile Ergoteles of Knossos was probably among those Dorians naturalized as citizens of Himera by Theron of Akragas in 476 (Pindar *Olympian* 12; SEG 11.1223a add., l. 4; Pausanias 6.4.11, with Diodorus 11.49.3; cf. Barrett (1973), 23–4; Hornblower (2004a), 195); Dionysius I in 396 settled wandering self-ascribed 'Messenian' exiles in Messana, where they presumably enjoyed the citizenship of their homonymous host city, before giving them the land to found their own polis, Tyndaris (Diodorus 14.78.5–6). Compare Dionysius' large-scale enfranchisements of immigrants, including refugees from his own conquests, in Syracuse (McKechnie (1989), 35–8; Demand (1990), 98–106).

<sup>336</sup> The Ephesians granted citizenship, in 409, to Selinountians who had fought with them, rendered refugees by Carthaginian destruction of their home polis (Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.2.10); and, in the early Hellenistic period (cf. Habicht (1989), 88), to at least two 'Olynthians' (*I.Ephesos* 1454; SEG 39.1156; cf. Fraser (2009), 161–2). Ephesian citizenship was probably particularly open in the early Hellenistic period, not least because naturalization was made into a fundraising device: *I.Ephesos* 2001, ll. 9–12. In c.370, the Pontic Trapezountians greeted as 'fellow residents' (*συννοίκους ἐδέξαντο*), and thus presumably as citizens, Arcadian Trapezountians fleeing integration into Megalopolis (Pausanias 8.27.6; Hansen and Nielsen (2004), 964). Parmenon, an exile from Byzantion, had his own house at Ophryneion in the Troad in the mid-fourth century (Demosthenes 33.20). This suggests that he enjoyed status there, probably even citizenship. The Troad and neighbouring Propontis may have been particularly receptive to outsiders in the fourth century: cf. Xenophon *Anabasis* 5.6.23 (Timasion, an exile from Dardanos, promises the remaining mercenaries a good reception in his home polis); SGDI 5533a–d (citizenship grants at Zeleia).

<sup>337</sup> Contrast the enthusiastic embracing of Athenian identity by the naturalized non-exile Apollodoros, son of Pasion: Trevett (1992).

<sup>338</sup> SEG 11.1223a add., ll. 1–2.

<sup>339</sup> Pindar *Olympian* 12, l. 16.

<sup>340</sup> Silk (2007), 192–3.

<sup>341</sup> Hornblower (2004a), 195–6; see especially Thucydides 6.5.1.

<sup>342</sup> Silk (2007), 190.

important enabling factors. Moreover, the fact that he was isolated from fellow members of his *stasis* faction probably drove him to seek social solidarity elsewhere. That factor was not relevant, however, in a related case involving a coherent exile group. That case involves naturalized exiles who probably embraced a new civic identity precisely because it enabled them to reassert their original civic affiliation. The Arcadian Trapezountians who found refuge, and probably citizenship, in Pontic Trapezous in c.370 hardly needed to sacrifice any of their original civic identity, because they settled in a homonymous daughter-city.<sup>343</sup> Indeed, they could have claimed to be best able to preserve distinctive Trapezountian civic identity in distant exile: back in the Peloponnese, Trapezous and its and cults were forcibly integrated into Megalopolis.

The tendency of ‘emigrant’ displaced citizens to retain or reproduce their native civic identity, even when they had the benefit of the security and opportunities of a new citizenship, further demonstrates the pervasive influence of underlying particularist ‘Nakonian’ civic norms, oriented around ethnicity and specific local culture, institutions, and religion. This leads into the concerns of the next sub-section. The sub-section as a whole concerns the improvised quasi-civic identities and associations developed by ‘emigrant’ displaced Greeks; and its first part concerns ‘emigrant’ exiles’ attempts to reproduce in exile features of home civic life.

## 5.4. Non-Assimilated Displaced Settlers in Host Poleis

### 5.4.1. Introduction

By contrast with the fortunate exiles considered earlier, many ‘emigrant’ exiles had no option but to live as metics in host cities or to be perpetually mobile. In either case, the best hope of earning a livelihood was usually to work as a craftsman, trader, moneylender, or mercenary. A large number of such displaced Greeks strove to preserve or improvise a civic or quasi-civic identity, through individual self-presentation and through collective quasi-civic organization. They were joined in this by some exiles who did gain naturalization in a host polis. This sub-section examines the varied quasi-civic habits and organization of relevant ‘emigrant’ exiles, identifying the strands in civic political cultures influential on them.

<sup>343</sup> Inhabiting a daughter-city may have been considered no exile at all: in Classical and Hellenistic Teian law, for example, exile from Teos was accompanied by exile from the daughter-city of Abdera (*Nomima* I, no. 105, fr. b, ll. 5–9; *SEG* 26.1306, ll. 23–5). Concerning the probable comforts of homonymy for exiles, note that Ephesus, where Selinountian refugees were naturalized in 409 (for these refugees, see this chapter’s n. 336), had a River Selinous (Xenophon *Anabasis* 5.3.8).

#### 5.4.2. 'Odyssean' Identities and Social Organization: Preserving 'Nakonian' Habits in the Face of Centrifugal Tendencies

'Emigrant' exiles settled in a host polis most commonly laid claim to a civic identity by constructing an 'Odyssean'<sup>344</sup> identity: they accepted or embraced the deracinated, often mobile predicament of the exile, but reproduced in specially adapted, durable expatriate forms their previous civic identity and civic habits. Those exiles who did not live in close-knit 'liminal' exile communities, constantly interacting with fellow expatriates from their home city, inevitably engaged in more complex and varied social relationships than the 'liminal' exiles considered earlier in this chapter.<sup>345</sup> However, it was quite possible for individual exiles to develop a new social, economic, and intellectual life in exile, while advertising retention of their original polis affiliation.<sup>346</sup>

Moreover, especially when 'emigrant' exiles from a single polis were resident in the same location, they could interact with one another in a quasi-civic way. They could even improvise durable, self-standing institutions and practices similar to civic institutions and practices. This is well attested for groups of refugees from a destroyed or captured polis, as opposed to political factions in exile. Presumably, in the former case, the lack of a rival faction at home with which to compete reduced the pressure to display wholehearted liminal mobilization. For example, the naturalized Plataean exiles resident in late fifth-century Athens, expelled from their city when it fell to the Spartans and Thebans, reportedly held a regular monthly meeting in the cheese market.<sup>347</sup> This was at least a perpetuation of Plataean collective social life, and possibly even an imitation of the monthly 'principal assembly' (*κυρία ἐκκλησία*) of a settled polis.

Similarly, 'Chalkidians living in Myrina' in the mid-fourth century, almost certainly refugees from Philip II's destruction of Olynthos in 348,<sup>348</sup> formed a quasi-civic community within Myrina.<sup>349</sup> The Chalkidian refugees received, as a corporate group, a donation of a plot of land (*χωρίον*) from another expatriate quasi-civic community, and probable model for their own

<sup>344</sup> Cf. Joly (2002).

<sup>345</sup> Compare the conclusions of an influential study of Hutu refugees in Tanzania, Maalki (1995): those who lived in Hutu refugee camps preserved or adapted a distinctive Hutu identity, whereas those who settled in large, cosmopolitan cities adopted new economic habits, interacted with a wider range of people, and developed new, more fluid identities.

<sup>346</sup> Around 330, for example, men styled as 'Olynthian' and 'Theban', whose home poleis had been destroyed by the Macedonians, were involved in legal affairs at Athens: *SEG* 18.36, ll. 241–2; Meyer (2010), no. 19, col. II, ll. 3–8. Cf. Davies (1977/8), 107. On 'posthumous ethnics' in general: Fraser (2009), 159–66. For exiles outside Athens, compare the continuing interest in Athenian affairs, or even the Athenian patriotism, of the exiled Athenian historians Thucydides and Xenophon (e.g. Badian (2004), 51).

<sup>347</sup> Lysias 23.6; compare Garland (2014), 184.

<sup>348</sup> Cf. Cargill (1995), 69.

<sup>349</sup> Although they styled themselves as displaced citizens of the federal Chalkidian state, their community in Myrina must have had the dimensions more of a polis or civic sub-division.

organization, the Athenian δῆμος 'living in Myrina'.<sup>350</sup> In return, they crowned the Athenian overseer (ἐπιμελητής) in Lemnos, praising him on account of his virtue and justice (ἀνδραγαθίας ἔνεκα κ[α]ὶ δικαιοσύνης).<sup>351</sup> In doing so, the refugees imitated a settled polis in one of its characteristically 'Nakonian' political activities: the developing or securing of good, peaceful relations with a foreigner, cemented through ethical praise.

Although inspired by the political cultures to which they were exposed, the 'Nakonian' tendencies of exiles who developed an Odyssean 'emigrant' quasi-civic identity, such as the Chalkidians, could be intensified by exile itself. These tendencies probably reflected many 'emigrant' exiles' nostalgia for lost security and pride as members of a settled civic community.<sup>352</sup> They also represented responses to particular effects of exile. First, they could represent attempts by members of an exile diaspora to resist the dissolution or weakening of social ties. For example, in an example which does involve an exiled *stasis* faction, and one dispersed across different poleis, the early fourth-century diaspora of Siphnian oligarchic exiles discussed previously in Section 3.3.2, whose members came to be dispersed in Aigina, Troizen, Lycia,<sup>353</sup> and probably also Melos,<sup>354</sup> maintained lines of internal communication. The exiles in Troizen received word of Thrasylochos' death from illness in Aigina. More strikingly, news arrived in Troizen of Sopolis' death fighting in Lycia.<sup>355</sup> The continued existence of these lines of communication made possible face-to-face solidarity, involving shared ritual and mutual consolation, at a moment of crisis: the majority of the Siphnian exiles in Troizen sailed to Aigina for Thrasylochos' funeral.<sup>356</sup>

Second, 'emigrant' exiles' 'Nakonian' tendencies could be a response to the acute insecurity and disorientation of the struggle for basic subsistence as immigrants in unfamiliar poleis, which were particularly pronounced for isolated individual exiles, separated from fellow exiles from their home polis. This is clear from the misfortunes of the mid-fourth-century<sup>357</sup> Byzantine exile Parmenon, recounted by the Athenian speaker of Demosthenes' *Against Apatourios*. Two Byzantines, the citizen trader Apatourios and the exile Parmenon, had arrived in Athens on a ship belonging to Apatourios. Under pressure from his creditors, Apatourios reached a credit arrangement with

<sup>350</sup> IG XII 8 4, ll. 1–3. Cf. Cargill (1995), 69. <sup>351</sup> IG XII 8 4, ll. 6–12.

<sup>352</sup> Compare the Spartan exile Klearchos' identification of his fellow mercenaries (many of them fellow Spartans) as his new πατρίς, and only source of honour, at Xenophon *Anabasis* 1.3.6.

<sup>353</sup> Isocrates 19.40; Mathieu and Brémond (1928–1962), vol. I, 103, n. 3.

<sup>354</sup> Thrasylochos and the speaker initially travelled to Melos and might have settled there, but then went on to Troizen and eventually Aigina (Isocrates 19.21–4). Other exiles probably stayed on Melos.

<sup>355</sup> Isocrates 19.31, 40. <sup>356</sup> Isocrates 19.31.

<sup>357</sup> The speech probably dates to Alexander's reign, most likely after 331: Gernet (1954), 132–3; Cohen (1973), 185, with n. 63.

Parmenon and the almost certainly Athenian<sup>358</sup> speaker of Demosthenes' *Against Apatourios*. Parmenon was to provide ten minae and the speaker thirty minae. Parmenon quarrelled with Apatourios after paying the first three minae of his part of the loan, as a result of which he persuaded the speaker to take over responsibility for his part of the loan. The speaker himself, short of money, provided surety for a thirty-minae loan to Apatourios from Herakleides' bank, in lieu of his part of the loan. Herakleides' bank then collapsed. Apatourios attempted to remove from the Piraeus his slaves and ship, which the speaker had had registered as surety for the total forty-minae loan to Apatourios. However, Parmenon intervened, restraining the slaves and preventing the ship from departing. The speaker then arranged, after protestations from Apatourios, for Apatourios' ship to be sold, to yield the forty minae to cover the whole debt.

Shortly afterwards, Parmenon brought a suit against Apatourios for assaulting him when he restrained Apatourios' slaves. Apatourios refused to swear an oath prepared for him by Parmenon with respect to this suit, allegedly because he feared perjuring himself, and brought a counter-suit against Parmenon, presumably relating to the same events. According to the speaker, the two Byzantines then agreed to submit their grievances to a three-man arbitration committee, chaired by their fellow Byzantine Phokritos, and also containing Athenian advocates for each of them. However, no arbitrated settlement was reached. Apatourios' advocate, Aristokles, claimed to have lost the arbitration contract and insisted that he was the sole arbitrator, before giving judgement against Parmenon while he was away at Ophryneion in the Troad, where the new home he had established in exile had been destroyed by an earthquake. Sometime later, Apatourios brought a suit against the speaker, claiming that the speaker had acted as guarantor for Parmenon in the arbitration and should therefore pay the penalty which the single arbitrator had controversially imposed on Parmenon. The speaker denied that he was surety for Parmenon, but also denied that Parmenon had legitimately incurred the penalty; hence Demosthenes' *Against Apatourios*.<sup>359</sup>

There are numerous points of contrast, doubtless accentuated by Demosthenes, between the social tendencies of Parmenon, the Byzantine exile, and Apatourios, the voluntary Byzantine migrant (or long-term absentee).<sup>360</sup> Parmenon consistently sought to preserve 'Nakonian' links with his fellow Byzantines. He arrived in Athens on Apatourios', his fellow Byzantine's, ship; he agreed to give Apatourios a loan when he was in acute need; he prevented Apatourios fleeing to escape from his obligations to his creditors and

<sup>358</sup> Cf. Demosthenes 33.11: the speaker talks of 'myself and the foreigner'; cf. Gernet (1954), 128.

<sup>359</sup> Demosthenes 33.5–22. On the three main protagonists: Reed (2003), 102–3.

<sup>360</sup> Apatourios clearly spent an extended time in Athens.

indirectly to Parmenon himself, a fellow citizen; when Apatourios later brought a counter-suit against his own suit regarding events in the Piraeus, he agreed to an attempt to find a consensual solution through arbitration; and he strove to ensure that the arbitration was brought to a consensual conclusion. The intended arbitration was clearly 'Nakonian' in character: first, because it was chaired by a fellow Byzantine, a member of the shared descent-group of Parmenon and Apatourios, not by a more impartial figure; and, second, because it was an alternative to an adversarial trial.<sup>361</sup>

Apatourios, by contrast, was a relatively rootless and calculating trader. He was already in debt to unnamed creditors at the start of the story. He befriended and extracted a loan from Parmenon for convenience, but no sentimental civic solidarity prevented him from trying to flee repayment when he had the opportunity. When prosecuted by Parmenon, he took the provocative, adversarial step of bringing a counter-suit against his former fellow citizen. Although he then initially agreed to a consensual arbitrated settlement, he succeeded in avoiding that outcome, by supporting Aristokles' claim to be sole arbitrator.<sup>362</sup> Aristokles then gave a provocative, unilateral judgement, the antithesis of an arbitrated settlement, presumably with Apatourios' support. The Athenians from whose help Apatourios benefited during these events included, not only Aristokles, but also, through him, Eryxias, 'the doctor from Piraeus',<sup>363</sup> a man with whom he did not obviously have any ties other than this prudential one. Finally, Apatourios brought an adversarial suit against the speaker of Demosthenes' *Against Apatourios*, aimed at his own financial gain.

These contrasts evoke the mixed society and mixed ethical culture of the Athenian Piraeus. A world of rootless, individualistic traders and moneylenders identified, for example, by Cohen,<sup>364</sup> in which status distinctions and civic ties were irrelevant,<sup>365</sup> coexisted with a Finleyan world in which personal friendships, civic bonds, and status distinctions significantly shaped individuals' economic behaviour.<sup>366</sup> Faced with these coexisting worlds, Parmenon, the exile, showed great reluctance to assimilate to the requirements of market rationality, clutching at elusive opportunities to forge more 'Nakonian', socially embedded economic relations. By contrast, Apatourios embraced the market and mobility and the opportunities they offered for personal success.

Some of the insecurities to which Parmenon responded through his 'Nakonian' behaviour were psychological and social. Parmenon, lacking Apatourios' indisputable dignity as a citizen of his home polis, was far more anxious to

<sup>361</sup> Compare the preference for consensual arbitration over legal judgements in some Hellenistic civic honorary decrees for foreign judges: cf. Chapter 4.2.

<sup>362</sup> Demosthenes 33.19.

<sup>363</sup> Demosthenes 33.18.

<sup>364</sup> Cohen (2000); cf. Baslez (1984), 167–8.

<sup>365</sup> Cf. Whitehead (1977), 48; Vlassopoulos (2007b).

<sup>366</sup> Cf. Finley (1985).

maintain 'Nakonian' quasi-civic relations with his fellow Byzantine expatriates. Even quite possibly to his own material detriment, Parmenon refused to undertake a marginal, interstitial, market-oriented economic role, hard to square with the ideal of the free citizen, or to adopt the corresponding identity of the footloose trader. The 'Nakonian' sociability and collective identity of the Plataean refugees in Athens after 427 probably represented a similar attempt to retain 'Nakonian' citizen dignity, despite the temptation or necessity for Plataean refugees to adopt predominantly market-driven lifestyles in Athens. There is some evidence for Plataeans adopting, or being widely perceived to be adopting, such lifestyles: Pancleon, the defendant in *Lysias* 23, a fuller with apparently few firm social connections, either was, or hoped to claim plausibly to be, a Plataean refugee; and at least one Plataean, a certain Theodotos, could be presented in court as a prostitute available for hire through contracts (*συνθηκαί*).<sup>367</sup>

Besides the psychological and social ones, other relevant insecurities of exile were economic: Apatourios possessed the resources and social connections to thrive as a market-rational trader, whereas Parmenon's precarious position in his new world in exile is vividly reflected in his eventual humiliation at Apatourios' hands. Solidarity with fellow Byzantines must have appeared to Parmenon the only possible way of forming meaningful, dependable social relationships, and gaining insurance against exploitation.<sup>368</sup>

Significantly, Parmenon did occasionally fall back on pragmatic, business-like or patron-client relations with the Athenian speaker in the course of his period of crisis.<sup>369</sup> Moreover, although his initial commitment to make a loan to Apatourios was probably only a face-to-face oral promise,<sup>370</sup> Parmenon subsequently relied on the more formal, less fraternal guarantee of a written contract. He negotiated with Apatourios an arbitration agreement which was written up, presumably in legally binding form, by a third-party, a literate slave of Aristokles. Parmenon then appealed to the authority of the written agreement when he confronted Aristokles.<sup>371</sup>

Nevertheless, even Parmenon's attempts to assimilate partially to the norms of the world of market-rational, interstitial traders failed to improve his well-

<sup>367</sup> See *Lysias* 3.22.

<sup>368</sup> Admittedly, Parmenon was not destitute: he was able to lend money; and he had a new household in Ophryneion in the Troad (*Demosthenes* 33.20). However, his lack of social connections made his wealth no guarantee of personal well-being.

<sup>369</sup> The speaker himself was, however, keen to emphasize his long familiarity with both Byzantines, resulting from his earlier extensive travel while trading (*Demosthenes* 33.5).

<sup>370</sup> *Demosthenes* 33.6: the verb used is *ὁμολογεῖν*. On this verb in Athenian commercial contexts: Cohen (2003), 73; see also Carawan (2006b).

<sup>371</sup> *Demosthenes* 33.17. On the probable increased use of written contracts in Athens in the second half of the fourth century: Gernet (1938), 30; compare Carawan (2006b), 374 (arguing that appeal to contracts as consensual agreements involving binding promises probably became more common after c.350).

being. He still could not compete with Apatourios' familiarity with that world, connections, and scheming. This is a further feature of Parmenon's story which indicates that there was little alternative, for a marginal 'emigrant' exile, to attempts to develop 'Nakonian' quasi-civic relationships with fellow expatriates.

In conclusion, therefore, the experience of exile reinforced 'emigrant' exiles' existing 'Nakonian' political consciousness, derived from the political cultures of their home poleis, suppressing any 'Dikaiopolitan' political attitudes. Although Parmenon's efforts to construct a microcosm of Byzantine civic community were unsuccessful, other 'emigrant' exiles' 'Nakonian' aspirations did yield cohesive exile communities, such as those of the Plataeans of the Athenian cheese market and the Chalkidians of Myrina. As in the case of liminal exiles, 'Nakonian' tendencies could be unifying as well as divisive.

In order for Odyssean 'emigrant' exiles to form relevant quasi-civic relationships and institutions, they must have drawn on distinctive civic norms, at least as a source of initial orientation, ideas and motivation in their unfamiliar circumstances, ripe for development and adaptation. The most plausible candidate is a particular strand in mainstream civic 'Nakonian' norms which contrasted sharply with that which shaped the behaviour of those exiles, considered in Section 3, who developed liminal quasi-civic exilic identities. One distinctive feature of this strand was discussed in Section 4: a requirement not to compromise the ideal and practices of civilized life in a crisis such as exile, even for the sake of political struggle and resistance. However, in order to motivate the attested forms of behaviour, the relevant strand of 'Nakonian' norms must also have had another distinctive entailment: the political and cultural institutions, dispositions, and practices distinctive to a civic community are not tied to a particular geographical place, but can be stably and durably reproduced elsewhere.<sup>372</sup> This kind of thinking was made explicit in the passage from Isocrates' *Archidamus* analysed in the discussion of anti-citizen exilic identities in Section 3.3.2: Isocrates there suggests that the Spartan polis could realize its true nature if it became a wandering polis of warriors, not tied to a particular place.<sup>373</sup>

This aspect of the relevant strand of 'Nakonian' norms was also influential within the political cultures of settled poleis. For example, its influence is evident in Athenian representations of Athenian cleruchies on Aegean islands, including that on Lemnos, mentioned above, as displaced fragments of the Athenian polis.<sup>374</sup> It could also be crystallized by intellectuals into explicit

<sup>372</sup> For an argument that the relationship of a polis to a particular place was a fundamental concern of Greek political theory: Azoulay (2006a). Compare Bertrand (1992).

<sup>373</sup> See Isocrates 6.72–81.

<sup>374</sup> Note, in particular, Hallof and Habicht (1995); Moreno (2007), 102–15. Such conceptions probably had their roots in the development of the notion of the ἀποικία in the Archaic period.



abstract conceptions of the essential nature of a polis: a polis could be conceived as a group of men, or citizens sharing a constitution, not essentially tied to a particular place.<sup>375</sup>

In response to their circumstances in exile, Odyssean 'emigrant' exiles distilled this strand in underlying 'Nakonian' norms into distinctive forms of quasi-civic organization. Some, such as the Chalkidians on Lemnos, attempted to form a 'Nakonian' quasi-polis with a new particular territorial or geographical base within their host polis. However, others, such as the Siphnian oligarchs and Parmenon, attempted to create or sustain a quasi-polis without any geographical or material base: a social and psychological construction. The latter constructions embodied a particularly radical extension by relevant exiles of the strand in 'Nakonian' thinking under consideration: their founders and participants presupposed that a polis need be no more than the shared aspirations, virtues, and practices of its members.

This quite abstract conception of the essential character of a polis was made explicit in the representation of recent 'liminal' exiles from Delphi in the later Hellenistic decree of the Delphic Amphictyony considered earlier and in the Introduction to this book. Although they travelled as far as Rome, these exiles did not 'defect from' the just, the fine, or the protection of the sanctuary.<sup>376</sup> According to this presentation, Delphian citizenship and Amphictyonic membership was as much a matter of benevolent and patriotic attitudes as of physical presence and activities. These exiles were much better guardians of the Delphic sanctuary across the sea in Rome than those responsible for their exile, still ensconced in Delphi. They also demonstrated their continued citizenship by their continued devotion to the just and the fine, something potentially transportable all around the world.

#### 5.4.3. *'Emigrant' Exiles' Cosmopolitan Communities, Quasi-Communities, and Identities: Reinventing Political Community*

The principal alternative type of quasi-civic identity and organization adopted by 'emigrant' exiles based in host poleis was a cosmopolitan type: a type which involved unqualified embrace of the deracination and variety of the exilic life. This identity was inevitably most attractive to isolated exiles who did not even have the option of associating closely with fellow exiles from their home polis, or strongly asserting their original civic identity. However, as is clear from the examples of Zeno of Kition and Theodoros the Achaian discussed below, some

<sup>375</sup> Thucydides 7.77.7, with Raaflaub (1993), 44; Aristotle *Politics* 1275b34–1276b15. Compare also the discussion of Polybius 2.61.4–12 in Section 2.5.

<sup>376</sup> *CID* 4.118, ll. 6–10.

embraced this kind of political identity even when they could have insisted on their original affiliations.

It was exiled philosophers, or exiled citizens who became philosophers in exile, who most wholeheartedly embraced cosmopolitanism, and most wholeheartedly put it into practice in their social organization. This was especially true of early Cynics and Stoics. The exiled Diogenes of Sinope was reported to have promoted a variety of cosmopolitanism which rendered the conventional, small-scale polis otiose: citizenship of any particular, local polis is contrary to nature; only citizenship of a universal, world polis is natural.<sup>377</sup> Diogenes was thus not a thoroughgoing opponent of the civic ideal, in the same camp as the sophist Aristippus, said by Xenophon to have repudiated the burdens of citizenship in favour of a being a stranger everywhere.<sup>378</sup> Even if his world polis was mainly a metaphor, Diogenes still used the polis ideal to express his political attachments, or lack of attachments.

In offering his cosmopolitan arguments, Diogenes could have been influenced by the kind of Panhellenism advocated by, in particular, Isocrates. As Richter argues, the vision of a grand community of all Greeks, crossing polis lines, has important affinities with full cosmopolitanism.<sup>379</sup> Significantly, however, Isocrates and other Panhellenists continued to insist on the primacy of a particular, culturally specific identity: Greek identity. Diogenes, by contrast, called for a cosmopolis whose members were united in following the entirely abstract, deracinated dictates of nature.

Strands of contemporary political thinking and practice other than Panhellenism must, therefore, have been influential on him. The behaviour of certain 'emigrant' exiles and other expatriates was probably significant. Indeed, Diogenes was partly extending to a logical extreme the 'emigrant' conception of a polis mentioned in closing the previous sub-section: conceived as a social and psychological entity, not a material or territorial one, a polis need not be confined to any particular place or group, but can extend throughout the souls of all virtuous men in the world.

However, elements of the political cultures of settled poleis probably also played a significant role in preparing the ground for Diogenes' cosmopolitanism. Richter has argued that democratic Athenian criticisms of aristocratic claims to superiority on grounds of birth opened an avenue for cosmopolitanism: if birth does not determine ethical or political status, there is no reason to divide the world into states based on different kin groups.<sup>380</sup> This probably was an important factor, but it could not by itself have provided the raw materials for Diogenes' extreme, abstract cosmopolitanism. Breaking the link between birth and virtue, or between birth and identity, would have called into question the

<sup>377</sup> Diogenes Laertius 6.63, 72; cf. Moles (1995); Konstan (2009), 473–7.

<sup>378</sup> See Holmes (2005), 15–17, discussing Xenophon *Memorabilia* 2.1.

<sup>379</sup> See Richter (2011), ch. 3.

<sup>380</sup> Richter (2011), e.g. 54.

restriction of membership of any particular polis to members of a kin group, but it did not represent a threat to the view that a polis must have a specific, or even idiosyncratic, culture and institutional form, to mark it out from other poleis.

The seeds for a critique even of this position are, however, detectable in mainstream civic rhetoric. Most poleis, for example, passed almost identical honorary decrees praising citizen and non-citizen benefactors for abstract, unqualified ἀρετή and εὐνοια, rather than for some quality or type of virtue closely linked to the particular polis in question and its culture and needs. If civic virtue was seemingly the same for a citizen of Athens or a citizen of Priene, in Athens or in Priene, an obvious inference would have been that virtue, the principal qualification for citizenship, is a universal quality, whose acquisition is not dependent on ethnicity or familiarity with a particular local culture.<sup>381</sup> Such an inference could have formed the starting point for a thoroughgoing challenge to civic particularism in all its forms, cultural as well as ethnic, of the kind articulated by Diogenes.

Significantly from the point of view of comparison with modern debates, Diogenes did not advocate anything resembling prominent liberal strands in modern cosmopolitan thinking, such as Waldron's argument that the true cosmopolitan ceases to regard any particular cultural attachment or notion of the good as intrinsic to his identity.<sup>382</sup> Diogenes apparently continued to dream of far-reaching consensus about the good, of the kind idealized in the 'Nakonian' paradigm, even though he hoped for worldwide consensus and interpreted the good or 'nature' in abstract, simple, unitary terms. Nevertheless, it is also true that Diogenes' notion of a true polis was much more inclusive than those influential in the Greek mainstream: it set aside distinctions of origin and status. Any Greek, or even any person, could potentially be a member of his cosmopolis.

Zeno of Kition, another Greek migrant based in Athens, is said by Diogenes Laertius to have advocated ideas in his *Republic* similar to those of Diogenes of Sinope.<sup>383</sup> Diogenes Laertius' report of Zeno's thinking can be interpreted as a report that Zeno shared Diogenes' ideal of a truly worldwide republic of the virtuous and wise.<sup>384</sup> However, it can also be interpreted as a report that Zeno advocated a 'universalist Nakonian' political philosophy: a doctrine according to which the ideal polis is a conventional small-scale, solidaristic polis, but one in which universally valid standards of virtue and wisdom are the principal criteria for citizenship. In such a polis, the criteria for citizenship are ones which all men, or at least all Greeks, can potentially fulfil. Indeed, Diogenes Laertius' report has been interpreted as evidence that Zeno favoured a Spartan-style polis of close comrades, united in their knowledge of, and

<sup>381</sup> Compare Ludwig (2002), 369–80 (on Periclean Athens).

<sup>382</sup> See, for example, Waldron (2000); cf. Benhabib (2004).

<sup>383</sup> Diogenes Laertius 7.32–3. <sup>384</sup> Erskine (1990), 18–27.

commitment to, virtue.<sup>385</sup> Perhaps the most convincing interpretation of Diogenes Laertius' report is that it shows that Zeno combined these two views, arguing that the ideal arrangement would be a world community composed of, or represented in microcosm by, such small-scale communities of the virtuous.<sup>386</sup> In any case, Zeno, like Diogenes of Sinope, did not relinquish the desire for a strong community, united in virtue and commitment to the good. His innovation was to make the demanding criteria for membership purely abstract, rather than thinning them into criteria of mutual respect and law-abiding behaviour, in the way favoured by modern liberal cosmopolitans. Nonetheless, like Diogenes', his ideal polis was far more inclusive and free of internal status distinctions than mainstream Greek real and imaginary poleis.<sup>387</sup>

The view that desirable social relationships are particular relationships oriented towards virtue with individuals of any origin, possible for an exile wherever he ends up, is evident in the approach to exile of the third-century Cynic Teles, himself possibly an exile.<sup>388</sup> In his *On Exile*, Teles at one point styles himself as a mobile cosmopolitan: changing cities is for him like changing ships. However, he continues to value sustained, localized social relationships as a key to individual fulfilment. In showing that the predicament of the exile is not necessarily worse than that of a citizen in his home polis, Teles at first appeals to egoistic notions of the advantages of citizenship: an exile can, in fact, exert more brute power over others than a polis citizen, as clear from the examples of exiles, such as the Athenian exiles Chremonides and Glaukon and the Spartan exile Hippomedon, who gained employment in the service of Hellenistic kings. However, he then shifts to more 'Nakonian' argumentation. He presents as more desirable than the relationship between a monarchical or quasi-monarchical figure and his charges the educational relationship between a teacher and his pupils, who, he implies, need not be of the same ethnic origin. Such a *παιδαγωγός*, whose role, Teles implies, any exile could easily take on, moulds the impressionable souls of his few pupils, 'ruling' them in the same way as he 'rules' himself, through the cultivation of virtue and self-control, rather than merely giving orders to multitudes whose

<sup>385</sup> Schofield (1999b), ch. 2; (1999a), 52–60; compare Richter (2011), 61–6.

<sup>386</sup> Dawson (1992), 175. This view accounts well for the different parts of Diogenes Laertius 7.33, where Zeno is said both to have considered all virtuous men to be fellow citizens and to have proposed specific arrangements for affairs 'in the cities' (plural). Compare the view of Murray (2004), 211–13, that Zeno thought that a world community of the wise, sympathetic to one another, was already in existence; all the wise could potentially be gathered one day into a single, unified, local polis (or presumably into many such poleis).

<sup>387</sup> Not, however, the mixed composition of some earlier Greek small-scale ideal cities, such as Magnesia in Plato's *Laws*: less pure forms of 'universalist Nakonianism' might well be said to precede Zeno.

<sup>388</sup> Cf. Teles *On Exile*, p. 25 Hense. Alternatively, Teles may have adopted the first-person persona of an exile only for the purposes of this diatribe: O'Neil (1977), xiv; Fuentes Gonzalez (1998), 318–20.

souls have already been formed.<sup>389</sup> Advocates of the small-scale cosmopolitan polis or quasi-polis, such as Teles and probably Zeno, were, like Diogenes of Sinope, developing to their full extent the universalist implications of common civic rhetorical tropes which treated virtue as something abstract and generic.

In addition to advocating cosmopolitanism, early Cynics and Stoics probably also interacted in a way consistent with cosmopolitan principles. Diogenes Laertius reports that when Zeno first arrived in Athens, supposedly after shipwreck, he was directed towards the Cynic Crates, himself an exile from destroyed Thebes, who subsequently assisted him and guided him towards philosophy.<sup>390</sup> This report implies that early Cynics and Stoics in fourth-century Athens constituted an informal, cosmopolitan mutual aid network for dispossessed Greeks interested in philosophical reflection and political criticism. This implication has a ring of truth, since the success of the early Cynics and Stoics in making an intellectual impact, despite their marginal social position, is most plausibly ascribed to mutual material aid and intellectual exchange between like-minded individuals, extending beyond traditional boundaries of civic allegiance. Crates' reported comment that he was a 'fellow citizen of Diogenes'<sup>391</sup> supports the view that the network of Cynic and Stoic philosophers in Athens was, and could be viewed by members as, quasi-civic. If so, these early Cynics and Stoics were to some extent imitating the fourth-century Platonic Academy, which was in some respects structured, and possibly even conceived by members and other contemporary philosophers, as a quasi-civic cosmopolitan association:<sup>392</sup> it too could have provided an alternative focus of civic identity for philosopher exiles.<sup>393</sup> In this case, it would not

<sup>389</sup> Teles *On Exile*, pp. 23–4 Hense, with Fuentes Gonzalez (1998), 310, 313–14.

<sup>390</sup> Diogenes Laertius 7.2–3.

<sup>391</sup> Diogenes Laertius 6.93. Schofield (1999b), 144–5, suggests that Crates' reported claim to be a *Διογένους πολίτης* should be interpreted as a claim that Diogenes is Crates' city: he sees a symmetry with Crates' immediately preceding remark that lack of repute and poverty are his 'country'. This alternative interpretation is possible, but the metaphor of Diogenes as a 'city' is far more jarring than the metaphor of abstract nouns as a 'country' (*πατρίς*). Moreover, the whole claim can be interpreted as expressing the view that Crates and Diogenes are fellow citizens of the 'country' of lack of repute and poverty. Indeed, it would be odd for a fourth-century Greek to distinguish his *πατρίς* from his polis.

<sup>392</sup> Academics could have conceived their school as a new form of ideal community, resembling a polis in being a structured community of free Greeks living a common life and engaged in ongoing debate with each other, but distinctive in its entirely different membership criteria: virtue and learning, as opposed to birth, wealth or particular cultural allegiance, were the criteria for membership. Quasi-civic political organization: appointment of scholar by election (e.g. Philodemus *Historia Academicorum* VI, l. 41–VII, l. 6). On contemporary internal perceptions of the Academy as a revolutionary, ideal community of the virtuous: Ostwald and Lynch (1994), 615–16; cf. Watts (2007). Note also the ambitious restorations of Philodemus *Historia Academicorum* Y, ll. 24–30, in Gaiser (1988), 153; contrast Dorandi (1991), 127.

<sup>393</sup> The Academy was, in any case, dominated by foreigners (Ostwald and Lynch (1994, 613). As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the exiled Dion had dealings with the Academy. Significantly, Plutarch *On Exile* 603b7–d9 talks about the fourth-century Academy in the context of exilic habitats, or habitats fit for exiles.

simply have been a case of pre-existing ideas shaping social organization: the experience of cosmopolitan quasi-civic practices and improvised institutions would itself have helped to sow cosmopolitan ideas in their minds. This is a good example of the process of institutional influence on political ideas considered in Section 4.2 of the Introduction.

Non-philosopher exiles also engaged in cosmopolitan social practices and relations in this period. Any Hellenistic exile could in principle give cult to 'Zeus of Fugitives' or 'Zeus of Exiles' (Zeus Phyxios),<sup>394</sup> a universal patron god of those in flight, regardless of their origins. There is a hint of a more tangible cosmopolitan community of destitute, or at least disadvantaged, refugees in third-century Alexandria in a throwaway remark of Plutarch's. Plutarch reports that Cleomenes III of Sparta, himself an exile in Alexandria after ejection from his kingdom in 222, distributed most of the Ptolemaic money he received to exiles 'from Greece' (not merely 'from Sparta') who had fled to Egypt, escaping from Antigonid control of Greece.<sup>395</sup>

Although Plutarch does not state that the exiles in Alexandria had any formal political organization, some non-philosopher exiles are known to have participated in cosmopolitan quasi-civic associations in this period. Cosmopolitan associations within poleis are best attested for Hellenistic Athens, Rhodes, and Delos.<sup>396</sup> They mainly took the form of cult associations dedicated to a particular god, but cosmopolitan groups of soldiers based in Athenian forts also formed quasi-civic associations, at least in order to vote for honours for their commanders.<sup>397</sup> Each of these two types of Hellenistic cosmopolitan association could either incorporate local citizens and foreigners or be composed exclusively of foreigners.<sup>398</sup> Such groups could be explicitly, or even aggressively, cosmopolitan. In the epigraphy of Athenian *θίασοι*, for example, the ethnicities of members were commonly suppressed in inscribed lists.<sup>399</sup> This gave the impression that members' origins were irrelevant to the functioning of the *θίασος*, as an association of equal, mutually supportive

<sup>394</sup> See Hornblower (2014), 94, with n. 12; note especially Apollonius Rhodius *Argonautica* 2.1147, 4.119; Lycophron *Alexandra* 288; Pausanias 2.21.2; *SEG* 7.894 (Gerasa, first century AD), l. 9.

<sup>395</sup> Plutarch *Agis and Cleomenes* 53.5.

<sup>396</sup> Cf. Whitehead (1977), 88–9; Baslez (1984), 331–53; Arnaoutoglou (2003); Gabrielsen (2001). On Greek associations in general: Poland (1909). The much increased attestation of such associations from the end of the Classical period is probably better explained by the expansion of the epigraphic habit than by a sudden increase in their number (Arnaoutoglou (2003), 27–9; contrast Gabrielsen (2007), e.g. 188; 191, with n. 41).

<sup>397</sup> Cf. Launey (1987), 1047–51. For soldiers who were not Athenian citizens joining Athenian citizen-soldiers in communal, quasi-civic activities in the Hellenistic period, cf. *I.Eleusis* 190, 196; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1270 (Sounion). Quasi-civic associations of non-citizen soldiers alone in Hellenistic Rhamnous: *I.Rhamnous* 8, 23, 27, 30, 38, 42–3, 47, 51.

<sup>398</sup> Cf. Gabrielsen (2007), 186. On the membership of Hellenistic Athenian cult associations, see Arnaoutoglou (2003), 96–101, esp. 101.

<sup>399</sup> Arnaoutoglou (2003), 99, n. 35.

members. Even if individual members retained strong particularist civic identities in other contexts, in the specific context of such an association they took on, even if only temporarily, something close to a cosmopolitan identity.

Many such cosmopolitan associations within cities possessed quasi-civic institutions and undertook quasi-civic practices, imitating, in particular, the institutions and practices of the democratic polis.<sup>400</sup> For example, many elected magistrates and passed honorary decrees for benefactors. They were each marked by some particular, specific features: for example, in the case of a cult association, by commitment to a particular god or hero. However, much of their rhetoric took an abstract form consistent with the strictly universalist cosmopolitanism of Cynic and Stoic philosophers. Indeed, such associations tended to reproduce the abstract civic honorific language and rhetoric of their host poleis, praising the ἀρετή, φιλοτιμία, and other abstract ethical qualities of benefactors in their epigraphy.<sup>401</sup> On the basis of their different quasi-civic features, such cosmopolitan associations have been persuasively interpreted as alternative ‘poleis’ for their foreign members: membership of such groups allowed members to claim a quasi-civic identity and to engage in quasi-civic practices.<sup>402</sup> This does not exclude the possibility that at least some of their members also developed quite different alternative identities in other contexts in exile.

There were almost certainly many forced migrants among the participants in such groups. Most cannot be identified as such: like other exiles discussed in this chapter, they would not have been keen to advertise their previous allegiance or their diminished status as exiles. However, some participants can be identified as exiles. For example, at the beginning of the third century, an Athenian cult association (θίασος) passed a quasi-civic honorary decree for a certain Demetrios, described as an ‘Olynthian’, who had served as secretary of the association.<sup>403</sup> This text reveals that Demetrios, presumably a second- or third-generation immigrant from Olynthos (destroyed in 348) resident in Athens,<sup>404</sup> served as a quasi-civic magistrate in a cosmopolitan cult association which was structured as a microcosm of a democratic polis.

The honorary decree, whose content Demetrios was probably able to influence, presents Demetrios as an almost utopian ‘Nakonian’ quasi-citizen.

<sup>400</sup> Cf. Poland (1909), 337–8; Gabrielsen (2007), 188–90.

<sup>401</sup> Arnaoutoglou (2003), 154–5, 162, regards this feature of the rhetoric of Attic cult associations as a sign of the role of such associations in integrating outsiders into an expanded Athenian civic community.

<sup>402</sup> Cf. Rostovtzeff (1941), 1063–4; Baslez (1984), 332–3; Gabrielsen (2001), 217; Arnaoutoglou (2003), *passim*, but esp. 21, 166.

<sup>403</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1263.

<sup>404</sup> As such, he probably enjoyed ἰσοτέλεια in Athens, in accordance with a general Athenian grant to Olynthian refugees (cf. this chapter’s n. 334)

Most of its justificatory clause is taken up with praise of Demetrios in general terms for taking care of common affairs ‘finely and justly’ (καλῶς καὶ δικαίως); for continuing to say and do advantageous things for the whole association and for its individual members; and for generic ἀρετὴ and δικαιοσύνη towards the association. Nevertheless, he is also praised for a more distinctive act of self-sacrifice and disregard for strict personal entitlements, for the sake of the common good: he paid back to the association the money which members had voted to pay him as a salary, while he was secretary.<sup>405</sup> The emphasis on Demetrios’ ‘Nakonian’ virtue in most of the decree is slightly tempered by claims which could be interpreted as of a more ‘Dikaiopolitan’ orientation. Praise for him ‘rightly and justly’ (ὀρθ[ῶ]ς καὶ δικαίως) submitting accounts (λογισμοί) and justifications (εὐθύναι) for his own and others’ use of common funds<sup>406</sup> attributes positive ethical weight to strict observance of rules and a lack of corruption, falling short of the kind of voluntary virtuous supererogation and transparent trustworthiness which makes procedural checks superfluous.<sup>407</sup> However, the obvious inference for a hearer or reader of this decree was that, although he had lost his own particular polis through a Macedonian atrocity, Demetrios, like the Cynic Crates, had retained true civic consciousness and dignity by exercising far-reaching, ‘Nakonian’ quasi-civic virtue in this cosmopolitan<sup>408</sup> quasi-polis in his place of exile,<sup>409</sup> which reproduced even some of the tensions and ambiguities of an actual polis. He did so even though he could presumably have found enough fellow ‘Olynthians’ in Athens to ground his political consciousness and social life in a particularist Olynthian identity.

There is a possible direct attestation of an individual more recently exiled participating in a quasi-civic cosmopolitan association. This case concerns an inscription of c.235 containing honorary decrees for the Athenian general Aristophanes passed, first, by the Athenian citizen soldiers in Eleusis, Panakton, and Phyle and, second, by the deme of Eleusis.<sup>410</sup> After the honorary decrees, there is a list of the Athenian soldiers responsible for the setting up of an honorific statue of Aristophanes, followed by a list of the foreign soldiers

<sup>405</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1263, ll. 5–9, 13–25. On the return of the salary: Arnautoglou (2003), 117. For supererogative generosity by an Olynthian exile in a new environment, compare the benefactions of Herakleodoros to Thasos (SEG 19.595, later fourth or early third century).

<sup>406</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1263, ll. 9–13.

<sup>407</sup> Note their absence, for example, in Zeno’s utopia; see the next Section 5.4.4.

<sup>408</sup> As Mack (2015), ch. 2, points out, another Olynthian exile, Herakleodoros, dedicated the buildings he funded in Thasos ‘to all the gods’ (l. 3), which may indicate a quasi-cosmopolitan concern not to concentrate on particular, local gods.

<sup>409</sup> As an ἰσοτελής, Demetrios would have enjoyed only the fiscal, not the political, privileges of an Athenian citizen. Full participation in this quasi-civic cosmopolitan association was the only means for Demetrios to imitate full participatory citizenship.

<sup>410</sup> I.Eleusis 196, a new edition of IG II<sup>2</sup> 1299.



who joined in making the dedication. One of the foreign soldiers on this list is Theodoros the Achaian, whose ethnic is erased: *Θεόδωρος* [[*Ἀχαιός*]].<sup>411</sup>

It is a reasonable hypothesis that this Theodoros requested the erasure of his ethnic, and thereby his ethnicity: he consciously repudiated his identity as a federal Achaian citizen. As a soldier fighting for Antigonid Athens against the Achaian League,<sup>412</sup> he could well have been subject to ridicule or suspicion when his name was initially inscribed with the Achaian ethnic. This could well have provoked him to seek the erasure of the ethnic, a clear way of showing that he was no longer attached to the Achaians. Theodoros could well thus have chosen to have himself publicly recorded as a stateless exile,<sup>413</sup> partly in order to avoid appearing to be an opportunist mercenary, still casually attached to his original ethnicity, but prepared to fight against his homeland. If that hypothesis is correct, Theodoros' move was not merely a negative one. He was also declaring a new quasi-citizenship, as a member of the quasi-civic community of Athenian and foreign soldiers who passed the honorary decree, sufficiently important to outweigh the loss of Achaian federal citizenship. As a member of this quasi-civic community, he could have conceived of himself as a quasi- or second-class Athenian.<sup>414</sup> However, he could also have regarded this alternative community as a revolutionary new type of cosmopolitan quasi-civic community, incorporating individuals from a wide range of homelands.<sup>415</sup> In his case, at least, it would have been difficult for him to revert to a more particularist Achaian or Peloponnesian identity in other contexts: he had to make a break with that identity which could well have pushed a more cosmopolitan identity to the forefront of his consciousness.

On the one hand, this quasi-civic community engaged in the characteristic 'Nakonian' activity of collective recognition of the civic virtues and associated actions of a benefactor. On the other hand, however, it also engaged, like other cosmopolitan associations, in a greater degree of tolerance of differences between individuals than visible in most other evidence for Greek social and political interaction: most of the members' diverse ethnics were displayed, rather than suppressed. This was not a matter of full-blooded proto-Kantian pluralism of value, but it could be seen as a significant departure from 'Nakonian' insistence on homogeneity, verging on something more proto-Kantian.

In conclusion, there was a division within the political culture of the Classical Greek civic world, almost as significant as the division between 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaipolitan' civic norms, between particularist norms and

<sup>411</sup> *I.Eleusis* 196, l. 117. Clinton (2005), 226–7, is certain that this and the other two erasures on the stone are genuine erasures (compare his pl. 102, photograph 196–3).

<sup>412</sup> On the diplomatic situation at this point: Plutarch *Aratus* 33–4.

<sup>413</sup> Theodoros could have been a formal exile from the Achaian League, but it is more likely that he declared himself a de facto exile through this erasure.

<sup>414</sup> Cf. Launey (1987), 1043; Osborne (1990b), 280–5 (on Rhamnous).

<sup>415</sup> See the ethnics in *I.Eleusis* 196, ll. 95–117.

inchoate universalist norms. The tension between the different ways of thinking usually remained latent in everyday civic debate and interaction, but situations and debates involving outsiders, and especially exiles, could bring more universalist ways of thinking to the fore.

The inchoate universalist strand in civic political cultures provided at least an initial point of orientation and motivation for fourth-century and Hellenistic displaced citizens engaged in attempting to recreate civic dignity in exile though improvised institutions and practices, especially those who were isolated or estranged from fellow expatriates from their home polis. Without this starting point as a rival focus of basic political orientation to more familiar ones, newly relevant to their particular circumstances, it would have been difficult for displaced later Classical and Hellenistic Greek citizens to take the already radical step, involving a fundamental recasting of their self-understanding as agents and citizens, of imagining cosmopolitan civic or quasi-civic organization as a possibility, let alone accepting it as politically and ethically legitimate.<sup>416</sup> Similarly, the inchoate universalist strand in civic political cultures provided a starting point for those poleis which did attempt to be liberal with their citizenship, including towards exiles, something associated in Section 5.3 with poleis in whose foundation myths exiles were prominent.

In both cases, in accordance with the patterns identified in Section 4.2 of the Introduction to this book, implicit shared assumptions were worked up into institutions and practices when circumstances made it viable and desirable. Those new institutions and practices then stimulated new explicit ways of imagining the ideal political community. Indeed, the development of explicit cosmopolitan theory by fourth-century and Hellenistic philosophers is probably the clearest example of the phenomenon of exile helping to create, or shape, a major development in ancient ethical and political thought. Moreover, the figure of the exile remained central to subsequent philosophical and rhetorical formulations of cosmopolitan ideas. For example, it became a Stoic slogan that the virtuous man is never a true exile, irrespective of his worldly circumstances. By contrast, the man who is not perfectly virtuous is always an exile, even if he enjoys citizenship of a worldly polis.<sup>417</sup> Moreover, examples of the *On Exile* genre almost always use cosmopolitan ideas to console the exile. In the Roman Imperial period, as Whitmarsh and Richter have shown, Greek intellectuals commonly used the figure of the exile to articulate concepts of a borderless *oikoumene*, usually quite Greek in character.<sup>418</sup>

<sup>416</sup> There were also economic incentives for members of these associations and their host poleis: Gabrielsen (2001); (2007). However, the point stands that such associations would have been unimaginable without pre-existing universalist assumptions.

<sup>417</sup> von Arnim SVF, vol. III, frs. 328, 599, 679–80.

<sup>418</sup> See Whitmarsh (2001); Opsomer (2002) (on Plutarch's *On Exile*); Richter (2011), 114–34 (note especially the discussion of Dio Chrysostom as an exile and commentator on exile), 143–4 (on Favorinus' *On Exile*).

5.4.4. *Contrasting Views about Citizenship among  
'Emigrant' Exiles: Zeno, the Polis of the Virtuous,  
and the Kitians in Athens*

There was ample scope for disagreement among 'emigrant' exiles and fellow migrants about the relative validity of the contrasting varieties of 'emigrant' quasi-civic identity and organization considered in the previous two subsections. In particular, advocates or followers of the first variety were open to attack from advocates or followers of the second, on their own terms. If the good civic community is not thought to be tied to any particular place, or to be distinguished by its citizens' shared visceral attachment to that place, the question arises whether other forms of civic particularism, such as particularism concerning ethnicity and culture, are any more justified. As Richter has suggested, the boundary between a diaspora identity and a full-blooded cosmopolitan identity is a porous one.<sup>419</sup> There is one attested case of this kind of disagreement, reflected in contrasting behaviour and explicit argument, within a diaspora from a single polis: the diaspora of expatriates from Kition on Cyprus resident in later fourth-century Athens.

Many Kitians resident in, or visiting, Athens in the later fourth century were undoubtedly voluntary migrants or traders. It was probably such Kitians who predominated in the Kitian expatriate community to which, in 333/2, the Athenian *δημος* granted permission to own land on which to build a temple of Kitian Aphrodite.<sup>420</sup> The Stoic Zeno could have belonged to this group of voluntary migrants, but the dominant subsequent tradition, at least, presented him as an involuntary migrant: he supposedly settled in Athens after a shipwreck.<sup>421</sup> The significant point for the argument here is that Zeno, as a newcomer to Athens, did not rely on the expatriate Kitian network in Athens, attested in the Athenian grant, to carve out a social base for himself. Rather, as discussed in Section 5.4.3, he sought out the cosmopolitan community of marginal and exiled philosophers in Athens.

A distinctive feature of the ideal, cosmopolitan polis promoted by Zeno in his *Republic* is that it does not require laws and civic institutions: it is simply a community of fully virtuous men. This feature can be explained in philosophical terms, as a response to Plato's *Republic*. Whereas Plato retained some of the physical and institutional attributes of a conventional polis in his ideal *πολιτεία*, Zeno suggested that a truly ideal polis<sup>422</sup> would not require such institutions. If all citizens are fully virtuous, and therefore friends with one

<sup>419</sup> Richter (2011), 115.

<sup>420</sup> Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 91.

<sup>421</sup> Some denied that he was ever shipwrecked (Diogenes Laertius 7.5). The story could well have been a later invention designed to assimilate Zeno to a stereotypical Stoic survivor of adversity.

<sup>422</sup> As discussed in Section 5.4.3, it is unclear whether Zeno regarded this ideal polis as worldwide or local.

another in the fullest sense, marriage, temples, courts, gymnasia, coinage, and clothing become superfluous.<sup>423</sup>

However, this feature of Zeno's *Republic* can also be interpreted as a reflection of Zeno's experience as a migrant and outsider in Athens. As Richter has argued, Zeno should be seen partly as an outsider in Athens who was resentful or sceptical of the exclusivity of Athenian citizenship.<sup>424</sup> However, he can also be considered to have been in dialogue with fellow Kitian expatriates. Engaged in rebuilding civic<sup>425</sup> community and civic identity in Athens, mainstream Kitian expatriates made a temple of Kitian Aphrodite the focal point of their new displaced community. Zeno could have been thinking of their conservative, particularist choice, or unconsciously reacting against it, when he argued that all that is necessary to achieve true citizenship is personal virtue and relations of true friendship with other virtuous men. In other words, all that is necessary is the type of characteristics and relationships to which members of Athenian philosophical circles aspired. It is significant, for example, that Zeno explicitly said that 'sacred buildings' (ἱερά) are unnecessary in the ideal polis: the temple of Kitian Aphrodite in Athens undoubtedly fell into that category. On this interpretation, Zeno consciously or unconsciously criticized his fellow Kitian expatriates for failing to grasp the opportunity offered by migration for transformative political and social experiment. They chose to imitate the degenerate institutions of a settled polis, when they had the opportunity to join or construct in their new environment a cosmopolitan community much closer to the ideal than any settled polis.<sup>426</sup>

## 5.5. Conclusion

The overwhelmingly 'Nakonian' quasi-civic activities and organization of 'emigrant' exiles and exile groups were shaped by, and themselves reinforced, a particular underlying 'Nakonian' conception of a polis: a polis is a community of individuals with particular shared attitudes and practices, which is not inextricably tied to any particular place, but can be transplanted to a new place or recreated in non-terrestrial form. This underlying conception of a polis might be thought to be of practical relevance only in extreme circumstances, such as those of exile itself. However, it had significant implications which had important effects on early Hellenistic political and cultural history.

<sup>423</sup> Diogenes Laertius 7.33.

<sup>424</sup> Richter (2011), 57–61.

<sup>425</sup> Even if Classical Kition cannot confidently be identified as a Greek polis (Hansen and Nielsen (2004), 1223–4), it was undoubtedly a city-state.

<sup>426</sup> Compare Marx and Engels' criticism of German bourgeois exiles in their *On the Great Men of the Exile*.

First, this conception implied that civic identity, culture, and institutions are not dependent for their survival on possession of an unvarying civic territory or other material props. Second, it implied that social and cultural behaviour are the central aspects of citizenship. These implications were crucial starting points for the early Hellenistic development of notions of the 'cultural liberty' of the Greek polis and citizen.<sup>427</sup> A leading champion of such notions, Timaeus, was himself an exile who adopted an 'emigrant' quasi-civic lifestyle, as discussed in Section 4.2.2 above.<sup>428</sup> With the aid of this notion, even poleis whose territory had been conquered or mutilated could claim to remain, in a sense, 'free'.<sup>429</sup>

The behaviour, identities, and thinking of 'emigrant' exiles also brought into relief, and intensified, tensions within mainstream Greek political cultures between particularist and universalist ways of thinking. Though especially relevant in the case of exile itself, the universalist strand in civic political cultures, immeasurably reinforced by exile phenomena themselves, also had important implications for the everyday civic life of settled poleis. This was especially true in the changed conditions of the Hellenistic period, with increased mobility of population and the development of vast territorial monarchical empires, incorporating poleis.<sup>430</sup> For example, in the course of the Hellenistic period, in many poleis even the gymnasium, a fundamental civic institution, came to be partly cosmopolitan: membership requirements often became predominantly cultural, which made possible foreigners' participation.<sup>431</sup>

A model of cosmopolitan quasi-civic cultural and educational interaction first thoroughly developed by fourth-century exiled, or other migrant or marginal, philosophers, extrapolating from unexplored or contradictory assumptions within existing political cultures, thus gradually percolated into the civic mainstream. Moreover, from the second century, poleis began to praise home citizens in inscribed decrees for *φιλανθρωπία*, not only towards outsiders, but also towards fellow citizens: they explicitly praised citizens for showing towards fellow citizens the generic concern which one shows for one's fellow men (*φιλανθρωπία*), rather than a greater or more specific form of solidarity.<sup>432</sup> A more universalist conception of good relations between fellow citizens, partly developed by philosopher exiles and their fellow exiles, thus came to be in the Hellenistic civic world a robust, explicit rival to the more

<sup>427</sup> For the increasingly substantial cultural components of notions of good citizenship, and its truly free exercise, from the fourth century onwards, compare Azoulay (2006b).

<sup>428</sup> Cf. Momigliano (1977), 43–6. <sup>429</sup> Compare Hampl (1939).

<sup>430</sup> The development of these empires was itself a stimulus to cosmopolitan ideas (cf. Murray (2004)). However, it was exiles who responded most readily to this stimulus. Moreover, Diogenes of Sinope almost certainly propounded cosmopolitan ideas long before Alexander established his world-empire.

<sup>431</sup> Cf. Davies (1984), 308–9; Gauthier (1995).

<sup>432</sup> See Gray (2013c).

particularist 'Nakonian' ideal shown in this book also to have been thriving in the political cultures of Hellenistic poleis.

## 6. CONCLUSION

### 6.1. Exile Groups and Individual Exiles: Xenophon as Case-Study

This chapter has concentrated on the different political identities and forms of organization adopted by Greek exile groups, showing similarities in the difficulties and choices faced by exiles expelled from their poleis for a range of reasons. It has, however, also made use of the evidence for the perspectives of some individual exiles as a way of broadening and reinforcing the picture: the attitudes to the polis of such figures as Timaeus of Tauromenion, Parmenon of Byzantion, and Diogenes of Sinope have been discussed. As in Chapter 5, the most direct insights into the complex political perspectives of those involved come, however, from the literary works of exiled intellectuals: in particular, those of the historians Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius. This evidence can serve as an introduction to this conclusion. It shows how individual exiles were forced and enabled to reflect upon, and to choose between or combine, the different types of collective identity and organization considered in this chapter.

Xenophon's works offer the most complex picture of a single exile's attitudes to questions of exile politics, and their links with broader questions of political community, in this period. Indeed, he shows sympathy for most of the different exilic identities and institutions considered in this chapter, which suggests uncertainty about their respective merits. For example, he obviously admired the civilized way in which Corinthian oligarchic exiles held their own version of the Isthmian Games in 390, under Agesilaos' supervision. However, he obviously also admired the outright, single-minded militarism of the Phliasian exiles who organized their own messes on the borders of their polis, also with Agesilaos' encouragement and aid, or of the Spartan exile Drakontios, a member of the Ten Thousand who ostentatiously refused to shirk any hardship.<sup>433</sup>

Xenophon was thus probably himself ambivalent about the relative value of citizen-in-exile and anti-citizen identities for exiles, such as himself, desperate to retain political dignity or even to return to their home polis. In this he resembled the liminal Hellenistic exiles from Priene in the Karion and from

<sup>433</sup> Xenophon *Anabasis* 4.8.25–6, analysed by Ma (2004b), 332–3.

Achaia in Skiros who, as discussed in Section 3 above, combined civilized constitutionalism with anti-citizen mobilization and suspension of normal standards in their organization and self-presentation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given his date, Xenophon did not show much comparable enthusiasm for the third possible liminal exilic identity: that of the helpless, dependent refugee.

Xenophon did, however, also show interest and respect for 'emigrant' exilic choices and organization. He himself embraced Agesilaos' Sparta as an alternative particularist focus of civic identity. However, at least in the *Anabasis*, he also idealized more innovative, cosmopolitan types of exile community. He makes the Spartan exile Klearchos say that his fellow soldiers are his new country. In a rare appearance of strictly 'Dikaiopolitan' thinking in the reported rhetoric of an exile, Klearchos stresses personal honour and strict reciprocity: in the company of his new quasi-compatriots, he can be honoured. Without them, he would not be able to help friends or to harm enemies.<sup>434</sup> As argued in Section 2.5., Xenophon himself goes on to present the army of the *Anabasis* as a paradigmatic cosmopolitan quasi-polis, at least until arrival at the Black Sea: he is another exile for whom the experience of displacement helped to crystallize the cosmopolitan close-knit community into a positive ideal.

The most utopian presentation of a cosmopolitan community including exiles comes, however, in the midst of the description of the breakdown of civic order after arrival at the Black Sea. It is Xenophon's idyllic description of his life in exile in Skillous in Triphylia in the period c.394–370. Xenophon presents life in Skillous as faultlessly harmonious and devoid of political strife: he and his sons participate in hunting and revelry with the local population without friction. Moreover, Xenophon has embedded cosmopolitanism, or Panhellenism, in the physical environment of the community: he has set up a small imitation of the sanctuary of Ephesian Artemis, in fulfilment of a vow, a way of linking this small, isolated community into a wider world.<sup>435</sup>

By the time he wrote this idyllic description of life in Skillous, Xenophon had probably been exiled again from this exilic paradise: he was driven out of Skillous in the aftermath of the Battle of Leuktra and forced to settle in Corinth. His inclusion of the description in the *Anabasis* must thus have carried a note of pathos: a cosmopolitan idyll of this kind, whether it took the form of a wandering army or a rural community which had integrated outsiders faultlessly, could easily be destroyed by the workings of power politics. It is, nonetheless, clear that Xenophon saw the attractions of a cosmopolitan community, united in harmony and virtue, as a political paradigm, not least because of the reassurance and opportunities which it offered an exile.<sup>436</sup>

<sup>434</sup> Xenophon *Anabasis* 1.3.6.

<sup>435</sup> Xenophon *Anabasis* 5.3.5–13.

<sup>436</sup> Compare Dillery (1995), esp. chs. 2–3.

## 6.2. The Features of Civic Political Cultures Revealed by Exiles' Behaviour and Identities

It is now possible to summarize some of the basic ideas and assumptions about citizenship thrown into relief by the competing varieties of exilic identity discussed in this chapter, which are starkly combined in Xenophon's work, with all their contradictions. The representations and actual behaviour considered in this chapter confirm the coexistence of 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' civic norms within Greek civic political culture in this period. More importantly, they illustrate the many varied forms which underlying 'Nakonian' civic norms could take. According to different influential versions of the underlying 'Nakonian' paradigm, the 'Nakonian' polis should be militaristic or humanitarian; civilized and measured or fanatical and mobilized in periods of crisis; principally political or military or social or religious or cultural, or some combination of those, in its organization and ethos; a confined descent-group or a cosmopolitan polis of the virtuous; tied to a particular place or readily transferable to a new place; and territorial and material or dispersed and imaginary.

As a result of the coexistence of these different versions of the underlying 'Nakonian' paradigm, and the gaps and contradictions between them, there was great scope for displaced citizens, whose political consciousness had been shaped by them, to exercise agency in determining their own political identities and activities. This tendency was intensified by the influence of widespread, radical norms of civic voluntarism, which enabled and encouraged political improvisation. Such improvisation could take the form of the formation of a temporary polis-in-exile or even the founding of a new, permanent polis.

In most cases, exiles' improvised quasi-civic institutions and ideologies, constructed in accordance with selections from available underlying 'Nakonian' norms, secured social cohesion among groups of exiles, or in groups incorporating exiles. They did not tend to unleash *stasis* within such groups, by encouraging those of rival interests and views to cohere into uncompromising factions, though this is evident in some cases. The evidence of exiles' organization therefore confirms the conclusion, defended in Chapters 4 and 5, that underlying Greek 'Nakonian' civic norms were double-edged in their political effects: as well as provoking or intensifying civic conflicts, they could promote political solidarity, especially when applied in ways sufficiently ambiguous to appeal to varied individuals.<sup>437</sup>

<sup>437</sup> Consider, for example, notions of 'Sicilian' or 'Syracusan freedom'.



### 6.3. Effects of Exile

In addition to throwing into relief aspects of the political culture of the Greek civic world, the phenomenon of exile also itself influenced its shape. First, exile reinforced many exiles in their attachment to varieties of underlying 'Nakonian' norms, predominantly particularist ones, and usually suppressed their 'Dikaiopolitan' instincts.<sup>438</sup> For 'liminal' exiles, 'Nakonian' unity was usually essential for the struggle to return home. As for 'emigrant' exiles, the disorientation and practical hardships they frequently experienced often demanded solidarity with sympathetic, or equally vulnerable, individuals.<sup>439</sup> This must have had an effect on the general shape of the political culture of the Greek civic world.

Second, exile brought to the surface, or cast into sharp relief, some of the tensions and contradictions between some prominent fundamental civic norms. As shown in Section 4, it cast into relief the tension between, on the one hand, fundamental norms requiring citizens to demonstrate uncompromising loyalty to their home polis at all times, through political activism and military mobilization, and, on the other, fundamental norms according to which good citizenship is as much a matter of preserving civic ethical and cultural standards. In addition, as shown in Section 5.4.4, the phenomenon of exile brought into relief the tension between particularist and inchoate universalist basic civic norms.

Partly because it brought these tensions and contradictions into relief, exile was an important stimulus to political thought. Even a relatively conventional Greek such as Xenophon could be provoked to undertake fundamental reflection about politics by the experience of exile. It was undoubtedly partly migration in general, rather than exile specifically, which stimulated abstract political thought. For example, in the case of Zeno of Kition, who may well have been a quite conventional voluntary migrant to Athens, the tension between particularist and universalist ideas, brought into relief by the experience of migration and migrant organization, probably helped to provoke explicit philosophical reflection about politics.<sup>440</sup> However, the additional factor of lacking any opportunity to return home probably sharpened the relevant dilemmas and feelings of alienation in some cases.

In any case, other early Cynics and Stoics were full exiles: Diogenes, Crates, and possibly also Teles. Also relevant in this context is Epicurus, who was

<sup>438</sup> The case of the original Dikaiopolitans, probable exiles considered in Section 5.2, is the only clear exception considered here.

<sup>439</sup> Compare Xenophon's presentation of the displaced mercenaries of the *Anabasis*, discussed in Section 2.5: they show predominantly 'Nakonian' attitudes and behaviour during the more difficult, uncertain parts of their march.

<sup>440</sup> Compare Plutarch *On Exile* 603d9–e1.

among the Athenian cleruchs expelled from Samos, where he had probably grown up, when the Samians recovered their island in 322. He spent some time in Colophon and elsewhere in the eastern Aegean, but eventually moved permanently to Athens, where he in time founded the Garden.<sup>441</sup> His commitment to the interstitial philosophical lifestyle and to the rejection of conventional Greek political expectations was probably reinforced by his own paradoxical social status: he ended up as an exile in his own ancestral 'home' polis, unable to return to his true home quasi-civic community, itself a type of exilic community, the Athenian cleruchy on Samos, which no longer existed.<sup>442</sup> Stories are also preserved about Hellenistic exiles turning to philosophy, such as the Megalopolitan Ekdelos or Ekdemos, whom Polybius represents engaging in philosophical studies at the Academy and in anti-tyrannical campaigning while in exile.<sup>443</sup> Relatedly, teaching appears to have been a promising role for an exile to take on. In addition to Teles' self-presentation as a teacher-exile, the story is preserved that Philopoemen was educated while young by a Mantineian exile, Kleandros, based in Megalopolis.<sup>444</sup>

Some philosophical exiles probably had an interest in abstract reflection and political thought stimulated or reinforced by experience of liminal exile. Watts suggests that, after fleeing Athens on Socrates' death, Plato went on a 'tour of philosophical discovery', reaching as far as Sicily.<sup>445</sup> Also relevant are the cases of Pausanias and Thibron of Sparta in exile, discussed in Section 3.3.1 earlier. However, longer-term emigrants such as Zeno or Epicurus probably experienced this effect more strongly. This is because certain features of long-term emigration, especially 'emigrant' exile, were particularly conducive to political philosophy or political idealism: the state of disorientation and the opportunity to improvise civic or quasi-civic institutions *ab initio*, both shared by liminal exiles; but also the time for careful reflection about politics and a state of critical detachment from conventional political life, not shared by liminal exiles. Timaeus, like Thucydides and Xenophon before him, had the opportunity and inclination to address fundamental political questions in historical writing produced in exile. Similarly, even the mainly pragmatic Polybius, in exile in Rome, came to reflect on the ethical qualities of earlier Megalopolitan exiles, those of 223, but also on the significance of the Roman constitution for Greek political theory. Unlike most known exiles, he opted for a radically 'Dikaiopolitan' theoretical approach. Moreover, the probably exiled founders of Dikaia, like some Greek exiles in South Italy, gave their new polis a utopian stamp, reflected in its abstract ideological name, again

<sup>441</sup> Diogenes Laertius 10.1–2; Long and Sedley (1987), vol. I, 3, 5.

<sup>442</sup> Compare Garland (2014), 196.

<sup>443</sup> See Chapter 5, n. 408.

<sup>444</sup> Polybius 10.22.1; Pausanias 8.49.2.

<sup>445</sup> Watts (2007), 107–8; compare Montiglio (2000), on 'wandering philosophers'.

probably intended to evoke a distinctive, or distinctively pure, 'Dikaiopolitan' civic ethos.

This argument should not be taken to imply that exile was the most important stimulus to abstract political reflection in fourth-century and Hellenistic Greece. It exerted its effects alongside many other relevant factors. For example, as suggested above, several figures were probably not first turned towards political philosophy by exile, but simply gained the opportunity for reflection and a distinctive critical perspective through the experience of migration or exile. Moreover, some figures, such as Socrates, engaged in wide-ranging abstract political reflection without ever experiencing exile. Even for immobile political philosophers, however, exile could offer a useful model or metaphor of the critical detachment and outsider identity of the political philosopher and true citizen. For example, as Seery shows, Plato in the *Republic* sometimes presents the character Socrates almost as a wandering Odysseus, a homeless good, wise man in pursuit of the truth and the good polis.<sup>446</sup> Moreover, he makes Socrates present the ideal city, the one in which Socrates could be a true, happy citizen, as something never yet realized, and only realizable if philosophers came to rule:<sup>447</sup> Socrates is estranged from the polis which would be a truly suitable home for him,<sup>448</sup> which would itself be, at the same time, a form of 'exile community' for all those disillusioned with everyday realities and compromises.

Third, partly because it encouraged political reflection, exile stimulated some displaced citizens to develop and refine, or give prominence to, novel or previously suppressed basic paradigms of the good polis: non-territorial, humanitarian, and cosmopolitan ones. The contributions of exiles such as Diogenes of Sinope, Xenophon, and Theodoros [of Achaia] to the development of the latter two new or partially new approaches to citizenship can be partly understood as a response to the perpetual exclusivity and instability of many poleis, considered in Chapter 5, of which they were among the most immediate victims.

In sum, this chapter shows that exile was itself double-edged. On the one hand, it reinforced 'Nakonian' civic norms, principally of a particularist type, the most mainstream norms within most poleis' political cultures. On the other, it stimulated critical reflection and original ideas about the very foundations of politics and political community.

<sup>446</sup> Seery (1988). <sup>447</sup> e.g. Plato *Republic* 473c11–e4.

<sup>448</sup> Compare Plato *Laws* 732e7–733a4, on the benefits of not becoming an 'exile' from the 'finest life' in youth.



# Conclusion

## 1. THE NATURE, HETEROGENEITY, AND CONTRADICTIONS OF LATER CLASSICAL AND HELLENISTIC CIVIC POLITICAL CULTURES

The exile evidence considered in this book has revealed that the dominant recurring ideals of Greek civic political cultures in the period c.404–146 were multiple, diverse, demanding, and often rationally irreconcilable. Indeed, they were often in tension with each other within individual poleis' political cultures. Many exile case-studies, especially those discussed in Chapter 6, demonstrate the pervasive influence of norms of civic voluntarism. These case-studies confirm some scholars' existing identifications of strong voluntarist strands in democratic and aristocratic Greek civic political cultures,<sup>1</sup> but also add to those scholars' arguments. Citizens were commonly emboldened, not only to make important interventions in ongoing, already institutionalized civic life, but also to improvise their own civic institutions, claiming political legitimacy for their creations.

Most importantly, many exile case-studies demonstrate the constant coexistence and interaction of two sharply contrasting, radical paradigms of the good polis which underlay much Greek political rhetoric and organization: a 'Nakonian' paradigm and a 'Dikaiopolitan' paradigm. The political cultures of some exceptional poleis, such as Nakone and Dikaia themselves, were dominated by one or the other paradigm. However, the two paradigms usually both had appreciable strength within a given polis' political culture. One could have considerably more strength than the other, as in later fourth-century Mytilene or Tegea (see Chapter 2.2). However, they were usually of comparable strength, with the 'Nakonian' paradigm perhaps marginally stronger, as in

<sup>1</sup> Compare Bertrand (1996), 374–7; (1999), 78–9. On volunteer prosecutors: Fisher (2000), 96; Rubinstein (2003). On volunteer motions by private individuals before Hellenistic civic assemblies: Gauthier (2005). On Hellenistic and Imperial-era voluntary euergetism: Veyne (1976). On its Classical roots: Schmitt-Pantel (1992), e.g. 201, 208. For reflections of the civic voluntarist ethos in Greek political philosophy: Berent (1998).

Classical Athens. The interaction between these conflicting paradigms must, it has been suggested, be given great weight in writing Greek history, alongside the more familiar conflict between more egalitarian and more hierarchical, more democratic and more oligarchic ideals.

In addition to the contradiction between the two underlying paradigms, exile case-studies reveal the indeterminacy and heterogeneity of the overarching 'Nakonian' paradigm and its local versions. Although well-defined in their formal aspects, both widespread and local versions of the 'Nakonian' paradigm were ill-defined in content. Few contained unequivocal conceptions of, for example, civic virtue or civic friendship<sup>2</sup> or a given polis' ancestral traditions.<sup>3</sup> As a result, most variants of the 'Nakonian' paradigm contained specific content which was subject to ongoing, open-ended debate. Moreover, there were many contrasting notions of even formal 'Nakonian' civic order, with varied levels of relative strength in different poleis. For example, the conclusion to Chapter 6 summarizes the varied conceptions of the best form of 'Nakonian' civic order reflected in the behaviour and rhetoric of exiled citizens, strongly influenced by home and host political cultures. Conversely, Chapters 1–3 of this book showed that 'Dikaioopolitan' ideas could be approached in sharply contrasting ways: in a spirit of libertarian enthusiasm or of realist resignation.

## 2. VARIETIES OF GREEK INDIVIDUALISM

This book has shown that more individualistic norms were not usually subconscious and suppressed,<sup>4</sup> but overt and influential, in civic political cultures in this period. However, the traditional view of Greek political cultures as strongly 'Nakonian' should not be jettisoned in favour of the recently resurgent view that the diversity of civic populations was reflected in dominant political norms encouraging individualistic exchange, mobility, and debate.<sup>5</sup> More individualistic civic norms existed in this period in a mutually reinforcing relationship with the ideal of the closed, strongly united 'Nakonian' polis, even though that ideal was never realized, in a world of mobility and variety.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Derrida (1994), 176–9 (discussing Plato's *Lysis*, esp. 212e5–222e7) and Yack (1993), 229–30, on indeterminacies in Greek notions of friendship and associated obligations.

<sup>3</sup> On Athens: Balot (2001), 144. On local civic histories: Clarke (2008), 315. Compare Socrates' demonstration at Plato *Republic* 414b7–415e5 of the utility of constructed (and thus malleable) civic myths of origins, which make all citizens appear 'brothers' (cf. Schofield (2006), ch. 7). For modern parallels for constructed and contested political traditions: Welch (1993), 56–7, 61–2, 77–8.

<sup>4</sup> The view of Loraux (2001); (2005).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Vlassopoulos (2007a).

The evidence considered in this book has not given much support to arguments that individualistic norms other than the 'Dikaiopolitan' ones emphasized were prominent within civic political cultures. In particular, there is relatively little evidence in this book for a prominent middling, proto-Kantian strand within the political culture of the Greek civic world in this period, strongly influential on mainstream political interaction and reflection. That is to say, there is relatively little evidence for the influence of norms giving priority to unconditional respect for individuals as ends in themselves, to pluralism about value, and to open, pluralistic dialogue among citizens. This is not to deny the importance of ancient Greek ethical and political life and ideals for understanding the eventual emergence of Kantian ethics and politics. The ancient Greek values considered in this book represent important parts of the complex processes of collective ethical and political reflection which eventually yielded Kantian ideals: they provided later thinkers with both material for appropriation and foils to react against. The point is simply that direct forerunners of Kantian ideals are difficult to find in the ancient Greek evidence.

What is more, in general, more inclusive, cosmopolitan models of political interaction are difficult to find in mainstream Greek political life. On the evidence of this book, therefore, it is probably worth looking to the margins of the Greek polis' politics and political thought for traces of ancient political paradigms, and some actual political practices, relevant to modern debates about multiculturalism and pluralism.<sup>6</sup> For one thing, it is worthwhile looking to some of the political philosophical ideas of marginal intellectuals, open to ethical and political complexities and critical of the false certainties of mainstream political debate.

In some cases, relevant ideas must even be sought on the margins of the works and philosophies of relevant intellectuals. For example, in Plato's *Republic*, notes of doubt, uncertainty or even pluralism, which may even be implicit in the dialogue form itself, are somewhat overshadowed by the driving utopian 'Nakonian' argument of the central character. As a result, it is difficult to keep in mind the possibility that Plato himself thought that divergent political ideas might have simultaneous weight and raise rationally irreconcilable intellectual conflicts. Similarly, because Socrates does not really explicitly develop his stigmatization in Book I of all harm to individuals, the possible proto-Kantian character of that argument remains on the margins.

In addition to looking to marginal intellectual suggestions, it is worth looking to the actual practices of some marginal outsider communities of the excluded and downtrodden,<sup>7</sup> including some exile communities considered in

<sup>6</sup> For modern interest in the possibility of a diverse polis, open to outsiders and disparate voices, compare Alston (2011), 325–7.

<sup>7</sup> Compare Alston (2011), 329.

Chapter 6, for evidence of inchoate cosmopolitanism, if not pluralism, in practice. Relevant cases include some philosophical schools, some associations of mercenaries, and some clusters of refugees. Athenian philosophical schools or varied soldier-communities in Athenian forts were not necessarily pluralistic in their rhetoric and behaviour: the existence of shared substantial notions of virtue and the good life was presupposed in the internal dialogues within philosophical schools or in the orthodox, demanding virtue rhetoric of the honorific documents of soldier-communities. However, those communities were certainly more inclusive and open-ended than actual poleis, including their Athenian hosts. It may, therefore, have been principally those who did not fit easily into 'Nakonian', or 'Dikaiopolitan', poleis who at least began to develop alternative, more inclusive forms of politics.

### 3. THE PARTICULAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GREEK CIVIC POLITICAL CULTURES AND GREEK CITIZENS' INDIVIDUAL AGENCY

The evidence of Chapters 4–6 confirms that Greek civic political cultures exerted a strong influence on the political activities of Greek citizens. Different groups of Greek exiles, and even factionaries on opposite sides in the same *stasis*, showed symmetrical political tendencies, reflecting common political cultures. Moreover, the influence of political norms led some citizens to act contrary to their own narrow material interests. This was argued in detail in Chapter 5 for various participants in exclusionary *stasis*. As far as Chapter 6 is concerned, many exiles considered there clung doggedly to their original polis allegiance, under the influence of norms of civic particularism, even though it might have better advanced their personal economic interests to lobby for improved status together with dispossessed Greeks from other poleis, or even non-Greeks.

Nevertheless, the evidence considered in Chapters 4–6 also suggests that, in a manner consistent with the theoretical model outlined in the Introduction, the character of civic political cultures in this period actively encouraged the exercise of individual agency. First, norms of civic voluntarism directly encouraged individual initiative. Second, the circulation of a particularly wide range of competing, often contradictory fundamental political norms within the Greek civic world as a whole, and within individual poleis, created particularly wide scope for citizens to exercise individual agency. Citizens could choose between a wide range of different norms, or between the practical entailments of those varied norms in their particular circumstances. As clear in Chapter 6, for example, different exiles made different choices



about the best way to live and interact politically while in exile, selecting from a broad range of possibilities derived from the political cultures influential on them. In doing so, they exercised a degree of agency which belied their marginal and disenfranchised status.

Third, the particularly acute indeterminacies in the content of both widespread and local versions of the 'Nakonian' paradigm of citizenship left particularly wide scope for citizens to exercise individual agency in interpreting that content or supplementing it with their own idiosyncratic content. This was clear from the discussion of moments of civic crisis in Chapter 5. Competing citizens were commonly able to advance contentious interpretations of shared ideas of virtue or civic history, or to fill vacuums in the collective civic imagination with their own constructions.

Significantly, these three different factors were strongly conducive, not only to individual agency, but also to imaginative theoretical syntheses. The complexity, heterogeneity, contradictions, and indeterminacies of Greek civic political cultures must have both enabled and encouraged systematic, critical, or original political thinking and political philosophy, on the part both of the intellectually curious and of others faced with difficult ethical and political dilemmas. As argued in Chapter 6, this particular effect was strongly intensified when the experience of exile itself offered the distance, detachment, and time required to identify and reflect upon the fault lines of Greek political cultures.

#### 4. GREEK CIVIC POLITICAL CULTURES AND EXCLUSIONARY *STASIS*

Another principal argument advanced in this book is that, in certain circumstances, prominent features of civic political cultures identified in the exile evidence were significant causes of the acute political conflicts which frequently led to *stasis* and exile. Individually and in combination, prominent basic norms of citizenship, and their contradictions and indeterminacies, commonly created and shaped grievances and ideologies which citizens could pursue only through judicial or extra-judicial expulsion of opponents. This was the case especially when prevailing tensions and uncertainties made citizens unwilling to tolerate and negotiate normative indeterminacies and contradictions. The absence of a significant middling proto-Kantian paradigm, giving priority to unconditional respect for individuals and pluralistic dialogue, was an important reason why such conflicts gained steam.

As argued in Chapter 5, whose conclusion summarizes the complex processes involved, this approach represents a departure from the dominant

scholarly tendency to present exclusionary *stasis* principally as a result of acute power struggle between self-interested citizens, on whose antagonistic conduct prominent norms of citizenship had little effect. As also explained there, this approach represents an adaptation and extension of some powerful arguments advocated by Loraux. Following Loraux's lead, it calls into question certain prevalent views about the practical effects of prominent Greek civic norms. It challenges, for example, the tendency to identify a close, usually reliable causal connection between the 'Nakonian' paradigm and civic cohesion and stability in the Greek world.<sup>8</sup>

## 5. THE UNIFORMITY ACROSS SPACE AND PERSISTENCE ACROSS TIME OF GREEK CIVIC POLITICAL CULTURES AND THEIR CONTRADICTIONS

The argument of this book might be criticized for being insufficiently historical. First, the 'Nakonian'-'Dikaiopolitan' dialectic already existed before the beginning of the period studied,<sup>9</sup> even though the two paradigms underwent much further discussion and refinement during it. As a result, for practical reasons, it has only sometimes been possible to undertake the kind of study of the dynamic creation of new political ideals advocated by some political theorists as an antidote to models of static, monolithic ideas.<sup>10</sup> In the case of this book's main paradigms, that kind of investigation would have to delve much further back into Greek history.

Second, a striking feature of the patterns in civic political cultures identified in this book is their uniformity across different regions, from Sicily to Macedonia, Athens to Asia Minor, and their continuity throughout the period studied, part Classical, part Hellenistic, and even beyond it.<sup>11</sup> A historical investigation might have been expected to discover far greater variation. Moreover, the frequency of political unrest which was, as argued here, partly

<sup>8</sup> Compare Murray (1990c), esp. 5–6, 19–21, analysing this line of thought, initiated by Durkheim. For recent applications of this broad approach, with respect to Greek civic religion, see, for example, Sourvinou-Inwood (1990); Parker (2005), esp. 453.

<sup>9</sup> For example, as argued in Chapter 4.2, the same dialectic is evident for fifth-century Athens in the period before 403. Moreover, it is arguably even present in Herodotus' account of the earlier Athenian democracy (contrast, for example, the 'Dikaiopolitan' Herodotus 5.78 with the more 'Nakonian' Herodotus 8.143–4). The roots of the dialectic probably lay much further back in Greek political history; note Seaford (1994).

<sup>10</sup> See Welch (1993), 147–58; Berman (2001); Schmidt (2008), 320–1.

<sup>11</sup> Compare, for example, Zuiderhoek (2009), on the continued interaction of individualistic and communitarian norms within the politics of euergetism in the Roman Imperial era.

provoked by influential norms might have been expected to foster different civic norms, more reliably conducive to political stability. There are signs of this process. Some citizens' embrace of politicized humanitarian and cosmopolitan civic norms in the Hellenistic period was, as argued in Chapter 6, probably often partly a response to the divisive consequences of harsher, more exclusive 'Nakonian' norms and of 'Dikaiopolitan' norms. However, there was never a normative revolution.

Some explanations can be offered for uniformity and continuity. First, as is clear from phenomena discussed in Chapters 1–2 and 6, the unrest partly provoked by influential civic norms tended, paradoxically, to reinforce those very civic norms. The civic reconciliation settlements considered in Chapters 1–2 all represent responses to acute *stasis*. In each case, citizens sought to achieve far-reaching civic unity or to allow hard bargaining in pursuit of a new civic contract, or to do both of those things. As a result, at least one of the dominant, polarized sets of civic norms was reasserted and given a new or restored institutional form. Similarly, the phenomena considered in Chapter 6 show that those forced into exile through *stasis* frequently had their 'Nakonian' instincts reinforced. This conservative effect counterbalanced the unleashing of free political thought and experimentation on the part of some exiles. Second, as argued throughout this book, the two sets of norms probably reinforced each other through dialectical processes. When citizens were devoted to one or the other set, or to the radicalism and simplicity which they shared, embrace of intermediate civic norms might have appeared an unsatisfying capitulation.

However, a third explanation, of uniformity and continuity is probably most important. The two polarized sets of civic norms remained dominant because they satisfied fundamental needs of later Classical and Hellenistic citizens. Although the civic norms under consideration have been interpreted in this book as components of political cultures more basic than partisan ideologies supervening on them, they might also be seen as components of a deeper level of partisan ideology, useful for citizens to cultivate. This is because they can be regarded as ideological means by which citizens maintained clear status distinctions between themselves and slaves and resident foreigners. The absence of a significant proto-Kantian middle in dominant civic norms is particularly susceptible to such analysis: norms prioritizing unconditional respect for individuals would have been very difficult to reconcile with slavery.

Nevertheless, the relevant basic civic norms can also be interpreted in a more positive way: as products of collective attempts by ancient Greeks to devise notions of citizenship and political community which made sustained republican political interaction of any kind possible. 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' norms enabled citizens to gain a useful understanding of their political circumstances. Between them, they accounted for two inescapable dimensions

of political experience, individual independence and interdependence.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, as argued in Chapter 4, 'Nakonian' and 'Dikaiopolitan' norms and their indeterminacies, individually and together, enabled much fruitful political interaction among citizens. When they both operated in tandem, a vibrant and robust public sphere could coexist with, and productively regulate, strong individualism and even egoistic calculation.

A similar argument can be made concerning norms of civic voluntarism. The case-studies of organized political decision-making and lobbying by exiles considered in Chapter 6 show that underlying norms of civic voluntarism made possible, and encouraged, effective political action by groups of citizens in times of hardship. More generally, many settled poleis, like exile groups, were continuously assailed by acute challenges, such as foreign invasion, food and water shortages, or the secession of constituent civic sub-divisions. In the absence of a coercive state apparatus and of reliable networks for the transport of people and goods or the transmission of information, far-reaching individual initiative by citizens in upholding civic institutions and norms was a prerequisite for maintaining civic life.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, the very varied, often contrasting types of 'Nakonian' understanding of politics shown in Chapter 6 to be crystallized by the experience of exile would have played important counterbalancing roles in sustaining poleis at other times, when doublethink enabled citizens to entertain some or all of them simultaneously: militaristic norms would have offset more gentle ones, and universalist norms more particularist ones.

Study of exile thus reveals the double-edged character of Greek poleis' political cultures in the period c.404–146, also sometimes evident in earlier and later Greek history. Successful civic life required contradictory paradigms of matching, and mutually reinforcing and balancing, radicalism. At the same time, it required fruitful indeterminacies and ambiguities in those paradigms, to create scope for consensus and improvisation. When civic fission occurred, external pressures usually helped to provoke it, but the fissile material on which they acted included the extremes, contradictions, and indeterminacies of civic political cultures themselves, which in other contexts secured the very survival of poleis as political communities.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> On these as two ineradicable aspects of political experience, see Aristotle *History of Animals* 487b33–488a7; Yack (1985), 95; also Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1973), 73, with Leonard (2005b), 134–5.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Berent (1998).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Hunt (1983), 89–90, on the simultaneously integrative and divisive effects of the contradictions of French revolutionary discourse.

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